

*Falklands Wars – the History of the Falkland Islands: with particular regard to Spanish and Argentine pretensions and taking some account of South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and Britain's Antarctic Territories by Roger Lorton*¹

Paper 11²

1972 – 1982

Negotiation

“the only other option open to the Argentine government is a resort to force.”³



In 1965 the United Nations had called upon the UK and Argentina to commence negotiations with a view to resolve the main issue that lay between them – sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.⁴ Talks had started in 1966, but had been slow to produce anything tangible. Concentrating on the future of the archipelago; with historic rights not discussed, as neither side was going to budge from their entrenched positions. But the fundamental problem of the future was grounded in the recognition, by both the United Nations and the UK, that the Islanders' had rights which had to be respected. Argentina, however, rejected any recognition of the Islanders that would have given the people of the archipelago a veto. For Argentina, there were only two parties to the dispute, not three. Seeing itself in a no-win situation, the British government could only seek to persuade the Islanders that life with Argentina could bring improvements to living standards and offer a more prosperous future. An Anglo-Argentine agreement of 1971 was intended to start a process of persuasion; offering unrestricted contact with the mainland, access to hospitals and education facilities. Also the modernization of infrastructure within the islands; telephones, gas and televisions. This paper considers both this process together with the progress of negotiations; and the inherent frustrations that would lead to conflict.

1972 – January 7th, from Argentina, the cruise ship *Libertad* sails for Antarctica via the Falklands. On board are Britain's Ambassador, Michael Hadow, and Mario Izaguirre, of Argentina's Foreign Ministry. Bound for Stanley.⁵

In London, a briefing note on the Falklands is prepared by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO).

“At present the Islands are something of a liability to Britain; they no longer have a strategic value and they are difficult and expensive to defend, while remaining a constant source of friction in relations with Argentina and with Latin America as a whole.”⁶

1 *Falklands Wars – the History of the Falkland Islands: with particular regard to Spanish and Argentine pretensions and taking some account of South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and Britain's Antarctic Territories* Roger Lorton LL.B(Hon), M.Phil. 2011 – 2019. Roger Lorton has asserted his rights under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as the author of this work. **NB.** These papers are about the disputes surrounding the Falklands. The full research can be found here – <https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/>

2 Citation = Lorton, Roger. *Falklands Wars: Timeline History of the Falkland Islands*. Wordpress 2011 Paper 11

3 Minister Vignes to the Argentine press March 19, 1975

4 Argentina also claimed South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, but these were not included by the UN. *cf.*1946

5 *From Chapultepec to the Beagle. Argentine Foreign Policy 1945-1980* Juan A. Lanús 1984 p.478. Some 350 tourists. Unconfirmed, as I have found no British source for this visit.

6 *FCO 7/2115 1972* quoted in *Far from Moderate: An account and appraisal of some aspects of the human involvement with the natural environment of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia* S. Palmer 2004.

January 10th, in Stanley, Governor Ernest G. (Toby) Lewis addresses the Falklands Legislative Council.

*“May I turn now to external affairs, and in particular to our relations with the Argentine, much has been said and written and I do not intend to repeat it all. However, I would like to say that the agreements do reflect a degree of political maturity that is rare in these days and that we should not under-estimate what has been achieved. I would like to pay tribute to the work done by our negotiating team including the members from the Islands for the way in which they handled the talks. On the agreements reached in B.A. in June (1971) of course the acid test is going to be how these agreements work out in practice, ... So far the agreements have worked well and we can expect the first regular amphibian flight in a couple of days thus introducing the fortnightly service and there are many other areas in which the provisions of the agreement have been implemented — not quite as spectacular perhaps as the air link but in important fields such as medical, postal, telecommunications and education, We expect that a third round of talks will take place in Stanley in March...”*⁷

On the same day, *Libertad* arrives in Port Stanley.

January 12th, a sea plane arrives in Stanley harbour.

*“In January 1972 the Argentine Air Force started a fortnightly service between Comodoro Rivadavia and Port Stanley, using the amphibious Albatross. During most of the year this was the only external carrier and as the pay-load was limited to 6-8 passengers, the demand for seats far exceeded the carrying capacity, and seats had to be allocated on a priority basis. First class mail was the first priority, followed by urgent medical cases. Although the Argentine pilots did a superb job, keeping the link open sometimes in atrocious weather, it became clear that in order to give the service flexibility, land planes would have to be introduced.”*⁸



*“... on 12 January 1972, a seaplane from the Argentine Air Force landed in Stanley harbour establishing the first regular flight between Comodoro Rivadavia and the Falkland Islands. From then onwards, "sanitary, passenger and general cargo (mail, fresh food, and medicines) became regular flights" ... the sea plane was a Grumman HU-16 Albatross, from the Air Force, which was able to operate on land, sea and snow, and could carry some five passengers. Flights linking Stanley with Comodoro Rivadavia took place twice monthly.”*⁹

*“On 12 January 1972, while the future airstrip was being built, LADE started to operate with an Albatross configured for six and eight passengers. In all, thirty crossings with 203 flight hours were performed. ... The personnel who performed as pilots were Mayor Alberto S. Álvarez, Capitanes Ángel G. Toribio and José A. Demarco, Primeros Tenientes Juan M. Maclay and Antonio A. Bruno; as navigators: Primeros Tenientes Héctor González, Francisco F. Mensi and Raúl A. Tamagnone; as mechanics: Suboficiales Mayores Fidel Contino and Rubén C. Bidegain, and Suboficial Auxiliar Néstor Fernández; and as radio operators Suboficial Mayor Julio Martín, Cabos Principales Juan C. Scianca and Eduardo Castilla, Cabo Primero Jorge Morales and Cabo Ricardo del Río.”*¹⁰

January 24th, at Port William, a French liner, *France*, anchors; discharging 500 tourists into Stanley.

⁷ *Falkland Islands Gazette* 1972. Despite the expectation, I am unable to find any record of negotiations taking place in March, 1972. It appears likely that any discussions focused on the arrangements necessary to facilitate the construction of the temporary airfield at Hookers point. *cf.* 1971

⁸ *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1972 & 1973*

⁹ *Mercopress* January 13, 2022

¹⁰ *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

January 26th, in London, Viscount Eccles speaks during a House of Lords debate on Latin America.

*“Your Lordships will be glad to know that our political relations with the countries of Latin America are generally most cordial and there are remarkably few points of difference. ... in full consultation with the Islanders, and without prejudice to the question of sovereignty, the Argentine Government and ourselves have made arrangements for modern communications between the Islands, Argentina and the world beyond, both by air and sea. These arrangements when completed will make a material contribution to the welfare of the Island community. ... Now we are looking forward to a third round to be held in Stanley and we very much hope that holding the talks there will contribute to the process of greater mutual understanding between the inhabitants of the Islands and their Argentine neighbours.”*¹¹

May 2nd, following months of deliberations, the Argentine government agrees to construct a temporary airfield at Hooker’s Point, near Stanley, to replace the sea-plane service. The steel mesh strip to be obtained by Britain from the USA at a cost of \$1 million. Buenos Aires is to provide the workforce and construction equipment.¹²

*“... given weather conditions, its limited payload, and high operating costs, it was soon decided to replace it with land planes. The Argentines offered to build an aluminium landing strip for this purpose. The proposal ran into local opposition mainly on the grounds that the strip would be an encroachment on sovereignty. As Lewis said in a despatch “the local politicians, not known for their ability to stand up to pressure, immediately took cover and we found the road ahead blocked”. It took extensive touring of the settlements by Lewis and his colonial, later chief, secretary (Thomas) Layng, to swing Island opinion in favour of the proposal to which councillors eventually agreed unanimously.”*¹³

*“The project entailed reaching agreements so that the Argentine ships from Transportes Navales could transport machines, aluminium plates –similar to the ones used in Vietnam– and personnel from the then Argentine Air Force Grupo I de Mantenimiento (Group I Maintenance). Likewise, it would be necessary to get authorization to: Purchase at least three houses (one of them for the technical personnel of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales) and some premises to establish Líneas Aéreas del Estado office; install two SSB (single side band) communication stations; take two or more vehicles from the continent, including a fuel truck; prepare access to the runway; temporarily house thirty workers (and) reconcile accounting mechanisms for funds transfer... Also, it would be necessary to build a road to connect the airport and the city.”*¹⁴

May 14th, from Buenos Aires, an Argentine transport ship, *Cabo San Gonzalo*, sails with 40 workmen and technicians together with 900 tons of construction equipment. A correspondent for *The Financial Times* watches them sail.

“The Argentines have finally established a beach-head on the Falklands.”

From Stanley, Governor Lewis writes to the FCO proposing a permanent airport to eventually replace the airfield about to be built by Argentina.

*“Whitehall now experienced a severe bout of interdepartmental warfare.”*¹⁵

11 *HL Deb 26 January 1972 vol.327 cc333-407*

12 Lanús 1984. See August, 1971.

13 *The Dictionary of Falklands Biography (including South Georgia): From Discovery up to 1981* David Tatham (ed) 2008

14 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

15 *The Battle for the Falklands* 1997 M. Hastings & S. Jenkins 1997 p.32

On East Falkland Island, the European Space Research tracking station ceases operations. ¹⁶

June 6th, at Hookers Point, construction of the airfield gets under way; supervised by engineer Luis Remorino.

“With aluminium plates 3.6 metres long by 60 centimetres wide and 4 centimetres thick imported from Los Angeles and taken to the islands by the Argentine ship San Gonzalo, forty Argentines and seven islanders laid out an 800-meter-long landing strip, by 41 meters wide at Hookers Point, 5 kilometres from Stanley.” ¹⁷

On the same day, in London, the 1971 Anglo-Argentine Communications Agreement is presented to Parliament by the Foreign Secretary. ¹⁸

“Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Argentine Republic concerning Communications between the Falkland Islands and the Argentine Mainland signed at Buenos Aires on 5 August 1971 (with Joint Statement and Related Notes) - The Agreement entered into force on 5 August 1971 and was presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, June 1972.”

As regards travel between the Falkland Islands and Argentina, the agreement states:

“2. The Argentine Government should issue a document, in the form annexed, to residents of the Falkland Islands irrespective of their nationality who wished to travel to the Argentine mainland, which would allow them free movement within it. A document in the same form issued by the Argentine Government should be the only document needed by residents of the Argentine mainland for journeys to the Falkland Islands” ¹⁹

#Researcher's Comment: N.B. “... a document ... to residents of the Falkland Islands...” Within the agreed text, there is no mention of South Georgia, or the South Sandwich Islands, otherwise known as the Falkland Islands Dependencies in 1971. The word 'dependencies' also does not feature. This seemingly trivial fact would become important in early 1982. When it comes to treaties and other diplomatic agreements, words carry weight.

- 1) El presente certificado provisorio deberá ser exhibido a las autoridades cada vez que se lo requiera.
- 2) El status del titular de este certificado está contemplado en la Declaración Conjunta de Buenos Aires de 1° de Julio de 1971.
- 3) Para más información y averiguaciones recurra al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto.

- 1) The present temporary card must be produced to the authorities whenever requested.
- 2) The bearer is covered by the Joint Statement of Buenos Aires of 1st July 1971.
- 3) For further information of inquiries apply to: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto.



REPUBLICA ARGENTINA

CERTIFICADO PROVISORIO
EMITIDO DE ACUERDO A LA
DECLARACIÓN CONJUNTA DE
BUENOS AIRES DE 1971

TEMPORARY CARD
ISSUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE JOINT STATEMENT OF
BUENOS AIRES OF 1971

July 24th, in Britain's House of Commons,

asked about the prospect of an airport in the Falkland Islands, Government spokesman, John Anthony Kershaw, MP, responds: *“The Governor has applied for a grant of £1615 million for the construction of the permanent airfield. This is being considered and I hope that an early decision will be reached. If the application is*

¹⁶ Built in 1967, it had completed its work.

¹⁷ *Lo que no sabemos de Malvinas: Las islas, su gente y nosotros antes de la guerra* S. Carassai 2022. The temporary runway was constructed by Grupo I de Construcciones de la Fuerza Aérea (FAA) using aluminum matting from the Harvey Aluminium Company in the USA. It was 730m long by 20m wide.

¹⁸ See - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/1971-anglo-argentine-joint-statement-on-communications.pdf>

¹⁹ For the full agreement, see the link above and also 1971, where the subject is dealt with in depth.

*approved construction could, barring unforeseen difficulties, be started by August, 1973, and completed about May, 1975. ... I think this is the best we can do. It is a big job which will have to be put out to tender properly. Construction difficulties are considerable, but we nevertheless appreciate the importance of this. ... The Argentine Government are co-operating in the provision of a temporary airstrip. I am sure they see that this is for the good of the islanders, and it will give them satisfaction as well as ourselves.”*²⁰

In the UK, the Falkland Islands Company (FIC) is acquired by Dundee, Perth and London Securities Ltd. As part of the agreement, the new owners grant the Falkland Islanders' Sheep Owners Association a right of first refusal should they decide to sell.

In **August**, President of Uganda, Idi Amin, declares that the UK will have to take responsibility for British subjects of Asian origin; in effect expelling over 50,000 people. Britain's government contacts the Crown Colonies with regard to settling some of the refugees; *“Only the Falkland Islands gave a positive response, saying they would accept doctors, teachers, domestic servants and farm workers.”*²¹

September 27th, at the UN in New York, Argentina's representative addresses the General Assembly.

“.. In order to encourage ties between the Islands and the mainland and as a result of instruments approved by both countries, efforts have been made to allow communications, to increase mutual knowledge and to benefit the population of the Malvinas. Despite these practical steps of undisputed importance, there still are differences outstanding between the two Governments regarding the circumstances that should exist for a final solution to be arrived at over the question of sovereignty. Further talks on the matter are to be held and we trust that they will be fruitful. The result can, in any case, be none other than the return of the Malvinas Islands to the Argentine territorial heritage”

September 28th, at Port Stanley, the new motor vessel *Monsunen* arrives; intended for coast-wide trade and occasional voyages to South American ports.

October 23rd, the UK's representative, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, responds that; *“... the efforts of our two Governments to solve our differences should be pursued in a climate of mutual understanding...”*

October 24th, an Anglo-Argentine agreement is reached to open a Líneas Aéreas del Estado (LADE) office in Stanley. Also confirmed is the initiation of a regular air service from Argentina.

*“Air Lines of the State (LADE), an Argentine Company in charge of the regular as well as the temporary service, referred to in numbers (8) and (9) of the Joint Declaration, will open a commercial and operational agency in Port Stanley ... 3. The crews and air planes with which the services referred to in numeral (2) of this Agreement are used, will carry the same flight documentation that is de rigueur for crews and air planes that perform internal flights over the Argentine continental territory and its operators will be exempt from payment of landing fees, levies or other charges ...”*²²

November 9th, in London, tenders for the construction of a permanent airfield are received by the FCO.

November 14th, six Argentine pilots arrive in Stanley to familiarize themselves with the new airfield.

“One day before the inauguration event, the I Brigada Aérea (1st Air Brigade) sent six pilots to familiarize them with the airdrome: Vicecomodoros Raúl A. Barcala (Brigade Operations Commander) and Roberto H.

20 *Hansard, Commons Chamber, Oral Answers, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs vol.841 Monday 24, July 1972*

21 *Ministers hunted for island to house Asians in The Guardian* January 1, 2003. I can find no suggestion that any actually went to the archipelago.

22 Lanús 1984 p.496

López (F-27 Squadron Commander); Mayor Jorge R. Ruiz (LADE Operations Commander); and Capitanes Rubén O. Moro, Carlos G. Novillo and Abel A. Síntora. Pilots had never landed on aluminum plates before. That was why they observed the arrival from the cockpit. The airstrip did not look as short as its 720 meters long indicated because, in perspective, the few 30 meters wide gave the illusion it had a regular size. Landing short, performing a long landing or exceeding the plates would break the landing gear since there were no shoulders or braking areas. Beyond the aluminum plates, everything was spongy humid peat with no consistency to bear a person's weight. That day a crosswind was blowing, at 90° from the airstrip. Anyway, the Vicecomodoro Barcala, the F-27 Commander, landed without inconvenience and he could stop it right before the final with the brakes applied.”²³

November 15th, in the Falkland Islands, the new temporary airstrip is officially opened.

“The temporary airfield with its slotted aluminium strip was formally opened in November 1972—just in time for the third round of political talks scheduled to take place in Stanley between the British and Argentine representatives. From that time a regular weekly service has been in operation by the Argentine State Airline (LADE), using Fokker F 27 planes. The temporary airstrip is only 800 metres long, and this limits the pay-load ...”²⁴



“The islanders regarded the arrival of any group of Argentines as an incursion of their territory. The negotiator Scott thought this sensitivity might disappear with time; unfortunately, his assumption was not correct. He may have begun to realize this when the planned ceremony to open the new Port Stanley airstrip turned into a trivial fiasco more humorous than important. The Argentine officials proceeding on the first flight of the air service turned out to be Argentine senior military officers in full uniform. Hearing of this, the Falkland Islands' governor, Toby Lewis, was ordered to hoist the Union Jack and appear at the ceremony himself in full-dress Governor regalia. The islanders themselves feared that ceremonially clad Argentines represented a covert invasion, perhaps even supported by the British Foreign Office. The islands' secretary, John Laing felt a demonstration was likely and called out the Marine guard, a permanent detachment of military stationed on the Falklands to maintain order. Scott's hopes that relations between the islanders and the Argentines would improve must have been dampened as this attempt at a positive step forward fell victim to unfounded fears.”²⁵



“Beltramino and Scott had meticulously negotiated that the opening of the air link would be a civilian affair, even though it would be run by the military air service, LADE (Lineas Aereas del Estado). When Scott arrived at Buenos Aires for the ceremony to celebrate the launch of the service,... he was horrified to see the inaugural flight filled with senior officers in full uniform. Events worthy of an Ealing comedy ensued. The Falkland Islands' governor, Toby Lewis, was ordered to run up the British flag at the airstrip and appear in full-dress regalia, his plumes blowing proudly in the strong wind.”²⁶

23 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

24 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1972 & 1973*

25 *War since 1945: Offensive Air Operations of the Falklands War* Walter F. DeHoust 1984

26 Hastings & S. Jenkins 1997 p.32

*“Despite the good impression created by the Argentine workforce employed on the construction of the strips, (Governor) Lewis was confronted with the prospect of a demonstration on sovereignty by hardliners at the inaugural ceremony which was to be attended by numerous Argentine visitors, including press. This was only prevented by Lewis' persuasiveness, by a broadcast by a member of LegCo and by tight security measures.”*²⁷

*“At the inauguration, which was witnessed by about three hundred people, the British and Argentine flags flew side by side. Governor Lewis thanked everyone who had worked to make it a reality and awarded Remorino the Shackleton Medal, in recognition of his efforts. The runway received blessings from Monsignor James Ireland, and Reverends Canon Heyler and Robon Forrester, the Ministers of the three Christian cults (sic) in Stanley. Brigadier Major Higinio González, commander of Regiones Aéreas de la Fuerza Aérea Argentina, said on that occasion: “This new milestone in our permanent approach allows us to incorporate conventional aircraft for a greater number of passengers and will allow the movement of cargo between the islands and the Argentine continental zone. May God grant that this airfield consecrated to such a noble purpose serves peace, concord and communication among men of goodwill.”*²⁸

November 16th, in the Falklands, the airfield comes into full operation with a weekly air service.²⁹

*“... quite an event. For the islanders because, from then on, they were communicated weekly with the mainland in a period of two and a half hours, for £9.60 or its equivalent in Argentine pesos (\$230). For the Argentine authorities, because the State company LADE would operate the runway, ... Things were going reasonably well. When the Argentine Air Force Team that laid the runway left Stanley, they thanked the islanders for their hospitality and cooperation.”*³⁰

*“From that moment on, the F-27 scheduled flight would be performed on Mondays. It departed from Comodoro Rivadavia at 1000, arrived at Stanley at 1230 and returned one hour later. Each crossing cost £ 9.80 or ARS \$ 230 from Buenos Aires to Comodoro Rivadavia. Commercial airlines charged ARS \$ 295 per ticket. In order to travel to Stanley, it was necessary to have an international vaccination certificate and the authorization from the Argentine Foreign Affairs Department. These requirements were only for Argentine citizens and resident foreigners. Foreigners were required to have a passport. Travellers had to carry, at least, five pounds per day of stay. At both Comodoro Rivadavia and Stanley, the Customs service fulfilled its functions without further requirements. There, boarding/landing cards were filled out both in Spanish and English, stating nationality, address and identity card number. When traveling to the Argentine mainland, Malvinas settlers had to meet the requirements and get the White Card at the British representative's office.”*³¹

Accommodation is provided by the Falkland Islands Government for LADE staff.

*“Several Argentine members of staff of LADE naturally had to be resident in the islands; as befitted a military airline they were headed by a vicecomodoro of the Argentine air force, who lived in a house in Stanley provided for him by the Falkland Islands Government, while the remainder lived in rented accommodation in the town.”*³²

27 David Taylor in Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.338. LegCo was an abbreviation of Legislative Council – the unicameral legislature of the Falkland Islands from November, 1845 until January 2009 when the Council became an Assembly.

28 Carassai 2022 citing *La Razón* November 18, 1971.

29 The temporary runway was constructed by Grupo I de Construcciones de la Fuerza Aérea (FAA) using aluminum matting from the Harvey Aluminium Co in the USA. It was 730m long by 20m wide.

30 Carassai 2022

31 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

32 *The Falklands Saga* Graham Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.570

November 21st, in Stanley, a further round of Anglo-Argentine negotiations commences.

*“The third round of talks between H.M.G. and the Argentine Government with representatives from the Islands forming part of the British Delegation was a success and helped to smooth out a long list of administrative and political problems. It also enabled our visitors to see something of the Islands at first hand.”*³³

*“When the negotiators met..., the practical measures on communications and movement of persons were almost entirely in full implementation.”*³⁴

November 24th, from Stanley, Governor Lewis informs London of local concerns regarding any Argentine monopoly over fuel supplies in the Islands.

December 3rd, in the Falkland Islands, a census is conducted.³⁵

December 18th, in New York, at the United Nations building, the General Assembly defer any consideration of the Falklands question until 1973.

December 31st, in the Falklands, the biannual review notes 39 births, 25 marriages and 10 deaths in the territory during 1972.

“Since November 1972 a five-day week of 40 hours has been worked; previously the working week was five-and-a-half days of 45 hours total. Time and a half was paid for overtime, with double time for work on Sundays and public holidays. Hourly paid workers were granted a fully paid holiday of 96 hours annually. There was no night work except in essential services. ...

The Government is responsible for education throughout the Colony. All education is free and the Government bears the cost of all books, materials and equipment. The fees for boarding school education are fixed at a maximum of £50 per academic year per family: for the first child £25, for two children £25 and £15 respectively and for three children £25, £15 and £10 respectively. A fourth child is free. There is no regular secondary or higher education in the Colony though special tuition is available and several pupils have obtained Ordinary and Advanced level successfully in the General Certificate of Education. Royal Society of Arts examinations in commercial subjects (Typewriting, Shorthand, Book-keeping and Commercial English) are part of the regular pattern and occasionally students sit City and Guilds examinations.

*A competitive Overseas Scholarship examination is held annually in September, enabling successful candidates to benefit from at least five years at secondary level at boarding grammar schools in Dorset, the British Schools in Montevideo, Uruguay, and at secondary schools in the Argentine. Children in outlying houses are taught by Camp teachers, each of whom is assigned a beat of from four to six houses which he covers by Land-Rover, horse, boat or aircraft. A camp teacher stays two weeks with each family in turn and leaves homework to tide the children until he visits again.”*³⁶

33 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1972 & 1973*

34 *Las “Conversaciones Especiales” Argentina-Gran Bretaña sobre comunicaciones entre el Territorio Continental Argentino y las Islas Malvinas de 1970-72. Una negociacion Diplomatica Tipica* J. C. M. Beltramino 1997. I am unable to confirm this. See below.

35 See next page.

36 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1972 & 1973*

1973 – January 1st, the UK joins the European Economic Community (EEC); acceding to the Treaty of Rome (1957).³⁷ Britain's dependent territories are 'associated' with the Community and listed under Annex IV to the Treaty of Rome. Argentina protests.

March 9th, in Stanley, the results of the 1972 census are published, noting a population of 1,957 of which 1,081 are males and 876 females.³⁸

*“Included in the total population of 1,957 are 36 Royal Marines stationed in the Colony and 14 members of the Argentine Airfield Construction Team who were in the colony for the purpose of constructing a temporary airfield, but not the crews (67 males) of locally registered ships at sea on Census Day.”*³⁹

March 11th, in Argentina, Presidential elections are held. Left-wing Peronist, Hector José Cámpora, wins with 49.6% of the vote. Juan Domingo Perón, living outside the country, is barred from standing.

In **April**, during preparatory discussions regarding further negotiations, the Argentines indicate that they wish to reintroduce the 1968 *Memorandum* proposals, but are now opposed to any Islander representation at the talks. British negotiators respond that they are only prepared to discuss practical matters; not sovereignty. The UK also insists that Islanders must be present. Negotiations stall.⁴⁰

*“At the meeting in London in April 1973,... after a restatement of the views of the United Kingdom Government, the Argentine delegation declined to continue the meeting ...”*⁴¹

April 17th, in London, the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee founded in 1968 is formally re-established as UK Falkland Islands Committee (UKFIC); *“To assist the people of the Falkland Islands to decide their own future for themselves without being subject to pressure direct or indirect from any quarter.”* Letters are written to the three main political parties with a request that a representative join the Committee.

*“Implementation of the Communications Agreement passed in 1973 to the new head of the Latin America department, Hugh Carless, and his superintending under-secretary, Robin Edmonds. ... To the Falklands Islands Committee, Carless, Edmonds and his successor as under-secretary, George Hall, became the embodiment of the Whitehall Falklands policy.”*⁴²

May 14th, at the UN, an Argentine citizen addresses a private petition to the Special Committee on Decolonization (C24).

“Mr. Jose Ramon Cornejo maintained that the Argentine claim to the Islands had been based on their proximity to Argentina and the inheritance of title from Spain. He added that the Argentinians did not believe that talks like those recently held between the two Governments could make any progress towards resolving the question of the transfer of the sovereignty of the Territory to Argentina.”

May 25th, in Buenos Aires, Hector José Cámpora is sworn-in as President of Argentina.

37 Prime Minister Edward Heath signed the Treaty of Accession in January, 1972. Parliament's European Communities Act was passed in October, 1972 and the instrument of ratification deposited with the EEC on October 18, 1972. Coming into effect on January 1, 1973.

38 The comparative figures for 1962 were 2,172, 1,195 and 977 respectively. See - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/06/report-of-census-1972.pdf>

39 *Report of Census 1972.*

40 *Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 1: The Origins of the Falklands War* L. Freedman 2005 p.25

41 *UN Yearbook 1973.*

42 Hastings & S. Jenkins 1997

*“In his inaugural speech, President Héctor J. Cámpora had a few words for the Malvinas. Its recovery would be one of the objectives of his government.”*⁴³

June 9th, in Argentina, *La Capital* reports:

“Invasion of the Malvinas. A few days ago we invaded the Malvinas. And in a way that makes our chests swell. The first Argentine fuel arrived on the cargo ship Florentino Ameghino. From now onwards, the Malvinas gasoline is Argentine. ... another great Argentine success.”

*“And the advertising of the Atma company, an electronics manufacturer, presented the arrival of vehicle batteries to the islands through the image of a parachutist who descended from the heavens with a Atma Chloride in his hands...”*⁴⁴

June 20th, former Argentine President, Juan Domingo Perón, returns to Buenos Aires.⁴⁵

*“Juan D. Peron returned to Argentina today, ending almost 18 years of exile, and violence among the more than one million people gathered to welcome him left at least 13 dead and more than 250 injured. ... before Mr. Peron's arrival a number of serious shooting incidents had taken place between left-wing and rightist followers of Mr. Peron. ... In one of the incidents, rival groups exchanged machine-gun fire in front of the stage where Mr. Peron was scheduled to speak. Snipers continued to shoot into the crowd even as ambulances arrived on the scene, to carry away wounded men, women and children. ... after receiving reports of the shooting incidents, the former President ordered his airliner to land at a military air base 15 miles west of the capital, instead of at the international airport about 20 miles south-west of Buenos Aires, where hundreds of leading Government and Peronist officials had gathered to greet Mr. Peron. ...”*⁴⁶

*“... (there was) an immediate hardening of the Argentine line.”*⁴⁷

July 12th, Argentine President Campora steps down, to make way for a new Presidential election.

August 10th, in Buenos Aires, Senator Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen calls for a tougher approach to negotiations with London regarding the archipelago.⁴⁸

On the same day, Argentina's provisional President Lastiri, together with his Defence Minister, Angel Robledo and Ministers Gelbald, Benitez and Taiana, fly to Antarctica.

*“Argentina has openly affirmed, in contravention of Article IV, that specific acts and activities carried out while the treaty is in force do strengthen claims to sovereignty. In 1973 President Lastiri and the entire Argentine cabinet flew to Marimbo Base which was then proclaimed Argentina's temporary capital.”*⁴⁹

August 15th, in New York, Argentina's representative addresses a letter to the UN's Decolonization Committee.

“... his Government regretted to report that the negotiations had been virtually paralysed as a result of the attitude adopted by the United Kingdom, whose position, he said, had changed substantially from that which it had taken since contacts were first established in 1966. When,.. efforts were made to reactivate the

43 Lanús 1984 p.479

44 Carassai 2022

45 Perón had fled Argentina in 1955 when the Catholic Church and armed forces turned against him; spending exile in Paraguay and Spain. He had returned in November, 1972 for a brief visit, only remaining a few weeks and being watched closely by the army. From the moment he was sworn-in, Cámpora would seem to have set about arranging Perón's return.

46 *The New York Times* June 21, 1973

47 Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.338

48 Carassai 2022 citing *Nuevo camino para integrar las Malvinas* in *La Opinión* August 10, 1973

49 *Motivations in the Falklands War and the Aftermath* Marshall Van Sant 1983

negotiations, postponed since 1968, the United Kingdom took the position that the round of meetings could not be called negotiations on sovereignty since in its opinion they involved only talks or discussions, and it was willing to discuss only the collateral question of communications rather than the basic issue of sovereignty over the territory... This position, Argentina considered, was not in conformity with the provisions of the Assembly's resolution of 16 December 1965. Argentina called on the United Kingdom Government to take measures to continue the negotiations without further procrastination, within the framework of that resolution and subsequent decisions, so as to bring about the speedy elimination of the territory's colonial situation.”⁵⁰

In reply the UK's representative denies; “... that there had been any change in its consistently upheld position on the scope of the discussions. It reiterated its readiness to renew discussions, bearing in mind that in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the principles of the Declaration on the granting of independence, it was essential that any solution should recognize the right of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands to self-determination and should provide for them to express their wishes in this connection.”⁵¹

August 17th, the UN's Special Committee on Decolonization meets to consider the question of the Falkland Islands. Argentina's Ambassador tells the Committee that; “... failure to settle this dispute within a short and reasonable time will necessitate a thorough reappraisal of the policy (Argentina) has pursued until now...”⁵²

August 21st, concluding its debate on the question of the Falkland Islands, the UN's Special Committee adopts a resolution calling for the acceleration of negotiations.⁵³ Responding, Britain writes to the UN Secretary-General.

*“It has been the common purpose of the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) to explore in accordance with that resolution all possible means of finding a peaceful solution to the problem defined in that resolution. The letters addressed to you and your predecessors in successive years,... constitute a record of progress endorsed by both Governments ... there have been no grounds for supposing that there has been any change in the consistently upheld position of the United Kingdom Government. ... For their part the United Kingdom Government reiterate their readiness to renew discussions bearing in mind that in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly it is essential that any solution should recognize the right of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands to self-determination and should provide for them to express their wishes in this connection.”*⁵⁴

September 13th, a new Anglo-Argentine agreement facilitates the construction of *Antares II* at Hookers Point airfield, consisting of fifteen tanks of aircraft fuel of 30,000 litres each.

*“... the construction of Antares II plant —with seventeen fuel, jet fuel, kerosene and gas oil tanks— a laboratory, and a gas station started. Construction works, under YPF direction, involved the participation of sixty four workers during six months.”*⁵⁵

50 UN Yearbook 1973

51 *Ibid.*

52 UN Doc A/9023/Rev.1

53 UN Yearbook 1973. UN Committee resolutions are not UN resolutions unless adopted by the General Assembly. See December 14, 1973 below.

54 *Ibid.*

55 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

October 3rd, at the UN building in New York, at the opening of a new session of the General Assembly, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Alberto Vignes, addresses the assembled members regarding negotiations with the UK over the Falkland Islands; *"My country ... is forced to state that the procedure cannot be indefinitely prolonged,..."*

October 5th, in Washington DC, Minister Vignes, meets US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Vignes complains that; *"... Argentina is concerned with the indifference of the US regarding the issue of the Falkland Islands, which is a colonial problem within the hemisphere. He could not understand how the US, which was once a colony, could take such an attitude."*⁵⁶

October 12th, in Argentina, following his success in the elections brought about by Hector Campora's sudden resignation, 78-year old Juan Perón commences his third term as President; with his wife as Vice-President.

*"The return of a Peronist Government brought an end to the Anglo-Argentine rapprochement."*⁵⁷

October 19th, in New York, the UK's representative informs the UN Secretary-General that; *"... his Government was reluctant to believe that Argentina would wish for any solution of the differences between the two Governments which was contrary to the expressed wishes of the inhabitants of the territory."*⁵⁸

October 25th, in the Falklands, a *Petroleum Products Bill* is debated at a meeting of the Falklands' Legislative Council (LegCo).⁵⁹ Concerns are raised over Argentina's monopoly of fuel supply to the archipelago.

*"... the Chief Secretary argued that Y.P.F. required a monopoly to guarantee a demand for its products. He also claimed that the price of petrol, which had more than doubled in the past two years, would fall by nearly a third. Adrian Monk, elected member for East Falkland, offered the only opposition and abstained in the vote. He stressed that, "What I do not like about it all is that the monopoly has been granted to the country which wants us." The British Government clearly hoped that the Islanders would accept closer ties with Argentina if they were shown the benefits of co-operation."*⁶⁰

*"Two supplementary Communications Agreements were reached by the Foreign Office aimed at encouraging economic links with the mainland and permitting the Argentines to build and supply fuel tanks at the airfield. Fuel oil, including that for the islands' modest internal air service, would be provided exclusively by the Argentine state oil concern, YFP, and the base would be staffed by Argentine military personnel. ..."*⁶¹

"The Argentine State soon became the main engine of communications between the islands and the continent. The national Telecommunications Company (ENTel) put into operation a Buenos Aires-Puerto Stanley telephone circuit and Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) built the Antares 1 plant (six tanks of 25,000 litres each) to supply aircraft. Yacimientos Carboniferous Fiscales sent coal from Rio Turbio. The company Transportes Navales, of the Argentine Navy, made part of its fleet available for these projects, which required transfers of material and personnel. ... All this added up was symptomatic of the attitude with which the Argentine government of that time faced the new stage: one that demonstrated to the islanders, the British and

56 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Documents on South America, 1973-1976 Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 5, 1973, 12.45pm.* Apparently, Kissinger's response was so general in nature, that it was not clear whether he had been listening.

57 *British Interests in the Falkland Islands: Economic Development, the Falkland Lobby and the Sovereignty Dispute, 1945 to 1989* C. R. Ellerby 1990 p.178

58 UN Yearbook 1973

59 The Legislative Council was the unicameral legislature of the Falkland Islands from 1845 until 2009, when it was replaced by a Legislative Assembly.

60 Ellerby 1990 pp.176-177 citing *Leg. Co. minutes, 25 Oct. 1973*

61 Hastings & S. Jenkins 1997

*the United Nations Decolonization Committee that it could be believed when it promised to look after the interests of the island population.”*⁶²

November 5th, at the UN, Argentina responds to Britain's August letter to the Secretary-General. Quoting the first paragraph of resolution 2065 of 1966, Argentina's representative points out that the resolution makes “no reference” to the wishes of the population or any right of self-determination.

*“... this tardy and misplaced concern for respect for the right to self-determination would be praiseworthy and legitimate if the United Kingdom had consulted the original population of the Malvinas Islands about their wishes before displacing them by force and replacing them by British settlers in 1833...”*⁶³

*“Towards the end of 1973 the (British) Joint Intelligence Committee assessed that Argentine attitudes were hardening and for the first time there were indications that Argentina might be preparing contingency plans for an occupation of the islands.”*⁶⁴

In Buenos Aires, on the same day, in Argentina's Congress, Tucumán Deputy Antonio Moreno calls for his Government to cease any further action or investment that seeks to improve the situation of the Islanders.

*“It is not clear how one can believe that in this way, there is a step forward in the recovery of the islands. If someone expels me from my house and I provide him from outside and at my own expense with materials so that he can live better in the usurped house, the usurper will applaud my gesture publicly, but no one will be able to prevent him thinking in his heart that I am an idiot.”*⁶⁵

November 6th, Islanders hear a report by the BBC.

*“Much consternation was caused in the islands by a report on Radio Newsreel by Adrian Porter the BBC Latin America correspondent. This was to the effect that there might be a likelihood of the temporary airstrip being 'rolled up' and taken back to Argentina if action is not forthcoming soon on the sovereignty. This was in comment on a Note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Argentine Government about the Falkland Islands. ... His Excellency the Governor subsequently issued a statement seeking to pour oil on troubled waters, reminding us in his own words, "in this part of the world we are used to squally weather"...”*⁶⁶

In Stanley, Governor Ernest Gordon Lewis is interviewed by a local journalist, Robin Forrester.

“RF: Home months ago the Argentine Government made a statement to the effect that if something didn't happen about talking on sovereignty soon then maybe they'd do something. What is the reaction to that in London?”

HE: You get these emotional terms like the return of the Falklands to the patrimony of the fatherland. To be perfectly frank the reaction was that it wouldn't do any good in improving the climate but you know what it is when people are in the United Nations. That's not to say I'm underestimating the question. It is a very real problem. We are under claim. We are in front of the United Nations. We come up regularly under the Committee of 24, the Fourth Committee and then the General Assembly, and colonialism in all its forms ... is regarded in some quarters as an evil thing. All we can do is repeat time and time again that the British Government is on record as saying that if it is the wish of the people of the

62 Carassai 2022

63 Quoted in *UN Doc A/9623/Rev.1 vol.6 Chapter XXVI p.112*. See 1833

64 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

65 *Ladrones y cinicos* in *Crónica* November 5, 1973

66 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* December 1973 p.7

Falkland Islands to come to some arrangement with the Argentine then so be it. But the British Government is not going to push the islanders into doing anything against their wishes. The Argentine attitude on this is that it is not the wishes of the people that matter, it is the interests of the people that matter. In other words the Argentines start from the legal concept that as successors to the Union of 1816 they are automatically the heirs to these islands. Therefore the people that came in afterwards, in their opinion do not matter - that is their stand. ...

RF: Now what would you say to people who have gained this impression, that the British Government doesn't, in fact, want the Falkland Islands?

HE: I would say that this is completely wrong. I think that there is a tremendous amount of understanding for ourselves but we must get it into perspective. We are a small group of islands, with just 2.000 population, situated close to the mainland of Latin America. In the long term there is very little future for places like ourselves if we can't get along with our neighbours. That doesn't mean to say be seduced by them or be taken over by them. Obviously it makes sense to have communications with the Argentine. To say that we are not wanted - we must remember that Britain's role in the world is changing. The days when we could send a fleet down here, when we were a major power I'm afraid, have gone. ... The answer in brief is that there is no question of Britain not wanting us. Britain says that it makes sense to be friends with our neighbours and play our part in the world. That doesn't mean to say that they don't take an interest in us.”⁶⁷

November 9th, Argentina's Chamber of Deputies approve a declaration calling for Falkland Islands children to study subjects in school that would encourage integration into Argentine culture.⁶⁸

November 13th, *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* publishes an editorial:

“People overseas should realise that the majority of residents in the Falklands assume that "they don't want us", 'they' being the British Government. Throughout the islands there is growing a general distrust of the British Government. Perhaps this is what they want, who can tell? We must assume that the British Government want this impression to come over otherwise they would put their public relations chaps on to the job of reversing it. Of course the best form of good publicity is promises kept. Here ... Argentina shows up very well. Britain shows up poorly. Argentina promised a weekly air service and it is in operation and has now been so for a year. Britain promised a sea connection with the mainland - and we are now told that the 1971 agreement doesn't mean what it quite plainly says and that there will be no sea service unless the Falklands pays for it. Can anyone wonder that some people are sceptical about the promised permanent airfield from Britain? We hope it is falsely based scepticism. Of course the issue is not just fuel supplies. Falkland Island children now go in increasing numbers to Argentina schools for education, which of course involves indoctrination in the Argentine way of life. People cannot enter or leave the islands without the consent of the Argentine Government Airline. And now it is proposed to put our fuel supplies in the hands of our Argentine neighbours.”

November 15th, in the Falklands, the first anniversary of the opening of the Hookers Point airstrip is celebrated; “... apparently at the request of the Argentine Government.”⁶⁹

“The Argentine delegation was led by a friendly and fit looking Brigadier D. Roberto Bartot, Chief of Staff of the Argentine Air Force. He was accompanied by various officers, diplomats including Coucillor Blanco and reporters. There were also Mr. John Shakespeare and Miss G. Evans from the British

67 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* reported November, December 1973 & January 1974

68 Carassai 2022 citing *Piratas y 'becados'* in *Crónica* November 9, 1974

69 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* December 1973 p.8

*Embassy in Buenos Aires. The Governor in his official uniform, and Mrs Lewis, together with Legislative and Executive Council Members and their wives welcomed the visitors... Speeches were made...”*⁷⁰

November 30th, in Buenos Aires, a new Argentine law (20,651) establishes June 10th as the – “*Day of Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and the Antarctic Sector.*”⁷¹

“Law No. 20,561

Day for the Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and Antarctic sector

Sanctioned: November 14, 1973. Promulgated: November 30, 1973.

Whereas: The Senate and Chamber of Deputies of the Argentine Nation Meeting in Congress Sanction by Force of Law:

Article 1 - Set June 10 as the Day of the Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and Antarctic sector; an expression of sovereignty that will be celebrated every year throughout the country.

Article 2 - That day and at the same time the celebration will be commemorated in the educational establishments of all cycles, of the State and individuals, units and offices of the Armed Forces, judicial headquarters and dependencies of the public administration, inside and outside the territory, with allusive acts, dictating to the effect: Special classes and conferences in which they will indicate the historical background, the legitimacy of the Argentine titles and the way in which it is exercised in the southern sector.

Article 3 -Likewise, and as a symbolic protest against the attacks suffered by the Republic in the region, all the buildings where official offices function will be mandatorily flagged and illuminated on that date.

*“... an official celebration of Argentina's claim to the Falklands, to be held annually on 10 June, the date of the expulsion of the British garrison from Port Egmont in 1770 and of Louis Vernet's appointment as political and military commander in 1829.”*⁷²

December 5th, the UN's Fourth Committee approves the Decolonization Committee's annual report.

*“During discussion of the question .., Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Spain were among those supporting the contention of Argentina that the (Falklands) negotiations should be resumed with a view to finding a solution based on recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the islands. Argentina considered that the conflict of sovereignty, which dated from 1833, was the basic point to be resolved if an end was to be put to the colonial situation prevailing in the territory. The United Kingdom did not accept that interpretation; the essential problem was one of self-determination, complicated by a claim to the territory by another Government. The United Kingdom considered that any settlement of the differences between the two Governments must recognize the right of the inhabitants to self-determination and must be in accordance with their expressed wishes.”*⁷³

December 14th, in New York, taking up recommendations from the Fourth Committee, the UN General Assembly adopts resolution 3160 (XXXVIII) – *Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)*.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Día de la Afiración de los Derechos Argentinos sobre las Malvinas, Islas y sector Antártico.* No holiday was announced. In 1983, the date was changed to April 2 and that was made a public holiday. In 1984 the public holiday was moved back to June 10 and in 1992, April 2 became Veterans Day but not a holiday. In 2000, June 10 lost its holiday status and April 2 gained it. Both days are currently celebrated, but only the April day is a public holiday.

⁷² Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.575. No mention that the British returned in 1771, and Vernet departed in 1831.

⁷³ *UN Yearbook 1973*

“... Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

*Recalling also its resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, in which it invited the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),*⁷⁴

Gravely concerned at the fact that eight years have elapsed since the adoption of Resolution 2065 (XX) without any substantial progress having been made in the negotiations.

Mindful that resolution 2065 (XX) indicates that the way to put an end to this colonial situation is the peaceful solution of the conflict of sovereignty between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom with regard to the aforementioned islands,

Expressing its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, to facilitate the process of decolonisation and to promote the well-being of the population of the islands,

1. Approves the chapters of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and, in particular, the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 21 August 1973 concerning the Territory;

2. Declares the need to accelerate the negotiations between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland called for in General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) in order to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict of sovereignty between them concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

3. Urges the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom, therefore, to proceed without delay with the negotiations, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, in order to put an end to the colonial situation;

4. Requests both Government to report to the Secretary-General and to the General Assembly as soon as possible, and not later than at its twenty-ninth session, on the results of the recommended negotiations.”

*“... Argentina had been back to the United Nations and emerged armed with yet another resolution, calling this time for ‘accelerated progress’ in resolving the Falklands dispute. To meet this pressure Julian Amery had approved exploring the chances of joint sovereignty, or condominium. It was a measure of growing desperation that this was put forward at all. ... For one thing it was regarded as a legal nightmare.”*⁷⁵

74 Resolution 2065 of 1965 had been the first Falklands specific resolution adopted by the General Assembly. See - <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/218/28/PDF/NR021828.pdf?OpenElement>

75 *Little Platoon* M. Charlton 1989 p.37. Harold Julian Amery was Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs under the government of Edward Heath.

The *Falklands' Sheep Owners' Association* negotiates to sell carcasses to *Corporacion Argentina de Productores de Carnes*.

December 18th, in Argentina, a television competition *Odol Pregunta*, concludes a series concerning the history of the Falkland Islands. An amateur historian, José Antonio da Fonseca Figueira (28), wins ARS\$5,000,000. ⁷⁶

December 31st, in the Falklands, the biannual review estimates the population as 1,874 with 39 births, 12 marriages and 12 deaths in the territory during the year. ⁷⁷

“There are several social clubs in Stanley, among them the Colony Club, the Falkland Club, The Falkland Islands Defence Force Club and the Working Men’s Social Club. The clubs provide facilities for a variety of activities, including billiards, snooker, darts, table tennis and cards. The Working Men’s Club organise annual sports for children and an annual children’s fancy dress party. Both events are popular and well supported. ...

The law in force in the Colony is based on the common law, rules of equity and the general statutes in force in England on 22nd May 1900, on United Kingdom legislation subsequently applied to the Colony and on local laws known as Ordinances made by the Governor and Legislative Council. There are four courts: the Summary Court, the Magistrate’s Court, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. There is a final right of appeal in certain circumstances to the Privy Council.

The Summary Court, which has very limited jurisdiction, has not sat since 1971 and all cases are dealt with in the Magistrate’s Court except those specifically reserved to the Supreme Court, e.g. murder rape, manslaughter and divorce. Appeals from the Magistrate’s Court he to the Supreme Court and thence to the Court of Appeal There are 17 Justices of the Peace in the Colony appointed by the Governor to perform very much the same duties as JPs in Britain There are no qualified lawyers in Government service or in private practice in the Colony. The Government employs a part-time Legal Adviser resident in Britain. Parties wishing to be legally represented would have to fly in their own lawyers from Britain, South America etc.

Periodicals published in the territory, other than the official Gazette, are the Falkland Islands Times, which appears on the second Tuesday of each month, and the Falkland Islands Journal, devoted to items of historical, geographic and social interest which is published annually. A weekly newsletter is broadcast from the local broadcasting station every Friday evening.” ⁷⁸

76 Carassai 2022. The questions had been prepared by a jury of writers, journalists and critics headed by Laurio H. Destéfani, of the National Academy of History.

77 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1972 & 1973*

78 *Ibid.*

1974 – January 3rd, in London, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the Foreign Secretary, submits a *memorandum* to the Cabinet regarding the Falklands.

*“Douglas-Home concluded that doing nothing would endanger the interests and security of the islands. He believed condominium was the best way of continuing a dialogue with both parties, reasoning that it would have a greater chance of acceptance from islanders than talks on an outright transfer of sovereignty.”*⁷⁹

January 4th, in Stanley, a meeting of the Falklands' Legislative Council considers a motion proposed by Mr. Monk and seconded by Mr. Bowles; *“That this House objects strongly to any negotiations or talks being held with the Argentine Government which are concerned in any way with the transfer of sovereignty of this Colony.”*⁸⁰ After a short discussion, an amended motion, presented by Mr. Blake and seconded by Mr. Miller, is adopted; *“That this House objects strongly to any negotiations or talks being held with the Argentine Government without the prior full knowledge of the Falkland Islands people which would involve the transfer of sovereignty of this Colony against the wishes of its inhabitants.”*⁸¹

*“... despite ‘maximum arm-twisting’, Falklands Governor Ernest Lewis was unable to wring concessions from councillors about talks on a possible sovereignty transfer.”*⁸²

*“Motions that did not have the support of the colonial authority were often not approved or were modified. In this case, the motion underwent an amendment by which the British government was recognised as having the power to negotiate any issue as long as the people of the islands were aware. Commenting on this meeting, (the Reverend) Forrester stated that some council members were becoming “increasingly frustrated” with their attempts to serve the people. In part, he explained, this frustration was due to the fact that there were “invisible people” in the meetings, the “faceless men” of Whitehall who, in his view, dominated the sessions.”*⁸³


A further motion calls for the formation of a select committee, to ascertain the views of the electorate on possible changes to the Islands' Constitution, and to make recommendations.⁸⁴

In Argentina, news journal *Mayoría* reports: *“... (with) a hundred armed and courageous men provided perhaps, by the Zeronist youth, the islands are recoverable.”*

January 11th, a Japanese ship, *Taiyo Maru 82*, arrives in Stanley. Chartered by a British fisheries company to assess fish stocks around the archipelago in summer.⁸⁵

January 21st, Britain's Ambassador to Argentina, Sir Donald Hopson, together with his wife, land at Stanley for a fortnight's tour.

Notices confirming British sovereignty are cemented onto the Shag Rocks by a Royal Navy expedition.⁸⁶ Six small islets, they are situated some 150 miles to the west of South Georgia.



79 *The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 1974-79 A.* Donaghy 2014

80 *The Falkland Islands Gazette* 1974

81 *Ibid.* The Council was split 50/50 on the amendment which passed with the President's (Governor's) casting vote.

82 Donaghy 2014

83 Caressai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Times* January, 1774. Forrester was the owner and publisher of the *Times*.

84 *The Falkland Islands Gazette* 1974. Also *HC Deb* 18 December 1974 vol.883 cc1565-6. Passed unanimously.

85 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* February 1974 p.5.

86 *Who owns the Falkland Island Dependencies in International Law? An Analysis of Certain Recent British and Argentine Official Statements* C. R. Symmons 1984 p.729.

January 25th, in Britain's House of Commons, the Government announce that they expect the contract for a permanent airfield in the islands to be awarded - "*shortly.*" With the project to be completed within two years.

In the Falkland Islands, geology expert, Donald Griffiths, arrives to explore the potential for oil resources around the archipelago.⁸⁷

*"Oil companies began asking the British government for licences to explore the waters around the Falkland Islands in the late 1960s."*⁸⁸

*"In the midst of these investigations, the first energy crisis struck. Between October 1973 and January 1974, the price of oil quadrupled. Suddenly, interest in petroleum resources around the Falklands skyrocketed. A 1974 report from the US Geological Survey asserted that the continental shelf between Tierra del Fuego and the Falklands might contain 40 billion to 200 billion barrels of oil. That would be more than the 35 billion barrels purportedly contained in the North Sea and perhaps even greater than Saudi Arabia's reserves, estimated at the time at 119 billion barrels."*⁸⁹

February 20th, in the Falklands, a first public meeting to discuss constitutional changes is held. On the same day, a strike takes place in Stanley following the refusal of employers of workers with the General Employees Union, to consider a wage increase.⁹⁰

February 26th, Vice-Commodore Carlos Bloomer Reeve arrives in Stanley to take over management of the LADE airline operation from Vice-Commodore De la Colina.

*"Bloomer Reeve had experience on issues related to Malvinas islands. In 1969, while he was working as LADE Business Manager, and the only Argentine newspaper reaching Stanley was the Buenos Aires Herald, he recommended the morning newspaper Director to publish an article about the development line. The journalist Bonnie Tucker interviewed LADE Directors, who declared their conviction that the Argentine Air Force operated company was the most suitable instrument to establish a regular connection between Malvinas Islands and Comodoro Rivadavia. For the same reason, he had been designated by the Air Force to be a member of the joint commission with the Argentine Foreign Affairs Department."*⁹¹

February 28th, a second public meeting is held to consider changes to the Falklands constitution. Suggestions from the public include wider representation and a reduction in the voting age accompanied by an increase in the residence requirement to seven years before a person could vote. Also the transfer of powers from the UK to the local legislature.⁹²

March 5th, in Britain, following the election of a (minority) Labour Government under Prime Minister Harold Wilson, James Callaghan is appointed Foreign Secretary.

At Port Stanley, the ARA *Bahia Buen Suceso* arrives with four Grumete sailing yachts.

"Among the most significant activities that sought to bring both shores closer is the sailing regatta in Stanley Bay, held in March 1974. Organized by the Nautical Department of the Argentine Navy, it was carried out

87 Griffiths had originally been commissioned by the UK Government in 1971 to conduct a library survey. That survey had been submitted that same year and suggested that oil resources were likely to be found around Burwood Bank, some 120 miles south of the archipelago. *cf.* 1971 & 1975

88 *Oil and British Policy towards the Falklands/Malvinas Islands* Grace Livingstone 2020

89 *The Oil Wars Myth* Emily Meierding 2020

90 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1974 & 1975.* Following arbitration, an increase was given to hourly aid workers.

91 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

92 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 1974 p.16-19

under the motto "The sea unites us" and the University Club of Buenos Aires (CUBA), the Southern Maritime Center of Rio Gallegos and the Ushuaia Nautical Club participated in it." ⁹³

"In March, the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso transported three grumete sailboats for the islands youth group, a donation from San Isidro and Ushuaia yacht clubs. Some months later, they were returned for repair purposes." ⁹⁴

At the end of the event, Governor Lewis makes a speech.

"Much has been done in recent years to improve the links between us and the continent, but there are limits to what politicians and diplomats can do. There comes a time where real links are strengthened, when ordinary people meet and I consider sporting bonding the best method of all. That is why over the past week we have enjoyed seeing you all in your colourful yacht gear walking the streets of Stanley, and it has been a pleasure to see the white sails of the cabin boys against the background of our port." ⁹⁵

April 8th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador to Argentina, Donald Charles Hopson, reports a conversation with Minister Manuel de Anchorena, in which the latter insisted that negotiations needed to resume.

"One of the problems about the Falkland Islands was that from Her Majesty's government's point of view it was a marginal problem... always dogged by lack of ministerial time. In addition it was viewed by some senior people in the Foreign Office as an intractable problem about which nothing could be done." ⁹⁶

May 1st, at a meeting of the Organisation of American States (OAS), Argentina's Foreign Minister, Vignes, referring to the Falkland Islands, demands the end of "*this anachronistic colonial situation.*"

May 3rd, in London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan submits an assessment of the Falklands issue to Cabinet.

"Callaghan's conclusion was forbidding: 'A policy of inaction would surely result in the Argentines progressively withdrawing their cooperation (e.g. the air service) and in a weakening of our position at the UN.' The ultimate political, financial and commercial penalties could be severe." ⁹⁷

Callaghan's proposals call for the inclusion of Island councillors as delegates at any talks. Also full consultation with the Islanders throughout any negotiation.

May 10th, after some debate, Britain's Cabinet approve Callaghan's proposals.

"Callaghan therefore recommended that (Ambassador Hopson) call on Vignes and explain that Britain would shortly resume a dialogue. There would be no mention of condominium until the islanders had been consulted by the governor. Care was also taken to avoid use of the term 'negotiations'. Callaghan believed its inclusion would only alarm islanders and give rise to hostile questions in Parliament..." ⁹⁸

May 22nd, in London, the British government approves the spending of £4.2 million on permanent airport facilities for the Falkland Islands. ⁹⁹

⁹³ Carassai 2022. See also *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1974 & 1975*.

⁹⁴ *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

⁹⁵ Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Times* April 1774. Two sailing yachts and 4 rowing boats were donated by the Argentine Navy for use by Islands children.

⁹⁶ Hugh Carless quoted in Donaghy 2014

⁹⁷ Donaghy 2014

⁹⁸ *Ibid*

⁹⁹ *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* June 1974 p.1

June 3rd, at Stanley, two Spanish-language teachers arrive – María Teresa and María Fernanda Cañas.¹⁰⁰

“Colonel Luis González Balcarce, first advisor of the General Directorate of Antarctica and Malvinas, dependent on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, was in charge of the selection... the Argentine teachers taught Spanish in Stanley's two schools, offered a free, optional evening course twice a week for adults, and recorded lessons to play on the radio. ... almost all the teachers ended up married to British men., whether marines, technicians or professionals who temporarily resided on the islands.”¹⁰¹

June 4th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Donald Hopson informs Minister Vignes that Britain is working on a proposal to form the basis of renewed negotiations.

June 7th, in Stanley, Falkland Island councillors are informed of Callaghan’s proposals by the Governor.

“Lewis described the councillors’ reaction as predictable, in that they saw acceptance of it, as infringing on their sovereignty. ... Adrian Monk, an outspoken opponent of Argentina’s territorial claims, referred to the proposals as a ‘dilution of sovereignty’. ... Councillors were reluctant to go far without consulting their constituents... The councillors did not object to the Foreign Office approaching Argentina, but acceptance of the proposal would ultimately depend on the attitudes of the 1,900 islanders.”¹⁰²

“In other words, the councillors would not go in to bat at any stage without a prior mandate.”¹⁰³

June 10th, Argentina celebrates its 'Day of Affirmation of Argentina's Rights over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands.'

“Reports came in over the BBC World News that June 10th had been observed as a 'Day of Affirmation' by the Argentine when they reiterated their "irrevocable determination to recover their Malvinas Islands and it is likewise determined to discharge its actions to obtain their National objective”, in the words of the Argentine Ambassador in London. The report said that ceremonies were held in Argentine Embassies in many parts of the world. A newspaper report said that ceremonies were held in schools and all units of the armed forces and continued that 'is seen as a result of resurgent nationalism since the Peronista party returned to power last year.'...”¹⁰⁴

June 11th, in Buenos Aires, a detailed proposal from the UK is handed to the Foreign Ministry.¹⁰⁵

*“I have now received instructions from Her Majesty's Government to propose that the discussions between Britain and the Falkland Islands should be resumed on the basis of the safeguards and guarantees to be extended to the Islanders in the **hypothesised** event of a condominium. These discussions would be without prejudice to the respective positions of the United Kingdom and the Argentine Governments with regard to territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islanders. I am to explain that the main aim of Her Majesty's Government in entering into negotiations on the basis of a condominium would be to settle the dispute about sovereignty by accepting Argentine co-sovereignty over the Islands, and that the end product might be a treaty resolving the Anglo-Argentine dispute and*

100 Supplied and salaried by the Argentine Government.

101 Carassai 2022. Between 1974 and 1982, Argentina supplied some ten teachers to the Islands, including one married couple.

102 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* June 1974 p.1

103 FO 7/3198 March 8, 1976

104 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* July 1974 p.16. The Day had been re-established in November, 1973.

105 In an article in the *La Nacion* newspaper on March 13, 2012, ex-Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rosas, stated that the British Ambassador handed the 'non-paper' to President Péron personally at a secret meeting where the Argentine Foreign Minister was also present. See Donaghy 2014.

creating a favourable atmosphere in which the Islanders could develop according to their interests. For the duration of the Treaty the the two parties would accept shared sovereignty over the Islands. The co-domini would be Her Majesty The Queen and His Excellency the President of the Argentina Nation.

There are several forms which a condominium might take but the basic elements might include the following:

- 1) The British and Argentine flags would fly side by side and the official language would be English and Spanish;*
- 2) All 'belongers' of the Islands would possess dual nationality;*
- 3) Existing colony passports would be replaced by travel documents issued in the co-domini;*
- 4) The present constitution, administration and legal system would have to be adapted to the needs of a condominium. The Governor might be appointed alternatively by the Queen and the President of Argentina;*
- 5) Further constitutional change would require the agreement of the co-domini.*

*I also have to inform you that a Joint Session of the Executive and Legislative Councils of the Islands have informed the Governor that they had no objection to talks being held with the Argentine Government on the safeguards and guarantees required in a condominium. However, I am to state that Her Majesty's Government would feel free to invite representatives of the Islands to form part of the British delegation, and that before final agreement the Islanders would have to be formally consulted and **their acceptance sought by some form of popular representation**. On this basis, Her Majesty's Government propose that, if the Argentine Government agree, official or preliminary official talks should take place in Buenos Aires as soon as possible.”¹⁰⁶*

“This, the secret document detailing Britain's offer to share the Falkland Islands with Argentina in 1974. Harold Wilson's Labour government approached President Juan Domingo Perón with a confidential plan for shared rule. ... Argentine newspaper La Nación today published what it said was a 'non-official document' from the British Foreign Office. It shows that Britain made the offer to then President Perón, ..., on June 11, 1974. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, James Hutton,¹⁰⁷ gave Argentine Foreign Minister Alberto Vignes the text in a secret meeting. The proposals would see both flags being flown over the islands, and Spanish and English being made dual official language. A governor would also be put in place - who would be decided, on a rotating basis, by the British monarch and the Argentine President. The proposal would 'create a favourable atmosphere in which the islanders could develop according to their interests'. It would also 'put an end to the dispute over sovereignty'. It concluded: 'Covering these terms, the government of Her Majesty proposes that, if the Argentine government agrees, we should realise official conversations in Buenos Aires as soon as possible'. ...”¹⁰⁸

“Vignes responded cautiously. He promised to put the proposal to Perón, but believed that in view of Argentina's repeated declarations in the UN and elsewhere, it would be 'extremely difficult' to agree to share sovereignty with Britain.”¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ *La Nacion* March 13, 1974. My emphasis throughout.

¹⁰⁷ The British Ambassador to Argentina in 1974 was Sir Donald Hopson (died unexpectedly August 26, 1974 of a heart attack). I can find no record of a James Hutton.

¹⁰⁸ *Pictured for the first time: The secret document showing Britain's offer to SHARE Falklands with Argentina* Lee Moran in *The Daily Mail* March 13, 2012. My emphasis

¹⁰⁹ Donaghy 2014

June 12th, From the Falklands, news of the offer by the British Government leaks out.

*“Despite the fact that I stressed the secrecy of the discussions... some of our members are incapable of keeping quiet. On this occasion the leak may have been deliberate with a view to sabotaging our initiative.”*¹¹⁰

June 20th, Argentina responds to the condominium proposal by suggesting a fixed term of joint administration preceded by recognition of Argentine sovereignty. Vignes assures Ambassador Hopson that his country’s response is only a starting position, and that Argentina would not insist upon a prior recognition of sovereignty. That could be delayed to the end of the joint sovereignty period – 4 or 5 years.¹¹¹

*“This prior recognition of sovereignty, prior to any discussion, was unacceptable, obviously...”*¹¹²

*“Perón is said to have reacted with 'euphoria', according to veteran diplomat Carlos Ortiz de Rozas who today spoke to La Nación. Perón is said to have told his confidante: 'We accept. Once we get a foot on the Falklands no-one will remove us. Shortly after the sovereignty will belong to Argentina alone.’”*¹¹³

*“It (Argentina) proposed that recognition of Argentine sovereignty should be followed by a period of joint administration’ for a term to be fixed in the negotiations... The fundamental objectives of the joint administration would be to facilitate the gradual integration of the population of the Islands into the political, social and institutional life of the Argentine Republic. ... (And) in his meeting with Vignes, Hopson found there was more room for manoeuvre. His optimism was not shared in Stanley, however, where Lewis was far less upbeat. The governor ... was pessimistic about the islander response. "I am certain that this would not be acceptable locally", he declared.”*¹¹⁴

On the same day, in Britain's House of Commons, Joan Lester MP, speaking on behalf of the Government, confirms that there will be no change in the status of the Falkland Islands without the consent of the Islanders.¹¹⁵

June 24th, from London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan writes to Ambassador Hopson.

*“The Argentine counterproposal certainly has constructive features... and we note his evident flexibility and readiness to compromise... (However) If the Foreign Minister and President Peron insist on including recognition of Argentine sovereignty in the basis for initiating talks, the islanders will refuse to take part: and **we cannot move without them.**”*¹¹⁶

June 26th, in London, an announcement is made to Parliament.

“With the agreement of the Falkland Islands Executive Council, we have been in touch with the Argentine Government about the possible resumption of discussions between our two Governments in connection with United Nations resolution 3160. If discussions are resumed, representatives of the Islanders will be invited to join the United Kingdom delegation.”

Owners of the Falkland Islands Company from 1972, Dundee, Perth and London Securities Ltd is itself taken over by Charington, Gardner and Locket.

110 Gove Lewis to Callaghan & Hopson June 12, 1974 in FO 7/2699

111 FO 7/2699

112 James Callaghan quoted in Charlton 1989 p.37

113 Lee Moran in Daily Mail March 13, 2012 *op cit.*

114 Donaghy 2014

115 *HC Deb 20 June 1974 vol 875 c240W.* In answer to a question from Sir Nigel Fisher.

116 FO 7/2700. My emphasis.

July 1st, Juan Perón dies of a heart attack. His wife, Isabel Martinez de Peron, assumes the Presidency.

*“... the deal, agreed by the then Argentine leader, was scuppered when he died just 20 days later. Britain was said not to trust his successor, his widow María Estela Martínez, and so cut contact with the South American country.”*¹¹⁷

*“The Foreign Office was eager to act quickly. ‘Unless we seize this opportunity, there may be a coup or change of government in Buenos Aires within a matter of weeks’, Carless warned. ‘If so, we shall lose all the momentum we have gained’...”*¹¹⁸

*“Argentina’s Foreign Ministry documents reportedly reveal that the British secretly offered former president Juan Perón ... shared control of the Islands on 11 June 1974, with a carefully considered proposal and concrete plans for making it a reality. The plan only failed to materialise because Perón died three weeks later, otherwise the course of history would have been quite different.”*¹¹⁹

July 5th, from Stanley, Governor Lewis reports that attitudes are hardening against the proposals.

*“... it is most unlikely any councillor will be willing to join a British delegation to discuss condominium.”*¹²⁰

*“The proposal was for a condominium where the Islands would be ruled partially by Argentina and partially by Great Britain. We at the time in Joint Council decided that this wasn’t on and did everything we could to throw it out, which we did. It just wasn’t going to work; we knew that, so we threw it out.”*¹²¹

July 10th, in London, the Falkland Islands Committee host a reception at Lincoln’s Inn attended by Earl Mountbatten of Burma. A message from Queen Elizabeth II is read to those present.

*“... attended by 50 MPs of all parties, 10 Members of the House of Lords, 20 representatives of the press and media, 10 Commonwealth representatives, 10 civil servants (including former Governors of the Falklands), and about 30 Islanders and Committee members. The presence of the Earl Mountbatten of Burma as special guest reflected the British Government’s approval of the campaign. It was stated that the purpose of the gathering was, “... the rallying of support for the Islanders and of providing visiting Islanders with the opportunity of meeting people friendly to their cause.” The reunion became an annual event.”*¹²²

*“It was an astonishing example of the committee’s organisation and influence.”*¹²³

July 15th, in London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan concludes that talks on condominium cannot proceed.¹²⁴

117 Lee Moran in Daily Mail March 13, 2012 *op cit*.

118 Donaghy 2014

119 *Chronicle of a referendum foretold: what next for the Malvinas–Falklands?* Cara Levey & Daniel Ozarow in *Revisiting the Falklands–Malvinas Question: Transnational & Interdisciplinary Perspectives* Guillermo Mira & Fernando Pedrosa (eds) 2021. This appears to date from 2013 as a version appeared as an opinion piece in *Al Jazeera* dated March 17, 2013.

120 *Lewis to Callaghan July 5, 1974* in FO 7/2700

121 Ex-councillor William Bowles quoted in *MercoPress* April 13, 2006. This article followed an assertion in 2006 by ex-Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rosas that the Islanders had been willing to accept the condominium proposal. An assertion repeated on June 14, 2012, when Argentina’s President Cristina Kirchner, presented this “*secret document*” to the UN’s Special Committee on Decolonization; erroneously suggesting that it was only Peron’s death that had caused the proposal to fail.

122 Ellerby 1990 p.181. These annual receptions still take place at Lincoln’s Inn.

123 Donaghy 2014

124 *Falkland Islands Review Committee Report* Franks Committee 1983 para. 29

“... Lord Goronwy-Roberts, the Foreign Office Minister in the Lords, advised the British government in July 1974 that Argentine foreign minister Vignes should be told that no progress could be made without the islanders' agreement, since otherwise: both the Argentine and the UK would be seen to be engaged in one of the worst forms of "imperialism" i.e. disposing of a people without their consent or even their participation in a discussion on their future.”¹²⁵

July 29th, in the Falkland Islands, representatives of Johnston Construction Ltd arrive to plan the development of a permanent airfield; “By the spring of 1975 there may be up to 90 people working on the airport – both local and expatriate workers. It is expected that 12-15 families will be coming out. ... Setting out work will begin as soon as engineers start to arrive. Specialist machinery required will arrive by ship in late November.”¹²⁶

August 2nd, a letter is published in the *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review*:

*“I am Argentine, married to a Falkland Islander, with two Argentine born children and a third a Kelper; ... What never ceases to amaze me is that many of those people who so fervently say "We want to remain British" are the same ones who accept Argentine scholarships for their children. Surely they must see that their children are being taught to hold a viewpoint contrary to their own. These children, particularly as they move up into secondary education, are learning all about the Argentine's claim to these Islands. I think parents will be dismayed to find that next time they say "we want to remain British" the first ones to shout them down will be their own children. Has this not occurred to anyone else?”*¹²⁷

August 8th, Argentina's National Academy of History meets to consider a paper by Ernesto Fitte entitled '*The National Academy of History and the blood in 1833 Malvinas.*' Controversially, this concludes that the Falklands riot of August, 1833, had no political character.¹²⁸

*“Two gauchos five Charruas Indians led by Antonio Rivero, who worked the cattle in the field, arrived in Port Soledad and because Juan Simon, had denied the change of metallic money, rather than vouchers they made a killing in cold blood of Vernet's men namely the foreman Juan Simon permanent manager of the Argentine government, Brisbane, Vernet's henchman, one German, one Spanish and Scottish Dickson.”*¹²⁹

August 14th, from London, reacting to Governor Lewis's letter of July 5th, Foreign Secretary Callaghan writes to Ambassador Hopson in Buenos Aires, asking that a message be given to the Argentine Foreign Minister.¹³⁰

*“Given the sensitivity of Parliamentary opinion in the UK to the issue of self-determination, HMG cannot possibly proceed without the concurrence of the islanders.”*¹³¹

August 22nd, in New York, Argentina's representative informs the UN Secretary-General that contact with the UK has been re-established regarding future Falklands negotiations.¹³²

125 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.579 citing Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.35

126 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* August 1974 pp.11

127 *Ibid.* pp.5 & 6

128 A murderous attack by a group of gauchos and Indians against the managers of Luis Vernet's cattle business on East Falkland Island over unpaid wages. *cf.* August, 1833, March, 1956, November, 1965, January, 1966, April, 1966, April 1982, August 2012 and March 2015

129 Historian, and Academy member, Laurio H. Destefani. Dickson was Irish. *cf.* March, 1956, November, 1965, January, 1966, April, 1966, April 1982, August 2012 and March 2015

130 Hopson did not deliver the message. He died unexpectedly from a heart attack on August 26, 1974, aged only 59. Argentine Minister Vignes was only informed as to the failure of the condominium proposal on August 27, 1974, by Britain's *charge d'affairs*, Frank Maynard. Surprisingly, Vignes appears to have kept this information to himself; not informing anyone else at Argentina's Foreign Ministry. His reasoning isn't clear, and some confusion arose as a result.

131 Callaghan quoted in *FO 7/2700*

132 Before Minister Vignes became aware of the collapse of the condominium proposal.

“... a note to Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations, highlighted the “innumerable evidence of restraint and consideration” by Argentina “despite the legitimate impatience and emotional fervor that the Argentine people feel regarding the recovery of a part of their national territory”.¹³³

At the UN in New York, having ceased its participation in 1971, Britain resumes limited collaboration with the Special Committee on Decolonization. But only to the extent of providing the information required under the terms of Art. 73 of the UN Charter. However, the UK does not take up a seat on the committee; albeit reserving a right to speak on matters concerning the Falkland Islands.¹³⁴

“In 1974 the UK resumed cooperation with the Committee, without rejoining. The US and France were not members either.”¹³⁵

August 27th, Argentina's Foreign Ministry is informed of Britain's abandonment of the condominium proposal.

September 5th, at the UN, the Special Committee on Decolonization decides to defer the Falklands question until 1975.

September 13th, an agreement is quietly signed between Argentina and Great Britain, allowing for the continued supply of fuels and gas to the Falklands by Argentina.¹³⁶

“... the Foreign Office reacts feebly to Argentinian encroachment, ... for instance, in the September 1974 Agreement, signed by our Secretary of State, giving the Argentine YPF government department the right to erect a fuel storage tank in Port Stanley with a monopoly of petrol and diesel oil throughout the islands.”¹³⁷

“... agreed by the British and Argentine Governments in 1974 with regrettably little explanation or reference to the people of the Falkland Islands. The YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales) company was allowed to install a Plant at Port Stanley, which required a number of Argentine technical staff to be here permanently to look after it. This seemed to us to be the thin end of the wedge.”¹³⁸

“It's purpose was to reduce high costs, by allowing the Argentine state oil company (YPF) to supply oil fuels to the islands at Argentine mainland prices. Yet there were more than fiscal concerns at hand. It was designed to demonstrate the government's willingness to cooperate with Argentina, as well as buttress its position at the United Nations.”¹³⁹

“... the construction of Antares II plant —with seventeen fuel, jet fuel, kerosene and gas oil tanks— a laboratory, and a gas station started. Construction works, under YPF direction, involved the participation of sixty four workers during six months. The vessel ARA Cabo San Gonzalo performed two crossings transporting materials. At the facilities, a pipeline supply system was established from the Falkland Islands Company dock. Once it was set up, the British company did not authorize its operation alleging safety reasons, breaching the initial agreement.”¹⁴⁰

133 Carassai 2022

134 Every year a place is set out for the UK's representative, but not taken up. If someone from the British mission does attend, they sit at the back among the public. cf. 1971

135 Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office O.T.18 May 2011. cf. 1971, 1986 & 1999. See – <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaif/writev/overseas/ot18.htm>

136 Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the Supply and Marketing in the Falkland Islands of Argentine Petroleum-based Products September 13, 1974 Treaty Series No.30 1975

137 Infamous White Card Molly Mortimer 1975 in *The Spectator* July 11, 1975 p.12

138 74 Days: An Islander's Diary of the Falklands Occupation John Smith 1984

139 Donaghy 2014

140 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

September 23rd, in New York, at the opening of a new session of the United Nations General Assembly, Ministers Callaghan and Vignes meet in the sidelines; “*Vignes was downcast, ominously remarking that the situation ‘could not be held indefinitely’.*”¹⁴¹

September 24th, speaking before the UN's General Assembly, Argentina's Foreign Minister; “... *made a moderate speech, which included the obligatory Argentine claim to sovereignty.*”¹⁴²

In **October**, in Stanley, a local committee is formed to liaise with the Falkland Islands Committee in London.

“... *a ten member Falkland Islands Committee (Local Branch) was formed at a public meeting in Stanley with Jack Abbott (an expatriate of independent means who had married an Islander) as Chairman and Sydney Miller (a former Executive Councillor and farmer) as Secretary. The purpose of the Committee was to liaise with the UK (Committee).*”¹⁴³

An Islander, Peter McLeod, accepts Argentine citizenship; taking up Argentine ID Card 12,045,643.¹⁴⁴

“*The Falkland Islands are Argentine or they ought to be. I didn't do it, like the world supposes, as a challenge to Argentine sovereignty in the Islands. Simply, because I can see with my own eyes the advantages etc. ... Recently they (the Islanders) are taking much more interest in the Argentine. Negotiations are going on at official levels for establishing relations and for the Falkland Islands and Argentines to know each other....*”¹⁴⁵

October 18th, from Stanley, Governor Lewis writes to the Foreign Office in London.

“*I see no likelihood of islanders agreeing to participate in talks before the end of the year. In fact, unless we are prepared to tell the committee in London the facts of life, I see no hope of any dialogue being renewed with the Argentines in the foreseeable future.*”¹⁴⁶

October 24th, the UK government writes to the United Nations Secretary General confirming that contact with Argentina continues regard the question of the Falkland Islands.

In London, it is announced that Mr. Neville Arthur Irvin French is appointed to be the next Governor of the Falkland Islands from January 1975.¹⁴⁷

October 30th, Argentina also informs the UN Secretary-General that talks with the UK are on-going.

“... *the Government of the United Kingdom insists that the solution must be consonant with the 'wishes' of the inhabitants of the Malvinas... the Argentine Government wishes to reiterate that, ... the negotiations must take place exclusively between the Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom. ...*”¹⁴⁸

In **November**, in London, the Foreign Office holds meetings with members of the Falkland Islands Committee.

December 4th, in Stanley, a Legislative Council meeting considers a question of oil exploration licences.

141 Donaghy 2014

142 *Ibid.*

143 Ellerby 1990 p.182. This is the only source I have for this, but my general reading suggests that the local committee was more likely to have been formed in September 1974, if not August.

144 McLeod would seem to have been born in the Islands and employed 1957 to 1961 as a radio operator on South Georgia. After accepting Argentine citizenship, he was employed by YPF – in the Falklands.

145 McLeod quoted in Argentine magazine GENTE (October 1974) republished in *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* November/December 1974 pp.17.

146 *Lewis to Callaghan October 18, 1974 in FO 7/2701*

147 For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/french_neville

148 *UN Doc A10023/Rev.1 vol.4*

“... the Colonial Government should take immediate steps to invite interested parties to apply for licences to examine the possibilities of drilling for oil, both on-shore and within territorial waters.”

Almost immediately, Argentina reacts.

*“Within two weeks a bill had been presented to the Argentine Congress which would, if passed, 'authorise the government to use force to recover the Islands'. Maynard warned that supplying licences in Falkland waters 'would be an act of the utmost provocation'...”*¹⁴⁹

*“In late 1974, the Falkland Island Times reported that the islands' government had received multiple new permit requests. In December, the Falklands' legislative council met to discuss the oil issue. Eager to exploit any potential resources, the council passed two motions asking the governor of the islands, a British official, to invite applications for exploration licenses. Although the governor did not support the initiatives, oil companies continued to submit inquiries.”*¹⁵⁰

From London, Argentina's Ambassador, Manuel Anchorena, is summoned back to Buenos Aires, where he is publicly insulted as being a *“lawyer for the British.”*¹⁵¹

December 7th, in Lima, Minister Vignes has a conversation with Minister of State for the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, David Ennals, repeating that there are only two real options – negotiation or invasion.

*“Whatever might have been the rhythm implied by the Scott-Beltramino accords, it was now replaced by an ad hoc combination of sticks and carrots, largely directed at breaking down Falklander intransigence.”*¹⁵²

*“Vignes was in a truculent mood, perhaps conditioned by an incident in Stanley earlier that morning, when the FIC had blocked an Argentine cargo of goods from docking. He complained that islanders opinion was monopolised by the FIC who were determined to prevent progress.”*¹⁵³

In London, a meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association hears from Argentine Senator Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen, who claims that the UK is shedding colonies, and the Falklands *“would go.”*¹⁵⁴

*“The reception was very successful. The Parliamentarians present are all friends of the Colony but, if anything, they were even more determined to ensure that the Islanders' wishes would be honoured.”*¹⁵⁵

*“(Solari Yrigoyen) ... roundly denounced the British position. Among other things, he said there were only 2,000 people in the colony, so the Argentine to sovereignty was not an important matter for Britain; the "vast majority of nations had decided that a solution to the problem must be achieved and that solution was transfer of sovereignty and the end of Colonialism"; that Britain could no longer afford to keep the Falklands, and that "With a transfer of sovereignty the Islanders would enjoy all the benefits of Argentine citizenship and would be looked after". The MPs present were clearly annoyed...”*¹⁵⁶

December 13th, in Buenos Aires, at a press conference, Vignes states that there are only two ways to recover the Falkland Islands; *“invading them or negotiating them”.*¹⁵⁷

149 Donaghy 2014. Maynard was the British *charge d'affairs* in Buenos Aires.

150 Meierding 2020

151 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

152 *Ibid.*

153 Donaghy 2014.

154 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* January/February 1975 p.21. Twenty MPs attended.

155 *Ibid.* p.24

156 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.580

157 Vignes reiteró la soberanía sobre las Islas Malvinas in *La Opinión* December 15, 1974

*“Several politicians made statements about the alternative mentioned by Vignes. Juan Carlos Cárdenas, of Vanguardia Federal, said that the islands were a casus belli (reason for war) and presented a bill to authorise Isabel to declare war without resorting to Parliament. ... When the controversy reached the Senate of the Nation, the senators unanimously approved a declaration of support for "all popular mobilization actions in defense of the archipelago as part of Argentine territory", a barely veiled nod to Crónica's initiative.”*¹⁵⁸

December 16th, in Argentina, journal *Cronica* mounts a campaign advocating an invasion of the Falklands.¹⁵⁹

*“For its efforts the newspaper was provisionally closed by the administration of Mrs Peron for 'endangering peaceful relations with foreign countries', and legal proceedings were initiated according to the Penal Code and Law 20,840. A week later, a federal judge on hearing the case agreed that there had been an infringement of Article 219 of the Penal Code. Sr Hector Ricardo Garcia, the editor, was only released after paying a high sum and the case continued its normal procedural course.”*¹⁶⁰

*“In less than 48 hours, the newspaper counted 16,000 volunteers, among whom were figures of sport and entertainment, among them, the boxer Oscar "Ringo" Bonavena, the soccer players Héctor Scotta, Carlos García Cambón, Enrique Chazarreta, Roberto Telch and Carlos Avanzi, the actresses Mercedes Carreras and Linda Peretz, the actors Carlos Cores and Aldo García Grau, the comedian Jorge Porcel and the winner of Ordol Pregunta 1973, Da Fonesca.”*¹⁶¹

At Port Stanley, *Hercules Scan* arrives with the heavy equipment for the new airstrip.¹⁶²

December 18th, responding to a question in Britain's House of Commons, David Ennals MP, for the government, says; *“There have been several discussions between Ministers of Her Majesty's Government and Ministers of the Argentine, one occasion being as recent as last week. It is the wish of both Governments to keep in touch and I assure the House that it remains the policy of this Government, as of previous Governments, that no change in the present British Sovereignty over the Falkland Islands shall be made against the wishes of the Islanders.”*¹⁶³

December 30th, a Geoffrey Deroath and his partner, Gillian Lipscombe, arrive in the Falklands. Found to be in possession of a revolver and .22 ammunition, their documentation is checked.

*“The couple bluffed their way here without white cards by showing LADE officials a leather passport cover with City of London crest on it, convincing them that they were Embassy Officials!”*¹⁶⁴

December 31st, the biannual review notes 39 births, 25 marriages and 24 deaths during 1975.¹⁶⁵

158 Carassai 2022

159 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.580

160 Makin 1983 p.396. Makin actually gives the year as 1975. This appears to be an error. See Dillon 1989

161 Caressai 2022

162 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1974 & 1975*

163 Quoted in *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* January/February 1975 p.9

164 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* January/February 1975 p.14. Arrested and deported.

165 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1974 & 1975*

1975 – January 3rd, in Buenos Aires, on the 142nd anniversary of the ejection of a Buenos Airean garrison from East Falkland (Soledad) Island, Argentina's Foreign Minister holds a press conference. ¹⁶⁶

“Argentina has decided in this case, even though there is usurpation, to continue to negotiate according to the Argentine pacifist tradition in the solution of international controversies.” ¹⁶⁷

Argentina unilaterally imposes immigration controls on all air travel between it and the Falkland Islands.

“In 1971 Great Britain and Argentina signed, under UN auspices, a communication agreement... The use of only a 'white card' permitted open movement between the Islands and Argentina by both Argentine and Falklands Islands residents. The card contained no fingerprints, no nationality, and no expiration date.” ¹⁶⁸

“In January 1975 the Argentine Government imposed immigration controls on air travel to the Falklands in breach of the Communications Agreement. A declaration that the holder was an Argentine citizen of the Malvinas was added to the 'white card.'...” ¹⁶⁹

“The 'white card' was now replaced by one declaring the holder to be an Argentine citizen of the Malvinas.” ¹⁷⁰

In Buenos Aires, the government of Isabel Martinez de Peron indicates its frustration with the lack of progress in negotiations over the Islands.

“... the Ministry of Social Welfare instructed Argentine cruise ships not to show a courtesy Red Ensign when they entered Stanley harbour.” ¹⁷¹

Joint Hon-Secretary (UK Falkland Islands Committee), E. W. (Bill) Hunter Christie, arrives in the Islands. ¹⁷²

“Bill Christie, on his first visit, was very busy whilst here. He made a long Camp trip ... to visit 11 settlements and to speak to over 300 people. ... In Stanley Mr. Christie busied himself with brief visits to many people both in their homes and in public places such as bars. The major public event was an open meeting in the Town Hall which was very well attended.” ¹⁷³

“Christie spent three weeks in the Falkland Islands. He held 11 formal meetings in Stanley, including a public one with 220 people present, and public meetings for the inhabitants of 12 settlements in Camp. He made 34 calls in Stanley involving interviews and exchanges of view. He concluded that the people of the Islands were adamant in their desire to remain British and that strong indirect pressure had been put on the people of this small community to change their allegiance against their will.” ¹⁷⁴

January 20th, in London, aware that Prof. Donald Griffiths is compiling his report, the Department of Energy write to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

“Ministers are very interested in the possibility of exploring offshore oil around the Falkland Islands.” ¹⁷⁵

166 See January, 1833

167 *La Nacion* January 3, 1975

168 *An Analysis of the Falkland/Malvinas Campaign* Admiral Harry D. Train 1988

169 Ellerby 1990 p.178

170 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.34

171 Ellerby 2009 p.178 citing *The Daily Telegraph* March 5, 1975

172 For a biography see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/christie_eric

173 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March/April 1975 p.24

174 Tatham (ed.) 2008

175 *Lindley to Carless* January 20, 1975 FCO 96/369

January 28th, Neville Arthur Irwin French, the new Governor of the Falkland Islands, arrives in Stanley. ¹⁷⁶

“He appears to have brought to his governorship of the Falklands many of the characteristics which had served him so ill in Tanganyika in 1958, nearly twenty years before: a single mindedness in carrying out what he correctly conceived to be his duty to his masters coupled with a strong authoritarian streak and lack of judgment. His obsessions about security and secrecy set up a barrier between him and the Islanders. He was openly criticised by the Falkland Islands Committee in London. His previous experience in Latin America (which the FCO doubtless thought appropriate and relevant) probably added to local suspicions.” ¹⁷⁷

January 31st, in London, Minister David Ennals, writes to Foreign Secretary James (Jim) Callaghan.

“I am now moving towards the view that the best long-term aim might be a long-term leasing arrangement by which, under a treaty, we would cede sovereignty but would otherwise retain virtually all the arrangements on the Islands which exist now.” ¹⁷⁸

“The foreign secretary reacted to the leaseback suggestion with disdain. ... Callaghan felt that Ennals overestimated Britain’s hurdle at the UN, and underestimated its capability to counter an Argentine attack and the parliamentary difficulties which would arise.” ¹⁷⁹

February 13th, in Stanley, shops close in protest regarding the refusal of a cruise ship to fly the Red Ensign; *“Cruise Ship ‘Regina Prima’ visited Stanley for the 5th time. However the nearly 500 passengers found all shops but three were closed. ‘Regina Prima’ is Greek owned and Panamanian registered and was chartered to an Argentine Government company. It had two captains. The Argentine one had refused to allow the courtesy British flag, Red Ensign, to be flown, maintaining Stanley is an Argentine port for each visit here. Many residents had expressed anger at the local governments refusal to take action and its willingness to grant clearance to the ship for the previous four visits. Finally traders took matters into their own hands and closed down for the day. It was felt that this was hard on the tourists who were ordinary holidaymakers but that a protest had to be made. The incident captured the international news headlines for a day. We heard later that the refusal to fly the flag was the result of non-cooperation between different Government departments in Buenos Aires.”* ¹⁸⁰

“Upon her return to the continent, the ship was festively received by Argentine citizens and officials, led by the Secretary of Sports and Tourism, in charge organising the cruises.” ¹⁸¹

A representative for six oil companies visits Stanley to discuss the issue of exploration licences for an off-shore area known as Burdwood Bank. A geological feature to the south of the Falkland Islands archipelago.

In London, the Falkland Islands Committee is renamed the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee.

March 2nd, the captain of *Regina Prima*, refuses yet again to fly the Red Ensign when entering Port Stanley. ¹⁸²

“On its final visit the ‘Regina Prima’ still did not fly the courtesy flag, in spite of the intervention of the F.I. Chief Secretary, and the ship was not cleared and sailed without landing any tourists.” ¹⁸³

176 *The London Gazette* No. 46481 also *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* May-July 1975 p.26.

For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/french_neville

177 Tatham (ed) 2008

178 Quoted in *FO 7/2964*

179 Donaghy 2014

180 *Falkland Island Times* January/February 1975

181 Carassai 2022

182 *The Malvinas, the South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands: the conflict with Britain* L. Destefani 1982.

Traditionally a ship, on entering a foreign port, displays the flag of that port.

183 *Falkland Island Times* January/February 1975

March 9th, in Britain's *Sunday Telegraph* newspaper, an article speculates that competition over oil licences for the Falklands could provoke a military clash with Argentina.

March 13th, British intelligence reports indicate that, without negotiations, Argentina is likely to resort to force in the case of oil being discovered near the Falklands archipelago.¹⁸⁴

March 17th, Argentina's Foreign Ministry issues a press release to the effect that the Argentine Government does not, and will not, recognise any oil exploration licences issued by the UK on behalf of the Falkland Islands Government.

March 18th, in Britain's Parliament, the Government confirms that it has received Professor Griffiths's report into the potential for oil exploration around the Falklands. No further details are given.

*"Griffiths reported in early 1975 that the prognosis was 'sufficiently promising to encourage further commercial exploration'. The government submitted the findings to Sir Peter Kent, a former chief geologist at BP, who agreed..."*¹⁸⁵

March 19th, from Buenos Aires, aware of Griffiths' Report, Argentina's Foreign Ministry issues a *communiqué*.

"According to cabled information published in the press, the United Kingdom Foreign Office has received a scientific report, ... concerning the possible existence of petroleum deposits under the Argentine continental shelf near the Malvinas Islands. Since the Malvinas Islands and the above-mentioned areas constitute an integral part of the national territory, the Government of Argentina wishes to state that it does not and will not recognize the right of any foreign Government to explore for or extract minerals or hydrocarbons.... Furthermore, the Argentine Government will regard the carrying out of activities of the kind referred to above to be contrary to United Nations resolutions and consensuses on the Malvinas Islands, ..."

*"... at a press conference... Vignes suggested that if Britain was unwilling to negotiate, "the only other option open to the Argentine government is a resort to force."... Vignes said his remarks were made unwillingly, forced upon him by public pressure. "People are burning my feet", he claimed, warning that unless there was progress, grave consequences would ensue: "It would be the big thing, the breaking off of diplomatic relations and an armed conflict"..."*¹⁸⁶

March 26th, in London, considering the Griffiths Report on the potential for Falklands' oil, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office notes; *"Of one thing we can be certain: there can be no exploration of any oil there may be around the Falklands except in collaboration with the Argentines."*¹⁸⁷

April 3rd, Britain's *Financial Times* newspaper claims that progress towards greater contact between the Falklands and Argentina has been delayed. Due to the possible existence of oil deposits.

Britain's new Ambassador to Buenos Aires, David Ashe, receives instructions to issue a warning that any military action will be met with force.

184 FO 7/2949

185 *Britain and the Dictatorships of Argentina and Chile 1973-82: Foreign Policy, Corporations and Social Movements (Security, Conflict & Cooperation in the Contemporary World)* Grace Livingstone 2018 citing *Geology of the Region Around the Falkland Islands: Summary of Report by P.F. Barker, J. Burrell, F. Simpson and D.H. Griffiths April 11, 1975 and Review of Birmingham Report of Geology of the Falkland Islands Region by Peter Kent June 2, 1975 in FCO 96/369*

186 Donaghy 2014

187 Coles to Collins March 26, 1975 FCO 96/369

*“The foreign secretary felt that an aggressive approach was required:..”*¹⁸⁸

*“In April 1975, the then head of the Foreign Office and future prime minister, James Callaghan, ordered his ambassador to Argentina, Derick Ashe (sic), to tell his Argentine counterpart that no future reference to “invasion or negotiation” would go unanswered. ... (Callaghan) on this occasion gave express instructions to make it clear that “an attack by Argentina would meet with a military response” and that, “unless Argentina wanted a war,” the only alternative Vignes had was negotiation.”*¹⁸⁹

April 7th, the Falklands governor submits a report concerning proposed changes to the Islands' Constitution.

April 10th, in Britain’s House of Lords, spokesman Goronwy-Roberts confirms that if negotiations between the UK and Argentina take place, Islanders will be invited to attend.¹⁹⁰

April 14th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Ashe delivers Britain's warning to the Foreign Ministry.

*“The Argentine Government must clearly understand that an attack on the Islands would be met with a military response. At the same time Her Majesty’s Government wished to avoid any confrontation with Argentina. The only alternative to confrontation was negotiation and they stood ready to examine any proposal which the Argentine Government might wish to put forward.”*¹⁹¹

April 16th, in London, a meeting between Prime Minister Wilson, Foreign Secretary Callaghan and Minister David Ennals considers the policy to adopt with regard to oil deposits on the Islands' continental shelf. Callaghan notes that the current Argentine regime is; *“... so unstable that it was questionable whether a negotiated settlement would stand the test of time.”*

*“If we receive no warning of an invasion and we are obliged to liberate the Islands from an Argentine occupation, our political task at the United Nations, and in Washington, would be formidable. The Secretary of State for Defence should therefore advise on the practical aspects of defending the Islands.”*¹⁹²

Between them, they decide; *“... that economic cooperation and joint oil exploration would provide the basis for a new Anglo-Argentine dialogue, with the sovereignty issue being withheld for a later date.”*¹⁹³

April 25th, in Buenos Aires, a car bomb explodes outside the British Embassy Residence, killing a guard and injuring two others. The Ambassador and his family are unhurt.¹⁹⁴

May 5th, in New York, Britain informs the UN that it has no doubts about its exclusive sovereign rights to explore for natural resources of the continental shelf around the Falklands' archipelago.¹⁹⁵

188 Donaghy 2014

189 Carassai 2022

190 *HL Deb 10 April 1975 vol.359 cc180-1*

191 Quoted in Charlton 1989 pp.42-43

192 Callaghan interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.44

193 Donaghy 2014

194 *Chronicles of Modern Terrorism* Barry & Judith Rubin 2009. Surprisingly little information is available regarding this attack, the attackers or its objective. No group appears to have claimed responsibility.

195 *UN Yearbook 1975*. In December, 1950 a British *Order in Council* had extended the borders of the colony to include the adjacent continental shelf areas. This was followed in 1958 by the UN's *Convention on the Continental Shelf* which recognised that, for the purposes of international law, islands had their own shelf areas. Unsurprisingly, Argentina declined to sign that convention. Also, geologically, it appears that the archipelago sits upon its own micro-plate. See May 9 below. Also - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2021/03/geology-of-the-falkland-islands-1999.pdf>

May 8th, in London, at the Foreign Office, Minister David Ennals hosts an informal seminar attended by the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee.

*“The agenda covered oil exploration, alginates, fisheries, welfare, the constitution and restrictions on foreigners owning land. There was no attempt to reach conclusions or recommendations, although ideas discussed were passed on to Governor French.”*¹⁹⁶

*“The U.K.F.I.C's representatives included Bill Hunter Christie, Frank Mitchell, Sir John Barlow and Jack Abbott (from the Local Branch in Stanley). Professor Donald Griffiths, a geologist from Birmingham University, and Dr. Peter Calvert, a Politics Lecturer at Southampton University, contributed their specialist knowledge of the region. Commercial interests were represented by the Chairman of the F.I.C., the Chief Manager of Lloyds Bank International Latin American Section, the Managing Director of the Baring Bank, and a consultant for the Argentine National Bank. Twelve Members of Parliament attended including John Biggs-Davison, James Johnson, Nigel Fisher and Tam Dalyell. Finally, there were officials from the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and Department of Energy.”*¹⁹⁷

*“Large British corporations with investments in Latin America argued that Britain’s commercial interests were being put at risk by the failure to resolve the sovereignty dispute with Argentina. This was the argument put forward by executives of Barings Bank, Lloyds Bank and a former director of Shell at a secret seminar on the Falklands organised by the FCO on 8 May 1975. The only business executive at the meeting who was in favour of maintaining the status quo was the chairman of the Falkland Islands Company.”*¹⁹⁸

May 9th, the Geneva conference on the Law of the Sea closes.

*“... the Geneva Session confirmed universal support of the 12 nautical mile territorial sea and also of a 200 nautical mile economic zone.”*¹⁹⁹

*“During the 1970s, the United Nations was coordinating negotiations on a new Convention on the Law of the Sea, which included the concept of an Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) in which a sovereign state had the right to explore and exploit the maritime resources within 200 nautical miles. Although negotiations on the Convention (UNCLOS) did not end until 1982 and did not come into force until 1994, the concept of 200-mile maritime zones was very much in the minds of officials ...”*²⁰⁰

May 14th, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan proposes to the Prime Minister that dialogue with Argentina proceed through the offices of Britain’s Ambassador in Buenos Aires. But in strict secrecy, to avoid leaks.²⁰¹

*“Foreign Secretary James Callaghan wrote to the Prime Minister in early 1975 warning that if Britain refused to talk to Argentina, not only would it lead to confrontation, but it ‘would also preclude any possibility of exploring or exploiting either oil deposits on the Falkland Islands Continental Shelf or the resources of the South Atlantic as a whole’. The paragraph on oil in this letter is completely redacted – as are many of the references to oil in the National Archives collection of government papers,...”*²⁰²

196 Ellerby 1990 p.200 citing *U.K.F.I.C. archive (Sussex), group D, file 9: Coles to Christie, 7 Apr. 1975*. Also *Christie to Hall, 31 Dec. 1974*

197 *Ibid.*

198 Livingstone 2018 citing *FCO 7/2958*. Hardly a secret.

199 *Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea* Milenko Milic 1976. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was not finalized until 1982. Argentine signed, but did not ratify. *cf.* 1966 & 1977

200 Livingstone 2018

201 *FO 7/2950*

202 Livingstone 2018 citing *Callaghan to Wilson PM/75/38 May 14, 1975 in FCO 7/3373*

Callaghan also suggests that talks concerning the Falklands could be eased by an offer of joint oil exploration. ²⁰³

From Argentina, a group of actors fly into Port Stanley to stage a series of theatrical, cultural and musical events organised by LADE in the Town Hall. ²⁰⁴

May 18th, in Washington DC, Argentina's Foreign Minister Alberto Vignes has lunch with the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. The situation regarding the Falkland Islands is briefly discussed. ²⁰⁵

May 24th, in Buenos Aires, during an interview with Vignes, Ambassador Ashe proposes *in camera* discussions with regard to a joint development of the resources of the south-west Atlantic. Vignes promptly counter proposes that any negotiations on economic cooperation should be linked to the immediate transfer of sovereignty followed by simultaneous leaseback for a period of 15 years.

May 27th, in Stanley, Island councillors propose that an 'economic study' be pursued to advise on the long term prospects of both the Falklands, and the Dependencies. ²⁰⁶

"On the length of the airstrip at Stanley, lies the Falkland Islands' future. An entirely unpublicised, unofficial delegation from the islands is, I understand, currently engaged in discussion of the matter with the Foreign Office. There is no other British territory which can only be reached by courtesy of a foreign country.

The present airstrip being inadequate for the landing of long international-flight aircraft, islanders can only leave and return home by way of Argentina. Furthermore, these British, either leaving or entering their Islands, are obliged to get a White Card permit either from the Argentine Office in the Islands or in Buenos Aires, before the Argentine airline (LADE) will confirm a booking. Adding insult to injury, Argentine personnel enter the Islands without it. No such right is granted to Argentina by the Communications Agreement of 1971 with Britain.

In present circumstances, Argentinians can enter the Islands and could well form a nucleus for takeover, before counter-action could be taken... The key to development and control lies in communications. Conditions for these were laid down by the 1971 Agreement, by which the British government undertook to replace the temporary airstrip by a permanent airfield. Work on it is expected to start this year, but Argentina has refused any aid which will make an international airport and allow the Islanders direct flights to Ascension or the Cape (though this would be cheaper).

The current field under construction has a runway of only 1,250 metres; 2,000 metres are needed for international jets. The Seychelles were provided with an international port by British aid; why not the Falklands? In the meantime, it has cost about £1 million to get Johnston Construction and their machinery to the Islands, and the decision whether to do the job properly or not must be made in the next few months." ²⁰⁷

203 A suggestion approved by the Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee in July, 1975. A Cabinet Committee, its existence was first admitted in 1962 and was confirmed as still in being by Thatcher in 1979. Until 1992, the membership of Cabinet Committees, their remits and decisions, were not made public.

204 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

205 *US National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820125-0187*. No details provided. The primary conversations appears to have focused on Cuba.

206 *Ibid*. See October

207 *Infamous White Card* Molly Mortimer 1975 in *The Spectator* July 11, 1975 p.12

June 19th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador David Ashe again meets with the Foreign Minister. Vignes indicates that Argentina is prepared to start a discussion on economic cooperation. A condition, however, is that Argentina is allowed to occupy the uninhabited islands of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, without condemnation by the UK.

*“That proposal was unacceptable to Britain and the absence of talks on sovereignty unacceptable to the Argentines. For some time following that there were no negotiations.”*²⁰⁸

“We have undertaken a careful examination of the resolutions in question. They refer only to the Falkland Islands and do not explicitly mention the Dependencies. Moreover, the list of non-self-governing territories compiled by General Assembly Committees in 1946 and subsequently in 1964 referred exclusively to the “Falkland Islands.”...”²⁰⁹

July 14th, in London, an announcement is made to Parliament; *“The association of the Falkland Islands, as a dependent territory for whose external affairs the United Kingdom remains responsible, will, in accordance with Article 117 of the Act of Accession to the Community Treaties, take effect upon a decision of the Council of the European Communities. The Falklands Executive Council has approved.”*²¹⁰

July 16th, in Buenos Aires, Minister Vignes repeats to Ambassador Ashe that talks on economic cooperation alone hold no interest for Argentina.

July 31st, Ashe informs London that the Peronist administration is unlikely to last much longer. However, Argentina’s Foreign Ministry is demanding that sovereignty talks resume before September, when a meeting between Foreign Secretary Callaghan and Argentina’s Foreign Minister is scheduled to take place at the United Nations building in New York.

August 11th, in Buenos Aires, Alberto Vignes is replaced as Foreign Minister by Angel Frederico Robledo.

*“We have been some way across a diplomatic minefield with an Argentine foreign minister who has been thrown out of office just at the moment when there was a chance of launching a new dialogue. We must be extremely cautious before attempting to relaunch it.”*²¹¹

August 18th, in the UK, an article in *The Times* newspaper reports on the activities of the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee; *“... in the autumn they will lead a political campaign to challenge the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s view of the immediate and future needs of the Falkland Islands...”*

August 20th, at the UN building in New York, the Special Committee on Decolonization refers the Falklands question to the General Assembly.

In the Falkland Islands, it is noted that tourism from Argentina has increased.

*“Tourism increased exponentially. In 1970 only 146 people visited the islands; in 1975, 6201. The three tourist attraction that the islands offered were wildlife, trout fishing and a duty free shop. The chronicles of the island press reflect that the last one was the one that most attracted Argentine tourism that “left nothing in the stores, which is why in 1975 the colonial government decided to no longer accept Argentine currency for transactions made in the archipelago, because later it could not be sold at a reasonable rate (in Argentina there was rate control).”*²¹²

208 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

209 *PREM 19-0625 6 May 1982*

210 *HC Deb 14 July 1975 vol.895 cc324-5W*

211 *Callaghan to Ashe August 15, 1975 in FO 7/2952*

212 Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Times* August-September 1975

September 9th, in London, at a meeting of the International Parliamentary Union,²¹³ Argentina accuses Britain of an act of 'international piracy' in establishing a colony on the Falklands. Forewarned, the meeting is picketed by Falkland Islanders and their supporters.

September 16th, in Argentina, in an interview with the press, new Foreign Minister Robledo describes the wishes of the Falkland Islanders as "irrelevant."

September 18th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador protests Robledo's comments. Robledo responds by questioning Britain's insistence on Islander consent for talks to proceed.

In the Falkland Islands, *Gas del Estado* holds an exhibition to promote the advantages of liquefied gas over the tradition peat fuel used by the Islanders. Sixteen Islanders, and the Governor, express an interest.

"... *"The Argentine presence is already accepted in the Falklands as a normal fact" reported González Balcarce.*"²¹⁴

"... *Gas del Estado rendered a gas tube service, and, also, authorized the use of thirty heaters and stoves. It built some distribution premises and two islanders received installation training on the mainland. LADE was in charge of the management and, by May, it reinforced the personnel with Suboficial Principal Jorge Sossa, who was responsible for communications and operation assistant tasks.*"²¹⁵

September 23rd, in New York, in a speech at the opening session of the UN General Assembly, Argentina's Foreign Minister Robledo raises the question of the Falklands.

"We are a people convinced of the merits of negotiation. We apply this to what concerns us most directly. As is well known, my country suffers from the usurpation by a foreign Power of a part of its territory, namely the Malvinas Islands. For that question to be settled, there is no solution other than the return of those islands to the territorial patrimony of the Republic, since their occupation by force was carried out against every law..."

Robledo claims that the application of self-determination to the Falklands; "... was excluded, in view of the fact that the British occupation constitutes a violation of the principle of territorial integrity specifically laid down in resolution 1514."²¹⁶ He also asserts that Argentina has the support of the Non-Aligned Movement.²¹⁷

September 25th, Britain's Foreign Secretary meets with Robledo at the Waldorf Towers, in New York.

*"Robledo conveyed an invitation to Callaghan and the Queen to visit Argentina. He gave no commitment to Callaghan's proposals for economic cooperation, agreeing only to "consider them urgently." Consequently, Callaghan's suggestion that a senior official might go to Buenos Aires to discuss an agenda also went unanswered. Robledo accepted that economic cooperation would be mutually beneficial to promote stability and progress. He did not adopt the hard-line approach expected, nor emphasise the need for early progress on sovereignty. Far from being a source of distraction it appeared that the Falklands might even take a back-seat, as Argentina confronted its domestic woes. Like his predecessor, Robledo saw condominium as providing Argentina's best hope, suggesting that negotiations might be renewed in the near future..."*²¹⁸

213 Founded in 1889, this is the international organisation for Parliaments.

214 Carassia 2022.

215 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

216 *UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4*. See 1960 for comments on the non-retroactive nature of resolution 1514.

217 A forum for the UN members which are not formally aligned with any major power bloc.

218 Donaghy 2014

Minister Robledo assures the Foreign Secretary that there is; “... (no) question of an Argentine invasion of the Islands, nor of an attempt to solve the problem by force.”²¹⁹

Responding, Callaghan informs the Foreign Minister of plans for an economic survey, at the request of the Islanders; “... Its purpose is to quantify the options for future economic development...”²²⁰

“There is no record of a response from Robledo to this, indicating that he had not grasped the magnitude of the enterprise to be undertaken.”²²¹

In Montreal, Canada, on the same day, a protocol is signed concerning the international carriage of parcels by air. On signing, Argentina protests the UK's inclusion of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and the British Antarctic Territory. The UK submits a counter declaration:

“In reference to the declaration made by the Argentine Republic when depositing the instruments of ratification of Protocols Nos. 1, 2 and 3 as well as Montreal Protocol No. 4, signed at Montreal on 25 September 1975, the position of the United Kingdom is well known and remains unchanged. The United Kingdom has no doubt of its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and its incontestable right to apply the treaties thereto. As for the part of the declaration concerning the British Antarctic Territory, the Embassy recalls the contents of the Antarctic Treaty and particularly the provisions of Article IV of the said Treaty.”

October 2nd, in Buenos Aires, after less than two months in office, Frederico Robledo is replaced as Argentina's Foreign Minister by Arauz Castex.

October 9th, from the Mar de la Plata naval base, Argentine submarine ARA *San Luis* (S32) departs for a fifty-day mission to reconnoitre the South Atlantic and survey the coasts of the Falkland Islands.

October 16th, in London, following the suggestions in May from the Islanders, the British Government announces a comprehensive economic survey; to be led by Lord Shackleton. Its purpose to inquire into the development possibilities of the Falkland Islands.²²²

*“Terms of Reference: In the light of the weakening of the colony's economy and the decline in population, and taking into consideration previous reports including those of Theophilus, Armstrong, Comben/Waller and Davies:-”*²²³

1. To examine the resources of the colony and the dependencies and the prospects for economic development with particular reference to agriculture, the wool industry, the need for diversification and possible developments in oil, minerals, fisheries, and alginates and to make recommendations.

2. In this context to examine the present fiscal structure and the provision of government services in the colony and dependencies in the light of the present uncertain economic climate and to make recommendations. To advise on priorities for capital expenditure over the next five years with particular reference to the need for improved infrastructure and to programmes for public utility development and housing.

219 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.38

220 *HC Deb 14 January 1976 vol.903 cc391*

221 Donaghy 2014

222 Franks 1983, para.34. Son of the explorer, and a respected Labour peer, Shackleton was under no illusions that his report was to emphasise the importance of Argentine/Island relations and to include the possibility of a take-over. Fortunately, Shackleton was more inclined towards independent thinking.

223 Theophilus had reported on sheep farming (*The Economics Of Wool Production In The Falkland Islands* 1972). William Davies on grasslands (*The Grasslands of the Falkland Islands* 1939). The other names are proving elusive.

3. To assess the financial, manpower and social obligations of any recommended economic strategy, with particular reference to the encouragement of small scale enterprise and scope for local investment, and the extent to which all these needs can be met from local resources and to the degree which recourse to all potential external resources may be necessary.”

“It appears that the economic survey was sanctioned by the British Government in response to the increase in Argentine hostility. In April 1975 the British Embassy in Buenos Aires reported the need for a diplomatic initiative after the Argentine Government warned that the only option open was a resort to force. ... The Government wanted to persuade Parliament and the Islanders through an “informed approach” that collaboration with Argentina was the answer.”²²⁴

“Concerned about the continuing decline of the local economy, councillors had requested ‘a comprehensive economic study’ of the Falklands region, which would advise on long-term prospects and include the Dependencies. But for the British Government there were different motives at hand. The Foreign Secretary saw this as an ideal way to show the islanders that future development rested on cooperation with Argentina rather than dependence on Britain, and thereby encourage closer links... by the Autumn of 1975, certain factors had convinced the Foreign Office that the councillor’s proposals justified investigation.”²²⁵

From Edinburgh, Scotland, the firm of Christian Salvesen informs the British Foreign Office that they now own two old whaling harbours on South Georgia, and are trying to acquire two more; “It is a long shot, but I think that sometime in the future there may be use for these bases, either for fishing or for oil. I hope that HMG will not absent-mindedly hand it over to Argentina.”

In the Netherlands, at the Hague, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) presents an Advisory Opinion (AO) regarding the situation in Western Sahara.²²⁶

“54. The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 1, paragraph 2, indicates, as one of the purposes of the United Nations: “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples...” This purpose is further developed in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. Those provisions have direct and particular relevance for non-self-governing territories, which are dealt with in Chapter XI of the Charter. As the Court stated in its Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 on *The Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)*:

“... the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the **principle of self-determination applicable to all of them**. (ICJ reports 1971. p.31)”

55. The principle of self-determination as a right of peoples, and its application for the purpose of bringing all colonial situations to a speedy end, were enunciated in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In this resolution the General Assembly proclaims “the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations”. To this end the resolution provides inter alia:

“2. **All peoples have the right to self-determination**; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development

224 Ellerby 1990 p.201 citing *Time and Chance* J. Callaghan 1987

225 Donaghy 2014

226 A disputed territory on the north-west coast of Africa.

*The above provisions, in particular paragraph 2, thus confirm and emphasize that the application of **the right of self-determination requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned.** ...*

*59. The validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples, **is not affected** by the fact that in certain cases the General Assembly has dispensed with the requirement of consulting the inhabitants of a given territory. Those instances were based either on the consideration that a certain population did not constitute a 'people' entitled to self-determination or on the conviction that a consultation was totally unnecessary, in view of special circumstances”* ²²⁷

As is usual, some of the judges publish separate opinions.

“... it is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people.” ²²⁸

“... it follows ... that the principle of self-determination could be dispensed with only if the free expression of the will of the people was found to be axiomatic in the sense that the result was known to be a foregone conclusion or that consultations had already taken place in some form or that special features of the case rendered it unnecessary.” ²²⁹

“... (an) exception exist(s), for example, in the case of Gibraltar or Malvinas (Falkland Islands) where the General Assembly has requested the States concerned to negotiate the issue of sovereignty and the transfer of territory, and they have refused to accept the effects of a referendum or consultation to the present inhabitants of these territories.” ²³⁰

“The self-proclamation of a "people" and a subsequent claim of entitlement to the right to self-determination are ... insufficient.” ²³¹

“... it cannot be denied that self-determination has, at the very least, attained a position of high normative regard, being seen as a peremptory norm with regard to the issue of decolonisation.” ²³²

“Although the ICJ approved of its earlier opinion in the Namibia proceedings that the principle of self-determination applied to ‘all’ Chapter XI Non-Self-Governing Territories, it cast doubt on the generality of this proposition in what is arguably the most ambiguous passage in the Western Sahara Opinion:... (para. 59) ... The fact that the passage is not supported by factual examples makes it particularly prone to a wide range of interpretations and to speculation regarding the specific anomalous cases the ICJ had in mind. ... it is important to recall that in the ICJ’s view, the fact that the General Assembly dispensed with a consultation of the inhabitants does not affect [t]he validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples.’...” ²³³

²²⁷ *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975* (advisory opinions have no mandatory effect). My emphasis. For the full ICJ report see <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/61/061-19751016-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>

²²⁸ Judge Dillard *ICJ ref: 061-19751016-ADV-01-07*

²²⁹ Judge Nagendra Singh quoted in Trinidad 2018 p.57

²³⁰ *Los Derechos Argentinas Sobre Las Islas Malvinas* Alfredo Bruno Bologna 1982

²³¹ *The Malvinas/Falklands Between History and Law* M. G. Kohen & F. D. Rodríguez 2017 p.214. *cf.* January, 1952 & August, 1982

²³² *Uti Possidetis: The Procrustean Bed of International Law?* M. Wesley 2017

²³³ *Self-determination in Disputed Colonial Territories* Jamie Trinidad 2018 p.56 & 58

“... in its decision the Court explicitly upheld the Saharawis’ right of self-determination, in paragraphs 70 and 162 of its Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975 ... If the Falklands case were taken to the ICJ, the Court might decide along similar lines: that there were certain historical links between Argentina and the Falklands, but they were not sufficient to override the self-determination of the Falkland Islanders.”²³⁴

“... following the Chagos opinion (2019), a persuasive argument can be made that self-determination and the right to decolonization come close to being one and the same thing,.. Identifying the right to self-determination with colonization has the further advantage that all the traditional and difficult questions relating to self-determination no longer pose insurmountable obstacles. If self-determination is essentially limited to non-self-governing territories (i.e. colonies), there is no need to figure out what on earth the notion of ‘peoples’ means, as in the phrase ‘all peoples have a right to self-determination’. ... the identity of the right-holder is now clear: the right-holder is the non-self-governing territory. Secondly, the consequence of self-determination has become clear as well: the self-determination of non-self-governing territories will ideally materialize in their independence, unless they themselves opt freely for association or integration with another state, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV).”²³⁵

October 22nd, from Buenos Aires, Argentina’s Foreign Ministry comments regarding the Shackleton mission.

“In response to the proposal made by the British Government to send a mission to the Islas Malvinas with the object of carrying out an economic and financial survey of the archipelago and the surrounding areas, the Ministry of External Relations and Worship states that:-

- 1) It reiterates in full the communique issued by the Foreign Ministry on 19 March 1975;*
- 2) Contrary to a report appearing in a London newspaper, the Argentine Government has on no occasion given its consent to the mission in question;*
- 3) Since the question of the Malvinas Islands is subject to the procedure recommended by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII), the parties to the dispute must abstain from any new unilateral action affecting the basic aspects of the question. Any such action will undermine the clear objective of the resolutions in question and will be contrary to the spirit which has prevailed in all the dealings so far between the two countries concerning the archipelago, and also is unacceptable to the Argentine Government;*
- 4) The mission which Great Britain proposes to send would not be welcome because investigations to assess the possibility of the economic exploration of the natural resources of the Malvinas Islands – resources which therefore belong to the Argentine Republic – would violate the principle of not undertaking new action. Consequently, the sending of this mission constitutes an inconsiderate act which the Argentine Foreign Ministry would not wish to interpret as an attitude of provocation because this would imply that Great Britain does not accept the normal continuation of bilateral negotiations, a fact which could have unforeseeable and certainly serious consequences for which Great Britain alone would be responsible;*
- 5) The essential factor in the process of reaching a final settlement of the dispute is negotiation between the two Governments and hence the initiation of acts which may prejudice this process will upset relations between the Argentine Republic and Great Britain and will impede the achievement of a peaceful settlement of the Malvinas question;*

234 *Falklands Facts and Fallacies: The Falkland Islands in History and International Law* Graham Pascoe 2020 p.317

235 *Shrinking Self-determination – The Chagos Opinion of the International Court of Justice* Prof. Jan Klabbers in *European Society of International Law ESIL Reflections* 2019 vol 8, issue 2

6) *Once more, Argentina urges Great Britain to take the view that negotiations to settle the dispute concerning sovereignty over the archipelago is the best procedure and is in conformity with the decisions of the United Nations and the recognized standards of the civilized world.*"

In Buenos Aires, Ambassador David Ashe is summoned to the Foreign Ministry. To be presented with a communique complaining that the Shackleton mission; "... represents a step not previously concerted with the Argentine Government." Ashe responds that the the Foreign Minister, Robledo, had been informed in September, without making any objection.


October 23rd, Ambassador Ashe informs London, warning that Shackleton's plans need to ensure that he does not pass through Argentina, as he would make a "*sensational hostage.*"²³⁶

October 28th, from London, Argentina's Ambassador, Manuel de Anchorena, is summoned back to Buenos Aires for '*consultations.*'

November 5th, in Buenos Aires, Anchorena and Ambassador Ashe meet. Anchorena complains about Britain's insistence that Islander consent is required before any progress can be made; and the emphasis that is placed upon their '*wishes*', rather than their interests.²³⁷

*"It is of course impossible to rule a people according to their interests but against their wishes, since their wishes define what their interests are. Interests are not an objective reality; they are defined by the perspective of the person defining them."*²³⁸

November 10th, Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces that Lord Shackleton will not be permitted to transit through Argentina. Off the north-eastern coast of East Falkland, Argentine submarine ARA *San Luis*, covertly photographs the Cape Pembroke lighthouse (right).



November 13th, in Buenos Aires, British Ambassador David Ashe meets with ex-Minister Robledo and his successor, Arauz Castex; to seek an explanation as to why Argentina suddenly objects to the economic survey and why Robledo had not argued against the idea in September. Initially Robledo denies that Callaghan had mentioned the survey but then, on seeing the notes from the meeting, excuses himself by saying that there had been too much to take in at that time, and there had been no talk of appointing Lord Shackleton.²³⁹

November 14th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry informs the British Embassy that the research ship, *RSS Shackleton*, will require Argentine permission to carry out any activity within 200 miles of the Argentine coast. Also that '*Argentine waters*' is being interpreted to include the area around the archipelago in accordance with "*Argentine law.*" Britain's Ambassador informs Foreign Secretary Callaghan.

*"So, what had seemed to be a very fruitful means of keeping the Argentines engaged, and recognising some of their legitimate interests in the waters around the Falklands, disappeared. The Argentine government raised a lot of difficulty about the Shackleton expedition,..."*²⁴⁰

In Stanley, on the same day, elections for the Legislative Council are postponed until January 1976.²⁴¹

236 FO 7/2961

237 FO 7/2954

238 Pascoe 2020 p.311

239 Donaghy 2014. Neither side had taken an interpreter for the September meeting.

240 James Callaghan quoted in Charlton 1989 p.47

241 *The Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order 1975 (no.1706)*. Delay was an attempt to hold the elections under a new Constitution; then waiting approval in the UK. See below.

November 21st, in Buenos Aires, Britain's naval *attaché* receives a warning that *RSS Shackleton* will be 'arrested' if found in seas that Argentina claims as its own.

December 5th, at the UN, the Fourth Committee recommend that the Falklands issue be deferred till 1976. ²⁴²

December 8th, Britain informs the General Assembly that; "... exchanges between the United Kingdom Government and the Argentine Government have continued over the past year with a view to finding a settlement of the differences between us. In seeking a solution, my Government has said repeatedly that we wish to observe the terms of resolution 1514 (XV). It is therefore the wishes of the people of the island which must be paramount, not an arbitrary idea of what their interests might be..." ²⁴³

Britain's representative also informs the Assembly that all information regarding possible oil deposits around the Falklands have been shared with Argentina, and that the UK has no intention of acting unilaterally; "My Government has similarly informed the Argentine Government, as a courtesy about its proposal for a survey of the economy of the island, and we regret that this survey is apparently regarded by the Argentine Government as an unacceptable innovation."

Exercising a right of reply, Argentina's mission writes to the Secretary-General; "The Argentine Government reserves its position regarding the responsibility which rests with the British Government for the breaking-off of negotiations and will not fail to assert its rights in the form which it deems most appropriate."

"On December 8, without conditional verbs, Ortiz de Rozas denounced at the United Nations that the United Kingdom had unilaterally abandoned the negotiations arranged by that organization in 1965 (sic) and issued a tacit ultimatum, "The negotiating stage within the United Nations framework is rapidly running out," he said, "and despite of its desire for a peaceful settlement, the Argentine government ... will not fail to assert its rights in the way it deems most appropriate"." ²⁴⁴

December 9th, in the Falkland Islands, a building used by Argentine YPF staff burns down. ²⁴⁵

December 12th, in Buenos Aires, *La Nacion* reports comments by Minister Ortiz de Rozas: "... The limits of our patience and tolerance must not be underestimated should we be confronted with an obstinate and unjustified refusal to negotiate." ²⁴⁶

December 17th, in Paris, France, during an International Economic Cooperation conference, Britain's Foreign Secretary James Callaghan talks to Argentina's Foreign Minister, Arauz Castex. Callaghan indicates his belief that progress can be made concerning economic co-operation. Castex suggests that if Argentine scientists are added to Shackleton's team, it would change the surveys' image in Buenos Aires. Callaghan expresses his doubts, but agrees to put the proposal to Lord Shackleton.

December 18th, in London, Shackleton agrees to accept the addition of a small Argentine contingent to his team. Informed, Castex, suggests that a retired Argentine Admiral, Jose Alvarez, be added to the party, but demands that he be given the position of 'deputy leader.' Castex also adds that Shackleton's conclusions, to be sent to both Governments, must be followed by sovereignty negotiations.

"(Shackleton) was portrayed as a 'pirate and buccaneer' to his evident delight." ²⁴⁷

242 *UN Yearbook 1975*

243 *Ibid.*

244 Carassai 2022

245 Cause unknown, although a number of Argentine journals implied a deliberate act of arson.

246 Ortiz de Rozas in *La Nacion* December 12, 1975

247 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

Callaghan offers to take Alvarez on as ‘*chief Argentine scientist*’, but declines to reopen talks. Minister Arauz Castex protests. ²⁴⁸

“(Castex) said that he would not want to interpret the British decision as a provocative attitude, because in that case Great Britain would actually be interrupting the bilateral negotiation and this could “have unforeseeable and surely serious consequences, for which only Great Britain would be responsible”.” ²⁴⁹

December 29th, Shackleton's team arrive in Brazil. Shortly thereafter they join HMS *Endurance*. ²⁵⁰

“... the mission was composed of five experts entrusted with assessing and making recommendations concerning the prospects for development in oil, minerals, fisheries, wool and alginates. The mission was further requested to advise on the need for capital expenditure over the next five years, and to assess the financial and social implications of any recommendations.” ²⁵¹

December 31st, the estimated population of the Falkland Islands is 1,967 with 32 births, 15 marriages and 15 deaths during 1975. ²⁵²

1976 – January 2nd, from Buenos Aires, Argentina's Government issues a statement asserting; “... that the United Kingdom representatives had finally stated that they were not in a position to accept the reopening of negotiations aimed at solving the dispute on sovereignty;...”

January 3rd, at Stanley, Shackleton and HMS *Endurance* arrive in the harbour.

“About 200 people waited for them at the entrance to the governor's house, “I shall do everything I can to help them”, Shackleton declared.” ²⁵³

Argentina's Foreign Minister Castex describes the timing as “*unfriendly and unthoughtful*.” ²⁵⁴ Castex adds that, if the British Government refuses to resume negotiations, then the two countries are; “... *rapidly moving towards a head-on collision ... his Government could accept no responsibility for such a disastrous outcome*.”

“... the Argentine Foreign Ministry issued a new statement, signed by Minister Arauz Castex, which added a warning to the Argentine people. As a consequence of this “unilateral rupture of the negotiations that had been maintained or pretended to be maintained for five years”, said the statement, attributing probable bad faith to the United Kingdom, “the people of the Republic must be warned that their government, together with the Armed Forces and other organizations that structure the Argentine State, unwaveringly share the latter's zeal for the defence of the dignity and rights of the Nation and of that; they will act without haste, but with all the persistence, prudence and energy that are necessary to achieve justice”.” ²⁵⁵

January 8th, in London, intelligence reports suggest that an invasion by Argentina remains unlikely.

248 *Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire* K. Dodds 2002 p.151. Also Donaghy 2014

249 Carassai 2022 citing *Revista de Polica Internacional* Sept 1977 no.153, vol.3 pp.36-37

250 The original plan was that the team join *Endurance* at Montevideo. However, Uruguay was unwilling to offend Argentina, at least publicly. It was later claimed in South America's Press that *Endurance* waited at Montevideo for the arrival of Shackleton, before sailing to meet an airlift. Other sources suggest that the team boarded the British ship at Montevideo as planned, but under some secrecy.

251 *UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4*

252 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1974 & 1975*. This appears to be the last year that this review was published.

253 Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Times* February 2, 1976 and *Crónica* January 3, 1976.

254 On January 3, 1833, HMS *Clio* had arrived at Port Louis to eject a trespassing Argentine garrison. Warnings having been given to Buenos Aires in 1829 and 1832. See 1829, 1832 & 1833

255 Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Times* February 2, 1976 and *Crónica* January 3, 1976.

*“... the JIC assessed that a sudden invasion was unlikely, but that there was an increased likelihood of Argentine political and economic action against British interests and that, as the sequence of Argentine measures proceeded, the possibility of military operations must be regarded as that much nearer.”*²⁵⁶

January 12th, from London. James Callaghan writes to Arauz Castex, referring to the dispute as “sterile.”²⁵⁷

*“Great Britain, ... contrary to the letter and the spirit of Resolution 2065, at the beginning of 1976, insisted upon the right of self-determination of the Malvinas, refused to discuss the problem in-depth and attempted to replace the subject of sovereignty with Argentine-British economic cooperation in the region of the south-western Atlantic.”*²⁵⁸

In the South Atlantic, as military aircraft overfly the Falklands, Argentina indicates that its Ambassador to London, on leave in Buenos Aires, will not be returning and suggests that Britain's Ambassador be recalled; *“... the Argentine Government have evidently reached the conclusion that they must make a gesture.”*²⁵⁹

January 14th, in London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan makes a statement to Parliament.

*“Our traditional friendship with Argentina is marred only by issues arising from the Argentine claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, whose inhabitants wish to remain British. Successive British Governments have undertaken to respect their wishes. ... As the House is aware, the Argentine Government have stated that the Argentine ambassador, who returned to Argentina in October, will remain in Buenos Aires until further notice and that, in view of the present state of affairs over the Falklands question, it would be advisable for the British Government to withdraw our Ambassador. ... I shall shortly be recalling Her Majesty's ambassador for consultations.”*²⁶⁰

*“Mr. Callaghan noted that the HMS Endurance of the Royal Navy was in the vicinity of the archipelago and that two other vessels were ready to proceed there,...”*²⁶¹

*“In a press interview the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina said that the decision to request the recall of the United Kingdom Ambassador did not mean a break in diplomatic relations with that country.”*²⁶²

*“Staff who remained ..., monitored these reports but they concluded that the tenor of press comment was predictable and that the Argentine Government seemed willing to control displays of anti-British sentiment. There had been no threats or demonstrations against the Embassy itself, for example, and no repetition of Cronica's invasion campaign of December 1974.”*²⁶³

January 15th, in Argentina, Arauz Castex is dismissed and replaced as Foreign Minister by Raul Quijano.

*“The withdrawal of Ambassadors, which had a favourable response in nationalist sectors, cost Arauz Castex his position...”*²⁶⁴

In London, on the same day, members of Britain's Foreign Office discuss the possibility that the prospect of oil exploration may sway the attitudes of the Islanders towards Argentina; *“Some in the FCO saw oil primarily – in*

256 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

257 *The Falklands, Politics and War* G. M. Dillon 1989

258 General Juan E. Gugliamelli in *Estrategia* No. 43-44 1977

259 *FO 7/3208*. There was not, however, a breach in diplomatic relations, just the absence of senior appointees.

260 *HC Deb 14 January 1976 vol.903 cc391*

261 *Permanent Representative of Argentina to the Chairman of the Special Committee on Decolonization May 6th 1976*

262 *UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4*.

263 Dillon 1989

264 Carassai 2022

*the words of one official – as ‘a lever to cajole the Islanders into accepting that there could be ... benefit from closer relations with Argentina’. ...”*²⁶⁵

January 16th, at a regular meeting of the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organisation of American State (OAS) the presence of oil reserves near the Falklands is considered.

*“On 16 January 1976, the OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee stated that exploring the potential of energy resources on the Malvinas islands was a threat to hemispheric security and, at Rio de Janeiro, it declared that Argentina had unobjectionable sovereignty rights over the Malvinas archipelago.”*²⁶⁶

January 19th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Ashe returns to London, leaving *charge d'affaires* John Shakespeare as the senior position at the Embassy.

At Port Stanley, following on from that of November 1975, a new *Statutory Instrument* further delays elections for the Legislative Council of the Falkland Islands, until February, 1976.²⁶⁷

January 20th, in London, *The Times* newspaper suggests that the Falkland Islanders are merely 'pawns'.²⁶⁸

January 23rd, a Foreign Office official complains about the Falkland Islands' Committee's effectiveness in Parliament; *“... their ability to manipulate a dedicated and vocal parliamentary lobby could limit severely HMG's room for manoeuvre.”*²⁶⁹

February 4th, in the South Atlantic, an Argentine destroyer, *Almirante Storni* (Capt. Ramón Arosa), attempts to stop and 'arrest' the unarmed RRS *Shackleton*. The British ship is 78 miles south of Stanley and some 450 miles east of the Argentine coast. Capt. Arosa instructs the British vessel to steer for Ushuaia. From the RRS *Shackleton*, Capt. Philip Warne radios the Governor in Stanley before responding to Arosa; *“We are not in Argentine waters; we are more than 200 miles from the Argentine mainland and the British Government does not recognise these as Argentine waters. I have no intention of stopping.”*

Shots are fired across *Shackleton's* bows; an action observed by helicopters from HMS *Endurance*.

*“... an instruction was given for the vessel Shackleton to be intercepted for the purpose of inspecting the vessel. On 4 February the Argentine naval destroyer Almirante Storni approached the Shackleton and told it to stop its engines and to permit boarding for inspection, as is customary in these cases. The captain of the United Kingdom ship continued his course, disregarding the instruction and thus endangering the lives of the crew and the safety of the ship. In accordance with existing rules, warning shots were fired from small arms, but, in the knowledge that the United Kingdom vessel was carrying explosives and in order to exercise maximum prudence, the commander of the Argentine vessel was instructed not to use force., as would have been appropriate in the circumstances. The reckless and provocative attitude of the British captain is clearly indicative of the intention to conceal the activities in which the Shackleton had been engaged.”*²⁷⁰

“In the first few days of February 1976, an Argentine Navy ship fired warning shots at RRS Shackleton which had refused to be boarded and inspected. This incident occurred 87 miles from the coast of East Falkland and

265 Livingstone 2018 citing *Heap to Hall January 15, 1976 FCO 7/3234*

266 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

267 *The Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order 1976 (no.52)*. A further delay in the hope that the Islands' new Constitution would be approved. This would not be achieved until 1977. *cf.* February 27, 1976 below

268 Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islanders may be no more than pawns in a game Britain does not want to win* Michael Frenchman January 20, 1976 p.12

269 *Hall to Carless January 23, 1976 FCO 7/3232*

270 *Permanent Representative of Argentina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations February 23rd 1976*

was a clear sign that Buenos Aires was demonstrating that the waters around the archipelago were Argentine."²⁷¹

*"... to fire five shots at an unarmed research ship, and to threaten to fire to hit it, cannot be said to be part of a "peaceful solution" as required under Resolution 2065 – Argentina was treating Resolution 2065 as void."*²⁷²

*"On the continent, the Navy congratulated the captain of the Storni and the Chamber of Deputies, at the same time, sent the Navy "its most energetic congratulations"."*²⁷³

Throughout the time it takes to sail to Stanley, RSS *Shackleton* is continually harassed by the *Almirante Storni* and by Argentine aircraft. One of these, a *Neptune*, flies at mast height above the British vessel.

*"The British captain, under orders radioed by the Malvinas governor, Neville French, given on the radio, did not come to a halt and refused to receive a group of inspectors on board, or to continue sailing up to Ushuaia guided by the Storni. In order to pressure further, the Argentine destroyer actions were supported by an SP-2H Neptune aircraft, while the Storni was firing at the Shackleton bow, which continued towards Port Stanley."*²⁷⁴

Almirante Storni only breaks away some six miles from the archipelago.²⁷⁵

*"London's intelligence sources later confirmed that the plan to intercept the vessel had been in existence for about six weeks prior to the incident, and that the action had been inspired by the armed forces rather than the Argentine Government. The JIC concluded, nevertheless, that Argentina's military commanders were opposed to military invasion and that a policy of 'continued pin-pricks' rather than a precipitated attack was likely."*²⁷⁶

*"On 4 February 1976, the oceanographic vessel RRS Shackleton was intercepted on the high seas by the Argentine Navy destroyer Almirante Storni. This unjustifiable action by the Argentine warship was a serious obstacle for the rapprochement policy. The British vessel just refused to stop and continued sailing and the Argentine ship did not take any punitive actions. When they arrived at Stanley and the news was disseminated, Argentina's opponents found the argument they needed to express themselves against said country. Bloomer Reeve's family returned, stating that living conditions were uncomfortable. The Governor made every effort to reverse the situation and indicated that dissatisfaction stemmed from the British company, the airstrip constructor, since only 25% of workers were residents."*²⁷⁷

In Buenos Aires, with Ambassador Ashe now in London, *charge d'affairs* John Shakespeare receives instructions to register a formal protest. At the same time, Shakespeare is summoned by Argentina's Foreign Ministry to see the new Foreign Minister, Raul Quijano; *"I had not been with him more than thirty seconds before I realised that he in fact had summoned me to hand over an Argentine protest."*²⁷⁸

271 *The British Political Parties & the Falklands War* Domenico M. Bruni 2018

272 Pascoe 2020 p.316

273 Carassai 2022

274 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

275 *The Falkland Islands as an International Problem* P. J. Beck 1987. Anecdotal accounts suggest that the two vessels came close enough together for the British sailors to respond by throwing turnips and potatoes at *Almirante Storni*.

276 Dillon 1989. The same policy that Argentina had employed in the 1930s when the term '*pin-pricks*' was first used.. JIC = Joint Intelligence Committee

277 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

278 Quoted in Donaghy 2014

“When the charge d'affaires sought an explanation in Buenos Aires, he discovered that the new Foreign Minister Raul Quijano had pre-empted his visit... Quijano blamed the British government for the incident...”²⁷⁹

Shakespeare tells Quijano that the British Government; “... took the gravest view of the incident which, in other times, might well have been regarded as an act of war.”

In London, Argentina's *chargé d'affaires* is also summoned to the Foreign Office to receive a copy of Britain's protest. The *chargé*, Rafael Gowland, claims that the incident took place within Argentine waters.

February 5th, in Britain's House of Commons, the incident is reported to MPs by Edward Rowlands.

*“The incident took place 78 miles south of Cape Pembroke as "Shackleton" was returning from a period of scientific work in the South-West Atlantic under an international programme. On learning of the incident, my right hon. Friend immediately instructed the charge d'affaires at Buenos Aires to deliver the strongest protest to the Argentine Government and to request that the Argentine destroyer immediately be ordered to stop harassing the "Shackleton". I also protested to the Argentine charge here in equally vigorous terms. The Argentine Government have been left in no doubt of the serious view we take of this incident.”*²⁸⁰

In Buenos Aires, Argentina responds to the UK's protest with a formal *note verbale*.²⁸¹

*“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ... has the honour to refer to the activities of the British ship Shackleton in maritime areas under the jurisdiction of the Argentine Republic. The Argentine Government is aware of the fact that the said ship has been engaged in scientific research activities geophysical and geological surveys – on the Argentine continental shelf, without having complied with the prior requirements of Argentine legislation on the matter, which is in conformity with existing international law. In view of these activities an Argentine naval vessel told it to stop, with a view to exercising the right to inspect and board. This order was disregarded by the British vessel, which thus incurred another violation of the pertinent law. ... The situation is all the more serious in that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship had already reminded the Embassy, in its note of 14 November 1975, that if the planned research activities were to be conducted, the requirements of Argentine law must be respected, which was not done. In view of the foregoing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship lodges the most formal and vigorous protest of the Argentine Government and demands, without prejudice to the continued exercise of the rights on which it is relying, that the British Government take measures to punish those responsible and to prevent the recurrence of such acts.”*²⁸²

In London, Britain's Defence Secretary agrees “reluctantly” to keep *Endurance* in service for another year.²⁸³

*“Every year from 1975 onwards the Defence Ministry announced that they wished to withdraw her (Endurance) from service. Every year, I replied in the same manner, namely that their proposal would have serious consequences for our policy of sustaining the (Falkland) Islands, and I would consent only if she were replaced by a ship of similar or improved capabilities.”*²⁸⁴

279 Donaghy 2014

280 *HC Deb 05 February 1976 vol.904 cc1414-7*

281 A diplomatic communication drafted in the third person and unsigned. This is more formal than an *aide-memoire* but less formal than a *note*.

282 *UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4 Appendix II*. It is actually the South American Continental Shelf and international law did not (and does not) recognise Argentina's outlandish claims regarding that shelf.

283 As ever, Britain's defence budget was under scrutiny. Despite there being little enthusiasm within the MOD for keeping a force in the South Atlantic, the deployment of a support vessel of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary was also approved.

284 James Callaghan quoted in *Britain's 1981 Defence Review 1992* citing *Time and Chance* Callaghan 1987 p.375

February 6th, the UK writes to the President of the United Nations Security Council complaining of; “... *an unlawful, and dangerous action by a warship of the Republic of Argentina against the Royal Research Ship Shackleton peacefully in passage on the high seas ... engaged in scientific research connected with the theories of the continental drift and was a British contribution to the International Geo-dynamics Project.*” The letter contains a demand that Argentina “... *refrain from further harassment on the high seas of peaceful vessels in contravention of recognized international law, and reserved the right to request at a later stage appropriate action by the Security Council on this matter.*”

In Buenos Aires, the newspaper *La Nacion* reports; “*In spite of a request by the Command of Naval Operations, the Navy was not allowed to take more drastic action.*”

“*In the short term the incident prompted not only the precautionary deployment of a British frigate to the area and a reprieve for HMS Endurance (whose presence in the region was threatened by the 1974 Defence Review) but also the resumption of more meaningful negotiations on sovereignty.*”²⁸⁵

February 9th, on completing their mission, the Shackleton team return to the UK.

February 10th, in New York, Argentina also complains to the UN Security Council of a; “... *serious violation of the legislation concerning Argentine maritime jurisdiction committed by the United Kingdom vessel Shackleton in consequence of the scientific-geophysical and geological research activities undertaken by that vessel on the Argentine continental shelf which were clearly directed towards geological surveying, with a view to the exploitation of hydrocarbons, if found.*”

February 11th, from London, Edward 'Ted' Rowlands flies into the USA with instructions to inform Minister Quijano, and the UN, that the British are fully prepared to defend the Islands with force if necessary.

“*In February 1976 the chiefs of staff produced a paper on military options. It was the first of four such papers. According to the report all were similar in scope and the language used was substantially the same. Having noted the limitations of the airstrip at Port Stanley and other difficulties, the 1976 paper continued, it would not be practicable to provide, transport and support the force necessary in the Islands to ensure that a determined Argentine attempt to eject the British garrison was unsuccessful.*”²⁸⁶

“*At their rendezvous on 11 February, Quijano assured Rowlands that British ships would not be harassed 'provided they took no survey work in the critical area'.... Quijano wanted to return the dialogue along the lines of earlier formulas. Yet he did not suggest any particular proposal... Quijano was open to the idea of returning the ambassadors once a basis for resuming talks had been reached.*”²⁸⁷

“*On 11 February Ted Rowlands,.. held talks with the Argentine Foreign Minister in New York. He was instructed to ascertain Argentina's views on future sovereignty discussions and restate that the Islands would be defended. ... Ted Rowlands commented eleven years later that the Government had, "... no clear goal... [we] had to feel our way."*”²⁸⁸

In Port Stanley, Vice-Commodore Bloomer Reeves is replaced by Vice-Commodore Rodolfo Abel Carnelli.²⁸⁹

“*At the beginning, thirty young people made use of the study scholarships. In the end, the FIC's speeches convinced them that accepting said scholarships amounted to treason. As a result, only a few students received*

285 Beck 1987

286 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

287 Donaghy 2014

288 Ellerby 1990 p.212 citing Rowlands interview with Charlton, *The Little Platoon (BBC Radio 3)*, broadcast on 3.5.87

289 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

education in Argentina. Another sign of dislike was observed when they left a considerable amount of empty beer cans at Carnelli's doorstep or when the Vicecomodoro noticed that if he ran into a neighbor, he would greet him politely, but if said neighbor was accompanied by someone from the FIC, he would ignore him and even deny him a greeting." ²⁹⁰

February 17th, Argentine newspaper newspaper, *La Nacion*, reports that the British Government, in a *quid pro quo*, has promised that RRS *Shackleton* will not operate in Argentine waters. A report immediately denied by Rowlands. Argentina writes to the UN's Special Committee on Decolonisation disputing the UK's interpretation of UN General Assembly resolutions.

"In presenting its case, the United Kingdom ... persists in citing resolution 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII) in such a way as to suggest that the question of the Malvinas is one involving self-determination. Both of these resolutions clearly refer to the "interests" of the population of the islands and not to its "wishes". When it is considered that Argentina was deprived of the islands by an illegitimate act of force, it becomes clear that the governing principle here is that of territorial integrity ... to take any other view would mean accepting this act of force, which also entailed the expulsion of the indigenous Argentine population and its replacement by subjects of the colonial Power." ²⁹¹

February 19th, in Britain, the Chiefs of Staff inform the government that it is not feasible to establish and maintain a garrison capable of repulsing a determined Argentine attack on the archipelago. ²⁹²

In Stanley, Legislative Council elections are again delayed.

February 27th, in the Falklands, it is announced that approval of the new draft-constitution has been delayed.

"What was not announced and yet what would probably not have been very surprising was the reason for the delay; it being that the new Constitution was not acceptable to a foreign country who want a bigger say in our affairs - Argentina. Apparently some Councillors (elected ones) wanted His Excellency to tell us why the new Constitution had not been approved by the British Government - and this he was not prepared to do. Had he broadcast the truth on our own radio station it would have caused noises in Buencs Aires and this our Masters would not like.

The report of the Select Committee on the Constitution was submitted to Her Majesty's Govt., some time ago and there has been ample time in which to make the necessary amendments before the next General Election. It seems that the approval was stalled last December when the British Ambassador in Bogota gave a press conference in which he happened to mention that the Falkland Islands was soon to have a new Constitution. Argentina saw this change in our Constitution as a deliberate attempt to forge closer links between ourselves and the Motherland which of course our 'neighbours' do not want. They hastily made it known that such a move would cause further deterioration in Anglo-Argentine relations - the result being that the British Government have not recommended approval of our new Constitution to the Privy Council.

As a result of this fiasco we are obliged to hold a General Election (the date of which has now been set for 17th - 21st May) under the existing Constitution which means that out of the nine members of the

290 *Ibid.*

291 *A/AC.109/520*. Those settlers to be found on East Falkland (Soledad) Island in 1833 were from France, Germany, Britain, Uruguay and the Argentine Confederation. They were certainly not '*indigenous*.' Nor were the members of the garrison from Buenos Aires in 1832, the only '*population*' to be told to leave. *cf.* 1833

292 Ellerby 1990 p.212

Legislature (including the Governor who is President) only four will be elected by the populace - the other four members being the Chief Secretary the Financial Secretary and two nominated by the Governor. Had the new Constitution been approved we would have still had a Legislative Council of nine but six of the members would have been Elected Members.” ²⁹³

“My Lords, we are anxious not to postpone the implementation of these changes, which have been asked for by the Falkland Islanders, for longer than is necessary. The noble Lord will, of course, recall that there will be a General Election in the Falkland Islands in May, and it seems to us appropriate that these changes should then be the subject of discussion and confirmation by the popular vote. Secondly, my noble friend Lord Shackleton has rendered very great service to the Islands by visiting them and reporting back on certain economic possibilities to help the islanders. These recommendations are now expected fairly soon. They may require further constitutional changes for their implementation. For those two reasons, it therefore seems that we should postpone the implementation, at least for the next few months.” ²⁹⁴

March 3rd, at the United Nations, and responding to Argentina's February letter, the UK tells the Special Committee on Decolonization that it does; “... not accept that resolutions 2065 and 3160 entail a commitment ... to transfer sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. ... (and) they cannot agree to any settlement of those differences which is not in accordance with the wishes of the Islanders...” ²⁹⁵

“It may also be helpful (to) comment on the incident in 1833, ... when British sovereignty was confirmed. In January 1833, a British naval vessel peaceably reasserted British sovereignty, which was first established in 1765. ... It is a demonstrable fact that since 1833, that is to say for nearly a century-and-a-half, a period which, coincides very closely with the period during which the nation States of Latin America have been able to assert their own right to self-determination, the United Kingdom has maintained an open, continuous, effective and peaceful possession of the Falkland Islands.” ²⁹⁶

Researcher's Comment: Worthy of note as there were remarkably few references by the British Government recalling the history of the British in the Falklands with any degree of accuracy prior to 1982. English involvement in the Falkland Islands actually went back to 1592, when they were first sighted, and 1594 when they were first claimed. Argentina was not recognised as existing by Britain until 1823.

March 4th, in London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan, after speaking to Lord Shackleton, suggests that the runway on East Falkland Island is extended. Reg Prentice, the Minister for Overseas Development, from whose budget the costs are likely to come, is less than enthusiastic.

“Shackleton pointed out privately that a longer runway would make rapid troop deployment possible in the event of a threatened invasion from the mainland.” ²⁹⁷

During the first two weeks of **March**, judges from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) visit the disputed Beagle Channel Islands as part of the arbitration process commenced in 1971 between Argentina and Chile. ²⁹⁸

²⁹³ *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 11, 1976 p.1

²⁹⁴ Lord Goronwy-Roberts (on behalf of the UK Government) in the House of Lords March 17, 1976. Hansard vol369

²⁹⁵ Quoted in *UN Yearbook 1976*

²⁹⁶ *Ibid. cf.* 2012

²⁹⁷ Hastings & Jenkins 1997

²⁹⁸ Set up under the auspices of the British Crown as a result of an arbitration treaty of 1902, the arbitration panel of five ICJ judges was tasked to decide sovereignty over the Beagle Channel Islands, aka the PNL Group (Picton, Nueva and Lennox). See February, 1977

*“Chile presented evidence from maps including the 1882 Lutzina map, which showed the PNL group (and incidentally the Falklands too) as being outside Argentina, and pointed out that these maps only later began to show the islands as Argentinian.”*²⁹⁹

March 10th, in London, following a review of policy initiated by Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, Britain’s Cabinet approves proposals for fresh dialogue with Argentina on all aspects of the dispute. Including the possibility of Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation in the South West Atlantic, and *“the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship.”*³⁰⁰

*“Any agreement we reach eventually with the Argentines will still be subject to the islanders’ concurrence...”*³⁰¹

*“... the then Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was given a mandate to send a personal message to the Argentine Foreign Minister proposing that the two governments should start a fresh dialogue...”*³⁰²

*“The closest Argentina has yet come to military action against the Falklands was in the months before the 1976 coup, ie at a time when the Government of the day were anxious to divert attention from internal problems. The heat was only taken out of the Falklands dispute in 1976 when HMG showed a willingness to negotiate.”*³⁰³

*“As the Cabinet prepared to launch a fresh initiative to discuss the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands with Argentina in March 1976, the FCO’s speaking notes for Foreign Secretary James Callaghan warned that if Britain did not start serious negotiations, Argentina might attack the Islands or ‘a lesser but still harmful option open to the Argentines would be to terminate... valuable contracts for the equipment of their navy and merchant marine’. The rather strange logic was that the Argentine military posed a threat to the Falkland Islands; therefore talks should be pursued which would then enable Britain to sell more military equipment to Argentina.”*³⁰⁴

At the Falklands, on the same day, LADE announce price increases on its flights to Comodoro Rivadavia.

*“To many people in the Islands tonight’s Broadcast Announcement from L.A.D.E. in which they referred to the F27 service as an ‘internal’ flight, must have been yet another irritating and provocative statement in the great Malvinas Saga. What may have escaped their notice is the amazing way in which our ‘friendly neighbours’ are trying to influence our choice of sovereignty. Whilst the flight, to the Argentinians is ‘internal’ we may not pay for the service in pesos nor indeed at the same price! For, although the cost of a ticket to Buenos Aires from here now costs £100.10 (an increase of nearly 100%) and which must be paid in sterling, the same journey paid for in pesos in Argentina costs under 6,000 pesos or, at our exchange rate approximately £10. Now that’s what I call neighbourly!”*³⁰⁵

March 16th, Britain's Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, announces his resignation.³⁰⁶

299 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.594.

300 Franks 1983 para.48

301 Callaghan memorandum quoted in FO 7/3198

302 Hugh Carless memorandum in FO 7/3201 at 304a

303 ALW 0420/325/1 (FCO 07-3801) entitled UK/Argentina dispute over the Falkland Islands – Policy 1980

304 Livingstone 2018 citing Speaking Notes for Secretary of State OPD(76)14: The Falkland Islands: Future Policy March 10, 1976 FCO 7/3198

305 The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review March 11, 1976 p.2

306 Something of a sensation at the time as the announcement was unexpected; although he had warned the Queen of his intention some three months before. Many conspiracy theories followed, but after 13 years as Labour leader and nearly eight years as PM, it would seem that he'd simply had enough.

March 18th, in London, a Cabinet meeting considers making an offer of talks to Argentina. ³⁰⁷

“... the Labour cabinet agreed, on March 1976, to offer talks on sovereignty or ‘the nature of a hypothetical relationship’, with a view to offering Argentina a leaseback.” ³⁰⁸

March 23rd, Argentina is informed of the willingness of the British government to enter into new talks, although it is made clear that discussions are to be on a ‘*without prejudice*’ basis. Also that - “*at the appropriate stage*” - the British delegation will include Islander representation; “*Leaseback was not mentioned, I may say, at any time to the Argentines, even though I was prepared to consider it...*” ³⁰⁹

On the same day, the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* of 1966 (ICCPR) enters into force. ³¹⁰

“Article 1 – All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Article 2 – All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

Article 3 – The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter... ” ³¹¹

“Self-determination was thereby confirmed as a right of all peoples including those of non-self governing territories, and it became an obligation on states responsible for such territories to promote “the realization of the right of self-determination” for the peoples living in them. ... Thus Britain is obliged to promote external self-determination for the Falkland Islanders. To hand the islands to Argentina would be a breach of that obligation...” ³¹²

Researcher's Comment: This event needs to be recognised for the effect it had on Britain's thinking regarding the Falkland Islands, and indeed, all of its old Colonies. Before it, UK governments had tended to consider self-determination as a principle rather than a right held by the peoples of the territories. After the Covenant was ratified by the UK (see below), Britain's administration had little choice but to recognise self-determination as a human right, specifically held by those Non-Self Governing Territories listed at the United Nations. Compliance with the ICCPR is monitored by the United Nations Human Rights Committee. ³¹³

307 CAB 128/58/11

308 Livingstone 2018

309 Callaghan interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.53

310 See December 16, 1966 & May 20, 1976. See also <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf>

311 The UK ratified the Covenant on May 20, 1976 (below). See [https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2200\(XXI\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2200(XXI))

312 Pascoe 2020 p.312

313 As an idea, self-determination was born after WWI, but only really became accepted, if at all, after WWII. Outside of the Non-self Governing Territories (Colonies) listed at the UN, it remains controversial. For a recent consideration, see - <https://falklandtimeline.files.wordpress.com/2021/11/shrinking-self-determination-the-chagos-opinion-of-the-international-court-of-justice-by-jan-klabbers-2019.pdf>

March 24th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's President, Isabella Perón, is ousted in a military coup. ³¹⁴

"The Argentines have long held that they have only two possible policies: negotiation or invasion. We believe that invasion was spoken of, though not prepared for, during the last confused weeks of Isabel Perón's administration." ³¹⁵

A military junta³¹⁶ consisting of General Jorge Rafael Videla (army), Brigadier-General Orlando Agosti (air force) and Admiral Emilio Massera (navy), take command of the country. Videla takes the position of President with Admiral César Guzzetti as Foreign Minister.

"The three commanders of Argentina's armed forces took office as a governing junta today 10 hours after overthrowing and arresting President Isabel Martínez de Perón. The long-awaited military takeover, meticulously planned, was swift and smooth when it came after midnight. The only resistance came in a brief shooting incident at a union headquarters. Numerous Peronist union leaders and political figures were being arrested, both here and in Córdoba, Argentina's second largest city. Martial law was proclaimed and communiques were broadcast threatening terrorists and saboteurs with death. Troops and tanks guarded public buildings, banks and transport services. ... A proclamation was issued saying that the armed forces had taken power "to restore the essential values" of the nation, eradicate left-wing subversion, promote economic development and "assure subsequently the establishment of a republican, representative and federal democracy". The Argentine economy is in serious difficulties. Inflation raised prices 335 percent last year, and \$1 billion in foreign debts must be met by May. ... The United States today recognized the new military Government in Argentina..." ³¹⁷

"... a ruthless dictatorship with a narrow-minded, nationalistic, anti-democratic, anti-socialist, "statist" ideology similar to that of the Fascist regime in Italy under Mussolini, except that whereas Mussolini's dictatorship was essentially secular, the Argentine junta professed an ultra-conservative hardline Roman Catholicism. It was not long before people began to die in large numbers, as the regime stepped up the so-called "Dirty War" ("La Guerra Sucia") against "subversion"." ³¹⁸

Admiral Massera immediately proposes an invasion of the Falkland Islands – *Plan Goa*. Requiring a surprise landing on the archipelago; the removal of the existing population to Montevideo and the introduction of Argentine settlers which would; *"... neatly reverse the 1833 action and forestall any wrangling about the status of the islanders under Argentine rule."* ³¹⁹ Concerns are expressed regarding Britain's submarine force, and Massera's plan is not adopted by the junta.

March 26th, Britain formally recognises the new Argentine government.

"The day before the military took power, the British Government had given a message to the Argentine foreign minister offering secret talks on the Falklands. The Foreign Office's top priority, therefore, on hearing of Isabel Perón's overthrow, was to recognise the regime 'as soon as practicable' in order to ensure that Argentina's new military leaders did not make Britain's secret communication public." ³²⁰

314 The sixth coup in Argentina in seventy-five years – 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962 and 1966. Isabella Perón was detained, either in detention centres or, finally, under house arrest, until July 9, 1981, when she went into exile in Spain.

315 Hugh Carless memorandum in FO 7/3201 at 304a

316 The term means 'meeting/committee or board' and originated in the national and local groups organised during Spain's resistance to Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808.

317 *The New York Times* March 25, 1976

318 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.587. During the lifetime of this regime, 1976-1983, it is estimated that up to 30,000 people may have "disappeared". Not all of them Argentines.

319 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.39

320 *Britain and the Dictatorships of Argentina and Chile 1973-82* Grace Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to Lamour March*

April 5th, in Britain, James Callaghan becomes Labour Party leader and Prime Minister. Anthony Crosland is appointed Foreign Secretary; *“Prime Minister Callaghan decided to undertake a major policy review. He suggested a fresh dialogue with Argentina on all aspects of the dispute, including possible economic cooperation and “the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship” ...”*³²¹

Speaking in Parliament, Viscount Boyd refers to the rights of the Islanders; quoting a Canadian newspaper.

*“Somewhere in the Third World there must be hidden away the secret rules about who is entitled to self-determination. One suspects that they consist of just one rule and one exception. The rule seems to be that any colonial territory, however minuscule, is not only entitled to independence but obliged to demand it. The exception simply states that European populated territories are different.”*³²²

On the same day, representations are made via the Foreign Office in London, and the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, with regard to the large increase in the costs of air travel on the Stanley-Comodoro Rivadavia route.³²³

In Argentina, the military junta introduce a compulsory course on geopolitics in secondary schools. Designed to teach students about; *‘Argentine National Sovereignty’*.³²⁴

*“... Argentines argue that their country was the rightful heir to the entire Viceroyalty and that all those countries that were once a part of the Viceroyalty and which are now independent states – Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay – must be computed as territorial losses. This is a deeply entrenched perception in Argentine culture, ... The perception of huge territorial losses makes the Argentines extremely sensitive to territorial disputes. Insignificant controversies, ... acquire a disproportionate importance...”*³²⁵

April 12th, in London, the Foreign Office proposes that Britain’s Ambassador return to Buenos Aires; *“The new government has made a most promising start and hardly put a foot wrong during its first month in power.”*³²⁶

*“The Foreign Office had suggested reinstating a British ambassador to Argentina less than a month after the March 1976 coup, but Labour minister Ted Rowlands wanted to wait to see how talks on the Falklands progressed.”*³²⁷

April 29th, from Buenos Aires, Argentina’s new Foreign Minister, Admiral César Guzzetti, responds to Britain’s message of March 23rd.

*“Unlike his predecessor, Guzzetti sought clarification on the phrase about the future relationship between the Falklands and Argentina. He also ruled out the return of ambassadors until a basis for a new dialogue had been reached. Guzzetti did not object to islanders participating as part of a British delegation in talks over economic cooperation. However, this did not extend ... (to) sovereignty.”*³²⁸

26, 1976 FCO 7/3027. See March 23, 1976 above.

321 *Peaceful Territorial Change* Arie Marcelo Kacowiz 1994 p.155

322 *Falkland Islanders cling to Britain* in the *Alberta* newspaper. *HL Deb* 20 April 1977 vol.382 cc222-66

323 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* April 15, 1976.

324 Dodds 2002 p.161

325 *Argentine Territorial Nationalism* Carlos Escude in *Journal of Latin American Studies* 1988 (May 1988, vol.20. no.1 pp.139-165

326 *Shakespeare to FCO April 24, 1976 FCO 7/3034* quoted in Livingstone 2018. Shakespeare was Britain’s top official in the Buenos Aires Embassy at that time.

327 Livingstone 2018 p.152 citing *Carless to Larmour April 12, 1976 FCO 7/3029*

328 Donaghy 2014

In London, Lord Shackleton submits his 400-page report – *Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands* – to the Government.³²⁹

“To guide the reader through what is a lengthy report, the following remarks may be of assistance. Volume One contains an introduction by the Chairman and under various chapter headings: a. an analysis of the overall economy of the Falkland Islands; b. description of the resources of the Islands and their surrounding waters; c. an assessment of their development potential, pointing out opportunities, constraints and the impact of any development.

*Volume Two begins by summarising the findings of Volume One, then goes on to discuss and propose a development strategy, and finally presents recommendations for a policy and programme of economic development, together with the financial implications and implementation arrangements which we judge to be necessary for them to be carried out.”*³³⁰

Unexpectedly, it reveals that, contrary to the previous assertions of the Foreign Office, the Islands are not only self-supporting but making a profit for the Exchequer.

*“I would now like to point briefly to one or two important conclusions that emerged from our Survey. The Falkland Islands economy has suffered historically from a lack of local investment and a continual flow of private funds out of the Islands to the United Kingdom. The transfer of company funds alone over the last twenty years has amounted to over £5 million in current prices. A result of this has been that the UK Exchequer has substantially benefited from tax, on both the profits and private dividends remitted to the UK. It is against this economic background, as well as the evaluation of the resource potential of the Islands, that we have put forward recommendations for a development programme which will call for certain UK expenditure, capital and recurrent, over the next five years (see Chapter 20). The major item is the extension of the runway of the new airfield, without which any substantial new development would, in our judgement, be greatly handicapped.”*³³¹

Shackleton estimates that UK based companies had made a £4 million 'profit' between 1950 and 1970, even after defence costs, subsidies and grants had been taken into account. Shackleton is also critical of the powers that the Falkland Islands Company (FIC) has to make decisions affecting the lives of the Islanders, noting that between 1951 and 1974 absentee landowners had taken £11.5 million more in profit than they had invested.³³² Most controversially, Lord Shackleton recommends public investment projects totalling £13 million, in addition to the cost of the proposed runway.

*“The main points of the Shackleton report, which was produced in collaboration with The Economist Intelligence Unit and was published on July 20, 1976 ... pointed principally to the fact that there had been a flow of resources out of the Falklands and a decline in the population, especially a drop in the proportion of native-born to overseas-born inhabitants, and devoted a section to fishing and oil policy.”*³³³

“A lot of the report was about the tremendous opportunities and enormous potential for development... our particular appreciation of the Shackleton Report,.. was that it would be just frankly physically, politically,

329 Exact date unknown. Published July 20, 1976. A copy of *Volume 1 Resources and Development Potential* can be found here - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2023/07/shackleton-report-1976-vol-1.pdf>

330 *Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands* vol.1 p.i

331 *Ibid.* vol.1 p.iv

332 The FIC's response can be found here - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2023/07/fic-on-the-shackleton-survey-1976.pdf>

333 *Keesings Contemporary Archives* June 24, 1977 p.28406

militarily impossible to adopt. It was a grand scale concept of development without any form of negotiated settlement on the other issues."³³⁴

*"As the Shackleton Report showed, Britain exploited the Falklands for decades and made a handsome profit out of them, while at the same time strangling their growth and increasing the hardship of the Falkland Islanders. For over a century British officials filled the important executive positions and treated the Falklands like any other colonial territory in the British Empire, discriminating against the native-born islanders and keeping them out of participation in decision making."*³³⁵

May 7th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's *charge d'affaires*, Shakespeare, considers Shackleton's conclusions.

*"It will be highly unpalatable... It will hardly escape their notice that the whole thrust of the report's recommendations is in the direction of greater self-sufficiency for the Falkland Islands and thus greater independence from Argentina – the opposite, in fact, of what Argentina and, paradoxically, HMG have been trying to achieve..."*³³⁶

*"Argentina wallows in a legalistic and declarative policy on the South Atlantic, ill-designed to profit from the crucial point made by Lord Shackleton that the Falkland Islands were neither economically nor demographically feasible unless they integrated with Argentina."*³³⁷

May 20th, the United Kingdom ratifies the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966). Under the act of ratification, the terms of the ICCPR are extended to Britain's Overseas Territories – including the Falkland Islands. However, Argentina declines to ratify the Covenant as it objects to the emphasis on the right of self determination.³³⁸

Argentina imposes customs charges on goods entering the Falkland Islands.

*"From time to time we in the Falklands are subjected to bullying tactics from our 'neighbours' control of external travel in the form of the infamous 'white card' and the dictating of the air fares for the service they operate the prevention of the Shackleton Team to travel here by air and the act of aggression on the RRS Shackleton. The latest one is the imposition of a 'customs charge' on a 1 kg package consigned from England that arrived: last Thursday May 20th. The package contained veterinary vaccine and when the consignee went to collect it from the LADE office they were told that there was a charge of approx £14 in respect of Argentine customs charges as it was deemed necessary to inspect it in Comodoro Rivadavia to make sure that it did not contain prohibited drugs. To add insult to injury it was quite obvious that the Package had not been opened en route, only the address altered from Falkland Islands to Islas Malvinas. The cost of the customs 'inspection' was about 1,600 pesos which in Argentina would amount to approx £4 at the official rate - but then of course not being Argentine we are expected to use the strange, unexplained and 'special' rate of about 98 pesos to the £."*³³⁹

May 21st, in the Falklands, elections are finally held for seats on the Legislative Council.

334 Ted Rowlands interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.48

335 Pascoe 2020 p.296

336 Shakespeare to Crosland May 7, 1976 in FO 7/3226

337 Macri's victory – the first election won by the establishment: Argentina now to be managed by its proprietors Guillermo Makin 2015. Shackleton's conclusions remain misunderstood in Argentina to this day.

338 Argentina eventually ratified the covenant on August 8, 1986

339 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* May 25, 1976.

*“The final results of our General Elections held under the old Constitution were announced last Friday evening ... Fortunately the system by which the Governor nominates two members to the Legislative Council will be abolished under the new Constitution.”*³⁴⁰

*“The May 1976 elections were held with the old constitution, which accentuated island discontent, especially when the rumour emerged that the cause of the delay was opposition in Buenos Aires. The colonial authorities had changed: Lewis had been replaced by Neville Arthur Irwin French, the new governor, and Lyng by Arthur Monk, the new chief secretary. According to The Falkland Islands Times, French was asked about that rumour but did not respond.”*³⁴¹

May 24th, in London, at the Foreign Office, a policy paper is drawn up by Hugh Carless on Britain’s relations with the new regime in Argentina. This is sent to Minister Ted Rowlands.

*“The ideal policy objective was to ‘establish an across-the-board dialogue with Argentina ... with the aim of reducing the Falkland Islands dispute to more reasonable proportions’....”*³⁴²

May 25th, Rowlands speaks to Lord Shackleton regarding the report’s conclusions.

*“Rowlands felt it was a fantasy to consider proposals without close cooperation from Argentina, and spelled out to Shackleton the international political repercussions which could arise.”*³⁴³

June 2nd, in Buenos Aires, *charge d’affaires* Shakespeare is informed by the Foreign Ministry that the junta wish to reopen talks; suggesting that a forthcoming conference in Paris may present a suitable opportunity.

June 10th, in Santiago, Chile, US Secretary of State Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti meet. Guzzetti tells Kissinger; *“Until now, the United States Government has abstained on the Falkland Island issue. The issue is very important to Argentina. We hope that the United States Government would reconsider its position and help us.”* Kissinger responds; *“It is difficult for us to get involved... But I suspect that, even so, over time the problem can be solved. The original purpose of the British presence is no longer being served by the Falklands, which are no longer necessary to protect sea lanes.”* Guzzetti answers; *“That is true, but what troubles us is that Great Britain wants self-determination for 2,000 people – and 1,600 of them are employees of the Falkland Island Company. This is not a question of historic rights. So long as this uncertain situation is unresolved it can always be complicated by collateral issues.”*³⁴⁴

June 11th, in London, Ted Rowlands notes that Lord Shackleton’s report is likely; *“... to embarrass and endanger HMG’s policy of opening a new dialogue with Argentina... the inference that any Argentine government will draw is that this report is nothing more than an assertion of British sovereignty...”*³⁴⁵

On the same day, the Foreign Office respond to the junta’s requests for talks in Paris. In Buenos Aires, Shakespeare tells the Argentine Foreign Ministry that the British Government agrees to a conversation taking place provided that such is as; *“informal and free-ranging as possible.”* Most importantly any conversation has to be, *“in confidence.”* Ezequiel Pereyra responds that the delegation will be briefed only to cover the issue of sovereignty in any depth.

340 *Ibid.*

341 Carassai 2022

342 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to PS/Rowlands May 24, 1976 FCO 7/3029*

343 Donaghy 2014

344 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Documents on South America, 1973-1976 Memorandum of Conversation, Santiago, June 10, 1976 8:10-9:15am*

345 *Rowlands to Croskland, June 11, 1976 in FO 7/3200*

June 22nd, in London, Shackleton acknowledges that his views are “*not palatable,*” coming at an, “*awkward moment.*”³⁴⁶ Under pressure from the Foreign Office, Lord Shackleton agrees to amend his introduction to the report; to include a paragraph acknowledging a need for cooperation with Argentina.³⁴⁷

*“... the hopeful development in international affairs which has led to regional cooperation between different nations is as relevant to this part of the world as to other areas where economic cooperation has been achieved. It is logical therefore that in any major new developments of the Islands economy, especially those relating to the exploitation of offshore resources, cooperation with Argentina - even participation - should, if possible, be secured. The sovereignty issue overhangs our Report, as it does the Falklands, and the absence of a settlement could well inhibit the full development of the Islands.”*³⁴⁸

June 29th, a Foreign Office official, Hall, submits his thoughts on how handle the Falkland Islands Committee; “*We should not underestimate these people. They are skilled and persistent interrogators ... but they have a human weakness for flattery – which may be of use, must be subtle and I would like to see a rather broader based contact with them. A little pretence at consultation and some modest hospitality ... might pay dividends.*”³⁴⁹

In early **July** in London, Falkland Islanders speak to Members of Parliament and the Foreign Office. They are not told of the Anglo-Argentine meeting proposed to take place in Paris.³⁵⁰

July 10th, in Paris, France, delegates from Britain and Argentina sit down for informal, exploratory, talks. Argentina’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Gualter Allara, proposes that the two countries return to the idea of a joint administration of the Islands, similar to the previously abandoned condominium. Britain’s Robin Edmonds points out that Islander objection caused this to fail and that the Islands lobby could not be easily ignored.

A copy of Lord Shackleton’s report is handed over to the Argentine team.

*“The exploratory talks ... have so far remained strictly confidential and we have not informed the Islanders. They have been of use in initiating the fresh dialogue proposed by the then Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in March ... the Argentines have predictably concentrated on moving towards their aim of bringing us to negotiate about the transfer of sovereignty. But, in contrast to their Peronist predecessors, they have shown some understanding of our position. In particular, they seem to accept that future discussions/negotiations should cover our theme of economic co-operation ... as well as their theme of sovereignty – which we have so far insisted on referring to as “the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship between Argentina and the Falkland Islands.” ... ”*³⁵¹

July 13th, from Paris, Minister Allara travels to the UK to speak to Rowlands. An agreement is reached that negotiations on the future of the Falklands should resume in August.

July 20th, in the UK, Shackleton’s report is published. Lord Shackleton speaks to the Press.³⁵²

346 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.45

347 Donaghy 2014

348 *Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands* vol.1 p.iii

349 *Hall to Sindall, Carless and Edmonds June 29, 1976 FCO 7/3232* quoted in Livingstone 2018. Which Hall is not clear, possibly George Hall.

350 *The Friends of the Falkland Islands: Newsletter* Nov 1976

351 Hugh Carless memorandum in *FO 7/3201* at 304a

352 For comments by Lord Shackleton in the *Geographical Journal*, see

<https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/1977-shackleton-report.pdf>

“In recent years instead of the Islands living on Great Britain, Great Britain has been living on the Islands. More has come out as taxes than has gone in as aid.”

*“The 450 odd page report compos(es) of two volumes - the first containing some 344 pages devoted to an analysis of the overall economy of the Falklands and their surrounding watery assesses the development potential and points out opportunities constraints and the likely impact of development, and the second containing 108 pages summarising the first volume and goes on to discuss and propose development strategy, presents recommendations for a policy and programme for economic development and discusses the financial implications and the arrangements which the Team judge to be necessary to implement them ... Publication of the Survey was widely reported in the British press. The possibility of off-shore oil and the fisheries potential was the main lead. There were comments on the financial gains to Britain from taxation of remittances sent to this country and on possible future problems with Argentina.”*³⁵³

*“The Argentine Foreign Ministry said after the publication of the report that it could not comment on proposals for co-operation until the 'sovereignty dispute' had been resolved.”*³⁵⁴

*“Shackleton rejected at a news conference the idea that development was doomed without Argentine collaboration, but thought it would be "foolish" not to seek it.”*³⁵⁵

*“In Argentina, the report was immediately translated, published and analysed by Strategy, the magazine of the Argentine Institute of Strategic Studies and International Relations – influential in military circles – and its conclusions were commented upon by the press.”*³⁵⁶

At No. 11 Downing Street, on the same day, Argentina's Minister of Finance is treated to lunch by Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Dennis Healey.³⁵⁷

*“British banks, including Lloyds, Barclays, Midland and Natwest, showed their confidence in the new regime by offering US\$60m of new loans to the Argentine junta.”*³⁵⁸

August 2nd, from Colombia, Britain's Ambassador Geoffrey Crossley, writes to the Foreign Office.

*“It is ludicrous that the interests of less than 2000 persons... should be allowed to be a thorn in the flesh of Anglo-Latin American relations... Surely the time has come for HMG to let the inhabitants of the Islands know that they are a nuisance...”*³⁵⁹

August 7th, in the port of Buenos Aires, *in-camera* negotiations between Britain and Argentina are held aboard *Fragata Sarmiento*. Argentina proposes a gradual transfer of sovereignty, with a provisional administration lasting for a single period of eight years under alternating British/Argentine Governors. Each serving for 2 years. Britain's delegation raise the need for further Islander consultation, asking; *“What means were envisaged for ascertaining the views of the islanders both during the negotiations of the proposed Agreement and prior to the specified date?”*³⁶⁰ *“This question was avoided by the Argentines in their answer...”*³⁶¹

353 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* July 30, 1976.

354 *Keesings Contemporary Archives* June 24, 1977 p28406

355 Ellerby 1990 p.205

356 Carassai 2022

357 Martinez de Hoz was on a tour of Europe in an attempt to persuade creditors to reschedule Argentina's debts.

358 Livingstone 2018

359 *Crossley to Carless, August 2, 1976* in FO 7/3229

360 Quoted in FO 7/3201 at 283a

361 Legal advice in FO 7/3201 at 283a

August 8th, talks continue off Buenos Aires. Minister Allara asserts that resolution 1514 limits the question to a matter of territorial integrity and that self-determination is inapplicable in this case. He considers the dispute, therefore, as a bilateral one that cannot involve the islanders, whose 'interests', only, may be considered. Allara adds that his proposals extend to the Dependencies.

*“At the second round of talks, the Argentines produced a paper proposing joint administration of the Islands to be followed, after 8 years, by the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. As it stands, this paper is quite unacceptable.”*³⁶²

*“... the British delegation made no written commitments. But Edmonds concluded by repeating that whatever the sovereignty model proposed, it would be examined by two interrelated criteria of great importance to the British government. (a) What was likely to be acceptable to the islanders? (b) What was likely to be acceptable to the British Parliament and public.”*³⁶³

August 26th, in Britain, an article in *The Times* newspaper considers the Shackleton report and suggests that the Islands' Governor is in favour of an Argentine take-over.³⁶⁴

September 14th, in London, advice from the Foreign Office's legal advisers is sought and given.

*“... an agreement on the lines of the proposal as it now stands would contain an unconditional undertaking by HMG to cede the Islands on a specified future date. ... such an agreement could only be implemented by Act of Parliament... It would also be necessary to use an Act of Parliament if the new arrangements for the Falkland Islands had the effect of restricting the right of Parliament or the Sovereign to legislate for the territory, or were repugnant to any previous Act of Parliament.”*³⁶⁵

September 17th, in New York, the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization adopt a draft-resolution calling for the UK and Argentina to expedite negotiations concerning the dispute over sovereignty.

At the end of **September**, Argentina's Minister for Marine Resources, Capt. Noe Guevara, visits the UK to discuss the purchase of ships and the regulation of fishing in the South Atlantic. During the visit, Guevara meets with the head of the Foreign Office's Polar Regions Section, John Heap.³⁶⁶

October 8th, in London, Hugh Carless submits an assessment of the situation for the Foreign Secretary.

*“We have now reached a turning point where we must decide about the next stage in the dialogue. We cannot embark on a third round of talks without having some idea of where we intend to go thereafter, since our tactics will to some extent vary according to the strategy we choose.”*³⁶⁷

Carless lists four options; “... in the short term.” The first calls for talks to be stopped on the basis that the British side cannot accept any development into negotiations over sovereignty. His second option is to play for time - “The aim would be to persuade the Argentines that we were serious about making progress, without in fact taking any substantive steps forward.” Third is to develop the present talks into; “... substantive, but still secret, negotiations...” with the aim of securing Argentine acceptance of terms of reference for a series of negotiations about Anglo-Argentine interests. Finally, Carless suggests the option of going public about the intention to negotiate.

362 Hugh Carless memorandum in FO 7/3201 at 304a

363 Donaghy 2014

364 Governor: *We must have cooperation with Argentina* Michael Frenchman *The Times* August 26, 1976

365 FO 7/3201 at 283a & 304a

366 Livingstone 2018. If Guevara was aware of the Southern Thule operation, he does not appear to have mentioned it.

367 Hugh Carless memorandum in FO 7/3201 at 283a

*“If we chose this course, we must recognise (and probably state) that these negotiations could not exclude the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The experiences of Mr. Michael Stewart in the House in 1968 show that it would be essential to give assurances from its outset that we were being frank about the subject matter for negotiation and that the wishes of the Islanders would not be disregarded at any stage... This option would allow us to retain the initiative and of reducing the Falklands lobby’s ability to launch accusations of planning a secret sell-out.”*³⁶⁸

Listing longer term objectives, Carless mentions ‘leaseback’, ‘joint sovereignty/condominium’, a ‘buy-out’ of the Islanders and ‘transfer of sovereignty.’ Concluding, he suggests that a public round of negotiations take place (option 4) with the long term aim of some ‘leaseback’ or ‘condominium’ arrangement.

*“At every stage it will be essential to pay particular attention to nursing Islander opinion. Our ability to bring them along with us will be crucial to the success or failure of our strategy. Given that the Islanders are likely to reject the idea of an early transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, however qualified, we may have to adopt a two-stage approach to negotiations. This would mean concentrating initially on a politico-economic package which would fall short of full transfer of sovereignty but which the Argentines would see as a stepping-stone to a fuller settlement at a later stage – by which time the Islanders would, we hope, have adjusted to the prospect of a change in sovereignty status.”*³⁶⁹

On seeing the Carless assessment, Robin Edmonds, writes; *“The Falklands problem taken as a whole is complicated, but the nub of it is simple: Parliament.”*³⁷⁰

October 14th, at London's Foreign Office, Minister Ted Rowlands notes; *“All that can be said of successive British Governments is that they avoided war and brought the Islanders and Argentines marginally closer together... we are trying to reconcile two apparently irreconcilable demands: the Argentine demand for us to hand over sovereignty – or at least to talk about handing it over – and the demand of the Islanders and the Lobby here that we do no such thing.”*³⁷¹

On the same day, the UK Falkland Islands Committee severs its link with the Falkland Islands Company.

Britain’s Department of Overseas Development rejects Shackleton's Report as overambitious. However, as regards the recommendations for an airport, a ‘feasibility study’ is promised.³⁷²

*“The British government was presented with a report containing proposals which it was incapable of fulfilling, and this could only spell further trouble for its relationship with the Islanders...”*³⁷³

In the Falklands, in poor weather conditions, a Beaver aircraft goes missing with two on board - its pilot, Capt. Ian Campbell and one passenger Dr. Bernard Lee.

October 15th, following a search and rescue operation, the missing aircraft is found. Dr. Lee is alive, however Capt. Campbell is still missing.³⁷⁴

“Vicecomodoro Bloomer Reeve (sic) requested the search and rescue from the Air Force, which assigned the mission to an F-27 equipped with external auxiliary tanks. Commanded by Mayor Alfredo Cano, the plane took

368 *Ibid.*

369 *Ibid*

370 Edmonds quoted in Livingstone 2018 citing *FCO 7/3201*

371 *FO 7/3201/307*

372 It was likely to be their funds that would have been used to implement Shackleton's recommendations.

373 Donaghy 2014

374 Campbell's body was recovered on November 2, 1976.

off at 0625 on 15 October from the I Brigada Aérea, carrying doctors, survival specialists, and photographers. ... They initiated a parallel exploration pattern in a north-south direction. At around 1600, they spotted a strong reflection on the surface of the sea at Punta Aguda, Bougainville Island. The sun glinted on the polished pontoons of the airplane, which remained afloat, inverted and half sunken. Just a few meters away, the sole survivor was waving for help. The discovery was immediately reported to Comodoro Rivadavia, from where the rescue was coordinated with Malvinas Islands. The F-27 remained flying, orbiting until a speedboat arrived. The Beaver had experienced an in-flight engine flameout. In the emergency, the pilot headed towards the only protruding rock nearby, and attempted ditching. Unfortunately, the plane landed on an algae carpet, the pontoons got entangled, and the aircraft flipped over. The pilot drowned while trying to escape, while his companion survived and reached the rocky outcrop. The F-27 landed in Malvinas Islands, where Vicecomodoro Bloomer Reeve (sic) awaited them and extended the crew an invitation from the governor to visit his house. Once the overnight stay had been authorized, they were accommodated at the Upland Goose hotel. At dusk, as they walked towards the governor's residence, they received unusual displays of affection from the settlers.”³⁷⁵

October 18th, in Stanley, following an emergency Executive Council meeting, two Councillors walk out after a disagreement with Governor French over an official inquiry into the loss of the Islands' Beaver aircraft and the death of Capt. Campbell.³⁷⁶

October 20th, at Stanley, a crowd of some 200 Islanders demonstrate against the Governor.

“On 21st October it was announced that a team of three from the Accident Investigation Branch of the Dept, of Trade in London and headed by Mr G.C. Wilkinson would be arriving on the 28th.”³⁷⁷

October 26th, in the Falkland Islands; “It was announced on 26th October that Her Majesty the Queen has been pleased to approve the appointment of Mr James Roland Walter Parker OBE as our next Governor and Commander in Chief.”³⁷⁸

In **November**, Argentina lands a military expedition on Morrell Island in the Southern Thule group of the South Sandwich Islands. Twenty soldiers under the command of a Major. Weather and radio stations are established, jointly given the name Corbeta Uruguay.³⁷⁹

“The idea of landing at Thule island allegedly dates back to 1974 and was first suggested to then president Juan Peron, by captain Juan Jose Lombardo (who later played a role as head of South Atlantic Theatre of Operations during the Falklands conflict). The purpose of such an action in the island of Thule was to test and assess the UK's reaction. However Operation Sun did not receive the kick-off and full support until 1976, when a new military Junta was again in control of Argentina.”³⁸⁰

“Southern Thule was the kind of territory the Labour Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland favoured giving to Argentina as part of a compromise. It also fitted precisely the scenario that Argentine Admiral Juan Jose

375 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023. Bloomer Reeve had left the Islands in February 1976. Vice-Commodore Rodolfo Abel Carnelli was running the LADE operation in October, 1976.

376 Leading to a public protest on October 19, 1976

377 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* November 6, 1976. The inquiry subsequent concluded that Dr. Lee, who had been piloting the aircraft, had lost control while attempting a landing.

378 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* November 6, 1976. For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/parker_james

379 Exact date unknown. The Southern Thule group consists of three islands.

380 *Thule island occupation: Argentine navy tested UK's resolve as part of its long term plan to take the Falklands in* MercoPress August 29, 2019

Lombardo revealed to me after the (1982) conflict – that Argentina's long term plan, code named Project Alpha, was to continue to occupy isolated British Islands so long as there was no British reaction. He mischievously described the South Sandwich landing as the 'first bite of the sandwich'!...”³⁸¹

Researcher's Comment: An invasion. There is no other word for it. Southern Thule had been claimed by Britain since 1908. By Argentina only after 1938, although 1952 is strictly more correct. Covert, not published, nor mentioned by Argentina in any forum.

November 4th, in England, three by-elections eliminate the Labour Party's thin majority, rendering it a minority government and increasing the power of Parliament.

November 15th, in New York, at the UN, the Fourth Committee reviews the work of the Special Committee on Decolonization. Argentina's representative makes a statement.

*“... resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 established quite clearly, in paragraph 6, that in certain circumstances – including without any doubt, those deriving from acts of territorial usurpation against a country – the applicable principle was territorial integrity and not self-determination.”*³⁸²

He also refers to the 1975 International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion concerning Western Sahara.

*“... the Court, while recognizing the important role of the principle of self-determination, had pointed out that on a number of occasions the General Assembly had given priority to the principle of territorial integrity, particularly when the colonial Territory had been created to the prejudice of the country to which the Territory belonged originally. Furthermore, in paragraph 87 of the opinion, the Court had affirmed quite clearly that in all cases the "special characteristics" of the Territory should borne in mind.³⁸³ However, the most decisive paragraph on the subject was paragraph 162, from a reading of which it was perfectly clear that in those situations where there was a dispute regarding sovereignty over a colonial Territory, whether or not the principle of self-determination should be applied depended on the nature of the link between the Territory in question and the State in question at the moment of colonization.”*³⁸⁴

381 *Fight for Falklands Freedom: Reporting Live from Argentina and the Islands* Harold Briley 2022

382 Britain had long argued that art.6 of UN GA resolution 1514 (1960) only applied to the listed Non-Self Governing Territories and offered no protection outside of that limited application. This perception was proved correct, finally, in 2019 when the ICJ gave its advisory opinion on the Mauritian decolonization in relation to the Chagos Islands.

383 Inaccurate. What para.87 actually said was – *“Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) is a territory having very special characteristics which, at the time of colonization by Spain, largely determined the way of life and social and political organization of the peoples inhabiting it. In consequence, the legal régime of Western Sahara, including its legal relations with neighbouring territories, cannot properly be appreciated without reference to these special characteristics. The territory forms part of the great Sahara desert which extends from the Atlantic Coast of Africa to Egypt and the Sudan. At the time of its colonization by Spain, the area of this desert with which the Court is concerned was being exploited, because of its low and spasmodic rainfall, almost exclusively by nomads, pasturing their animals or growing crops as and where conditions were favourable. It may be said that the territory, at the time of its colonization, had a sparse population that, for the most part, consisted of nomadic tribes the members of which traversed the desert on more or less regular routes dictated by the seasons and the wells or water-holes available to them. In general, the Court was informed, the right of pasture was enjoyed in common by these tribes; some areas suitable for cultivation, on the other hand, were subject to a greater degree to separate rights. Perennial water-holes were in principle considered the property of the tribe which put them into commission, though their use also was open to all, subject to certain customs as to priorities and the amount of water taken. Similarly, many tribes were said to have their recognized burial grounds, which constituted a rallying point for themselves and for allied tribes. Another feature of life in the region, according to the information before the Court, was that inter-tribal conflict was not infrequent.”* (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975 para.87) See <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/61/061-19751016-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>

384 Again inaccurate. Para.162 actually said – *“The materials and information presented to the Court show the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes*

Britain's representative exercises a right of reply; *"The United Kingdom delegation was told that the Falkland Islands was a special case. It did not accept that. ... The people of the Falkland Islands had the right to be consulted and to have their wishes about their own future taken into account. Yet, the draft which was before the General Assembly deliberately set those wishes aside as though the views of the people of the Falkland Islands were of no account."*³⁸⁵

The draft-resolution calling for negotiations on the issue of sovereignty receives the Fourth Committee's approval; however, more nations abstain than Argentina had anticipated, causing consternation among its UN delegation; *"While his delegation respected the right of every delegation to change its position on a particular question when and for whatever reasons it deemed appropriate, he said that his delegation was surprised at the decision of certain countries which, having voted in favour of resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII), had, on the current occasion, taken a different position."*³⁸⁶

In London, on the same day, Lord Shackleton presents his findings regarding the Falkland Islands to the Royal Geographical Society.³⁸⁷

*"Lord Shackleton highlighted this important but little-known (outside the Islands) and well-concealed (inside the British Treasury and FCO) fact "Far from living off the British, the British have been doing very nicely out of the Falkland Islanders ... Far more has come back to Britain in the way of profits than has gone out in the way of investment. More importantly, we concluded that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has, over the years, taken twice as much out in tax as has gone in in the form of aid to develop the Falkland Islands"."*³⁸⁸

November 16th, in Stanley, Governor French announces that he is to return to the UK.³⁸⁹

*"On 16th November Governor French gave a broadcast address in which he announced that due to the desire of Her Majesty's Govt., to discuss with him directly a number of issues raised by the Shackleton Report he would be leaving the Islands on December 2nd. His Excellency said that although Councillors felt strongly that he should return to the colony ... it would be an unjustifiable charge on public funds."*³⁹⁰

December 1st, in New York, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopts Resolution 31/49 (XXXI).

"... 2. Expresses its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, to facilitate the process of decolonisation and to promote the well-being of the populations of the islands;

living in the territory of Western Sahara. They equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the territory of Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court's conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara, and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory." (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975 para.162)

385 UN Doc A32/23/Rev.1 Chapter 28

386 This resolution passed 102:1 (UK) with 36 abstentions. 13 Commonwealth countries voted in favour – Bangladesh, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Lesotho, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania & Zambia.

387 See - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/1977-shackleton-report.pdf>

388 *Reasons in Writing: A Commandos View of the Falklands War* E. Southby-Tailyour 1990. Between 1951 and 1974, the UK gained, at the Islands expense £11.5 million.

389 Ostensibly for consultations on the Shackleton Report. However, French's replacement had been announced in the UK on October 26, 1976, and this departure appears more likely associated with the Governor's authoritarian attitude towards the Islanders. A population not easily cowed.

390 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* December 7, 1976

3. Requests the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to expedite the negotiations concerning the dispute over sovereignty, as requested in General Assembly resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII);³⁹¹

4. Calls upon the two parties to refrain from taking decisions that would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation while the islands are going through the process recommended in the above-mentioned resolutions;..”³⁹²

“Paragraph 2 is absurdly one-sided in thanking only Argentina – it was actually Britain that had been making efforts to “promote the well-being of the populations of the islands” .., whereas Argentina’s efforts had been devoted to taking over the territory against the wishes of those populations. ... Argentina continues to demand that Britain should respect Resolution 31/49 – an impossible demand since the premise on which it is based (ongoing negotiations) no longer applies.”³⁹³

December 2nd, Governor French departs the Falkland Islands.

“French had not been responsible for any single catastrophic decision and there is no evidence that he had any agenda apart from the implementation of British policy. His style, however, had increased Islanders’ suspicions and apprehensions about that policy when what they needed was reassurance. French was governor of the Falkland Islands from 27 January 1975 until 2 December, 1976, the shortest tenure of any governor of recent times.”³⁹⁴

“Never had a governor remained in office for such a short time (less than two years), ...”³⁹⁵

December 8th, in London, the Cabinet approve a mixed approach to future talks with Argentina.³⁹⁶

“It included two courses of action in the event of continued islander objections to leaseback. Firstly, the government would tell Argentina that it could not proceed with the negotiations against the islanders’ wishes. It could then buy time by making a series of minor arrangements (e.g. shared administration of the Dependencies) or a single large concession, such as an Argentine sovereign base on these uninhabited islands. In exchange Britain would seek Argentine economic cooperation covering fishing, oil exploration and research... This was to be followed by a ministerial visit to Stanley and Buenos Aires in February, the second stage of Crosland’s formula. Rowlands brief would be ‘to establish prospects for a move forward into some form of negotiations in 1977 which might lead towards the [politico-economic] package deal’³⁹⁷

“... in December 1976, cabinet ministers noted that if they were to ‘state plainly’ their intention to talk to Argentina, there would be a ‘political storm’, so they agreed instead to play for time.”³⁹⁸

In the Falkland Islands, the Royal Marines are granted the Freedom of Stanley. Col. Sir Stuart Pringle RM presents a sword to the Government and the People of the Falkland Islands.

391 As this resolution mentioned 2065(XX) of 1965, it cannot be viewed as a replacement for that earlier resolution. However, see 1985.

392 Operative paragraph 4 is described in Ellerby 1990 (p.213) as a; “veiled reference to the Shackleton Report.” See https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/31/49

393 Pascoe 2020 pp.319-320

394 Tatham (ed.) 2008

395 Carassai 2022

396 CAB/128/60/20

397 Donaghy 2014

398 Livingstone 2018

December 16th, at Stanley, James Roland Walter Parker arrives; appointed Governor of the Falkland Islands, and High Commissioner for the British Antarctic Territories. ³⁹⁹

*“His Excellency gave an impressive speech in which he said that it was his hope that he would discharge the responsibilities to the Government and people of the Colony to the best of his ability . and hoped that at the end of his ‘several years’ stay he would have some satisfaction at doing his best? Mr Parker also said he regarded himself as a Civil Servant brought up in the discipline that by his duty to the Queen his concern was the welfare and well-being of the people amongst whom he was required to serve and that this would be the abiding purpose of his activities whilst here. In what could be described as an astute awareness of the low morale of Islanders in their relations with the Administration, His Excellency asked us to express our views frankly to him...”*⁴⁰⁰

“Parker ... took over at a time when Argentine pressure on the Islands was steadily increasing.” ⁴⁰¹


“... in 1977 (sic), Governor Neville A. French was replaced by James R. Parker, who arrived with instructions to harden relations. Among other measures, he created the Deputy Governor position, thus breaking off direct contact with the Vicecomodoro. Conditions became stricter: only Transportes Navales’ vessels that had requested permission in advance were authorized to dock at the pier.” ⁴⁰²

In Argentina, two British Petroleum (BP) executives seek meetings to discuss the prospect of a joint approach to oil exploration. ⁴⁰³

December 29th, on Morrell Island in the Southern Thule group, a helicopter crew from HMS *Endurance*, visiting to retrieve scientific equipment left earlier in the year, discovers the Argentine military presence.

December 31st, in London, Britain’s Secretary of State for Defence, Fred Mulley, proposes that, with tensions with Argentina easing, now is the time for *Endurance* to be withdrawn.

*“... when I have been obliged to accept cuts in the defence budget for 1977/78 and 1978/79, I cannot justify the expenditure of an estimated £1.8m for a purpose which has no relations to our NATO commitments...”*⁴⁰⁴



Researcher's Comment: Worthy of note that HMS *Endurance*, the Falkland Islands only effective protection, had been in danger of removal from the South Atlantic long before Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Government turned their attention to it in 1981.

399 *The London Gazette* No. 47113. For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/parker_james

400 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* January 20, 1977

401 Tatham (ed) 2008. See - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/parker_james

402 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

403 Livingstone 2018

404 *Mulley to Crosland December 31, 1976 DEFE 24/911*. Quoted in Donaghy 2014

1977 – January 5th, in London, Argentina's *charge d'affaires* is summoned to the Foreign Office to explain the presence of a military base on Southern Thule.

“A JIC assessment in January 1977 concluded that the Argentine Government were unlikely to order withdrawal until it suited them to do so and, depending on the British Government's actions in the situation, could be encouraged to attempt further military measures against British interests in the area.” ⁴⁰⁵

January 7th, in London, executives from the BP oil company meet with Foreign Office officials to discuss the possibility of oil exploration around the Falkland Islands. ⁴⁰⁶

January 14th, Argentina informs the UK Government that the purpose of the Southern Thule operation is to establish a scientific station within the jurisdiction of Argentine sovereignty. They express the hope that nothing will cloud the, *“auspicious perspectives”* for negotiations. News of the landing is not made public within the UK.

“On January 5, 1977, Britain requested that Buenos Aires explain its presence on the Dependency. Nine days later, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs told its British counterparts that the work on the island was scientific in nature and implied that its presence would not be permanent.” ⁴⁰⁷

A 'Falkland Islands Office' opens in London. ⁴⁰⁸

January 19th, Britain's Government formally protests the violation of British sovereignty in Southern Thule.

“... (Admiral) Guzzetti said to Rowlands, "These Argentine scientists are only going to be there for a short summer season". We accepted that explanation at the time. We accepted it because we were at the beginning of the Crosland concept of long-term negotiation... We agonised over it considerably. But if we had made a public song and dance about it, we would then have had to decide whether to break off the whole negotiating process. We decided that negotiation was more important.” ⁴⁰⁹

Researcher's Comment: Britain's Labour Government not only acted inadequately in the face of an Argentine invasion of British territory, but then compounded the offence by keeping it a secret from the British public. More importantly, kept secret from Parliament and there is no doubt that the Commons would have erupted. How this could have been viewed as a reasonable policy under any circumstances is unfathomable. It would be 1982 before the Argentines were ejected from their Corbeta Uruguay base.

January 31st, following reports that Argentina is commissioning two American oil companies – Geophysical Services International and Western Geophysical – to carry out seismic surveys in the seas off the Argentine coast, a Labour MP, Colin Phipps, sends a warning to the Foreign Office.

“The British were concerned that the Argentine-sponsored seismic studies would cross the (unofficial) median line between Argentina and the Falkland Islands. Although the British government had not formally claimed the waters beyond the 200-metre isobath from the islands, it wanted to reserve its rights to up to 200 miles of the continental-shelf.” ⁴¹⁰

February 1st, in London, Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assess the Southern Thule occupation; describing it as a political act that may be considered so successful by Argentina as to encourage further displays.

405 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

406 *Hall to Anglin January 7, 1977 FCO 7/3409*

407 *Re-examining the Falkland Islands War: The necessity for multi-level deterrence in preventing wars of aggression* Steven G. Stransky 2012

408 This was under the control of the *UK Falkland Islands Committee* and the *Falkland Islands Research & Development Association*. Not the Falkland Islands Government, whose representative office opened in 1983

409 Hugh Carless quoted in Charlton 1989 p.60

410 Livingstone 2018 citing *Philips to Rowlands January 31, 1977 FCO 7/3409*

February 2nd, Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland, reads out a statement to the House of Commons with regard to the Shackleton Report. ⁴¹¹

“... Lord Shackleton has presented his 'Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands'. The whole House will join me in warmly thanking him and his colleagues for this immensely thorough and wide-ranging report. The Survey paints a vivid picture of this small community of 1,900 people, 7,500 miles away, yet staunchly British and with rich potential in the seas around them. But currently they face an uncertain economic future. The economy, essentially a mono-culture based on wool, is stagnant; the resources do not exist to exploit the new potential in other fields; and emigration is increasing. To remedy this situation, Lord Shackleton made a large number of recommendations, many of which will require further study and detailed consultation with the Islanders.

Meanwhile, the Government will proceed to implement those internal constitutional changes which have already been approved by the Falkland Islands Legislative Council. The recommendations on development aid will fall to my honourable friend the Minister for Overseas Development to implement. But I can say now that the Government are ready to consider, after such pre-investment studies as may be required, agricultural diversification, mutton freezing, knitwear production and improvements to education. We also propose to pay special and urgent attention to the Islands' internal communications, with particular reference to the availability and maintenance of an efficient local air service.

The Survey further recommends certain major capital projects, notably an enlargement of the airport and a pilot fishing project, which would bring the total recommended expenditure by the United Kingdom up to some £13–£14 million. The Government, like Lord Shackleton and his colleagues, are in no doubt that the potential for development is there, and they will at the appropriate moment commission the essential preliminary studies to determine whether airport enlargement is likely to be practicable and cost-effective. But for the rest, we cannot at this time accept the more costly recommendations. The overseas aid budget, recently cut in the December public expenditure exercise, would not stand it. There are more urgent claims from much poorer communities. And the right political circumstances do not exist. ...

The Government has therefore decided that the time has come to consider both with the Islanders and the Argentine Government whether a climate exists for discussing the broad issues which bear on the future of the Falkland Islands, and the possibilities of co-operation between Britain and Argentina in the region of the South West Atlantic...

I must make certain things absolutely clear. First, any such discussion, which would inevitably raise fundamental questions in the relationship between the Islands, Britain and Argentina, would take place under a sovereignty umbrella; that is, Her Majesty's Government would wholly reserve their position on the issue of sovereignty, which would in no way be prejudiced. Secondly, any changes which might be proposed must be acceptable to the Islanders, whose interests and well-being remain our prime concern. In consequence, thirdly, there must be full consultation with the Islanders at every stage; nothing will be done behind their backs.”

“At the same time he announced that the Government did not accept the more costly recommendations in the Shackleton Report, notably the enlargement of the airport and the lengthening of the runway. At a time when Argentina had just occupied British territory, what sort of a signal was that?” ⁴¹²

411 Repeated in the House of Lords by Lord Goronwy-Williams. For the Commons statement, see - <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1977/feb/02/falkland-islands>

412 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

Anthony Crosland also responds to a question regarding a 200 mile fisheries limit.

*“The situation with regard to the 200-mile fishing limit is unbelievably complicated. Argentina has claimed a 200-mile limit round the Falkland Islands as part of her claim to sovereignty. There is a complication inside UNLOSC, there are complications within the EEC about this, and there are possible analogies with Rockall which need careful study. I should not like to give a definite answer on the subject except to say that what is essential is that we have a de facto agreement on the question of fisheries.”*⁴¹³

February 4th, in the Falkland Islands, a message from Alginat Industries Limited is reported in the local press.

“As the Islanders will know, Humphries and Glasgow carried out a feasibility study on Alginat Industries behalf in 1974 covering the production of dried milled seaweed, and also the production of calcium alginate. At the time of the Shackleton report it was considered that only the production of dried milled seaweed would be a viable proposition. It is now considered that sodium alginate, worth even more than calcium alginate since it is an end product and is worth around £2000 per ton, can be produced in the Falkland Islands. ...

*The overriding question is the political future of the islands vis a vis the Argentine and Alginat Industries has made it clear to H.M. Government that, an assurance regarding the continued British Sovereignty of the Islands is essential. The Shackleton report considered, that it would be logical for any major new developments of the Falkland Islands economy, especially those relating to offshore resources such as oil and fish, if possible to be carried out in cooperation - even participation - with Argentina. This, must not apply, nor does Alginat Industries believe that it is intended to apply, to seaweed resources or any inshore operations. Furthermore no alginate development could take place without the recommended extension of the airstrip”*⁴¹⁴

February 7th, in the UK, reports suggests that Argentina's *Plan Goa*, the seizure of the Falkland islands, has been placed on hold over fears that the United Nations will not support an invasion of the Falklands.

*“... later intelligence indicated that this plan had been shelved, not because of any action by the then British Government but because Argentina could not count on the support of the Third World or the Communist bloc.”*⁴¹⁵

*“Argentina could count on ‘qualified’ support: backing its claim in the fight against colonialism, but (this) was not considered strong enough to achieve a fait accompli.”*⁴¹⁶

February 10th, from New York, Keith Unwin, Britain’s delegate to the UN Commission on Human Rights, seeks guidance from the Foreign Office on the subject of human rights in Argentina.⁴¹⁷

In London, on the same day, the Falkland islands Company issue a statement.

The Falkland Islands Company Ltd, welcomes the forthcoming visit to the Islands of the Minister of State, Mr, Edward Rowlands. The Minister has taken a close personal interest in the Islands and has availed himself of every opportunity of meeting Islanders in this country.

413 *HC Deb 02 February 1977 vol 925 cc550-61*. See link above. Lord Morris, in a debate in May, 1979, (*HL Deb 22 May 1979 vol.400 cc233-432*) referred to an Argentine claim to a 200-mile limit having been declared from Buenos Aires in 1977. In fact, Argentina made its 200-mile limit claim in December, 1966.

414 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* February 11, 1977 p.7

415 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

416 Donaghy 2014

417 Unwin to Callan February 10, 1977 FCO 58/1165 in Livingstone 2018

In the discussion in the House of Commons yesterday at which the announcement of the Ministerial visit was made, the Foreign Secretary stated that the economy of the Islands was stagnant and that without political and economic co-operation with Argentina the outlook for the Islands is bleak.

The Company does not share this view although it does wholly accept Lord Shackleton's statement that no off-shore developments are likely to take place without a form of co-operation agreement with Argentina. Since publication of the Shackleton Report the Gross National Revenue of the Colony has increased by 80% in 1976, and a further increase of between 50 and 40% is anticipated this year. The outlook for Falklands wool, over the next few years is very favourable.

The Company, in common with Islanders, wishes to continue friendly relationships with Argentina but considers that any Argentine involvement, other than on a commercial basis, within Falklands territorial waters impinges on British Sovereignty. The Company, as has previously been announced, is currently considering joint participation with non-Argentine interests in in-shore fishing which is likely to have a significant effect on the Colony's economy. British Government aid would not be required for the venture which involves fish meal and shell-fish.”⁴¹⁸

February 15th, in Buenos Aires, Minister of State Edward 'Ted' Rowlands, lands en-route to the Falklands. He holds brief talks with the Argentine Foreign Minister before moving on.

“... the visit was in fulfilment of his pledge that there must be full consultation with the Islanders at every stage; nothing will be done behind their back. The forthcoming visit by Mr. Ted Rowlands has, for some islanders, signalled the turning point in our fortunes. However, there are many who don't seem to be very optimistic at the out-come and this view is understandable for various reasons. It was a Labour Government Minister of State (in the form of Lord Chalfont) who came here in 1968 hoping that it would take little persuasion to get us to embrace Argentina like some kind of foster parents. ... None of us expect Ted Rowlands to come out next week with a magic wand – but I wouldn't say that he won't be carrying thirty pieces of silver.”⁴¹⁹

“... by 1977 alarm bells were beginning to ring as the Argentine Military Junta, which had over-thrown the civilian Government of President Isabel Peron, widow of the famous Juan Peron, started demanding a return for their investment in the Falklands. Had not the British Foreign Office promised that the naive Islanders would by now be totally receptive of the Argentine and be prepared to accept some form of acceptance of the long standing sovereignty claim? Also it was presumed that the younger members of the community were supposed, by now, to be speaking fluent Spanish while a vast majority of the population would have enjoyed the many delights which Buenos Aires offered. A vast majority of the Islands population suddenly realized that they had been lured into a trap which was going to be difficult to extract themselves from.”⁴²⁰

“... Buenos Aires, where he held conversations with Captain Gualter Allara and other Argentine officials. Rumours abounded on the islands and London's plans were suspected. An Islander who preserved his identity wrote a "welcome" article to the British minister, published days before his arrival, in which he not only assured that the United Kingdom preferred good relations with 23 million Argentines to the "well-being of 1,900 islanders," but, conceding that London would not do "anything behind the islanders' backs", ... he predicted that, instead, "(London) would do it right under their noses!"⁴²¹

418 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* February 11, 1977 p.3

419 *Ibid* p.2

420 Patrick Watts MBE quoted in *Penguin News* February 26, 2021

421 Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Times* February 11, 1977

February 16th, in Stanley, on his arrival, Rowlands is met by a crowd of some 400 Islanders waving Union Jacks and shouting “*We want to stay British.*”⁴²² The Minister is addressed by Islands’ Councillors.

*“Initially councillors were non-committal, seeking to circumvent the sovereignty debate by stressing the need for a referendum. Yet Rowland’s patient, frank explanation turned their stance,..”*⁴²³

*“Rowlands was a voluble Welshman who talked far more than he listened, and his visit was remembered with some bitterness in the islands.”*⁴²⁴

*“Rowlands, however, had gone with questions, not answers. And the main question revolved around whether the islanders would agree to explore negotiations with Argentina, in which the question of sovereignty was included.”*⁴²⁵

On the same day, in Argentina, General Jorge R. Videla, declares that the Falklands question is; “... a problem of purely and exclusively territorial integrity and that, therefore, since the islands were Argentine in Foreign hands, the solution was none other than restitution. Sovereignty is not discussed or negotiated.”⁴²⁶

February 17th, from the Islands, the Falklands Legislative Council issue a statement.

“We understand that the Minister will have to have discussions on the sovereignty question while in Argentina. We realise that these discussions will take place under the sovereignty umbrella and so the stand of all parties concerned will remain unaffected...”

*“A Labour Foreign Office Minister Ted Rowlands arrived in the Falklands and emphatically warned members of the Legislative Council that unless they agreed to talks on sovereignty being initiated then it was likely that LADE would withdraw their air link and the British Government was not prepared to come to the aid of the ever-diminishing Islands population.”*⁴²⁷

On the same day, Britain’s Foreign Office responds to Unwin’s letter of the 10th.

*“We had in mind (a) general statement to the effect that HMG deplore violations of human rights wherever they occur rather than a statement specifically relating to the situation in Argentina. As you know, our relations with Argentina are especially sensitive in view of the Falkland Islands dispute.”*⁴²⁸

February 18th, at the Hague, the Beagle Channel (PNL) arbitration group of judges submit their final decision to the British Crown – ruling in Chile’s favour.⁴²⁹

422 Letter in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 8, 1977 p.6 complaining about Argentine news reports that the Minister was only met by local dignitaries and a party of 10 children waving flags.

423 Donaghy 2014. This does not accord with the position outlined in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Reviews* of March 8 and March 28, 1977 which suggests that the Islanders were distinctly unimpressed with the Minister’s visit. See (from p.21 of the pdf.) - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/06/falkland-islands-times-falkland-islands-monthly-1977-to-1979.pdf>

424 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.610

425 Carassai 2022

426 *Crónica* February 16, 1977

427 Patrick Watts MBE quoted in *Penguin News* February 26, 2021

428 *Callan to Unwin* February 17, 1977 FCO 58/1165 in Livingstone 2018

429 Queen Elizabeth II signed the ratification on April 18, 1977. There was no immediate response from either of the parties. In January 1978 a letter was sent to both Chile and Argentina to discover whether they were content that the arbitration process had been completed. Chile answered in the positive and to say that, as far as it was concerned the Award had been duly implemented. Argentina did not reply. Nor did Argentina reply to a further inquiry in March, 1978, despite having already contacted Chile. On July 10, 1978, the President of the Court of Arbitration notified Queen Elizabeth II that, in its opinion, “... the Award stands fully and materially executed.” The arbitration panel then stood down. cf. 1848, 1971, 1976 & 1978 The decision is here - https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/53-264.pdf

“... the Parties were agreed in principle that their rights in the matter of claims or title to territory were governed prima facie by the doctrine of the uti possidetis juris of 1810. This doctrine – possibly, at least at first, a political tenet rather than a true rule of law – is peculiar to the field of the Spanish-American States whose territories were formerly under the rule of the Spanish Crown, and even if both the scope and applicability of the doctrine were somewhat uncertain, particularly in such far-distant regions of the continent as are those in issue in the present case, it undoubtedly constituted an important element in the inter-relationships of the continent.

As the Court understand the matter, the doctrine has two aspects:

First, all territory in Spanish-America, however remote or inhospitable, is deemed to have been part of one of the former administrative divisions of Spanish colonial rule (vice-royalties, captaincies-general, etc.). Hence there is no territory in Spanish-America that has the status of res nullius open to an acquisition of title by occupation.

Secondly, the title to any given locality is deemed to have become automatically vested in whatever Spanish-American State inherited or took over the former Spanish administrative division in which the locality concerned was stipulated (uti possidetis, ita possideatis, – the full formula). Looked at in another way, uti possidetis was a convenient method of establishing the boundaries of the young Spanish-American States on the same basis as those of the old Spanish administrative divisions, except that the latter were themselves often uncertain or ill-defined or, in the less accessible regions, not factually established at all, – or again underwent various changes.”

*“... essentially an accord on boundaries between successor states of the same (Spanish) empire, not an assertion of sovereignty against outsiders.”*⁴³⁰

*“As a principle, it could be applied only to a dispute between Latin American nations... Whether it is applicable in a dispute with a non-Spanish American nation is open to doubt.”*⁴³¹

*“In 1977, an arbitration award was favorable to Chile, but as soon as the Videla government received the result, it rejected it and declared its nullity. For its part, the Chilean government issued a statement stating that it was unwilling to restart discussions on an area that it now considered legitimately its own. This hardened relations between the two countries again...”*⁴³²

*“The Falklands were not at issue, but the evidence from history and maps applied to them exactly as it did to the PNL group.”*⁴³³

February 19th, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Crosland, dies suddenly of a cerebral haemorrhage aged only 59years old.

February 21st, as Rowlands leaves Stanley, he is met by a large crowd of Islanders and handed a letter.

430 *Falklands Title Deeds* M. Deas 1982

431 *Falklands or Malvinas? The Background to the Dispute* J. Metford 1968

432 *Génesis de la Guerra de Malvinas (1976-1982)* Valeria Lourdes Carbone 2008

433 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.594.

“We all wish you a safe and pleasant journey back to Britain and hope you will always remember your visit to the Falkland Islands.

(Keep the Falklands Islands British)

We fervently hope that you will recommend an extension to our airfield - this appears to be the only way that development of the Colony can take place.

(Support the Falkland Islands' wish to stay British)

We do not believe our economy to be stagnant. The wool industry is holding its value - in fact its value is increasing. This means more assistance to your balance of payments through increased hard currency and taxation.

(The Falkland Islands want to stay British)

We wish to have co-operation with Argentina only in the form of a normal relationship between any two countries.

(Keep the Falkland Islands British)

We would like to see the infamous 'White Card' abolished'

(Support the Falkland Islands' wish to stay British)

We do not want Argentine participation within these Islands and only accept it in off-shore ventures insofar as within a fully international legal framework.

(The Falkland Islands want to stay British)

The South American way of life is as foreign to us as the oriental one is to you. Our cultures, laws, politics, language etc., are entirely different. If we wanted the South American way of life we would go there and live.

(Support the Falkland Islands' wish to remain British)

We do not acknowledge that Argentina has any legitimate claim on our Islands.

(Keep the Falkland Islands British)”⁴³⁴

“Great Britain has begun the path towards the restitution of the Islands.”⁴³⁵

“The four and a half day visit by the Minister and two officials from the FCO was well covered by the British and Argentine press and international news agencies. Reports indicate that the Argentine press have distorted facts to support the Argentine propaganda machine.”⁴³⁶

“Dear Editor, Yes some of us did get a chance to meet Lord Ted Runway (sic) but had a job to get a word in as he talked so much that he filled the airspace. By the time he'd said how he'd come to listen, that "our hopes lie on the doorstep" (whatever that means!) twenty times, and how Wales' international airport is a "huge white elephant", he was off ... As a result of this morale boosting visit by one of our great chiefs and his entourage the Argentines are now claiming to be about to discuss our Constitution (Thank you BBC).”⁴³⁷

434 Quoted in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland islands Monthly Review* March 8, 1977 p.2. Also Ellerby 1990 p.214

435 *Somos* February 25, 1977 no.23 pp.10-14

436 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland islands Monthly Review* March 8, 1977 p.1 & p.6.

437 Letter by A. Chater in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland islands Monthly Review* March 28, 1977 p.3

Minister Rowlands arrives in Buenos Aires for talks with Argentina's Foreign Ministry.

*"I went to Buenos Aires and held two days of substantive talks with representatives of the Argentine Government. I gave an account of my visit to the islands and stressed the assurances given to the islanders by the Government that there would be full consultation throughout any negotiations and that any such negotiations would be conducted under the sovereignty umbrella. My talks in Buenos Aires were solely intended to establish whether terms of reference could be agreed for subsequent negotiations. I believe that, as a result of the talks that I held, we shall be able to make progress towards a possible agreement on future negotiations. However, there is still some way to go before concrete terms of reference can be agreed. It is essential that each side should be clear in its own mind from the outset how the other side is approaching the problem of negotiations. It is important to get the inter-relationship between the themes of economic and political cooperation absolutely right. We shall be exchanging further views with the Argentine Government on terms of reference through diplomatic channels and as a follow-up to my own talks."*⁴³⁸

In London, after the unforeseen death of Anthony Crosland, Dr. David Owen takes over as Foreign Secretary.

*"It seemed to me that we had an obligation to try and ensure the economic prosperity of the islanders, to reduce its isolation, and to accept that they would live happily in the region if there could be a mutual understanding with Argentina. Did I believe that the Islanders should have a veto on negotiations? My answer to that, ... was no."*⁴³⁹

February 22nd, in Buenos Aires, following two days of talks between Rowlands and Minister Allara, a joint-statement is released. All this says is that there is a need for the two sides to consult their governments.

*"In light of the concessions which we were able to bring them, the talks were much stickier than expected. It does not bode well for the next round, when the really difficult stage – of substantive negotiations – begins."*⁴⁴⁰

Rowlands flies back to the UK; *"I came back convinced that it was a perfectly legitimate and, in my opinion, important right of British foreign policy to defend the rights of a minority. ... I came back convinced that while I believed I could carry the Islanders with me, if we could get a workable solution and something Argentines would agree to, I was also convinced that we could not actually over-rule the Islanders."*⁴⁴¹

February 23rd, in London, *Guardian* newspaper journalist Richard Gott, in a piece on Rowland's round-trip, writes about the islanders.

"...(They) need to be told quite firmly.. that although they wish the islands to remain a British colony, the British in 1977 plainly do not. The Falkland Islands are an absurd colonial anachronism."

March 1st, in Britain's House of Commons, foreign affairs are debated.⁴⁴² Answering questions, Foreign Secretary Dr. Owen refers to the Falkland Islands.

"It is concern for the rights of the individual that govern our policies towards our few remaining dependent territories. We cannot avoid responding to changing circumstances but we must consider at all times the wishes and interests of the people who are dependent upon us. ... The Government believe that a framework of greater political and economic co-operation in the region of the South-West

438 *Commons: 1 March 1977 – Commons Chamber – Foreign Affairs vol. 927 col.207*

439 Owen quoted in Donaghy 2014

440 *Charge d'Affaires* Shakespeare quoted in Donaghy 2014

441 Ted Rowlands interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.57. Rowlands, had not heard a word.

442 *Commons: 1 March 1977 – Commons Chamber – Foreign Affairs vol. 927 col.207*

Atlantic is necessary if we are to have any prospect of achieving a prosperous and durable future for the Islands. The Government therefore decided that the time had come to consider both with the Islanders and with the Argentine Government whether a climate existed for discussing the broad issues which bear on the future of the Falkland Islands and the possibilities of co-operation between Britain and Argentina in the region of the South-West Atlantic. ..., any such discussions would inevitably raise fundamental questions in the relationship between the Islands, Britain and Argentina. However, any changes which might be proposed must be acceptable to the Islanders whose interest and well-being are our main concern. In consequence there must be full consultation with the Islanders at every stage; nothing will be done behind their backs. I now reaffirm these pledges. ... on the understanding that there would be full consultation at every stage, the Joint Legislative and Executive Council of the Islands gave their approval for the Minister of State to hold talks in Buenos Aires to try to establish a basis for negotiation with the Government of Argentina. These talks have not yet been concluded but I can assure the House that there has been and there will be no sell-out. That would be to betray the very principles which I believe guide our British foreign policy.”

March 3rd, the Falkland Islands Research & Development Association is incorporated as a non-profit making business into the Falkland Islands Association.

*“Its objectives were to represent the interests of the Falklands and to promote the economic, social and cultural development of the Islands for the benefit of the inhabitants. The Association had four functions. First, to provide the U.K.F.I.C. and affiliated groups with an office and salaried staff in London. Secondly, to incorporate a members' organization to which sympathizers in Britain and the people of the Falklands could subscribe. Thirdly, to provide Islanders visiting Britain and anyone interested in the Falklands with an information centre. Fourthly, to stimulate the commercial implementation of the Shackleton Report's recommendations in accordance with the wishes of the Islanders.”*⁴⁴³

March 11th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry proposes that there should be one set of negotiations; to include both sovereignty and economic cooperation. The UK government agrees.

*“Allara was delighted. He emphasised the need to make a statement soon, since public opinion was getting 'restless.'... Shakespeare believed his desire for an early announcement was linked to his government's need to have something favourable to give the public, and offset the 'disastrous effect' of the forthcoming award to Chile.”*⁴⁴⁴

March 16th, in a broadcast, the Falklands' Governor tells the Islanders that changes to the Constitution are being proposed which include the inclusion of six elected members to the legislature and the reduction of the voting age to 18.

March 18th, in Britain's Private Eye magazine; *“Connoisseurs of the Foreign Office news management will have noticed how the Falkland islands story has been handled. The F.O. considers that compared to British interests in the Argentine and assorted other dictatorships, the Falkland Islands are a drop in the bucket. Unfortunately for the F.O. the Shackleton Report made it perfectly clear that the Falklands had a viable economic future. In order to get around this, the F.O. assisted by the loyal hacks of the diplomatic lobby, have started to misquote the report. Contrary to the F.O. handouts, the report did not recommend £14 million expenditure, nor did it say that Argentinian co-operation was essential to future development. Instead it spoke*

443 Ellerby 1990 p.240

444 Donaghy 2014. The Beagle Channel arbitration decision had actually been reached 3 weeks before, but was not formally ratified by Queen Elizabeth II until April, 1977 and only announced in May, 1977.

of a small-scale £5.4 million development project spread over five years, bring profitable industry to the Islands. The Islanders remain rightly suspicious of the F.O.'s interventions. The F.O. Have decided that rather than be seen to sell the Falklanders out, they should complicate or hinder all future development and thus let the Islands die a slow death.”⁴⁴⁵

March 23rd, in Britain's House of Commons, a written question is put down by John Biggs-Davison MP asking the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations Minister Rowlands had received at Goose Green. Rowlands responds.

*“During the public discussions I held with the Falkland Islanders at Goose Green, the local branch of the Falkland Island Committee read out an eight point statement, prepared before my arrival, which expressed concern over discussion of the Falkland Islands sovereignty dispute with Argentina. I assured those present that, contrary to the suggestion in the statement, I had not discussed sovereignty with the Argentine Government en route to the Islands. I explained why the Government thought it right to establish whether Anglo-Argentine negotiations might be held and how United Kingdom sovereignty over the Islands and the position of the Islanders would be fully protected. Those present at the Goose Green meeting indicated their satisfaction with these explanations and with the Government’s intention to see whether a climate for Anglo-Argentine negotiations existed.”*⁴⁴⁶

In **April**, it is reported that a prominent Argentine businessman, César Cao Saravia is prepared to pay \$US 10 million for the Falkland Islands Company; at least \$1 million more than the asking price.⁴⁴⁷

*“The Board of Directors of the Company announced that they would not agree to a transfer of ownership to Argentine interests and pointed out that in any event a pre-emptive right to purchase the Company is vested in the Falkland Islands Sheep Owners' Association Ltd. and that the Islands Government would need to approve any transfer of control to an alien.”*⁴⁴⁸

*“The Falkland Islands Company, which exercised a strong oligopoly over the islands economic activity, received a British government’s subsidy to stay in business. In view of that weakness, in 1977, the then President of the Board of Banco Tornquist, Héctor F. D. Capozzolo, conceived an oblique approach to recover Malvinas islands. The banker estimated that shareholders, who were receiving meagre dividends from their investment, could very well be tempted to sell their shares. He presented the plan to Minister Martínez de Hoz, who agreed on it and committed to financing the operation through the Argentine National Treasury. To conceal Argentina’s intention, the negotiation was entrusted in the greatest secrecy to Mrs. Beau, president of France’s Banque Occidentale. The transactions were well underway, even an approving nod from the British government had been received, until the local newspaper La Opinión disseminated the project and caused an immediate reaction in the House of Commons.”*⁴⁴⁹

In London, Ted Rowlands makes a statement.

“... no land can be alienated on Falkland Islands without the permission of the Falkland Islands Government itself; the British Government would not support such a move.”

445 Quoted in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* August 31, 1977 pp.4 & 5

446 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 28, 1977 p.6

447 There is some evidence that another Argentine entrepreneur, Hector Francisco Capozzolo was involved in the offer. In 1978, Capozzolo also attempted to purchase a Falklands Farm – Douglas Station. See below.

448 *The Friends of the Falkland Islands: Newsletter* June 1977. cf. July, 1972

449 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023. Nod? No supporting evidence.

April 20th, in Britain's House of Lords, the Falkland islands are discussed. Speakers include Lord Shackleton. Addressing their Lordships at the end of the discussion, Lord Goronwy-Roberts makes a statement.

*“There is absolutely no doubt in this country in legal or Government circles about where sovereignty lies. It is here, in the United Kingdom.”*⁴⁵⁰

April 26th, simultaneously in Buenos Aires and London, a *Joint Communique* is released. Read to the House of Commons by Foreign Secretary, Dr Owen.

“The Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have agreed to hold negotiations from June or July 1977 which will concern future political relations, including sovereignty, with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, and economic co-operation with regard to the said territories, in particular, and the South West Atlantic, in general. In these negotiations the issues affecting the future of the Islands will be discussed and negotiations will be directed to the working out of a peaceful solution to the existing dispute on sovereignty between the two states, and the establishment of a framework for Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation which will contribute substantially to the development of the islands, and the region as a whole.

A major objective of the negotiations will be to achieve a stable, prosperous and politically durable future for the Islands, whose people the Government of the United Kingdom will consult during the course of the negotiations

The agreement to hold these negotiations, and the negotiations themselves, are without prejudice to the position of either Government with regard to sovereignty over the Islands.

*The level at which the negotiations will be conducted, and the times and places at which they will be held, will be determined by agreement between the two Governments. If necessary, special Working Groups will be established.”*⁴⁵¹

May 6th, Britain's Department of Energy urge the Foreign Office to ensure that Argentina's planned seismic studies off its continental shelf, do not cross the median line between the Patagonian coastline and the Falklands archipelago; *“The worst would be to do nothing, ... as this could lead to ‘our giving up without so much as a whisper the title to any oil which might lie beneath the sea outside the 200 metres line’ ...”*⁴⁵²

May 7th, in Argentina, following an attempted assassination of the Foreign Minister, the Montoneros Group claim responsibility. They assert that Guzzetti had been negotiating a deal with Britain over the Falklands, that would reduce Argentine sovereignty and allow for the exploitation of oil and the fisheries by British interests.

May 9th, in the UK, a British Petroleum (BP) executive, Dr. J. Birks, writes to the Foreign Office to seek an opinion on the likely attitude to BP setting up a consortium with Argentine companies in the search for oil around the Falklands.⁴⁵³

*“Birks added that the Falkland Islands Company had expressed an interest in joining such a consortium.”*⁴⁵⁴

450 *HL Deb 20 April 1977 vol.382 cc222-66*. For the full debate, see - <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1977/apr/20/the-falkland-islands>

451 *UN Doc A/37/553/Add.1*. Also quoted in *FCO 76/1892 Annex 2*, and Franks 1983 para.60. Owen's willing inclusion of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands was not explained. It would cause some confusion after 1979.

452 Livingstone 2018 citing *Brown to Cortazzi May 6, 1977 in EG 14/38*

453 *Birks to Rowlands May 9, 1977 FCO 7/3409*

454 Livingstone 2018

May 18th, in London, a cross-departmental meeting to discuss negotiations, is held at the Foreign Office; “... *Hugh Carless explained that the FCO envisaged splitting British possessions in the South Atlantic into four areas of consideration: the Falkland Islands; the 200 miles of sea around the Falkland Islands including their maritime and subterranean resources (oil and fish); the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands (South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands); and their 200-mile maritime zones. While leaseback would be the most appropriate solution for the Falkland Islands themselves, said Carless, there should also be a separate leaseback arrangement for the maritime zones, ‘which would allow Britain to exploit the resources of the area’. In regard to the Dependencies and their maritime zones, Britain’s aims should be ‘to retain access to the economic resources’. ...*”⁴⁵⁵

May 20th, Britain’s Ministry of Defence warns the Foreign Office that it intends to withdraw HMS *Endurance* in May, 1978.⁴⁵⁶

May 23rd, in Buenos Aires, Oscar Montes is appointed as Argentina’s Foreign Minister.

May 31st, in Buenos Aires, John Shakespeare receives instructions from London to make a formal protest to the Argentine government regarding any seismic oil studies carried out in Falklands waters; “*The FCO also feared that inaction would weaken Britain’s sovereignty claim, so in May 1977, it instructed its charge d’affaires to deliver a formal protest to the Argentine Government, noting: ‘We must make sure that we do not prejudice our rights ... over the Falkland Islands Continental shelf in advance’. ...*”⁴⁵⁷

Dundee Perth and London Shipping Company, owners of the Falkland Islands Company, are purchased by the Coalite Group PLC.

June 13th, in London, the Falkland Islands are discussed at a meeting of the Cabinet’s Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee; “*The Committee decided that the aim should be to keep the negotiations going.*”⁴⁵⁸

“... *Foreign Secretary David Owen felt that in order to secure the main objective of retaining the sovereignty over the Falkland Islands themselves, Britain should be prepared to concede sovereignty over the Dependencies and the maritime resources of both the Islands and the Dependencies. ... In speaking notes prepared for Owen, his case was made more explicit: ‘We have to get it across to Argentina that we are not after economic advantage at their expense, and that our concern for the Islanders is our real and genuine concern. I do not in any case believe that it is right for us to seek to secure for ourselves, economic resources 7000 miles away ... we should not lay ourselves open to accusations ... that we are economic imperialists.’*”⁴⁵⁹

Researcher's Comment: Both noteworthy, and appalling. Dr. David Owen was prepared to give away British territory to appease an undemocratic government in South America; the land of tin-pot dictatorships. Most of Owen's arguments remain embargoed – i.e. unpublished even today. An embarrassment, for any government.

In the House of Commons, questions are asked of the Minister of Overseas Development by Sir Nigel Fisher MP.

“1. When will the four feasibility studies which she is undertaking arising from the Shackleton Report, and recommended by the Falkland Islands Government, be completed; 2. What plans she has to implement the recommendations contained in the Shackleton Report on the Falkland Islands.

455 *Ibid.* citing *Record of a Meeting to discuss Anglo/Argentine Negotiations on the Falkland Islands Dispute May 18, 1977* in *EG 14/38*

456 The Prime Minister refused to allow it. See February, 1976

457 Livingstone 2018 citing *FCO to British Embassy May 31, 1977 FCO 7/3409*. The protest was ignored, so Britain gave its own authorisation to the two American oil companies commissioned by Argentina, to survey within Falklands waters.

458 *Ibid*

459 Donaghy 2014 citing *Secretary of State’s Meeting on the Falkland Islands June 13, 1977* in *FCO 76/1616*

Mrs Hart replied: "Certain recommendations fall either to the private sector to implement or to the Falkland Islands Government themselves. Some of the major suggestions which do or might involve aid, such as a possible extension of the Airport and the development of fisheries and tourism would require prior investigation which I would be prepared to initiate only when a framework of political and economic cooperation with Argentina has been established. My Advisers are at present considering a proposal from the Falkland Islands Government for a new school hostel in Stanley. At the Government's request I am setting up a study of internal communications covering the Air Service, roads and coastal shipping, to see what the needs in this field are and how they can best be met. I hope it will be completed not later than early next year. I am prepared to set up feasibility studies in other areas recommended in the Shackleton Report when the Falkland Islands Government request them, including sheepskin processing, mutton freezing and local television. I have also offered to provide advice to the Government if and when they enter into negotiations with any commercial enterprises that are prepared to explore those Shackleton recommendations which fall outside the aid programme. The already considerable technical cooperation programme in the Falklands covers several of the Shackleton proposals, including an expanding Grasslands Trials Unit and the provision of fiscal advice, which is an essential preliminary to any social and economic development."..."⁴⁶⁰

June 14th, in Stanley, the annual budget session of the Falklands Legislative Council commences.

*"In reply to questions from Councillors, the Chief Secretary informed them that the Government hoped that the new Stanley airport would be acceptable for operation by LADE aircraft during July, that Camp mail drops would continue to receive very high priority and that it was hoped that all Camp settlements would be equipped with the new radio/telephone sets (AEL) within eight to nine months."*⁴⁶¹

July 4th, in London, following a further discussion by the Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee, the Foreign Office prepares for negotiations with Argentina.⁴⁶²

*"... serious and substantive negotiations were necessary to keep the Argentines in play, since the Islands were militarily indefensible except by a major, costly and unacceptable diversion of current resources."*⁴⁶³

*"In July 1977, the then Labour Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), presented a paper to the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee which, as the report states "argued that serious and substantive negotiations were necessary to keep the Argentines in play, since the Islands were militarily indefensible except by a major costly and unacceptable diversion of current resources". The committee decided that the aim should be to keep the negotiations going. ... "Broadly speaking, the Government's strategy was to retain sovereignty as long as possible, if necessary making concessions in respect of the Dependencies and the maritime resources in the area, while recognising that ultimately only some form of leaseback arrangement was likely to satisfy Argentina"."*⁴⁶⁴

"A proposal to offer 'concessions over maritime resources' was put to the cabinet's Defence and Overseas policy Committee in July 1977. The Department of Energy was vehemently against this; a briefing note for Tony

460 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* June 15, 1977 p.5

461 *Ibid.* July 18, 1977 p.2

462 As of 2020, the minutes of this OD Committee meeting were still embargoed.

463 Quoted by Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

464 *Falkland Islands (Franks report) HC Deb 15 January 1983 vol.35 cc789.870*. See - <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1983/jan/25/falkland-islands-franks-report>

Benn noted that separating the continental shelf from the Islands could set a dangerous precedent for British claims in other areas... David Owen's DOP paper argued that if concessions on maritime resources were not enough, Britain should consider offering full leaseback of the Islands themselves." 465

July 13th, in Rome, Italy, delegations from Argentina and the UK meet for three days of talks.

"A change of location did not alter proceedings... minimal progress was being made. Allara repeated that the principle of self-determination was 'absolutely inapplicable' to the Falkland Islands archipelago, and that the restitution of Argentine sovereignty took priority over the economic dimension. ... The British team were unimpressed. Cortazzi ... (re-emphasised) that no British government could conform to proposals which were being forced on the Islanders." 466

"... the British put forward the 'mixed approach' in general terms (i.e. separating the Islands from their maritime zones and from the Dependencies), but did not make a specific offer to cede the sovereignty of the maritime zones. ... The 'mixed approach' concept bemused the Argentine delegation, which continued to demand sovereignty over the whole area,..." 467

On the same day in London, at the House of Commons, questions are put to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Questions refer to the right of self-determination; the discussion with Argentina and the new airport. Edward Rowlands MP responds on behalf of the Foreign Secretary;

"As was announced yesterday, the first round in Anglo-Argentine negotiations on the Falkland Islands dispute is taking place in Rome from 13th to 15th July. The topics for discussion are set out in the terms of reference for these negotiations which were announced on 26th April. The Government's commitment to the principle of self-determination will once again be made clear to the Argentine during the current negotiations. ...

We shall of course inform the Falkland Islanders about our actions and our approach to the talks. I have myself sent a message to the Island Council informing it in advance of the first round of talks. I made it very clear to the House when we debated the matter on 1st March that the Government would not even bring proposals to the House unless they had received the acceptance of the islanders themselves. ...

We have already carried out one extension of the airfield, which has only just been completed. The idea of extending it considerably to take very large international airliners has been the subject of considerable debate. It would be extremely expensive—a multimillion pound project—and on the basis of existing evidence we could not commit ourselves to it. However, we are willing to commission, when it seems appropriate, any preliminary studies necessary to investigate the matter further. ..." 468

"On the day that the talks commenced, questions by Members of Parliament were put to Mr Ted Rowlands in the House of Commons. In replying, Mr Rowlands gave assurance that the British Government would, once again, make clear to the Argentines its commitment to the principle of self-determination for Islanders and that HMG would inform Islanders about its actions and approach to the talks. Once again questions were asked about the possible extension to the permanent airport and the Minister of State said that he was a keen supporter of the Falkland Islanders' welfare but an extension would be a multi-million £ project and HMG

465 Livingstone 2018

466 Donaghy 2014

467 Livingstone 2018

468 Commons Chamber vol 935 debated on Wednesday 13 July 1977 col.406

*feared that if the runway was extended and it turned out to be a white elephant it would be a considerable burden to the Islanders.”*⁴⁶⁹

July 14th, in Britain, *The Daily Mail* newspaper complains that talks are taking place “*behind Islanders’ backs.*”
“*The (Falkland Islands) Committee’s relationship with the Foreign Office was contradictory ... antagonism derived from the campaign’s propaganda, which centred on the accusation that the Foreign Office was secretly trying to persuade ministers to ‘sell out’ the Falklands – a charge FCO officials resented.*”⁴⁷⁰

The British Labour Party’s National Executive Council publish a resolution.⁴⁷¹

“We call on the Government to ensure that under no circumstances will the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands be handed over to any Argentine regime which violates human and civil right.”

*“... while the Labour party’s official statements did not persuade ministers to halt talks with Argentina, they did make them more cautious in their approach...”*⁴⁷²

July 15th, in Rome, talks end without any progress. A communique is issued.

*“In accordance with the announcement made simultaneously by the Argentine and British Governments on 26th April 1977, delegations representing the two Governments met in Rome from 13th-15th July 1977 in order to conduct the first round of negotiations concerning future political relations; including Sovereignty, with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation with regard to the said territories in particular and the South West Atlantic in general. The two delegations were led respectively by Capt. Gualter Oscar Allara, Under Secretary for Foreign Relations of the Republic of Argentine and by Mr H.A.H. Cortazzi, Deputy Under Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In accordance with the terms of reference for negotiations announced in the statement of 26th April 1977 the two sides conducted a full exchange of views in order to agree on the procedure for defining the issues to be covered in their negotiations. The discussions between the two delegations were conducted in a positive spirit. They led to a better awareness of the position of each side as a basis to continue to seek understanding. It was agreed that the negotiations now established should be continued at a further high level meeting to be held at the beginning of November. The venue for this second meeting would be decided upon through the diplomatic channel.”*⁴⁷³

*“We are told that in the talks the British side put forward the idea that the sovereignty of the uninhabited dependencies might be “looked at separately” from the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands themselves. The Argentine reaction to that further signal is not recorded.”*⁴⁷⁴

*“Argentine proposals to establish ‘working groups’ were rejected by Cortazzi, who felt the gap was too large to begin discussing compromises. Allara suggested further negotiations in September but Cortazzi, citing party conferences and South Africa, said there would be no ministerial time until November. Allara accepted this and the talks fizzled out.”*⁴⁷⁵

469 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* July 18, 1977 p.1

470 *Ibid.* Bill Hunter-Christie, the Falkland Islands Company Secretary, was a particular cause for concern. An informal Foreign Office rule required that no official should meet him unaccompanied.

471 *Argentina, Chile, Brazil: A Statement by the NEC of the Labour Party* July, 1977

472 Livingstone 2018

473 Quoted in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* July 18, 1977 p.1

474 Baroness Young in *HL Deb* 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247

475 Donaghy 2014

In London, Hugh Michael Carless, of the Foreign Office's Latin America Department, is appointed *charge d'affaires* at Buenos Aires.

*"During July, Hugh Carless assumed the thankless job of chargé d'affaires in Buenos Aires. He spent his first few weeks writing of Argentine dismay at the outcome of Rome. ... Carless was gloomy about the prospects: "I believe that, unless progress on some aspect of sovereignty can be achieved at the next round in November, there is a probability that they will consider whether to switch from a policy of negotiation to a policy of pressure". This was not an isolated report."*⁴⁷⁶

July 18th, in Argentina, President General Videla signs decree 2065 (unpublished) authorising the Navy Command to continue to occupy Morrell Island in Southern Thule.

*"According to Secret Decree 2085, from 18 July 1977, and signed by then head of the military General Junta, Jorge Rafael Videla, the Ministry of Defense through the Navy's Command was authorized to continue and complete the logistic tasks and aspects for the mounting and necessary equipment leading to the effective and peaceful occupation of the island of Thule, part of South Sandwich islands. Through "Operation Sun", Argentina will reaffirm with scientific activities its rights and sovereignty over the South Atlantic islands occupied by the United Kingdom, added the decree. The foreign ministry considered these activities as necessary in support of Argentine foreign policy reaffirming National Sovereignty, underlined the secret decree. The first steps of Operation Sun had started during 1975 and 1976. The decree also provides funds from the 1977 Budget destined to Jurisdiction 47 of the Navy's commander in chief, some 300 million Argentine Pesos and US\$ 100.000."*⁴⁷⁷

July 27th, in Britain's House of Commons, 140 backbenchers from all parties sign a motion acknowledging the Falkland Islanders' wish to remain British.

*"The fear of a 'political storm' was uppermost in ministers' minds throughout the dispute. Every cabinet meeting which discussed the Falklands problem during Callaghan's period of office discussed the possible reaction of parliament."*⁴⁷⁸

July 28th, a meeting is held at the House of Commons, attended by the Falkland Islands Company, the Foreign Office and representatives of Britain's fishing industry.

*"It was sponsored by James Johnson, the Labour M P for Kingston-upon-Hull West (a constituency seriously affected by the decline in the distant-water fishing fleet) and chaired by Bill Hunter Christie. As a result the S.A.F.C.⁴⁷⁹ was formed composed of representatives from British United Trawlers, Christian Salvesens Ltd., the Confederation of Fried Fish Caterers' Associations, the National Farmers' Union, the National Fish Fryers' Federation, the White Fish Authority, Alginate Industries Ltd. and the F.I.C."*⁴⁸⁰

In the Falklands, in **August**, an expedition from Cambridge University arrives to collect data on wrecks.⁴⁸¹

In London a 'Falkland Islands Week' is held; *"... which included the presentation of a petition to 10 Downing Street. National newspapers produced photographs of Suki Cameron, a daughter of Norman Cameron, modelling a 'Keep the Falkland Islands British' T-shirt."*⁴⁸²

476 *Ibid.* As Head of the FO Latin America Dept., Carless had been dealing with the Falklands since 1973.

477 *MercoPress* August 29, 2019

478 Livingstone 2018

479 South Atlantic Fisheries Committee

480 Ellerby 1990 p.250 citing *F.G. Mitchell papers, S.A.F.C. minutes, 28 July 1977. cf. 1980*

481 *Cambridge Expedition to the Falkland Islands 1977: Report to the National Maritime Museum*

482 Ellerby 1990 p.244

“... there are certain powerful influences whose intentions seem to conflict with opinion in the Islands. As an example, the Argentine government has appointed the second largest public relations company in the world to sway public opinion, principally through the media.”⁴⁸³

In **September**, in Falklands waters, Argentine Navy ships fire on Russian and Bulgarian fishing vessels.

In Ottawa, Canada, Adrian Monk, representing the Falkland Islands Legislative Council, attends the 23rd Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference.

“We ... wonder why, when the Argentinian claim to our country is discussed in the United Nations and elsewhere, so few Commonwealth countries support our desire to retain our democratic, British way of life. We are continually being pressured to join with that country, whose way of life is alien to us, a country often without even the pretence of a democratic government, a country where human rights are virtually non-existent, a country with different cultures and a different language. ...”



September 25th, in Britain, the *Observer* newspaper, asks whether the Foreign Office are intent upon “giving away” the archipelago. In *The Sunday Times*:

*“The Falkland Islands have undoubtedly suffered from the amalgamation of the Commonwealth Office with the Foreign Office; passing under the control of the Latin American department whose main care is to foster easy relations with those States, not to defend a handful of people's rights to self determination.”*⁴⁸⁴

In the South Atlantic, Argentina’s navy ‘arrest’ Russian and Bulgarian fishing vessels operating within Falklands waters.

October 4th, Britain's Foreign Office prepare for a new round of talks with Argentina, scheduled for November.

*“Rowlands sent Owen a four-page minute outlining the FCO position. It contrasted sharply with the cautious approach adopted at Rome. Leaseback was now being pushed to the front of the agenda; a development which would again illustrate the differing views of Foreign Office diplomats and senior ministers.”*⁴⁸⁵

October 24th, the November negotiations are postponed until December.

October 26th, in Buenos Aires, Britain’s *charge d'affairs* Hugh Carless is summoned to the Foreign Ministry; to be told that Argentina intends to complete its installation on Southern Thule Island.

*“Unless we are prepared to deploy sufficient power physically to dislodge the Argentines from Southern Thule, we must surely tolerate them as squatters...”*⁴⁸⁶

October 28th, in London, Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee reports its concern regarding Argentina's increasingly hostile attitude. In particular, the belligerence of the Argentine Navy which has announced its refusal to fly the Falklands' red ensign while in Port Stanley.

483 *Falkland Islands Committee – Letter from London August 11, 1977 in The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review August 31, 1977 p.8*

484 *Why do the British want to Quit Penelope Tremayne in The Sunday Times September 25, 1977*

485 Donaghy 2014

486 *Carless to Owen October 27, 1977 in FO 7/3375*

November 10th, at the United Nations building in New York, the Fourth Committee considers the report of the Special Committee on Decolonization. Representatives of Ghana and Zaire assert the self-determination rights of the inhabitants of the Falklands. Argentina claims that three General Assembly resolutions have established that the dispute could only be resolved through negotiations between itself and the UK; taking into account the 'interests' of the inhabitants, but no application of self-determination.

November 16th, in London, the Secretary of Defence reluctantly accepts the need to retain HMS *Endurance* in the South Atlantic for the foreseeable future.

November 21st, following an intelligence assessment concluding that Argentina may be planning an incident along the lines of the Southern Thule encroachment, British Ministers decide to establish a military presence in the area.

*"We deployed forces in 1977 because we discovered that there were to be major problems in the negotiations. At that time I was an inexperienced Minister and therefore I approached the then Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), ... I put it to my right hon. Friend that the deployment of force could be an over-reaction that would lead to a reaction that would trigger a host of uncontrollable events. ... My right hon. Friend asked me, "Can you guarantee or assure me that there will not be a threatened invasion and that you will be able to keep the talks going?". I replied, "No, Prime Minister, I cannot guarantee that". My right hon. Friend responded by saying "Let me remind you of an old truth: it is better to be safe than sorry"..."*⁴⁸⁷

From Stanley, the Legislative Council urge the British Government to implement Shackleton's proposals.

*"We must not be deterred from initiating and developing such ventures as coastal and off-shore fishing and similar activities merely because this would be against the appeasement policy of the British Government towards Argentina."*⁴⁸⁸

November 22nd, Britain's Foreign Office decide that Islands' representatives should not be present at talks with Argentina in future; *"The newly elected councils had given no indication that islanders wished to participate at these talks (a similar stance to Rome). Instead it was agreed that Ted Rowlands, popular after his successful February visit, would meet islander representatives in Rio de Janeiro shortly after the New York summit had been concluded."*⁴⁸⁹

November 24th, frigates HMS *Alacrity* and HMS *Phoebe* are ordered to proceed to the South Atlantic, and stand-off about a thousand miles distant from the Falklands (*Operation Journeyman*).⁴⁹⁰

*"In mid-Atlantic we rendezvoused with "HMS Alacrity", RFAs "Resource" and "Owen" were to join us later,... At that stage the ship's companies were briefed on our mission. We were told that Operation Journeyman had been ordered by the then Prime Minister, James Callaghan, as fifty Argentine 'scientists' had landed on Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands, prompting fears of an Argentine invasion of the Falklands. Apparently the Argentines had set up a military base on Thule. ... We were to set up a 50 mile security zone and any ships entering the zone were to be asked to identify themselves and state their intentions..."*⁴⁹¹

487 Rowlands in the House of Commons – *HC Deb 03 April 1982 vol 21 cc633-68*.

488 Quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.218 citing *Leg.Co. minutes, 21 Nov. 1977*.

489 Donaghy 2014. Reports in the Falklands journals following his visit, contradict any suggestion that Ted Rowlands was 'popular.'

490 *Operation Journeyman*. James Callaghan only revealed this operation to Parliament in 1982.

491 Chris Cole, Supply Officer aboard HMS *Phoebe* quoted in *Mercopress* August 8, 2012 citing the July 2012 edition of the *South Georgia Newsletter*.

*“During 1976-77, Argentina had challenged Britain's claims to the Falkland islands. The Labour government had responded with fir, diplomacy, silently backed by deploying a nuclear-powered attack submarine and a ten-man GCHQ team to the area. This combination of force and intelligence trumped any likely Argentine attack, but Argentina did not know of their presence, and folded in the face of British determination rather than through deterrence.”*⁴⁹²

November 26th, from Gibraltar, nuclear submarine HMS *Dreadnought*, is ordered to close on the Falklands.

*“Commanding officers and aircraft captains are to respond to any aggression with tactful firmness and are to exhibit a determination to meet any escalation, though not to exceed that already carried out by the enemy. All use of force must be governed by the principle of using only the minimum force necessary to achieve the aim.”*⁴⁹³

*“The rules were quite explicit... If Argentine ships came within 50 miles of the Falkland Islands and were believed to have displayed hostile intent, the submarine was to open fire.”*⁴⁹⁴

*“The run up to the first round of talks with the Argentines, fixed for December 1977 proved as fraught and intense as the earlier contacts. Intelligence emphasized the mercurial role played by Admiral Massera, impatient with the lack of progress in the negotiations and, seemingly, with his fellow Junta members. The incident involving the Admiral Storni in 1976 and the occupation of Southern Thule were attributed to him and the naval 'hawks'. Following detailed discussions within the department and with the Ministry of Defence, Prime Minister Callaghan and Foreign Secretary Owen, all concerned agreed that a task force including a nuclear submarine should support the talks; if they went badly the Argentines would be told of the Force's presence.”*⁴⁹⁵

In the Falkland Islands, Stanley Airport officially opens for operations.⁴⁹⁶

*“The airport was first used on November 24 1977 ... Bill Luxton tells the story of the airport's first use - "The day before the flight Jim Kerr had heard that the Argentines were planning to officially land at the airport. ...(so) Jim telephoned me later and said the Argentines were planning to make the first landing and asked me, 'How do you feel about pre-empting them?' My response was, 'absolutely" so we met down near the Hookers Point strip the next morning. We went in and landed there and left the aircraft on the airfield that night. The Argentines were bloody furious; they had wanted a senior Argentine air force officer to open the airport.”*⁴⁹⁷



November 28th, at the UN, the General Assembly defer consideration of the Falkland Islands until 1978.

December 1st, in Britain, the *Financial Times* reports that “major international oil companies” are to carry out seismic exploration for oil in the waters around the archipelago.

492 *Behind the Enigma: The Authorised History of GCHQ, Britain's Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency* John Ferris 2020

493 Quoted in *Secret Falklands task force revealed* Ben Fenton in *The Telegraph* June 1, 2005

494 Foreign Secretary David Owen quoted in Donaghy 2014. Following the revelation in 1982 of this task force's deployment there was some controversy over the accuracy of Owen's memory regarding the rules of engagement. See Donaghy 2014, for a full account.

495 Rowlands, Edward (Ted) in *Dictionary of Falklands Biography* Tatham (ed) 2008. Authored by Ted Rowlands. See https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/rowlands_edward

496 At the last minute, LADE cancelled the first flight citing 'administrative difficulties.'

497 *Penguin News* December 6, 2002

A week later than announced, LADE makes its first landing at Stanley Airport.

December 7th, in Britain's House of Commons, the Government is questioned as to why it is prepared to negotiate with a "*Fascist-type dictatorship about the future of a democratic British community.*"⁴⁹⁸ Minister of State, Ted Rowlands, responds.

"... we are negotiating because, following my visit to the islands and by agreement with the islands council, it was decided that it was necessary to have negotiations on the economic and sovereignty issues. Otherwise we would let the stalemate of the position of the islands continue, and that would be a much worse prospect for the islanders themselves. ..."

MP Jeremy Thorpe asks a question.

"Will he confirm that Argentina has not accepted that part of the Hague Convention whereby it agreed to be bound by the decision of the International Court? Does this not shed some light on its lack of competence in international law in laying claim to the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands? May we take it that the question of sovereignty is not a matter that the Minister regards as being for negotiation in his New York meetings later this month?"

Ted Rowlands responds.

*"On the first part of the question, yes, that is the position... Sovereignty has been part and parcel of the terms of reference of the negotiations and will therefore be subject to negotiation in New York. ... They are not just about sovereignty they are about the whole issue of political and economic cooperation between Britain, Argentina and the Falkland Islands. ... Sovereignty issues are also involved. I repeat yet again that we shall not bring any proposals to the House unless they are acceptable to the islanders."*⁴⁹⁹

*"The Labour government also accepted the FCO's argument that Britain needed to pursue good relations with Argentina in order to resolve the Falklands dispute – ignoring the party's official policy that the Islanders should not be handed over to a regime that abused human rights."*⁵⁰⁰

December 8th, the London Falkland Islands Office organises a ceremony at the Cenotaph to commemorate Falkland Islands Battle Day 1914.⁵⁰¹

December 12th, reported in *The New York Times* -

"Britain begins high level negotiations in New York tomorrow that may well lead to a change in the status of the Falkland Islands, one of the 15 remaining colonial fragments, of the British Empire. ... But Argentina has claimed the Falklands, on and off, since 1828 (sic). Now the British have finally agreed to discuss with the Argentines, at the ministerial level, the questions of sovereignty and economic development. ... But the issues to be discussed are as tangled and as hotly argued as the ones in a nuclear weapons negotiation. ... The Falkland islanders know perfectly well that they could not survive as an independent state, especially with a hostile Argentina close by. What they want, as they regularly make clear in petitions to Parliament signed by almost every one of them, is to remain a colony, no matter how anachronistic that seems to outsiders. British governments used to pledge that they would never yield sovereignty against the wishes of the islanders, and that no pressure would be

498 Sir Bernard Braine in *HC Deb 07 December 1977 vol.940 cc1359-64*

499 *HC Deb 07 December 1977 vol.940 cc1359-64*

500 Livingstone 2018 p. 153

501 Now an annual event

*nut on the islanders to change their views. But the islanders, who will not be present at the meeting in New York, are already under pressure. ... Only the stable political situation that the British Government can insure, say the islanders' supporters, will attract the foreign investment needed to exploit the economic opportunities. The Government, on the other hand, apparently believes that the best hope lies in a wide-ranging agreement between Britain and Argentina for joint economic development and gradual political transition. So when Ted Rowlands, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, sits down opposite Capt. Oscar Allara, the Argentine deputy Foreign Minister, for three days of negotiations, the questions of sovereignty and development will be intertwined. The British want economic cooperation first, with political change coming later, while the Argentines put things in the reverse order.”*⁵⁰²

*“... it had been quite clear from the main FCO briefing that, had they not been under government pressure, the officials concerned, being apparently heartily sick of the subject, would have let the Argentinians have the Islands. One diplomat said to me privately, as we left the 12 December meeting, that he wasn't sure that any long-lasting effects would be felt if we abandoned the Islands to the Argentinians. Disgracefully, he wasn't thinking about the inhabitants or their wishes!”*⁵⁰³

December 13th, in New York, two days of talks between Britain and Argentina commence.

*“Gaulter Allara opened proceedings by venting frustration over the lack of progress on sovereignty. ... Rowlands assured the captain that his government had no desire to conduct Byzantine (never ending) talks, pointing out that it had ‘crossed the Rubicon’ in February by taking the decision to discuss sovereignty. The Argentine premise, Rowlands argued, was that the negotiations were simply related to how and when Britain would transfer sovereignty. But the British government's concern was with how a compromise could be reached.... If the issue was the principle of sovereignty there could be scope for discussion. But if Argentina wished to ‘transform the islanders, exercise all the actual attributes of sovereignty over them’, then there would be considerable difficulty.”*⁵⁰⁴

The Argentine delegation propose an 8-year joint administration before a recognition of total Argentine sovereignty by Britain. Rowlands rejects this; instead offering a ‘mixed approach’ - involving economic cooperation and the possibility of cessions from amongst the Dependencies. Allara rejects these proposals. The Argentines are not informed about the squadron lying off the Falkland Islands.

*“... there seems to be a difference of view between the then Prime Minister and the then Foreign Secretary about the events in 1977. The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Callaghan) said that this (task) force in 1977 became known and that a diplomatic solution followed, whereas the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) said yesterday on the radio that it was done in total secrecy but he added that it gave him confidence in his negotiations, whatever that might mean.”*⁵⁰⁵

*“66. Cabinet Committee papers show clearly that it was agreed that the force should remain covert. We have found no evidence that the Argentine Government ever came to know of its existence.”*⁵⁰⁶

502 *British, Argentines Hold Falkland Talks in The New York Times* December 13, 1977.

503 *Reasons in Writing: A Commandos View of the Falklands War* E. Southby-Tailyour 1990. In December, 1977, Southby-Tailyour was being briefed to take over command of NP-8901 in March, 1978.

504 Donaghy 2014. Also *Minutes of Anglo-Argentine Talks, December 13-15, 1977* in FO 7/3394

505 Defence Secretary John Nott in the House of Commons debate of April 3, 1982

506 *Falkland Islands Review Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors Chairman: The Rt Hon the Lord Franks, OM, GCMG, KCB, CBE Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty January 1983*. A copy of what is now commonly referred to as the Franks Report can be found here – <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2020/02/franks-report.pdf>

*“The Argentine government was privately warned by the UK that a nuclear submarine was in the area, but other countries were said to be unaware.”*⁵⁰⁷

December 14th, a final statement emerges from the negotiation.

*“The two sides recognized that there was a wide range of issues involved which would require detailed study. They accordingly agreed to establish at official level two parallel working groups on political relations, including sovereignty, and on economic co-operation, to pursue these studies in depth and to report back to the heads of delegations. ... A further round of negotiations will be held ...”*⁵⁰⁸

*“The broad Falkland Islands ‘lobby’ had both parliamentary leverage and informal social access to influence policy makers. It was strong enough to make ministers and officials extremely cautious in negotiations with Argentina and helped to ensure that no agreement on sovereignty was ever reached. Although the Cabinet had agreed in principle to explore leaseback, it was never formally proposed to Argentina during Labour’s period of office.”*⁵⁰⁹

*“At the New York talks in December Rowlands tabled a paper expressing HMG’s willingness to discuss fresh sovereignty arrangements in favour of Argentina in relation to the dependencies, and to explore cooperation to develop the continental shelf resources. However, the paper asserted that it was essential that sovereign rights in respect of the Falkland Islands should continue to rest with Britain, and that the present system of administration and government of the Islands should be maintained. Rowlands did not include in the discussions the other possible arrangement - leaseback - having been convinced that such a proposal would have been totally unacceptable to the Islanders. Fortunately, there was sufficient interest within the Argentine delegation in the novel proposals on sovereignty to agree a communiqué setting up two working parties - economic cooperation and political development.”*⁵¹⁰

December 16th, in Britain’s House of Commons, a debate is held on Lord Shackleton’s report. MP Hugh Fraser raises the Falklands negotiations.

*“Today, we have had an announcement in The Times of what has happened in the joint talks. It seems that the British and the Argentine Governments have agreed to form two joint working parties on the issues of sovereignty and economic development. I do not want to go into the issue of sovereignty, but I do not see how we can have an effective working party on a matter which should be a subject for a judicial decision. A working party seems to be a bit of a nonsense. The subject of that working party, I would have thought, should be one for The Hague court. With regard to the second working party, I would have thought that there was grave danger of burying the Shackleton Report before it is implemented. Lord Shackleton spent four months finding out what the developments were. I suggest that a further working party on economic development would only support what Lord Shackleton, recalling the 20 earlier reports, said in his report. When asked to define the Falkland Islands, he said: The Falkland Islands is a piece of land entirely surrounded by advice”. There is far too much of that already.”*⁵¹¹

507 *Secret Falklands fleet revealed* BBC News June 1, 2005. Unsupported by the available evidence.

508 *UN Doc A3323/Rev.1 vol.4*

509 Livingstone 2018

510 Rowlands, *Edward (Ted)* in Tatham (ed) 2008. Authored by Ted Rowlands. Link above.

511 *HC Deb 16 December 1977 vol.941 cc1226-36*

Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Overseas Aid, John Tomlinson, makes a statement.

*“British aid is not imposed on the Falkland Islands but is provided at the request of, and after discussion with, the Falkland Islands Government – we have to consider the amount of aid which the Falkland Islands can absorb without putting strains on its economy. The islands have hitherto been self-supporting, in the sense that the United Kingdom has not provided them with financial means to balance the budget.”*⁵¹²

December 18th, in Rio de Janeiro, Edward Rowlands meets with the Governor and Falkland Island Councillors. To update them on the progress of negotiations.

*“Rowlands remained in New York anxiously awaiting news of the Junta's reaction to this communiqué and only when it was favourable did he leave to brief the Islanders' deputation in Río. They accepted his exploring these proposals further.”*⁵¹³

December 20th, in the South Atlantic, the Royal Navy squadron receives instructions to quietly retire.⁵¹⁴

*“66. ... In the event the negotiations went reasonably well. The Argentine threat receded, and it was agreed after the talks that the naval force could be withdrawn.”*⁵¹⁵

*“According to the report, Ministers accepted that, such a force would not be able to deal with a determined Argentine attack”...*⁵¹⁶

*“No evidence has emerged that Argentina was made aware of the British defence plans... Owen, a close friend of Callaghan has always maintained that Operation Journeyman remained covert.”*⁵¹⁷

*“The more I consider the 1977 deployment, the more I realise what an irresponsible and useless act it was.”*⁵¹⁸

Researcher's Comment: Following Argentina's invasion in April, 1982, the deployment of 1977 became public knowledge. Used to gain political capital during the 1982 conflict by the Labour Party criticising Thatcher's response to the threat of war. However, in the debate of January, 1983, following the publication of the Franks Report, ex-PM Callaghan declined to answer clearly whether or not the 1977 deployment had been made known to Argentine negotiators. Callaghan had also declined to give evidence on the subject to the Franks Committee, which was forced to conclude that there was no evidence that the information had been supplied to Argentina. Despite being pressed on the inconsistencies in Labour's 1982 claims, Callaghan remained evasive on the issue, before refusing to answer any and all questions on the subject.

December 24th, press reports speculate that the Foreign Office is intent on pressurising the Falkland Islanders into accepting a reduction in the level of sovereignty over the archipelago.⁵¹⁹

512 *Ibid*

513 Rowlands, *Edward (Ted)* in Tatham (ed) 2008. Written by Rowlands. Link above

514 Owen to Callaghan, January 6, 1978 in PREM 16/1504.

515 *Falkland Islands Review Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors Chairman: The Rt Hon the Lord Franks, OM, GCMG, KCB, CBE Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty January 1983.* Now commonly referred to as the Franks Report. Link above.

516 Baroness Young during the debate on the *Franks Report* – *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

517 Donaghy 2014

518 John Nott quoted in Donaghy 2014 p.17

519 Mentioned in a House of Lords debate on January 25, 1978 (*vol.388 col.339*)

1978 – January 7th, in Antarctica, at Argentina's *Esperanza* base, a boy – Emilio Marcos Des Palma Morella – is born.⁵²⁰

*“2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.”*⁵²¹

*“In 1978 the world's first Antarctic baby was born at Esperanza Base. Esperanza Base has also been the site of a wedding carried out by an official of the Argentine government. As (a) specific instance for asserting sovereignty during the treaty period (this is) of little consequence. However, they do demonstrate Argentinian intentions and will by means of demonstrating occupation, Argentina intends to emerge from a treaty period in the strongest possible position. In the event of treaty termination, or withdrawal from the treaty, the mere continuation of Argentina's considerable activities would have relevance to the validity of claim under international law. Argentina's long-range objective is to emerge from the treaty period with a predominant presence in the Antarctic.”*⁵²²

*“In the case of the "Antarctic question", it should be taken into account that, if traditionally this was an area where the Armed Forces perceived they had a "special responsibility", this feeling increased considerably in the reference period. It could be affirmed that Argentina followed a "double standard" policy in relation to Antarctica, that is, continuity in participation within the Antarctic System but, at the same time, a high "consumption" of the image of sovereignty at the internal level. The latter can be found in a "multiplicity of measures and actions tending to affirm Argentine rights in the claimed Antarctic sector. Among them stands out, without a doubt, the implementation, at the beginning of 1978, of a "population policy" through the settlement of families at the Esperanza Base, marriages and the first births were registered, inaugurating, in May of the same year, the First Antarctic School for its inhabitants.”*⁵²³

*“As well as claiming the Beagle Channel islands, the Argentine junta sought to strengthen Argentina's claim to a segment of Antarctica by arranging for the wives of several military officers to give birth to their babies in the maternity facilities at the Argentine army Antarctic base "Esperanza". In the course of this exercise in what may be called a "claim by parturition", eight babies were born between 1978 and 1983.”*⁵²⁴

January 9th, Argentina presses for talks earlier than planned. Foreign Secretary Owen accepts the proposal.

January 25th, in a letter to Chile, Argentina formally rejects the decision of the arbitral Court regarding its dispute over the Beagle Channel (PNL) Islands. Argentina, however, fails to inform the arbitration panel or the Hague judges of its decision.

*“... the Government of the Argentine Republic, after carefully studying the arbitral Award by Her Britannic Majesty on the Beagle Channel dispute, has decided to declare the Arbitrator's decision irrevocably null and void under international law.”*⁵²⁵

520 Not the first person born in Antarctica however. An Australian, James Robinson, was born to the wife of a sealing captain on March 11, 1859. The first British birth certificate for Antarctica was issued to Solveig Jacobsen born October 8, 1913. It seems unlikely that getting born somewhere, gives sovereignty rights to the country of the child's mother.

521 Antarctic Treaty 1959 Article.4

522 Hall 1983

523 *Cambios y continuidades en la política antártica argentina, 1959-1983* Miryam Colacrai de Trevisan 1997

524 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.617

525 *Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic to the Ambassador of Chile in Argentina January 25, 1978*

“... they would consider the violation of a treaty no greater offence than a lie told by schoolboy. With the Bey of Tripoli or the Emperor of Morocco we might for a time maintain unviolated the provisions of a Treaty but with these people if a temporary advantage could be gained they would violate a treaty on the day of its ratification.”⁵²⁶



“The strategic importance of the Falkland Islands is recognised in a recent issue of the U.S. Military magazine "Parameters". A lengthy article on the dispute between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle Channel,... states that "if Argentina loses her dispute with Chile, her interests in the Falkland Islands will also be jeopardized".⁵²⁷

“... Argentina, having accepted the jurisdiction of an international court of arbitration on the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile, then refused to accept its results. It is difficult to believe in Argentina's good faith with that very recent example in mind. ... it would be hard to have confidence that Argentina would respect a judgement that it did not like.”⁵²⁸

In the UK, reviewing the situation following Argentina's Beagle Channel decision, Britain's Foreign Office conclude that Argentina's failure in its dispute with Chile has increased pressure on the junta to gain some success elsewhere. The Falkland Islands are mentioned.

“This dispute, in fact, impacted upon the Anglo-Argentine exchanges in Lima when, surprisingly, the Argentines insisted that the Islands did not generate a continental shelf, a factor in the Beagle Channel issue.”⁵²⁹

On the same day in Britain's House of Lords, Lord Mottistone refers to rumours and asks about the “present position regarding the Falkland Islands.”

“Lord Goronwy-Roberts: My Lords, the position is clear. With the agreement of the Falkland Islands Council, we are conducting negotiations with Argentina covering political relations, including sovereignty and economic co-operation. As the terms of reference state, a major objective of the negotiations is to achieve a stable, prosperous and politically durable future for the Falkland Islands. The Islanders are being fully informed and consulted as the negotiations proceed. ...

My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord and the House that those rumours were groundless. I hasten to repeat once more the categorical assurance given by my right honourable friend in the other place, and by myself in this House. The Government have given full assurances to the Islanders that no proposals affecting the future status of the Falkland Islands will be brought before Parliament unless they are

⁵²⁶ US charge d'affaires to Buenos Aires, Francis Baylies, speaking of the possibility of a treaty between the USA and the Argentina Confederation in July, 1832. Quoted in *Las Islas Malvinas* R. R. Caillet-Bois 1982 (6th ed.) p.252

⁵²⁷ *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November, 1978. See - <https://www.fiassociation.com/shopimages/pdfs/NL Archive/FIA NL 05.pdf>

⁵²⁸ Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher speaking to the House of Commons *HC Deb 29 April 1982 vol.22 cc980-1059*

⁵²⁹ Rowlands, Edward (Ted) in Tatham (ed) 2008. Link above

acceptable to the Islanders themselves. ... these discussions (with Argentina) are mainly, in our view, aimed at ensuring the right sort of climate and opportunity for such developments not just in the Falkland Islands but in the South-West Atlantic generally.

*We feel that we, Argentina and the Falklands could very profitably engage in consortial action to develop the undoubted riches of this area with benefit to all three peoples.”*⁵³⁰

Lord Hailsham adds; “... is it not a fact that these Islands of English-speaking people in or near the South American continent are not simply relics of colonialism, but small peoples whose rights and culture and right to self-determination should be accepted, irrespective of the character of the regimes to which they are neighbours? Will Her Majesty's Government - am sure they will - constantly bear in mind that British people all over the world are not for sale?”

In **February**, in the Falkland Islands, Vice-Commodore Carnelli is replaced by Vice Commodore Eduardo Julian Canosa who take charge of the LADE air transport operation.

*“He held the position from February 1978 to 1980. During the Advisory Commission’s first official meeting, he expressed the need for finding some land, within the airport area, to build an aviation fuel plant. Furthermore, he required that radio frequencies of Comodoro Rivadavia Flight Information Region (FIR) and of the Search and Rescue service should be answered in both English and Spanish to ensure scheduled flight operation; that the Transportes Navales vessel be granted greater accessibility at the FIC dock; and that a new house or a building site for constructing one —intended for the Argentine representative— was purchased.”*⁵³¹

February 15th, in Lima, Peru, Anglo-Argentine talks on economic cooperation resume. Argentina's head of delegation is Medina Muñoz, while for Britain, the delegation is led by George Hall of the FCO's Americas Desk.

*“No sooner had the British delegation taken their seats than a further complication arose. The head of the Malvinas department was attempting to separate the question of the continental shelf from the negotiations; a stance which would jeopardise any hope of reaching an agreement on economic or scientific cooperation.”*⁵³²

Despite the 1958 Geneva Conventions, Argentina refuses to acknowledge that the Falklands have any continental shelf rights.⁵³³

*“Islands generate their own territorial sea and continental shelf. Furthermore, the principle that islands should be treated as any other land territory for the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, contiguous zone and continental shelf was expressly recognised in Article 10(1) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. In so far as the continental shelf is concerned, the Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958, at Article 1(b) provided that the term 'continental shelf' is used as referring inter alia 'to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands'. Any insular formation, which is above water at high tide, therefore possesses a territorial sea and a continental shelf.”*⁵³⁴

530 See - <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1978-01-25/debates/f7dfc9fc-1332-4a4a-9f12-4163eb649e42/TheFalklandIslands>

531 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

532 Donaghy 2014

533 Including the *Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone* and the *Convention on the Continental Shelf*. cf. April & June 1958

534 *Islands* Andrew J. Jacovides in *Peaceful Order in the World's Oceans: Essays in Honor of Satya N. Nandan* Michael Lodge & Myron Nordquist (eds) 2014

*“Britain... could claim that, as the sole UN-recognised administering power of the South Atlantic Islands, it had a legitimate title to the rights prescribed by the conventions. Moreover, in its Article 6 the convention outlined the process whereby a continental shelf adjacent to two or more states could be divided between them and provided that, in the absence of an agreement, the boundary would be the median. This last proviso suggested that the convention applied even to those states, like Argentina, which had refrained from signing it.”*⁵³⁵

*“Argentina’s new stance was linked to its quarrel over the Beagle Channel. If Britain were to cede sovereignty over the continental shelf, the Argentine position in the dispute with Chile would be strengthened.”*⁵³⁶

In the South Atlantic, Argentina’s military base on Southern Thule is sighted by the crew of Antarctic survey ship RRS *Bransfield*. This information is quickly relayed to London where Foreign Secretary David Owen, fearing a back-lash once the occupation becomes public knowledge, warns the British Embassy in Buenos Aires.

*“... the crew might talk about this on their arrival in Port Stanley on February 20th.”*⁵³⁷

*“Ministers were informed and it set in train a series of urgent messages between London and negotiators in Lima highlighting a possible plan to legitimise the base as a joint scientific station before it came to light. Officials warned the Argentines of the “danger of a leak” and urged them to agree quickly. ... In the event of a leak ... the British Government would need to make it clear publicly that they had protested to Argentina about a violation of British sovereignty. It would be a complicating factor in our negotiations.”*⁵³⁸

February 17th, in Lima, talks finish abruptly with no joint communique issued. Britain’s delegation reports back to London; *“Medina Muñoz made it absolutely clear that they saw these negotiations as a long process which should not be hurried...”*⁵³⁹

*“Previous negotiations on the colony’s future broke down earlier in the year, when the Argentine delegation walked out of a meeting in Lima, Peru.”*⁵⁴⁰

*“Regarding the Lima meeting, in one of his documents González Balcarce wrote a brief note: “not very encouraging about sovereignty. Incident in Thule.”*⁵⁴¹

March 23rd, in London, addressing the House of Commons, Minister Ted Rowlands raises the question of continental shelf rights; *“As a consequence of its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the United Kingdom enjoys sovereign rights over the continental shelf...”*⁵⁴²

April 7th, during further talks, Argentina once again refuses to accept that the Falkland Islands have their own continental shelf.⁵⁴³

May 7th, in the UK, news of the Argentine base on Southern Thule appears in newspapers.

535 González 2014 p.109

536 Donaghy 2014

537 Owen quoted in *Royal Prayer: A Surprising History* David Baldwin 2009 p.25. cf. September & December, 1976

538 *The Telegraph* December 29th, 2008

539 FO 7/3528

540 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November, 1978

541 Carassai 2022 citing *Linea de tiempo 1945-1982* archivo González Balcarce.

542 Quoted in the *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978. If anything, it was Argentina’s raising of the issue that appears to have reminded the UK that it had continental shelf rights. A shot in the foot by Argentina?

543 Livingstone 2018 citing *Owen to Callaghan April 7, 1978 PREM 16/1504*. cf. April, 1958

May 10th, in Britain's House of Lords, Lord Carrington⁵⁴⁴ asks whether the newspaper reports are true regarding an Argentine presence in Southern Thule. Lord Goronwy-Roberts responds for the Government.

"... it would be incorrect to assume that these activities were in any way concealed from public knowledge. I understand that they were reported at the time in the news media; that is, towards the end of 1976. It is a fact that we are pursuing negotiations across the board on all outstanding issues, including the general issue of the future of that part of the world, with the Argentinians. Indeed, we expect that the two working groups on political and economic matters will reconvene this summer, followed by a ministerial meeting. It is in that context that an incident or a situation like this – which, again, I agree is a serious matter and should not be allowed to prejudice the success of the larger negotiations – will be viewed... The Argentinians established a research station on Thule Island some time in 1976. We protested, and in that way protected our legal claim to sovereignty. We understood that the residence, if I may call it that, was to be temporary; and it is a fact that, because of climatic conditions, seasonal adversity, it is practically impossible to be there all the year round. In that sense, it is a non-continuous residence. However, it is important, in the context of the larger negotiation now proceeding, in which we are seeking general accord and general co-operation for the development of the South-West Atlantic area, to the mutual benefit of all three countries – the United Kingdom, the Falkland Islands and Argentina – that incidents or situations like this, whether temporary or not, should not be allowed to grow out of proportion and imperil those larger and vital negotiations." ⁵⁴⁵

Researcher's Comment: It cannot be denied that the Government did not tell the truth to the House of Lords. A lie effectively told, via Parliament, to the nation; and in full knowledge that the 1976 occupation by Argentine forces had been kept a secret. From the press and from the people. To suggest that Argentine troops were not on-station in Southern Thule all year round was yet another lie.

In Buenos Aires, on the same day, the Argentine Government issue a statement affirming their sovereignty claim to Southern Thule and the South Sandwich Islands; rejecting Britain's protest of January, 1977.

May 13th, in Berkeley Sound, a Polish fishery vessel, *Zulawy*, is harassed by an Argentine aircraft.

"We have formally protested to the Argentine Government about this violation of Falkland Islands airspace and left them in no doubt of our concern about unauthorised overflights of any kind and the need to avoid their repetition." ⁵⁴⁶

On the same day, fishing some 63 miles from the archipelago, a Polish trawler, *Otol*, is stopped and boarded by marines from an Argentine destroyer. *Otol's* Captain is told that he is fishing in Argentine waters and ordered to leave the area. ⁵⁴⁷

*"... may I ask the noble Lord whether Her Majesty's Government would not agree that the Argentinians' somewhat petulant belligerence, their recent boarding of a trawler under the threat of traversing guns, their buzzing of a trawler in Berkeley Sound, their continued occupation of Southern Thule... together indicate Argentinian frustration at Her Majesty's Government's most praiseworthy resolution and diplomatic determination over the question of the sovereign integrity of British possessions in the South-West Atlantic?"*⁵⁴⁸

544 Peter Carrington (one 'r'), 6th Baron Carrington (two 'r's').

545 *HL Deb 10 May 1978 vol.391 cc976-81*. My emphasis.

546 Mr. Luard MP in *HC Deb 19 June 1978 vol.952 cc79-80W*

547 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 18, 1978

548 Lord Morris *HL Deb 13 June 1978 vol.393 cc175-80*. The muted response referred to "current negotiations."

May 16th, in London, Minister Rowlands speaks to the House of Commons with regard to Southern Thule.

*“The Argentines carried out scientific work on Southern Thule in the 1954 and 1956 Antarctic seasons and established their present scientific station in late 1976. There have been no other cases of unauthorised foreign activity in the Falkland Islands, South Georgia or the South Sandwich Islands. Argentine Service personnel provide logistic support for Argentina's Antarctic scientific activities. We have remained in communication with the Governor throughout, and he has reported that the Islands councillors know of and fully support our actions to protect British sovereignty.”*⁵⁴⁹

May 17th, in addition to the weekly Saturday flight of a Fokker F-27 from Comodoro Rivadavia, the Argentine air force introduce a further F-28 flight from Buenos Aires.

*“It is difficult to see the commercial reason or viability for this; ... There were hardly enough passengers to warrant one aircraft and certainly not two. As it is the F28 often arrives with one or two people and occasionally none. The thing I do not like is the number of pilots getting practice landing at the airport.”*⁵⁵⁰

*“On 17 May 1978, the Argentine Air Force's twin-engine jet aircraft Fokker F-28, registration mark TC-52, landed at the newly authorized airdrome, thus inaugurating the new LADE service. The crew consisted of aircraft commander, Mayor Armando E. Buira; co-pilot, Capitán Luis C. Sabolo; aircraft mechanic, Suboficial Auxiliar González; and the cargo handling assistant, Suboficial Mayor Antonio Pereyra. A new period to integrate islanders to the mainland was beginning. Thanks to the airstrip and the radio navigation (VOR) established by the Argentine Air Force, the advanced Fokker F-28 left islanders just one hour and twenty minutes away from Comodoro Rivadavia healthcare services, the thriving oil capital of southern Argentina. ... The F-28 service made a most auspicious start. In spite of that, Canosa was concerned about the islanders' attitude who were displeased with the negotiations progress. The British part of the Advisory Commission expressed dissatisfaction with aircraft lack of punctuality, and, furthermore, with the pollution caused by Transportes Navales.”*⁵⁵¹

May 24th, in London, Ted Rowlands further informs Parliament that the Argentines have not left the Southern Thule base, and that a further protest has been sent to the Argentine Government.

June 10th, in Buenos Aires, President Vidella reaffirms his country's claim to the Falklands on the *Día de la Afirmación de los Derechos Argentinos sobre las Malvinas, islas y sector antártico*.⁵⁵² Admiral Massera, is more aggressive.

*“The Malvinas are an open wound in the dignity of the Republic, and we Argentines are disposed to correct what negligence, cultural submission and a mistaken concept of international good manners have kept segregated from the metaphysical map of the Fatherland. The Malvinas are not a fragment of soil. The Malvinas are a fragment of our soul and we must go forth to find them because sovereignty, like dignity, is not negotiable.”*⁵⁵³

*“... on Malvinas Day, which they celebrated recently, President Videla referred to the successful outcome, as he hoped, of current negotiations;... This gives hope that the current negotiations based on the two working groups, political and economic, may possibly bear fruit.”*⁵⁵⁴

549 *HC Deb 16 May 1978 vol.950 cc160-1W*

550 Report by Major Ewan Southby-Tailyour to MOD May, 1978 in Southby-Tailyour 1990

551 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

552 See November, 1972

553 Quoted in Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.606

554 Lord Goronwy-Roberts *HL Deb 13 June 1978 vol.393 cc175-80*

June 15th, in London, during a Commons debate regarding fishing, it is asserted that the British fishing fleet is failing to tap into the resources around the Falkland Islands. Patrick Wall MP, claims that; “... *the Foreign Office is discouraging British fishing in the area because it might annoy Argentina.*” ⁵⁵⁵

“... *a junior Minister stated in April; "All the evidence is that this area is unlikely to provide the domestic British industry with viable fishing opportunities." She did not say what was the evidence she had in mind.*” ⁵⁵⁶

“*West German trawlers are now fishing the waters around the Falkland Islands under Argentine colours. Reports from the Islands confirm that the fishing grounds are densely stocked and according to one German skipper, processed hake are selling Europe for £1,000 per ton. The German vessel could process 20 tons a day, he said. Under an agreement with Argentina, the West Germans are fishing waters in the 'Argentine Sea' for the export trade, but the fish must be registered as exports from Argentina, where the ships are registered.*” ⁵⁵⁷

June 16th, Britain declines to issue a licence for the purchase of a Falklands farm – Douglas Station – by Argentine businessman Hector Francisco Capozzolo. ⁵⁵⁸

“*Undaunted, (Harland) Greenshields has tried to talk the council into purchasing his 135,000 acre 500,000 dollar farm if they will not allow him to sell it. A recent article by Michael Frenchman in the Times of London (written before Capozzolo's application for a licence had been turned down) said: "Undoubtedly pressure will be exerted by the Argentine government in their talks with Britain to get the sale accepted. Captain Walter Allare, under-secretary for foreign affairs, said that future business between Britain and Argentina depended to a large extent on a satisfactory outcome."...*” ⁵⁵⁹

June 19th, in Britain's House of Commons, Mr. Evan Luard MP, states that British officials in Argentina have been given fresh instructions to “*reaffirm our sovereignty*” over the Falklands archipelago. This following the 'buzzing' of trawlers by Argentine aircraft near the Islands. ⁵⁶⁰

June 22nd, in the House of Lords, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, speaks regarding the measures proposed in Shackleton's report.

“... *we have made further progress. We are financing the construction of an all-weather road from Darwin to Stanley and of a new school hostel in Stanley. We are also ... carrying forward our urgent discussions with the Falkland Island Government on expanding the internal air service...*”

June 25th, in Argentina, after the host nation wins the FIFA World Cup, Admiral Massera suggests that *Plan Goa* – the invasion of the Falkland Islands – should be authorised. ⁵⁶¹

In **July**, from Argentina, Constantino Davidoff, a Buenos Aires scrap metal merchant, contacts *Christian Salvesen* seeking a contract to remove the old equipment and scrap metal from the whaling stations at Leith, Stromness and Husvik on South Georgia. Gerald Elliot, managing director of *Christian Salvesen*, seeks advice from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, who refer the question to Governor Parker in the Falkland Islands. Parker advises against. ⁵⁶²

⁵⁵⁵ *HC Deb 15 June 1978 vol.951 col.1231 in Hansard*

⁵⁵⁶ *Falkland Islands – Why do the British want to quit?* Penelope Tremaine in *The Falkland Islands Times* May 1978 p.3

⁵⁵⁷ *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978 p.1

⁵⁵⁸ Harland Greenshields had spent eight years attempting to sell his farm, but as every offer he received involved Argentina he was rebuffed by the Foreign Office. The farm was eventually sold in early 1982. Capozzola has been implicated in a 1977 attempt to purchase the Falkland Islands Company. See above.

⁵⁵⁹ *The Falkland Islands Times* August 24, 1978 p.1

⁵⁶⁰ *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978 p.1

⁵⁶¹ Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.39. See March, 1976 above.

⁵⁶² Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.146. Further negotiations resulted in a contract signed in September, 1979. See below.

*“When approached by Salvenses in 1978, the British Foreign Office were not happy about allowing an Argentine citizen to do the salvage work – but did not raise any serious objections, ...”*⁵⁶³

July 5th, in Britain's House of Commons, Ted Rowlands again addresses the situation on Southern Thule.

*“We are not dealing with an illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands themselves. ... Nor are we dealing at this time with a military occupation. It is important to say that. Although the Argentines use service personnel for logistic support in their Antarctic work, their activities on Thule are purely scientific. I do not think that anybody has challenged that assumption. ... We object to the fact that they are being carried out on British territory without our permission. That is the bone of contention ... What the Argentines are doing there does indeed constitute a violation of our sovereignty, and, as hon. Members are already aware, we have firmly protested to them about this. Our sovereignty position has thus been protected fully and explicitly... When we learnt of it, we pursued the matter immediately. We are going back 18 months, but at that time we had reason to believe that the dispute would be resolved speedily and satisfactorily. I had a difficult decision to make on how to handle the issue. I thought that it would be wrong for us to have a slanging match with the Argentine Government...”*⁵⁶⁴

Argentina's Admiral Massera visits London, holding meetings with the First Sea Lord, Sir Terence Lewin and senior officials at the Department of Trade and the Foreign Office. The Foreign Secretary, however, declines.⁵⁶⁵

*“It is extraordinary that the commander of the Argentine navy met the commander of the British navy four years before the Falklands war, yet all official files relating to the visit have been destroyed.”*⁵⁶⁶

July 26th, in the Islands, Colonel Richard Sidwell and Major Timothy Downs arrive to assess defence options.⁵⁶⁷

July 31st, in the House of Commons, the Minister of Overseas Development is asked what further plans there are for the economic development of the Falkland Islands and whether these include an extension to the runway so that it can accommodate international aircraft.

*“We are providing funds for the reorganisation and re-equipment of the public works department, which is to begin construction of a road across East Falkland in September. A new school hostel is to be built shortly in Stanley. We propose to increase support of the grasslands trial unit and the possibilities of salmon ranching and inshore fishing are now being examined. A newly appointed development officer will take up his post in the autumn. There are no plans for extending the runway.”*⁵⁶⁸

August 4th, in Rugby, England, a 1933 £1 Falklands centenary stamp sells for £875 at a philatelic auction.⁵⁶⁹

August 24th, in London, Foreign Secretary Owen suggests that talks resume towards the end of September.

*“The Argentines are known to have been putting their case within the United Nations and wrote a letter in August to Dr. Kurt Waldheim, General Secretary of the UN, stating that Britain's intention to extend her territorial limits around the Falkland Islands was prejudicial to any negotiation.”*⁵⁷⁰

563 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.616

564 *HC Deb 05 July 1978 vol.953 cc620-30*

565 Owen was criticised for this decision by those vested interests that wished to sell arms to Argentina. No records survive, but Owen would later describe Massera as a “*little shit*”. See Livingstone 2018.

566 Livingstone 2018

567 Southby-Tailyour 1990

568 *Hansard Written Answers (Commons) July 31, 1978 col.3w*

569 *Birmingham Evening Mail* August 4, 1978. See 1933

570 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978 p.1

August 31st, from Buenos Aires, Britain's naval attaché, Capt. Leggatt, writes to the FCO to complain that a recent failure to win a contract to supply frigates to Argentina's Navy was as a result of "*the Falklands issue*".⁵⁷¹

September 29th, in New York, at the United Nations building, Dr. Owen and Oscar Montes agree that Anglo-Argentine negotiations will resume in December.

*"Doctor David Owen, Britain's Foreign Secretary, has announced that a review of the routine diplomatic exchanges on the future of the Falkland Islands will be made at a one day meeting in December between Mr. Ted Rowlands MP (Minister of State, FCO) and his Argentine counterpart Sr. Gaulter Allara."*⁵⁷²

*"I made no secret of the fact that I would not transfer sovereignty to Argentina. ... I must make it clear that when in office I was never prepared to contemplate it. I never accepted lease-back, and have great difficulty with it. The furthest that I was prepared to go was a sharing of sovereignty. In those days, one of the options that I thought was most hopeful was that sovereignty over the uninhabited islands would be transferred to Argentina, and the inhabited islands—the greater space, I admit—would remain with Britain, with a shared economic unit covering all the islands, inhabited and uninhabited, and the territorial waters..."*⁵⁷³

October 8th, Britain's *Observer* newspaper reports that the Foreign Secretary and his Argentine counterpart have agreed to Argentine sovereignty for the Islands, but continued British sovereignty for their inhabitants.⁵⁷⁴

*"A meeting of Members of Parliament, Peers and Falkland islanders concluded that a referendum should be held in the Falkland Islands. At a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association meeting in the House of Commons, it was suggested that the only way to prove the wishes of the islanders was by following the example set in Northern Ireland, when a referendum on constitutional reform was held. The Ulster referendum showed that a majority in the province wished to retain links with the United Kingdom. The colony of Gibraltar recently held a referendum to confirm the people's overwhelming preference for British, rather than Spanish sovereignty and the British colony of Belize has been promised a referendum on any proposals worked out with neighbouring Guatemala, which has territorial ambitions over Belize. Ninety seven per cent of the people in the Falkland Islands are of British stock."*⁵⁷⁵

October 12th, in London, an inter-departmental request is submitted for permission to allow the testing of a French *Exocet* missile at a British firing range, for a group of Argentine military observers.

*"The Defence sales department ... asked that the Argentine navy be allowed to test Exocet missiles in Cardigan Bay, because 'unless we demonstrate to the Argentinians our willingness to be helpful in all requests of a military nature then our chances of securing substantial military contracts likely to be awarded in the future are considerably diminished'. The French-made Exocet missiles were, of course, used to lethal effect against British forces in the Falklands War."*⁵⁷⁶

October 20th, in Buenos Aires, a new Argentine Presidential decree is promulgated.

"Government House has just received details of a decree published in the official Argentine bulletin on the concerning the issue of the controversial "White Card". The main points of this decree are as follows:- Presidential decree 20th of October, concerning the issue of the controversial "White Card" travel permit. The

571 Leggatt to Carless August 31, 1978 FCO 7/3450

572 *Ibid.*

573 Dr. David Owen speaking in 1985 in *Falkland Islands (Foreign Affairs Committee Report) HC Deb 14 March 1985 vol.75 cc492-530*. All evidence to the contrary.

574 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978 p.1. The *Observer's* source was not identified.

575 *Ibid*

576 Livingstone 2018 citing *Spencer to Keeling October 12, 1978 DEFE 68/377*

main points of this decree are as follows:- White cards for residents of the Islands and of Argentina are unchanged. An "embarkation and disembarkation card" is to be issued to non-residents. They will complete it in duplicate when they purchase their air or sea tickets, and will retain one copy. The retained copy will be checked by the airport or port police at the point of departure for the Falklands. On return from the Islands the retained copy will be checked by the same authorities and given back to the non-resident. It will be surrendered at the point of final departure from Argentina. If a non-resident leaves the Islands without passing through Argentina again, the Argentine Representative of the Special Consultative Committee in Port Stanley shall, whenever possible, ask for the return of the retained copy. Government is waiting for more information concerning the new non-resident regulations and details will be published as soon as they are known. It is understood that these regulations will come into effect as from January the 1st 1979."⁵⁷⁷

November 1st, in Britain's House of Commons, during a Debate on the Address (Loyal Address)⁵⁷⁸, MP Michael Hutchinson speaks regarding the Falklands and the outstanding question of Southern Thule.

"I much regret that no mention of the Falkland Islands was made in the Gracious Speech. It is extremely difficult to obtain any information from the Government about proposed developments there and about what is generally in the Government's mind concerning the islands. Open government seems to be all the rage these days. The word "open" is the latest watchword, but it certainly does not apply to Government thinking about the Falklands. Hon. Members will recall that in December 1976 there began an illegal occupation by Argentine citizens of Southern Thule island in the South Sandwich Islands, controlled by the Falkland Islands. The people concerned were supposed to be scientists. We did not learn about the occupation until several months later. Then we were told that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had made a protest, that there was not much need to worry, as so few people were involved, and that our legal position was covered. But I do worry. I am not convinced that a protest is sufficient. If the Argentine party has been in the island for more than 12 months, that strengthens Argentina's position and weakens ours. International law is by no means united on what the exact position is. Therefore, I should very much welcome a statement from the Minister concerned. It seems to me that there are two courses open to deal with the matter.

One is to mount a small police expedition to remove the intruders. That is my instinctive reaction and choice. The other is to set up our own scientific party and to land it in the island so that the Argentine claim is reduced. ... I am extremely concerned about the general stranglehold that the Argentine Republic is exerting over the Falkland Islands. The white card system still exists, air communication with the mainland is in Argentine hands, as is the supply of petrol and oil to the islands, and the Argentine people offer certain educational facilities. Those are merely some examples. Why should that be so? It would seem that there is a lack of interest or of will. ... The Falklands are British. The inhabitants wish to keep their ties with us. The islanders have many friends in this country, including many friends in the House, and they have backing from the British public. I believe it to be entirely wrong that Parliament should not be fully in the picture about what is happening there. I resent the Government's air of mystery—indeed, secrecy—about the islands' future. Therefore, I ask for more open government and a very strong policy, and for there to be no truck whatsoever with the "phoney" Argentine claims."⁵⁷⁹

577 *The Falkland Islands Times* November 10, 1978 p.1

578 The Debate on the Address (or Loyal Address) is the formal name for the Queen's/King's Speech debates that are held over several days in both Houses at the start of a new session of Parliament. The debates takes place on the motion: 'That an humble Address be presented to Her/His Majesty' thanking the monarch for the speech'. They are also an opportunity to discuss what the Speech contained: which is the Government's programme for the year ahead.

579 *HC Deb 01 November 1978 vol.957 cc9-156*

On the same day, in the Falklands, the old Hookers Point temporary airstrip is ripped up during a severe gale.

*“At about 0300 a sixty to seventy knot gust of wind from the south lifted the whole of the temporary airstrip like an enormous wing (it was cambered along both edges) and flipped it over to the north for almost its whole length... It must have weighed 1,300 tons. ... The Argentine press accuse the Chileans of sabotage!”*⁵⁸⁰

*“Islanders cleared the road and asked the Argentine Air Force to transport them back to the mainland. With the help of local government’s machines and other machines hired from the Falkland Islands Company, a group of Argentinian people arranged the freight for sea transportation. They worked for two months and, to the delight of both Catholics and the community, they painted Santa María church.”*⁵⁸¹

The Falkland Islands Newsletter reports:

*“We have not yet made the progress for which we had hoped in achieving the implementation of the recommendations in Lord Shackleton’s Report. The British Government has moved exceedingly slowly It is worth noting that, under pressure in particular from those in this country who have now for ten years supported the Islands, some £9½ million of aid has been provided by the Ministry of Overseas Development.”*⁵⁸²

Britain’s Labour Government approves the sale of Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles to Argentina; *“... in order to protect employment at the Shorts Brothers factory in Belfast...”*⁵⁸³

December 9th, Argentina sends a naval force south towards Chile’s Beagle (PNL) islands, intending to occupy the islands group on December 22.⁵⁸⁴ Chile, warned by its intelligence network, despatches a force of its own.

*“In November and December 1978 a propaganda campaign was organised by the Argentines, with Army, Navy and Air Force units prepared to fight a just war against Chilean territorial encroachment.”*⁵⁸⁵

*“The Plan provided for starting the war “quickly and violently” to gain greater control over Chilean territories in the early days invasion, impose that status quo and force Chile to negotiate from a position of strength...”*⁵⁸⁶

December 13th, in New York, at the United Nations, the General Assembly defers consideration of the Falkland Islands question until its 1979 session.

December 18th, in Geneva, Switzerland, three days of Anglo-Argentina negotiations commence.

*“The more problematic issue was co-administration of the Dependencies maritime zones. Allara agreed that Argentina and Britain should jointly declare a 200-mile fishing zone, but failed to explain how he planned to reconcile this with Argentina’s own sovereignty claim... Allara held out for a transfer of the Dependencies as his price for an agreement to the co-administration of a fisheries zone. Rowlands rejected this out of hand.”*⁵⁸⁷

580 Southby-Tailyour 1990

581 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

582 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978. Link above

583 Livingstone 2018 p.151

584 *Operación Soberanía*. What is known, all of it unconfirmed, is that the plan involved a number of incursions into Chilean territory in an attempt to force them into accepting Argentina’s terms. All three forces – navy, air force and army – were to be employed. Argentina’s success in maintaining troops in the South Thule group of British islands may have emboldened it to try force with the Chileans. See below.

585 *The Falklands War* D. George Boyce 2005

586 *Conflicto de límites con Chile y operaciones militares de las Fuerzas Armadas argentinas en 1978. Experiencias de la artillería de campaña en el «Operativo Soberanía»* Germán Soprano 2021

587 Donaghy 2014. See also *ALW 0420/325/1*

December 20th, On the final day of the Geneva talks, some agreement is reached over scientific activities on Southern Thule and within the Dependencies.

“Southern Thule: We and the Argentines both tabled outline papers for a scientific co-operation agreement. The Argentines accepted that, under such an agreement, these activities – including their station on Thule, would have no implications for sovereignty. Their thinking was also close to ours on the mechanics of such a scheme. But we came up against two difficulties. First, the Argentines had envisaged an agreement applying to land based operations only. We said we wanted the scheme to apply to maritime areas as well, since both we and they already conducted scientific work off-shore. The Argentines saw the logic of this, but were unhappy about the legal problems of defining maritime areas ... In particular, they wanted to exclude the continental shelf. In the end, I obtained Allara's agreement to the broad formulation that the agreement would apply to "surrounding maritime areas"; this should not prejudice either the Argentine position or ours on delimitation. Secondly, the Argentines dug their heels in on the clause I wanted which would have prevented their setting up other stations. ... Allara said that the Argentines could not give up their right in principle to have other stations, but they were not planning any ... I agreed to drop it.

Co-administration of the Dependencies maritime Zones: Again, both we and the Argentines tabled an outline paper. The Argentines saw no problem over the mechanics as far as fishing was concerned, and agreed on the need for urgent action to deal with third parties. The Argentines agreed that action would be required to declare a 200 mile fishing zone. They suggested this should be done jointly; but did not explain how they would reconcile this with their own sovereignty claim and existing zone. The major stumbling block which emerged was that they rejected the idea of a co-administration scheme being under the sovereignty umbrella. Instead, they wanted a transfer of sovereignty over the Dependencies themselves to Argentina as the price for co-administration of a fishing zone; and they wanted to exclude the continental shelf from the arrangement. I told Allara firmly that non of this was on. ...

Sovereignty: ... the Argentines repeated their positions on principle on sovereignty and tried to draw us out on the sovereignty changes we had in mind in the working paper which I gave Allara in the New York talks in December 1977. We rejected the idea that the aim of the negotiations was simply to transfer sovereignty to Argentina. ...”⁵⁸⁸

The two sides agree to meet again towards the end of March.

“Agreement between Britain and Argentina on scientific cooperation in the Malvinas (Falkland) Island dependencies constitutes a first step to affirm Argentine presence in the region, Argentine sources said yesterday. Commenting on the three-day talks here, the sources said the negotiators discussed all issues, including sovereignty over the islands and the dependencies of South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, all ruled by Britain and claimed by Argentina. A press communique issued on Wednesday night on the talks made no specific mention of the sovereignty issue. It said the delegations "reached agreement in principle on the outline of a scheme or cooperation in their scientific research activities in the island dependencies". The sources said Argentina saw this as a "first step towards affirming our presence in an area where other countries are carrying out fishing activities without accepting any regulation or control, leading to possible prejudicial effects on the preservation of the natural resources of the region".”⁵⁸⁹

⁵⁸⁸ Rowlands minute to Owen January 5, 1979 in ALW 045/325/1 Part A filed at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation
⁵⁸⁹ A first step towards affirming our presence in the Malvinas Buenos Aires Herald December 21, 1979

In London, under pressure from Defence Secretary Mulley, and Trade Secretary Edmund Dell, Britain's Foreign Secretary Davis Owen agrees to invite General Orlando Agosti, Argentina's Air Force chief, to visit London. To discuss the sale of Lynx helicopters and Hawk trainer jets.⁵⁹⁰ General Agosti initially accepts the invitation but then suddenly cancels, citing 'domestic' reasons.

*"Although the Agosti visit was cancelled, there were numerous other visits by Argentine officers to the UK during Labour's period of office and many British defence officials visited Argentina."*⁵⁹¹

December 22nd, in the South Atlantic, discovering that the Beagle Channel Islands are protected by a Chilean naval force, Argentina's task force withdraws.

*"In 1978, the dictatorship led the country to the brink of war with Chile by rejecting the arbitration convened in 1971 and delivered to the parties in 1977. ... In the conflict with Chile, ... much of the problem on the Argentine side was the bureaucratic and complex way that the Argentine military junta made its decisions. ... The 'war that was not' is an indispensable step towards understanding the war that did take place."*⁵⁹²

*"... in the early morning of D-Day (December 22), the vanguard of the troops stationed in the province of Neuquén began to advance towards the border and some elements of it reached to enter Chilean territory for about three or four kilometers, until they received a counter-order and withdrew. There the implementation stopped of Operación Soberanía."*⁵⁹³

*"On 23 December, ... the Pope called for a peaceful solution and announced that he was sending cardinal Antonio Samoré to Buenos Aires and Santaigo to mediate ... Both sides accepted the Vatican as mediator and the immediate danger of war receded."*⁵⁹⁴

1979 – January 7th, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Falklands Councillors meet Minister Rowlands for an update.

*"During the Geneva talks, proposals for scientific cooperation in the Falklands are were drawn up between Britain and Argentina. Legislative Councillors were briefed by Mr. Ted Rowlands MP, the minister responsible, in Rio on January 7 but have not disclosed the proposals or their attitude towards them. The Falklands Office in London is concerned and the situation is being closely watched."*⁵⁹⁵

In London, Britain's Labour Government issues guidelines restricting arms sales to Argentina. The Ministry of Defence is told that sales cannot be approved if they include equipment that could be directly used for internal repression. Or which could threaten the Falkland Islands; *"In fact, as soon as they were introduced, Labour's Defence Secretary, Fred Mulley said that, while he accepted the guidelines, each order should be looked at on a case by case basis, because "we would be reluctant to take any action which would seriously damage our prospects of obtaining at least a reasonable share of this market". Mulley then asked the FCO to approve sales of ammunition by British companies for use with weapons that had already been sold. Owen agreed... the first of many instances when the guidelines were bent."*⁵⁹⁶

590 Two Lynx helicopters had been sold to Argentina earlier in 1978. It was hoped to sell eight more.

591 Livingston 2018

592 *State, national identity and power: a historical tour in search of the causes of the Falklands–Malvinas War* Guillermo Mira and Fernando Pedrosa 2021

593 Soprano 2021. Available here -

https://ri.conicet.gov.ar/bitstream/handle/11336/176919/CONICET_Digital_Nro.da114069-39f4-4d1c-95aa-18fa2125ee8a_C.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y

594 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.614. In fact the Pope had made an offer to negotiate in October, 1978, which Chile accepted while Argentina declined to answer. See Soprano 2021.

595 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6

596 Rowlands, *Edward (Ted)* in Tatham (ed) 2008. Authored by Ted Rowlands. Link above

January 8th, Argentina reaches an agreement with Chile to refer their Beagle Channel dispute to the Pope.

*“... an important by-product of this tension was that the Argentine Government spent billions of dollars on arms procurement, including 40 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft and five Chinook helicopters bought from the United States, and 42 Dagger aircraft purchased from Israel. The Argentine armed forces were therefore mentally and physically prepared for war...”*⁵⁹⁷

January 13th, in Stanley, the agreements achieved at Geneva are rejected by the Falkland Islands Government, with Councillors fearing an erosion of British sovereignty over both the Islands and Dependencies.

*“Here there has been a set-back. ... The meeting (in Rio) went well and the delegation raised no objection to the Southern Thule scheme. But when they reported back to their colleagues in Port Stanley the Falklands Councils as a whole decided they could not accept the schemes at all. Their objections are, firstly that unless the scheme applies only to Thule we are in effect giving the Argentines some sort of status in the rest of the Dependencies and, secondly, that it represents the beginning of a process of concession to the Argentines which will lead to the loss of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. ... Councillors have agreed to maintain confidentiality over their objections, and that they and we should take the line in public that the scheme has been left on the table for further consideration. So we have, so far, prevented this disagreement coming into the open.”*⁵⁹⁸

*“The occupation of South Thule Island, the most southerly of the Falklands group, was described by Islanders as the 'thin end of the wedge'. Islanders fear continued Argentine encroachment, even under the name of science.”*⁵⁹⁹

*“The Islanders are loathe to admit any Argentine foothold in the archipelago. When after the December, 1978 round of talks, the sides announced tentative agreement toward potential cooperation in scientific research in the outer island dependencies, the Islanders emphatically rejected the proposal.”*⁶⁰⁰

*“... following the talks, Rowlands met the Island councillors in Río in early January 1979 to report the outcome. However, at a subsequent joint meeting of ExCo and LegCo councillors objected to the proposed terms and, particularly, feared that the Argentines would extend their activities to other parts of the dependencies. The UK government subsequently agreed not to sign the agreement but to pursue further exploratory talks.”*⁶⁰¹

*“An Anglo-Argentine agreement over Southern Thule would have been difficult to digest; the inclusion of South Georgia made it nigh impossible.”*⁶⁰²

In Buenos Aires, Argentina expresses an interest in the restoration of Ambassadors with the UK.

“Towards the end of Labour's period of office, Argentina expressed an interest in restoring ambassadors. The head of the FCO's Latin America department, John Ure, advised that reinstating ambassadors could facilitate talks over the Falklands, but that such a move could provoke criticism from the 'human rights lobby' and the 'Falkland Islanders and their lobby'. He suggested that Argentina be invited to appoint an ambassador to Britain, after which the British would consider re-appointing their ambassador. David Owen approved this,

597 *The Falklands War* D. G. Boyce 2005

598 Owen to Callaghan March 13, 1979 at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation

599 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6

600 *Airgram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State* Buenos Aires, May 16, 1979 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984*

601 Rowlands, Edward (Ted) in Tatham (ed) 2008. Authored by Ted Rowlands. Link above

602 Donaghy 2014

although his political advisor told FCO officials that this needed 'very careful' press handling. But a leaked press report, announcing that an exchange of ambassadors had been agreed to, led to an angry response from the Labour party. The party's national executive passed a resolution calling it 'totally inappropriate'. With just weeks to go until the general election, the British ambassador was not reinstated until the Conservatives came to power, but Labour ministers had not objected, in principle, to the move."⁶⁰³

January 16th, in Britain's House of Lords, Government spokesman, Lord Goronwy-Roberts notes, in answer to a question, that the aid provision to the Falkland Islands is greater *per capita* than that made to any other territory. Baroness Elles points out that with a population of only 1800, that figure was too easy to achieve. The Baroness seeks assurances that no decision will be taken regarding the future of the Falklands without a full and public consultation. Lord Goronwy-Roberts confirms that; "*Proposals will not even be put to Parliament without the full acceptance of the Falkland Islanders.*"⁶⁰⁴ Responding to a question from Lord Morris concerning the December negotiations, Goronwy-Roberts states; "*I am not yet in a position to say what are the results of that consideration by those Governments; but as soon as it is clear what the conclusions are by those various Governments, a full statement will be made to the House in accordance with the noble Lord's very proper request.*"⁶⁰⁵

In London, at the Ministry of Defence, the *Concept of Operations* for Marine detachment NP 8901 is approved. Requiring that they offer a more active defence in the case of invasion, and defend the seat of the Falklands Government to "*buy three weeks bargaining time in the United Nations*".⁶⁰⁶

*"Defence was the responsibility of the small Royal Marines detachment, NP 8901."*⁶⁰⁷

January 24th, a group from the USA visits the archipelago; to prepare a report for the US State Department.⁶⁰⁸

*"American businessmen, American historians and marine architects, American conservationists, American journalists and tourists, and resident American settlers met in Stanley expressed an interest in having on record at the State Department basic information on the Islands, including travel, communications, documentation, and visitors' facilities. ... The paper concludes that Argentina will eventually regain political sovereignty over the disputed Malvinas Islands, as a result of gradualist bilateral negotiations with Great Britain. Deterioration of the current talks could postpone but probably not avoid the eventual end of Britain's admittedly anachronistic colonial rule. It is less clear whether the Argentines will be successful in populating and rejuvenating the Islands' economy over the long term. As long as the Malvinas do not fall into unfriendly hands or are not exploited for harmful strategic and military ends, US interests are unlikely to be adversely affected by future disposition of the Islands."*⁶⁰⁹

The American team note that there are ten US citizens living on the Islands and that all but one of these are associated with the religious sect 'Bahai'; "*Members abstain from political activity and alcohol, but are not rigidly organized or segregated. The reporting officer did not detect any aberration or coercion in connection with their presence or activities in Stanley.*"⁶¹⁰

603 Livingstone 2018 p.152

604 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6

605 *HL Deb* 16 January 1979 vol 397 cc843-6

606 Southby-Tailyour 1990.

607 *Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 2: War and Diplomacy* L. Freedman 2005 vol.2.

608 See - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d1>

609 *Airgram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State* Buenos Aires, May 16, 1979 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984*

610 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.9. A religion originating in Persia (Iran) in 1844. The first follower to arrive in the Falklands in 1954, was a John Leonard.

February 6th, in Britain's House of Lords, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, speaking on behalf of the Government, explains the agreement concerning scientific activities in the Falklands Dependencies; discussed with Argentina in December, 1978. ⁶¹¹

“... it relates to a wide range of scientific questions, from meteorology to Antarctic questions generally. It is the kind of question that arises in conditions and circumstances of this geographical sort. The scope of the discussions, while not including hydro-carbons, is sufficiently wide not only to offer hope for development in the Dependencies but also perhaps to give added strength and confidence to the larger discussions which are proceeding amicably between us and Argentina in regard to the future of the Falklands. ...

The illegal station in South Thule remains illegal. We have asserted, and continue to assert without reservation, our claim to sovereignty over South Thule, as indeed over these Dependencies generally. However, any discussions specifically aimed at advancing matters in the Dependencies can only help to resolve not only the disagreement about the station in South Thule but, as I said, the larger question of our relations with Argentina, a country with which, historically, we have for many years enjoyed close and fruitful relations.”

No mention is made of the objections of Islands Councillors, although Goronwy-Roberts does confirm that the Government regards the continental shelf around the Falklands as British sovereign territory. ⁶¹²

“It was admitted in the House of Lords on February 7 (sic) by Lord Goronwy Roberts that the scientific cooperation proposals would legitimise the illegal occupation by Argentine scientists of South Thule Island in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.” ⁶¹³

February 23rd, in Britain's House of Commons, in a written answer, Foreign Secretary David Owen states that the 1978 seismic surveys around the Falklands, are still being evaluated.

“Whatever the outcome of the evaluations and in spite of the close and continuing interest of oil companies and the certainty of a world oil shortage by 1985, the true potential of the Falklands will not be known until exploratory drilling takes place, at a cost of approximately £7.5m.” ⁶¹⁴

On the same day, a question on defence, is answered.

“Falkland Islands: Mr Gow asked the Secretary of State for Defence what proposals he has for improving Moody Brook Camp in the Falkland Islands: whether he has any plans to re-build the Royal Marines camp at a site closer to the airfield: whether he will list the special allowances paid to Her Majesty's forces in the Falkland Islands: what criteria he applied when deciding on the rate of those allowances.

Mr. Wellbeloved: The Property Services Agency is to undertake a feasibility study in the near future into ways of improving accommodation at Moody Brook camp. At the same time an assessment will be made of the possibilities of rebuilding alternative sites. Members of Her Majesty's Forces in the Falkland Islands receive the normal allowances to which they are entitled: There are no special allowances for Her Majesty's forces in the Falkland Islands.” ⁶¹⁵

611 *HL Deb 06 February 1979 vol.398 cc589-91. cf. 1958*

612 *Ibid. at cc.591*

613 *Falkland Islands Newsletter April 1979 no.6*

614 *Ibid.*

615 Quoted in Southby-Tailyour 1990. See *Hansard-Commons:23 February 1979-Written Answers-Defence vol.963*

March 13th, in London, in a letter to the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary Owen sets out his future thoughts regarding talks with Argentina.

*“The Islanders' position is a problem. I am satisfied however, that, even though we cannot sign an agreement, our own sovereignty position over Thule is still not seriously eroded. I have considered whether Ted Rowlands should go out to the Islands in a further attempt to win Councillors over. But such a Ministerial visit would inevitably attract publicity and speculation and would focus attention on the Falklands when we want to avoid this. We have therefore told Councillors that we shall need to meet the Argentines again soon and that we will discuss their reservations about the scheme and report back to them. ... Meanwhile, the Argentines have proposed that the next negotiating round should be at official level in New York from 21-23 March.... There is no question of any decisions being taken in New York this month; our intention is to pre-empt trouble and continue talking.”*⁶¹⁶

March 22nd, in London, a petition signed by 36 members of the Trades Union Council (TUC) and several MPs is handed in to the Argentine Embassy calling for information regarding the fate of some 25,000 Argentines who have 'disappeared' during a period of three years of military rule.

*“The protest coincided with the announcement that Argentina and Britain were considering the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations, broken off in 1976...”*⁶¹⁷

March 21st, in New York, three days of Anglo-Argentine talks commence.

*“Sr. Oliveri Lopez suggested that the talks should continue from those of December 1978 in Geneva, on particular they should deal with: a) the agreement on scientific co-operation in the dependencies; and b) a regime covering the territory of the Dependencies and their maritime spaces. He also said that this meeting should be regarded as a formal one. Mr Hall agreed that the discussions should be formal and could cover anything which fell within the terms of reference for the negotiations. But on (b) he recalled that the UK proposals covered only the maritime zones and not the territory, though he would be willing to hear any proposals from Sr. Oliveri Lopez on a regime covering territory.”*⁶¹⁸

*“Domestic considerations hindered meaningful dialogue... Hall explained that the scientific cooperation agreement could not proceed, due to the islanders' 'deep suspicion' of Argentine motives... Subsequent discussions yielded no progress.”*⁶¹⁹

March 23rd, at the UN building in New York, negotiations end with a Joint press communique:

“In accordance with the announcement made simultaneously by British and Argentine Governments on 16 March 1979, delegations representing the two countries met in New York from 21/23 March 1979 in order to conduct a fourth round of negotiations on the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands in accordance with the terms of reference for these negotiation announced on 26 April 1977. The two delegations were led respectively by Mr. George Hall, Assistant Under Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and by Sr. Oliveri Lopez, Head of the Antarctic and Falklands department at the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There was a wide exchange of views and the two delegation discussed the main issue with which the negotiations are concerned. The date, place and level of a future meeting were left to be discussed through the diplomatic channel.”

616 Owen to Callaghan March 13, 1979 at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation

617 Falkland Islands Newsletter April 1979 no.6.

618 FCO Record on Anglo-Argentine Negotiations on the Falkland Islands in New York (21-23 March 1979). See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/9F1AE40CEB494E7A8BDA51D29AD0D3B6.pdf>

619 Donaghy 2014

From the UN, the UK Mission telegrams London.

*“To sum up, whilst the Argentine's were clearly disappointed about the scientific agreement and taken aback by the strength of our rejection of their position over sovereignty, they are unlikely to take any action which could lead to a breakdown in the negotiations and they still see some possibilities of reaching a mutually satisfactory settlement in due course.”*⁶²⁰

*“Talks between the British and Argentine governments over the future of the Falkland Islands appear to have failed. The most recent meeting took place in New York on March 21-23 between Mr. George Hall of the Foreign Office and his Argentine counterpart, Senor Lopez. The communique issued following the discussions gave no indication of their substance and was markedly less cooperative in tone than the statement issued following the previous round of talks in Geneva during December.”*⁶²¹

*“The communique released after the last round of talks in New York in March, 1979 conspicuously omitted any mention of joint scientific cooperation and announced only that the talks were held and another session would be scheduled later in the year. Argentina is clearly annoyed at British foot dragging on the question. It also feared a Conservative victory in the upcoming British elections. The Conservative Party has traditionally shown far less willingness than the Laborites to discuss the future political disposition of the Islands. In the meantime, however, Argentina is following a patient, multi-front policy designed to build international pressure to force Britain into speeding negotiations on the sovereignty question while, at the same time, steadily seeking to win the Islanders' confidence if not their loyalty.”*⁶²²

*“Anglo/Argentine exchanges on the Falklands date from 1966,... The most active periods have been 1967/8, 1972/3 and 1977/9. Differences over sovereignty have been central: we have never been able to get the Argentines to accept our view that sovereignty cannot be transferred against the wishes of the Islanders; we have refused to accept the Argentine formula recognising only the "interests" of the Islanders.”*⁶²³

An Argentine stamp-set celebrates 150 years since the 'Civil and Military Command of the Malvinas.'⁶²⁴

In **April**, the Falklands' Legislative Council calls for a 200-mile maritime limit around the archipelago; “to replace the existing three-mile limit.”⁶²⁵

In London, 118 MPs sign a Commons *motion* demanding that the Government implement the Shackleton recommendations. Britain's Ministry of Agriculture commission a 'desk study' into the fisheries potential in the South Atlantic.

May 1st, in the Islands, the new airport at Cape Pembroke is officially opened by polar explorer Sir Vivian Fuchs.

*“The construction of the permanent airfield had just been completed at a final cost of £6m million. Yet the new runway, measuring 1,370 yards, could only take short and medium-haul aircraft. The islanders thus remained reliant on the airport at Comodoro Rivadavia, southern Argentina, as their only available staging post for reaching the outside world.”*⁶²⁶



620 UKMIS New York telegram to FCO in ALW 040/325/10 at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation.

621 Falkland Islands Newsletter April 1979 no.6

622 Airgram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State Buenos Aires, May 16, 1979 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984*

623 FCO 76/1892 Annex 3. See October, 1979

624 See 1829

625 Falkland Islands Newsletter April 1979 no.6

626 Donaghy 2014.

May 2nd, from the UN in New York, a record of a meeting between Britain's Anthony Parsons and Martinez de Hoz, Argentina's Economy Minister, is forwarded to London.

"I made clear to Dr Martinez that no Argentine Government could expect any change in our position on sovereignty. He of all people would understand that the claims of small, distant and loyal communities of British descent were extremely emotive in the British political context. ... Dr Martinez did not contest what I said. He speculated about the possibility that the islanders might eventually change their views and regretted the fact that the practical contacts ie. visits by islanders to Argentina seemed to have died down." ⁶²⁷

May 3rd, in the UK, following a General Election, Margaret Thatcher becomes Prime Minister. Peter Carington is appointed Foreign Secretary. ⁶²⁸ Nicholas Ridley is appointed Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, with responsibility for the Falkland Islands. ⁶²⁹

"Fellow MP and contemporary at Eton, Tam Dalyell, described (Ridley) as a man who was 'gratuitously confrontational', and who 'enjoyed being rude'." ⁶³⁰

"Carless wrote again soon after Margaret Thatcher's election, saying: 'Since the British elections ... the concept of Argentina opting for a closer relationship with Britain would seem to have gained ground here.' He suggested that in exchange for granting Argentina 'political recognition as a valid partner', sharing military and nuclear technology, and a 'symbolic' agreement on the Falklands, British business could win lucrative contracts." ⁶³¹

May 10th, in London, John Ure, Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office's South American Department, minutes Nicholas Ridley.

"There is a vociferous and highly organised Falkland Islands lobby in this country with the capacity to enlist considerable support in Parliament and the media. Its function, in the name of the Falkland Islanders, is to monitor and oppose any attempt by the British Government to establish closer links between the Falkland Islands and Argentina. ... The Argentine claim enjoys widespread international support..." ⁶³²

May 14th, Minister Ridley responds to Ure.

"... I would hope to preserve the Falklands as British – maybe it's not possible – in return for helping Argentina to carve up the Antarctic with us as a partner. I do think its important for me to go a) to the Falklands, b) to Argentina."

"The Foreign Office argued that good relations with Argentina were necessary in order to resolve the dispute – an assertion with which Nicholas Ridley agreed – noting, in an early meeting with officials, that it might be possible to persuade Argentina to accept a continuation of British sovereignty 'if we acted in a friendlier fashion and tried to help them in other areas', ..." ⁶³³

627 FCO7/3676 (f136) available at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation.

628 6th Baron Carrington, Carrington of Upton, a hereditary Peer at the time of his appointment. His family name, however, has only one 'r'. Lord Carrington would later refer to the Falklands question, on becoming Foreign Secretary, as having been "number 249" on his list of priorities.

629 For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/ridley_nicholas

630 Ridley, Nicholas Graham Bound in Tatham (ed) 2008

631 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to FCO June 11, 1979 FCO 7/3573*

632 ALW 045/325/1 Part B

633 Livingstone 2018 citing *Minister of State's meeting, minutes May 16, 1979 FCO 7/3573*

May 16th, from Buenos Aires, a paper entitled, '*The Malvinas (Falkland) Islands: A Political and Social Review*' is transmitted by the US Embassy to the Department of State in Washington DC. ⁶³⁴

“The Embassy predicts, based on contacts and information available here, that eventually Argentina will regain political sovereignty over the Malvinas, most likely with solid guarantees conserving the Islanders' patrimony and life style and bilateral agreements for joint economic and scientific exploitation of the area. The opposition of the new Conservative government in Britain could delay that outcome, but it is clear that the continued decline and depopulation of the Islands will require some accommodation if the Islands are to remain viable at all. Another outburst of Argentine impatience and revanchism could, however, upset and maybe destroy the delicate gradualist approach underway today. Such an event would probably stiffen British backs and public opinion from letting go of the Islands and bring about further deterioration in bilateral UK-Argentine relations.

It appears unlikely at this writing that Argentina would attempt an armed occupation of the Islands, which would only bring international sympathy to the stalwart Islanders as an endangered species. The Argentine Foreign Ministry officials currently responsible for the Malvinas negotiations have expressed to an Embassy officer their support for the present gradualist process and their confidence that the Islands will revert to Argentina sooner or later. The recent unnerving near-war with Chile over conflicting Beagle Channel claims may have also helped to temper Argentine officials' impatience in pursuing a Malvinas solution. At the same time, Argentine diplomats will be compelled to demonstrate to the home audience real progress in the ongoing talks, balancing that off against potential British backlash at any sign of a “selling-out” of the Islanders.” ⁶³⁵

May 22nd, in London, the issue of the Falklands is raised in the Lords during a debate on the Address.

“Lord Morris: My Lords, I should like to confine my contribution to matters concerning the South-West Atlantic. ... It must be as apparent to noble Lords as it is apparent to me that the commercial and strategic importance of these waters is evidenced by the attention being paid to them by nations other than the United Kingdom, and in particular by the merchant fleets of the Warsaw Pact countries. The South-West Atlantic fishing grounds are being exploited concentratedly by the merchant fleets of Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, East Germany, Japan and West Germany. At this very moment there are two Polish supply ships permanently based at Port William in the Falkland Islands. Yet there is not one British fishing vessel, or any other vessel for that matter, in sight.

In the light of that, I beseech the Conservative Administration as a matter of urgency to review, report back upon and act upon the desk survey by the White Fish Authority, which was commissioned by the former Administration, and to do so in conjunction with the most admirable report of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. Although I appreciate that the survey has been on the Minister's desk only since 14th May last, many believe, as I do, that time is of the essence.

Noble Lords will recall that early last December, as a result of a Question tabled by my noble kinsman, the Earl of Lauderdale, it was learned that Her Majesty's Government had received a hydrocarbons survey of some 200,000 square miles around the Falkland Islands. Furthermore, on 13th March last the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, declared that the results of the survey would be forthcoming "in the near future". Bearing in mind that some six months have passed since Her Majesty's Government

634 Authored by Maxwell Chaplin, Deputy Chief of the US Mission to Argentina 1976-1980.

635 Airgram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State Buenos Aires, May 16, 1979 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984*. Link above

*received that survey, may I ask the Minister whether the Conservative Administration will be as coy as their predecessors were about informing your Lordships' House of the result of this survey? ”*⁶³⁶

May 24th, in the UK, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher invites Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, and Home Secretary William Whitelaw, to a working lunch at Chequers.

*“Carrington mentioned that one of the problems he faced was what to do about the Falklands. “I think we will soon be in trouble if we go on having meetings about them with the Argentines without saying anything at all,” Carrington said. “One of the options which seems to me worth exploring is a leaseback arrangement similar to what we have in Hong Kong.” Lady Thatcher “erupted in anger”, ... She spent the next ten minutes denouncing the very idea of exploring a Hong Kong solution. “That’s the trouble with your Foreign Office,” she said. “Everyone in it is so bloody wet!”*⁶³⁷

May 25th, in Britain's House of Lords, Sir Ian Gilmour responds to questions with a written answer:

“Successive British Governments have left the Argentine Government in no doubt as to British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.

*The majority of the recommendations put forward by Lord Shackleton in his economic survey of the Falkland Islands have now been implemented.*⁶³⁸

*The Government will continue to maintain a close interests in the development of the Falkland Islands. We are looking closely at the problems of the Falkland Islands but no change of policy is currently planned.”*⁶³⁹

June 4th, in London, Nicholas Ridley minutes Lord Carrington, seeking a decision as to the policy to be adopted.

“I have been looking at the various options open to us. These seem to be: (a) thumbing our noses at the Argentines and provisioning and defending the Falkland islands – the “Fortress Falkland” option: (b) selling out the Falkland Islanders: (c) negotiating with Argentina.

*I think that negotiation is the only valid option. The Argentines will not negotiate unless the negotiations include questions of sovereignty so, although I am much more interested in negotiating with them about economic co-operation, we will have to agree to discuss sovereignty. If we are going to do this we must keep the Falkland islanders with us. If we do not they will complain and we will have a blow up in Parliament and in the press. I am therefore proposing to go out to the Islands in July...”*⁶⁴⁰

June 7th, in Buenos Aires, the *La Prensa* newspaper reports that a further meeting has been arranged for later in the month between Deputy Foreign Minister Cavándoli and Nicholas Ridley. Topics are to include; *“... an analysis of the state of negotiations on the Falkland Islands, the establishment of the basis for a formal meeting to be held at Buenos Aires in July 1979 following Mr. Ridley's visit to the Territory, and the resumption of bilateral relations at the ambassadorial level.”*

June 12th, at an exploratory meeting, Minister Cavándoli informs Ridley that his Government requires sovereignty to be central to negotiations.

636 Lord Morris in *HL Deb* 22 May 1979 vol.400 cc233-432

637 *The Telegraph* October 12th, 2013

638 Not true.

639 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 19, 1979. See - <https://www.fiassociation.com/newsletter/FIA-NL-06A.pdf>

640 *ALW* 045/325/1 Part B

June 14th, Lord Carrington responds to Cavándoli, that Britain is willing to continue with discussions.

*“The talks ... between 1977 and 1979 were based on the prospect of some deal on sovereignty being possible. We kept the Argentines in play only with difficulty and there was continuing suspicion among the Argentine officials about the genuineness of our intentions.”*⁶⁴¹

June 19th, in Port Stanley, the Islanders celebrate Falkland Islands Day.⁶⁴²

*“The Falkland Islanders are determined to remain British – but they look forward to increasing cooperation with Argentina in the development of the South West Atlantic in the interests of the Falkland Islands, of Argentina and of Britain in two sectors: fishing and the possibility of finding oil in commercial quantities.”*⁶⁴³

June 26th, speaking in Cordoba, Dr. Carlos Helbling, calls for; *“The reconquest of the Malvinas; effective control of the Antarctic and the reoccupation of the geopolitical area belonging to the nation.”*⁶⁴⁴

July 4th, from Buenos Aires, Britain’s *charge d’affaires* reports to London on the visit to Argentina by the Chairman of General Electric Company, Lord Nelson, who has held meetings with the junta’s military staff.

*“Lord Nelson,.. met the chief of the Argentine air force in July 1979 to discuss a nuclear contract and was told that ‘Britain would never win any major contracts in Argentina unless progress were made over the Falkland Islands’...”*⁶⁴⁵

In Britain's House of Lords, a question is asked by Lord Morris regarding the government's progress in implementing the recommendations of the Shackleton report. Lord Trefgarne, responding for the Government, insists that a *“majority of the recommendations have now been implemented.”* This assessment is challenged by Lord Morris, and by the author of the report, Lord Shackleton.⁶⁴⁶

*“My Lords, I suppose there is some room for variation in interpretation of what constitutes a recommendation, but we certainly maintain that, quantitatively, a majority of the recommendations have been implemented.”*⁶⁴⁷

*“... for reasons which are not clear, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have given the wrong impression to Parliament and the public. Moreover, in terms of importance, the majority of the major recommendations of the Shackleton report have not been implemented. The matter is still being pursued at parliamentary level.”*⁶⁴⁸

July 11th, in Argentina, a draft executive decree announces; *“... the concession contract for the Rio Gallegos Area (8,700 km²) and the Magellan Area (4,700 km²) of the Austral Basin to Shell Hydrocarbons and Shell Argentina. This contract is closely related to the proposal of the Foreign Office to postpone any claim on our sovereignty in the Malvinas and to enter into negotiations on a vast program of (economic) cooperation, related in the first instance to the exploitation of oil in the Marine Basin Austral and Falklands Basin. ... the*

641 FCO 07-3801 1980

642 After the 1982 war, this was changed to June 14.

643 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 19, 1979. See - <https://www.fiassociation.com/newsletter/FIA-NL-06A.pdf>

644 FCO ALA 020/1 Part A Political Relations between UK and Argentina File No. 141/1. Helbling would seem, at that time, to have been Baring Bank's agent in Buenos Aires.

645 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to FCO July 4, 1979 FCO 7/3574*

646 *Hansard. Lords Chamber July 4, 1979 vol.401* See - <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1979-07-04/debates/f535937e-2449-479b-b5a9-0309fe878608/FalklandIslandsShackletonRecommendations>

647 *Ibid.* Comment by Lord Trefgarne, following Lord Shackleton asking if he was being accused of lying.

648 *Falkland islands Newsletter* November 1979 no.7. This gives an annotated breakdown of Shackleton's recommendations. See - <https://www.fiassociation.com/newsletter/FIA-NL-07.pdf>

Minister of the Economy Dr. (Jose Alfredo) Martinez de Hoz in his various trips to London, has unconditionally accepted the program of "economic cooperation". So the contract with Shell is the principle of execution of a tacit agreement.”⁶⁴⁹

Some 26 Islanders, including 11 children, take up an offer to visit Mendoza and the Iguazú waterfalls.

“In 1979, the director of the Army's Remonta y Veterinaria del Ejército launched an initiative for islanders to travel to Buenos Aires, to get to know the Rur de Palermo and receive some horses as a donation. The idea was to offer the population of the islands "a quick overview showing diversified Argentine advancement in different areas and environments". ... The event caused accusations between those who considered (the participants) as 'traitors' and those who understood it as a possibility to know something more ... Desmond Peck dedicated a poem to the episode, pointing out that the "trick" had already been tried a few years ago, when the (Argentine) Navy gave away two cabin boys at the end of the regatta... With macho humor, Peck stated that the Argentines should try tempting the islanders with women, since horses were not a universal hobby.”⁶⁵⁰

“After a visit from Remonta y Veterinaria del Ejército, a trip was planned with about fifty islanders to visit Argentine cities and the Rural Exhibition. The organization was flawless and, for most of them, it was their first trip to the mainland. Upon returning, the pro-British group received them with signs accusing them of traitors. Travelers answered by laughing and clapping.”⁶⁵¹

July 20th, at Port Stanley, Minister of State Nicolas Ridley arrives for consultations.

“... the party drove into Stanley where many houses were decked out with stickers such as 'Keep the Falklands British' and 'God Bless Our Queen.' Around about 50 people gathered at the entrance to Government House drive and although it was raining quite heavily, the Minister along with His Excellency the Governor, got down from the official car to talk with the crowd. The early arrival of the aircraft meant that some people were a little late in arriving at the drive but the Minister moved around quite freely and spoke with many of the late-comers. Mrs. Betty Miller unfurled one of the biggest banners which read: "We want our 200 miles, for Falklands Fish are British Fish". The Minister admired the banner and wanted to know who had thought up the slogan. He also observed another banner which said 'Long to reign over us, God bless our Queen.' ... The crowd meanwhile had swelled to about 80 and in answer to some questions Mr. Ridley said that he was pleased to be in the Falklands. ... Mr. Ridley referred to the possibility of an exchange of Ambassadors during his recent visit. It was understood that Her Majesty's Government are responding to an Argentine request: it was they who originally withdraw their Ambassador from London and asked for the withdrawal of the British Ambassador and the first move for a restoration of Ambassadors has properly to come from them. What Her Majesty's Government are agreeing to is simply a return to normal full diplomatic relations.”⁶⁵²

“He considered 'lease back' the best available option, ... but Thatcher was hostile and could sense unease among Conservative MPs who already resented the compromises that had been made to arrange a settlement in Rhodesia. Ridley was sent to the Falklands in July 1979 ... for discussions. The islanders were still firmly against a transfer of sovereignty.”⁶⁵³

649 *Contrato con Shell coopera con los ocupantes de las Malvinas* in *El Diario del fin del mundo* July 7, 2017, quoting Adolfo Silenzi de Stagni of the *Política Petrolera y la Cuenca Marina Austral* from July 7, 1979. The implication was that this decree was prepared for the benefit of Ridley's visit, but there is no evidence that he was ever made aware of it. 650 Carassai 2022 citing *La Capital* August 11, 1979 and *The Falkland Islands Times* August, 1979.

651 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War Chapter 1* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

652 *The Falkland Islands Times* August 13, 1979 no.11/79

653 *Britain's International Role 1970 – 1991* Michael J. Turner 2010 p.207

*“Ridley found a more demanding community than Rowlands. With the technical endorsement of the Shackleton Report, the Islanders asked that the United Kingdom declare the extension of the maritime zone to 200 nautical miles (at that time it was 12), explore fishing agreements with Japan, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and not only expand the airport, as Rowlands had been asked to do, but also implement a direct air service between Stanley and London. Ridley, whose government was in negotiations to re-establish ambassador with Argentina ... could not commit to any of it.”*⁶⁵⁴

July 21st, Ridley meets with Islands Councillors.

*“The Argentines had been charming to him, and he did not wish to suggest that they had demonstrated any belligerence; nevertheless he judged that if we did not talk seriously to Argentina concerning the Islands, their patience would run out, and they would adopt confrontational postures. ... Later this year he would like to start talks with the Argentines on the whole range of issues concerning the Falkland Islands. It would be more difficult for him if the Islanders refused the LADE house, or rejected the draft scientific co-operation agreement.”*⁶⁵⁵

July 25th, Minister Ridley holds a further meeting with Islands Councillors.

*“On the political side he had identified three themes. The first was that the dispute with Argentina overhung everything; ... Secondly he was struck by the shortage of capital in the Islands. British aid, averaging £1 million per annum was high; but in terms of the overall needs was woefully inadequate. It would be better to improve access to commercial capital. He believed that the FIC activities were not helpful, in that the Company took money out, and did not sufficiently discourage agricultural development. His third impression concerned the labour shortage... he suggested that Islanders could be more active in recruitment. ... He repeated his twin assurances a) that he would conclude no agreement which did not meet the Islanders wishes, and b) that he would keep Councillors fully informed through the Governor.”*⁶⁵⁶

From Stanley, Ridley flies to Buenos Aires for preliminary talks with the Argentine Foreign Ministry. Agreement is reached on the reinstatement of Ambassadors – but little else. As Ridley is about to depart, the Argentine Foreign Ministry present an *aide-memoire* stating that they will find it unacceptable for the Islanders to become 'third parties' to any negotiations. Also that Argentina “demands” that negotiations move at a more dynamic pace.

*“Ridley returned to London determined to sort this one out once and for all.”*⁶⁵⁷

*“The Argentines were beginning to be convinced that what the United Kingdom was seeking was to gain time ... The Islanders had become convinced that ... the United Kingdom was gradually forcing them to accept Argentina as their new administration.”*⁶⁵⁸

August 16th, in New York, at the United Nations building, the Special Committee on Decolonization decide to defer consideration of the Falkland Islands until the next session in 1980.⁶⁵⁹

August 17th, in London, an internal Foreign Office *minute* considers negotiations.

654 Carassai 2022

655 See - https://e3392c052334bac88ffb-4c459826b1c4d51634c39169da9f8ca9.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/790721_0930_FCO_cnv_RIDL-CLLRS_Ridley_A_f13.pdf

656 See - https://e3392c052334bac88ffb-4c459826b1c4d51634c39169da9f8ca9.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/790725_0930_FCO_cnv_RIDL-CLLRS_Ridley_A_f20.pdf

657 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.47

658 Carassai 2022

659 *UN Doc A/34/23/REV.1[VOL.IV](Supp)*

*“... we need to clear our lines with Cabinet on the next moves in our dispute with Argentina on sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. I recommend that the Secretary of State write to the Prime Minister and her OD colleagues seeking their agreement to resume negotiations with Argentina in the autumn, to see whether an overall solution involving a leaseback, or some other special status, is possible. ... No solution stands any chance of success if we do not take the Islanders with us.”*⁶⁶⁰

*“The Argentine effort to win over Kelper, however, was already seen by many as a ruse whose sole purpose was sovereignty. “Free rides in Buenos Aires, cheap flights, subsidised freight, fuels and oils, temporary runway, scholarships”, reflected another islander ... “Argentine national Pride demands complete control of the Malvinas Islands by the Government of Buenos Aires and it is to that end that all previous Argentine actions have been directed”. Islanders and Argentines could no longer deceive each other ...”*⁶⁶¹

Following enquiries by the arms manufacturer Marconi, with regard to the promotion of the Stingray lightweight torpedo in Argentina, the Ministry of Defence argue that a sale will not be permitted. One of the factors presented is the possible threat to the Falkland Islands.

*“An MOD sales representative responded by saying: ‘I was surprised to see you making so much of a military threat against the Falkland Islands,’ adding: ‘I was under the impression that ... we had accepted that the Argentinians could take the Falkland Islands at any time they wish.’ ...”*⁶⁶²

August 28th, in London, Minister Ridley meets with the Falkland Islands Committee.

*“(Ridley) believed that he had moved Islander opinion to the extent that progress may now be made towards solving the dispute with Argentina. ... Mr Ridley said that the Islanders as a whole recognised that their future was inhibited by the dispute. They also recognised their vulnerability as regards communications and travel. But, more importantly, they recognised the dead hand of the dispute on investment and development in the Islands. ... ‘Leaseback’ might be worth considering...”*⁶⁶³

August 30th, in a minute to Ridley, Lord Carrington requests more information on how 'leaseback' would work; *“The Secretary of State is not convinced that leaseback is the only or the right solution. He – and he thinks OD colleagues will feel the same – would like to consider other options before reaching a conclusion on leaseback.”*⁶⁶⁴

September 4th, Ridley's staff prepare a response to Carrington's request for further information.

“2. The options must be measured against our objective. Our objective is a solution with which the Argentines might agree (which means concessions on sovereignty) and which the Islanders will accept (which means the maintenance of their way of life). Any option that does not meet this objective is useless. We cannot sell out the Islanders to Argentina and we have to give the Argentine something on sovereignty. 3. The proposal put is that we should concede to Argentina sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the Dependencies and their Maritime Zones. Argentina should simultaneously give HMG a perpetual lease over the Falkland Islands and South Georgia and their territorial waters and agree on equal co-administration of the economic resources of the maritime zones and seabed pertaining to all the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.

660 Ure to Hall August 17, 1979 ALW 045/325/1 Part C. OD is short for the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee.

661 Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Times* September, 1979

662 Livingstone 2018 citing *J.R. Hill to The Secretary RMI Sub-Committee, MOD August 21, 1979 DEFE 678/378*. After some lobbying, the sale of one version of the torpedo was approved.

663 FCO73/713-16 (f178)

664 Wall to Duggan August 30, 1979 in ALW 045/325/1 Part C at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation.

The Argentines should also undertake to continue to provide services (eg air services and oil supplies) to the Islands and for the Islanders in Argentina (e.g. schooling, medical services, etc.) 4. This proposal would provide what the Islanders have said they must have and would make possible increased economic development. It would give the Argentines concessions on sovereignty which they may be brought to accept as sufficient, although they may not meet their ambitions even if, as a fall back position, we were to agree to a lease limited to 100 or 50 years and left out South Georgia.” ⁶⁶⁵

September 18th, in New York, at the opening of a new session of the United Nations, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Brigadier Carlos Washington Pastor, addresses the General Assembly regarding the Falkland Islands.

“My government ... reiterates its firm decision to persevere in the search for a prompt and just solution to this problem. But the Argentine decision cannot be unilateral. It has to be matched by a similar spirit on behalf of the British authorities.”

“In response, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office stated that Britain's position had not changed. A spokesman said that it was evident that Britain had exercised sovereignty over the Islands for 150 years and it was equally obvious that the Islanders, being of British descent, wished to remain under British rule. Despite this statement, it is known that Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, agreed at the UN General Assembly in private talks with his Argentine counterpart that the negotiations on the future sovereignty and economic status of the Falkland Islands will be resumed.” ⁶⁶⁶

On the same day, in London, Lord Carrington requests that the explanation regarding leaseback be redrafted to make it sound more positive; *“The Secretary of State does not wish the minute to sound defeatist.”* ⁶⁶⁷

September 19th, following extensive talks, Constantino Davidoff contracts with *Christian Salvesen* to recover whaling equipment at the stations at Leith harbour, Stromness and Husvik on South Georgia. ⁶⁶⁸ Under the contract, Davidoff agrees to comply with all British entry conditions at South Georgia, and accepts that any equipment remaining after March 1982 reverts to *Salvesen*. ⁶⁶⁹

“I can confirm that in the period leading up to the conclusion of the contract there were a number of exchanges between Salvesens, the FCO and the then Governor of the Falkland Islands. Mr. Davidoff also contacted the Embassy in Buenos Aires. ... While there were misgivings about the political implications of the contract, legal advice was that there was no lawful way of preventing Salvesens concluding the agreement if they were determined to do so. Accordingly Salvesens were not obstructed in their pursuit of a contract. Ministers were consulted at the time and approved. There is no letter from the FCO to Salvesens acquiescing in the arrangement.” ⁶⁷⁰

“Thatcher's Foreign Office not only cleared the way for Salvesens to enter into a salvaging contract, but it also sweetened the deal. First the Foreign Office authorized Salvesens to acquire the Albion Star leases at Husvik and Grytviken, giving the company control over all four of the whaling stations on the island. Then, Salvesens offered Davidoff an option contract to dismantle the stations at Leith, Stromness, and Husvik, all located at Stromness Bay and one more than Davidoff originally sought. The fourth station, at Grytviken, twenty miles

665 *Hall to Ridley September 4, 1979 FCO7/3677 (f200)* See - https://e3392c052334bac88ffb-4c459826b1c4d51634c39169da9f8ca9.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/790904_Hall_mnt_OPTIONS_FOR_CTN_MTG_FCO7_3677_f200.pdf

666 *Falkland islands Newsletter* November 1979 no.7

667 *ALW 040/325/14*

668 *Davidoff to Williams March 25, 1982 in AW 040/325.12.* The station at Grytviken was not included, possibly because it was the base for the British Antarctic Survey (BAS).

669 This was subsequently extended to December 31, 1982 and then to March 31, 1983

670 *Falkland Island Dependencies: Whaling Stations February 1, 1983 FCO note to Downing Street.*

away from the other three, where the BAS were located, was excluded from the deal... Although Davidoff signed a three-year contract with Salvesens in September 1979, and despite the fact that scrap metal prices reached their historic peak in 1981, Davidoff's enterprise lay dormant until activated in late 1981.”⁶⁷¹

“The company signed a contract with Davidoff for £115,000, to remove machinery and other metal from the deserted whaling stations on South Georgia at Leith Harbour, Stromness and Husvik, and Davidoff was given three years to complete the job ... For several years he made no progress, but he did not give up the project.”⁶⁷²

September 20th, in London, Lord Carrington seeks consensus on a Falklands policy within the Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee. He puts forward options: 1) *Fortress Falklands*; 2) protracted negotiations with no concession on sovereignty; or 3) substantive negotiations on sovereignty.⁶⁷³ Carrington favours the last option and again suggests that the best solution is some kind of leaseback arrangement with a preferred term of 99 years. He highlights that it will be necessary to ensure that the leaseback option has the support of the Islanders, and of Parliament.⁶⁷⁴

“NO!... I could not possibly agree to the line the foreign secretary is proposing. Nor would it ever get through the H of C – let alone the parliamentary party.”

“(Margaret Thatcher) ... wrote angry notes on Carrington's draft, rejecting the entire leaseback idea...”⁶⁷⁵

September 21st, in London, Cabinet Secretary John Hunt, minutes the Prime Minister.

“Lord Carrington... proposes that in the margin of the UN General Assembly meeting next week he should suggest to his Argentine Foreign Minister that negotiations should start soon ... In these negotiations we should, for the first time, formally put to the Argentine the suggestion that we might concede sovereignty over the Falklands and the Dependencies in return for a leaseback to ensure continued British rule for as long as possible...”

Thatcher writes on the top of the minute; “I cannot possibly agree to the proposed course of action.”⁶⁷⁶

September 22nd, in the UK, Energy Secretary David Howell, also writes to Thatcher.

“I have seen Peter Carrington's (sic) paper to you on the subject of the Falkland Islands ... It is true that the presence of oil (or gas) has yet to be proven, but the continued interest of the oil companies and the results of recent geophysical surveys ... lead us to think that there is at least a good chance that hydrocarbons are there. We ought to be very careful about adopting a course which could lead to British oil companies losing a favourable position ... ”⁶⁷⁷

“When, in late 1979, Lord Carrington proposed a 99-year lease-back formula, the Secretary of State for Energy, David Howell, wrote to Margaret Thatcher ... He called for a full discussion of the economic implications of leaseback, warning that if sovereignty was transferred "it could also involve a substantial loss to the British economy if oil were found". ... The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, agreed...”⁶⁷⁸

671 *The Reagan Revolution II: Rebuilding the Western Alliance* Richard C. Thornton 2004

672 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.616

673 PM/79/81. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/E87B85F2F68C42CEB2BBB9FABEEE7614.pdf>

674 A lease arrangement had been first mooted in January, 1975. See above

675 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carrington to Thatcher September 20, 1979 PREM 19/656*

676 *PREM 19/656 fl 14* Margaret Thatcher Foundation

677 *PREM 19/612*. Lord Carrington's family name, has only one 'r'.

678 Livingstone 2018 citing *Howell to Thatcher September 22, 1979 PREM 19/612*

September 25th, after speaking to Thatcher, Carrington informs Ridley that the Prime Minister will not be rushed into making a decision on his proposals and that Ridley should inform Argentina that this; “*complex problem*” was being considered. ⁶⁷⁹

Lord Carrington telegrams the UK Mission at the United Nations; “... *the Prime Minister would prefer that when you see the Argentine Foreign Minister you should confine yourself to saying that HMG have not completed their consideration of this complex problem.... Nor would it be appropriate to speak at this stage about negotiations on sovereignty.*” ⁶⁸⁰

In New York, at the UN, Argentina's Foreign Ministry proposes a “*programme of work*” in which Secretary of State Ridley meets with Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister informally twice a year with an open agenda. ⁶⁸¹

October 1st, in London, anticipating a discussion on the Falklands at the next Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee, John Ure circulates a *memo*. ⁶⁸²

“On historical and legal grounds we are confident that our sovereignty is soundly based. Nothing in the negotiations so far has eroded this. Equally, no progress has been made. ...

Our objectives in the dispute include the following (i) To defend the right of the British settlers to remain under British administration. (ii) To end a dispute which is damaging to trade; damaging to international relations (most of the UN vote against us) and politically explosive at home... (iii) To ensure that the UK derives advantage from the economic resources of the area: possibly oil and certainly fish.

Argentine objectives appear to include: (i) achieving nominal sovereignty for reasons of national pride. (ii) Securing a share of the economic offshore resources. (iii) A possible non-national objective in providing a cause to further the ambitions of individual Argentine officers.” ⁶⁸³

Three options are raised for discussion: a refusal to negotiate; negotiation but a refusal to make concessions on sovereignty; or the adoption of: “... *a more constructive approach... insisting on preserving our essential interests... On sovereignty, we could explore various arrangements, the most promising of which would appear to be a "leaseback" analogous to the New Territories in Hong Kong, under which Argentina would acquire nominal sovereignty while the Islanders continued to enjoy the security of British rule. ...*” ⁶⁸⁴

Annex 3 to Ure's *memo* notes.

“The question of British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies has not been submitted to the International Court of Justice or to any other international arbitration. Since Argentina has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and reference to the Court could only be made with the agreement of the Argentine Government.” ⁶⁸⁵

October 2nd, John Grundon, an Exploration and Commercial Manager for British Petroleum, informs the Government's Energy, Science and Space Department that; “... *BP had all but written off the Falkland Islands as*

679 Franks 1983 para.73

680 *ALW 040/325/14* at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation

681 See November 12, 1979, below.

682 An OD Committee meeting was scheduled for October 4, 1979. As yet, I have found no record. See October 15, 1979

683 *FCO 76/1892*. Original emphasis.

684 *Ibid*

685 *Ibid*. In Annex 3, 1947's decision of the Law Officer was highlighted; while the 1966 legal advice which broadly agreed with that of 1947, was only mentioned. *cf.* 1947 & 1966

a prospective offshore oil area. This was not because of the political obstacles... The main reason for BP lack of interest was geological.”⁶⁸⁶

October 3rd, in the Falklands, the first edition of the *Penguin News* is published. Founded by Graham Bound.

From Buenos Aires, Constantino Davidoff writes to the Falkland Islands Government.

“175. Mr. Davidoff signed a contract with the company "Salvensen Limited" of Edinburgh, which was notarized before the notary public Ian Roger Frame on 19-SEP-79 with validity until 31-MAR-83. In October 1979, the Argentine merchant contacted the authorities of Port Stanley, in order to inform them of the existence of the aforementioned contract and explore the possibility of renting a boat to transport the scrap metal obtained from the scrapping of the factories. To which the local authorities refused.”⁶⁸⁷

October 12th, in London, Lord Carrington again seeks a decision from Cabinet.

“I ... invite my colleagues to agree that the FCO should resume talks with the Argentines at Ministerial level. The purpose of the talks in the first instance would be to explore, without commitment, political and economic solutions... We would seek not to rush matters: so long as the Argentines believe we are negotiating seriously, they will desist from precipitate action.”⁶⁸⁸

“A memorandum by Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington in late 1979 warned that if Britain refused to negotiate, the Islands could be blockaded or even invaded. But he also argued that if an agreement was not reached with Argentina, the Islands could fall into economic decline, British trade with Argentina could be damaged and that it would be impossible to exploit the economic resources (primarily oil and fish) of the South Atlantic. Long annexes attached to the memorandum outlined not only the cost of defending the Islands militarily, but also the threat to British commercial interests in Argentina,...”⁶⁸⁹

October 15th, in London, PM Thatcher defers the Falklands question. “The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's memorandum of 12 October... She has asked that discussion of the Falkland Islands by OD should be postponed until after the Rhodesia issue has been settled.”⁶⁹⁰

Also in London, Argentina's recently retired Admiral Massera has a meeting with Minister Ridley; “During their meeting, the retired Admiral told Ridley that in ideal "military terms", Argentina wanted to "take" the Islands, but as this was 'unrealistic' they were seeking a compromise with Britain. The Foreign Office hosted a lunch for Massera at the Savoy...”⁶⁹¹

October 20th, from Argentina's Antarctic Base Esperanza, a radio station - 'Arcángel San Gabriel' - commences operation under the auspices of the Ministry of Communications.

November 2nd, in London, Argentina's *charge d'affaires* invites Ridley to meet with Deputy Foreign Minister Cavándoli in the next week or so.⁶⁹²

686 *Ibid.*

687 *Junta Militar: Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur – Informe Final* a.k.a. The Rattenbach Report (undated). Commissioned by the Argentine Junta after the 1982 war, a final, official, version was published in 2012. This appears to be earlier. See - <https://www.caserosada.gob.ar/pdf/InformeRattenbach/01-InformeFinal.pdf>

688 CAB 148/183

689 Livingston 2018 citing DOP Committee October 12, 1979 CAB 148/183

690 ALW 040/325/14

691 Livingston 2018 citing Temple to Ure October 31, 1979 FCO 7/3589

692 See November 12, 1979, below

November 8th, a draft Joint Intelligence Committee/Ministry of Defence assessment of the Argentine threat to the Falkland islands is circulated; *“If negotiations break down, or if the Argentinians conclude that there is no prospect of real progress towards a negotiated transfer of sovereignty, some form of diplomatic, political or commercial pressure is inevitable, and some military action cannot be discounted,”*⁶⁹³

November 12th, an FCO minute notes; *“When the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary saw the Argentine Foreign Minister in New York at the end of September, Brigadier Pastor suggested a “programme of work”, which included Mr Ridley meeting with the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister twice a year very informally with an open agenda, switching to official meetings when there was something agreed to be formalised. The Argentine Charge d’Affaires called on Mr Ridley on 2 November to convey an invitation from the Deputy Foreign Minister, Commodore Cavandoli, to meet him in New York ... We do not know for sure why the Argentines have suggested this meeting at this time. We have repeatedly made clear to them that we are not yet ready to discuss the Falkland Islands question. There is some possibility that the Air Force, now in charge of the Argentine Foreign Ministry wants to be able to show that they are doing no less well than their Navy predecessors and that discussions with us on Falklands matters are in progress. ... To decline this invitation runs the risk of awakening Argentine suspicions that we are simply stringing them along. ... However, we are not in favour of a meeting which has no substance. ... Mt Ridley has, therefore, ... sent the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister a polite but gentle message of regret.”*⁶⁹⁴

November 21st, in New York, the UN General Assembly defer consideration of the Falklands until 1980.

From London, a JIC threat assessment is forwarded to the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires; *“Direct military action against British shipping or against the Falkland Islands cannot be discounted, but we generally believe the risk of such action would not be as high as hitherto.”*⁶⁹⁵

November 27th, from Stanley, the Governor of the Falklands writes to Christian Salvesen Ltd to express his *“reservations”* regarding that company's contract with Constantino Davidoff.⁶⁹⁶

*“176. Mr. Davidoff's next step was to formalize a company for the entity "Islas Georgias de Sur Sociedad Anónima" (in formation) with two more partners. Subsequently, he tried to hire a transporter that would allow him to observe "in situ" the magnitude and tools necessary for the work to be carried out in the whaling factories.”*⁶⁹⁷

In **December**, in Finland, the Argentine Embassy complains about a television programme to be aired on MAINOS-TV; *Falkland Islands: Summer in the middle of Winter*. This refers to the archipelago as British. As a result of the protests, the recording is re-edited to avoid any political references.

*“The (Finnish) Foreign Ministry's rather silly reaction no doubt gave the Argentinians immense satisfaction.”*⁶⁹⁸

693 FCO7/3677 (f86) as amended. See - https://e3392c052334bac88ffb-4c459826b1c4d51634c39169da9f8ca9.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/791108_JIC_draft_FK_ASSESSMENT_FCO7_3677_f86.pdf

694 PREM19/656/f98

695 FCO7/3677 (f70). See - https://e3392c052334bac88ffb-4c459826b1c4d51634c39169da9f8ca9.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/791121_FCO_tel_to_UKE_BA_JIC_ASSESSMENT_FCO7_3677_f70.pdf

696 *Falkland Island Dependencies: Whaling Stations February 1, 1983* FCO note to Downing Street. cf. September, 1979

697 *Junta Militar: Comision de Analisis y Evaluacion de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlantico Syr – Inform Final* a.k.a. The Rattenbach Report (undated). See August, 1981 below

698 ALW 0420/325/1

1980 – January 9th, from Stanley, Governor Parker gives his response to the suggestion of a *lease-back* arrangement; “... *maybe I have been here too long but after even only three years among the Islanders I would instinctively find it as difficult to accept as they would.*”⁶⁹⁹

In London, facing pressure from arms manufacturers unhappy that the Foreign Office keeps blocking sales to Argentina, Minister Nicholas Ridley notes; “*The prime minister was most insistent when I saw her about the Falkland Islands that we should not sell Argentina any arms.*”⁷⁰⁰

January 14th, in London, Argentina's newly arrived Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, introduces himself to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*“He said that he had been particularly delighted with his appointment to the Embassy in London, which he knew very well, because he thought the prospect of improving intensifying relations between Argentina and Britain across the board had never been better than now. ... The only cloud on the horizon in our relations lay, as we all knew, in the Falkland Islands dispute. ... He did not see either the possibility or the necessity of making rapid progress. What was important was that we should be seen to be moving forward across a broad front.”*⁷⁰¹

January 15th, from Stanley, Governor Parker telegrams the FCO with his thoughts on talks with Argentina.

*“The whole policy has seemed from the start to have been based on one fallacious premise: that, given time, the Islanders would eventually resign themselves to an Argentine future, however grudgingly. As events have shown, their British ties are far too strong to allow any such time to work.”*⁷⁰²

January 24th, a confidential Foreign Office *memo* sums up an internal debate on whether or not the UK should recognise Indonesia's *de facto* possession of East Timor. Occupied by force in 1975, Foreign Office mandarins suggest that the result of such recognition could set an embarrassing precedent, the *memo* notes.

*“... there is a residual danger of an Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and should this take place, Britain's UN case would be seriously flawed were we to accord full legal recognition to the Indonesian seizure;...”*⁷⁰³

January 25th, in London, the Cabinet Secretary, Robert Armstrong, writes to Thatcher to remind her that any discussions on the Falklands should include the question of oil.

*“... ministers needed to consider ‘the possible oil and fishery benefits at stake’ and ‘the implications for our oil and fishery interests elsewhere of the possible cession of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands continental shelf. ...”*⁷⁰⁴

January 28th, from Stanley, Governor Parker, coming to the end of a three year term, sends a valedictory despatch to London.

699 See - <https://e3392c052334bac88ffb-4c459826b1c4d51634c39169da9f8ca9.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/800109 Parker to Duggan LEASEBACK Ridley A f64.pdf>

700 Notes dated January 14, 1980 in *FCO 7/3730* and quoted in Livingstone 2018. Despite the Prime Minister's views, several arms contracts were approved in 1980 and export licences granted for military aircraft, surveillance equipment and a missile control system. It is not clear what was eventually supplied. See Livingstone 2018.

701 *FCO7/3726 (f20)*

702 *FCO73/713-16 (f59)*. See - <https://e3392c052334bac88ffb-4c459826b1c4d51634c39169da9f8ca9.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/800115 Parker tel LEASEBACK Ridley A f59.pdf>

703 *ALW 0420/325/1* at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation

704 Livingstone 2018 citing *Armstrong to Thatcher January 25, 1980 PREM 19/656*

*“(The) greater part of a Governor's time is taken up by the day-to-day maintenance of the community's services ... it is a necessary part of the job also devote time to the planning of the further improvement of those services, alongside long term schemes for urban and rural development - just as if the place had the longest of all futures. And then the cold thought comes: that all this work and planning could be set at naught because of the need to meet the emotional and nationalistic demands of a country, Argentina, 400 miles away across the sea ... It might clarify thinking considerably if Britain were to drop her attitude of apparent detachment, assess her advantages and interests, and openly meet the Argentines on the same terms in the dispute as they have chosen for themselves.”*⁷⁰⁵

At the British Foreign Office, Robin Fearn, head of the South America department, receives Parker's communication.

*“Mr Parker tends to look at the problem from the islanders' viewpoint. ... We must try to ensure that the new Governor retains a more objective view of his mission and of the need to bring the Islanders to recognise the narrow options open to them and to us.”*⁷⁰⁶

January 29th, at Downing Street, London, a Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee meeting considers the relative strengths of claims regarding the Falklands.

*“Argentina's legal claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands was very weak. That was why they did not wish to let the matter go to arbitration. Any agreement to discuss sovereignty might damage Britain's strong legal position.”*⁷⁰⁷

Summing up the debate, PM Thatcher says; *“... that the nub of the problem lay in the danger that any resumption of talks might appear to foreshadow a surrender of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands at some time in the future. There was no legal basis for such a surrender.”* The meeting agrees to a new round of talks, but asks Carrington to seek agreement from the Islanders that negotiations with Argentina resume.

*“Department of Energy officials, however, were concerned that the commitment to preserving Britain's oil rights was not strong enough when ministers agreed, in January 1980, to start exploratory ministerial talks with Argentina.”*⁷⁰⁸

February 5th, Energy Secretary David Howell writes to Lord Carrington to emphasise the importance of retaining access for the UK, to any potential oil fields around the Falklands.⁷⁰⁹

February 7th, Stanley's *Penguin News* editorial says;

“We can trust the British Government as little as we trust the Argentina Government and feeble cries of 'Keep the Falklands British' and other cliches will win us no support. Instead we should look to ourselves and proclaim the Falklands belong to us, and not to Britain, Argentina or any other foreign country. ... independence.”

February 11th, in London, an internal FCO memo notes that with regard to Britain's dependent territories:

“The present British Government are fully committed to the policy followed by successive Governments since 1945 of giving every help and encouragement to those Dependent Territories which wish to become independent, while not forcing independence on those which do not wish it... Where local

705 Quoted in Parris & Bryson 2012

706 *Ibid*

707 *CAB 148/189* at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation

708 Livingston 2018 citing *Birchmore to D'Ancona January 30, 1980 EG 14/92*

709 *Ibid.* citing *Howell to Carrington February 5, 1980 PREM 19/612*

government have made it clear that they do not wish their territories to become independent, we are content to retain sovereignty for the time being. But we must also retain the legal powers necessary to ensure that we are able to fulfil the responsibilities that sovereignty entails. ... Each case will be considered on its merits, bearing in mind the constraints imposed by external political circumstances and the wishes of the local population....

Responsibility and power must go together. Political development must therefore stop some way short of full internal self-government where territories choose to remain dependent. In such cases the British Government, through the Governor, will retain overall responsibility for:-

(i) external affairs;

(ii) defence;

(iii) internal security, ...;

(iv) the administration of the police;

(v) the administration of the public service;

*(vi) the judiciary... ”*⁷¹⁰

In Buenos Aires, Anthony Williams arrives as British Ambassador to Argentina, re-establishing formal diplomatic relations.⁷¹¹

*“... a consistent advocate of closer ties with Argentina.”*⁷¹²

*“... Ambassador Anthony Williams said the Islanders could not continue to use facilities provided by Argentina – such as air service, supplies of fuel, food and other freight – whilst ‘insulting’ the Argentines. He wanted to visit the Islands ‘to install fear in them of the consequences’. He was criticised by the islanders for appeasement.”*⁷¹³

February 13th, in Stanley, the Falkland Islands Government agree to renewed negotiations, provided that an Islander is present and that the talks remain 'general,' 'exploratory' and 'without commitment.'⁷¹⁴

In London, briefing notes issued by the Foreign Office call into question Argentina's interpretation of UN resolutions.

*“The UK does not accept the assertion by Argentina that the ‘illegality of the occupation of the Falkland, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands by the United Kingdom has been recognised by the United Nations.’ Resolutions have simply called for the settlement of the dispute by negotiation between the two Governments.”*⁷¹⁵

In the Falkland Islands, Vice Commodore Héctor Ricardo Gilobert arrives to assume command of the LADE air transport operation.

*“The new Vice-Comodoro here said he volunteered for the post because it is so quiet and peaceful and his children have much more freedom here than on the mainland.”*⁷¹⁶

710 ALW 040/325/1

711 His predecessor had been recalled in 1977.

712 Livingstone 2018

713 Briley 2022

714 PREM19/656 f86 at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation

715 A4 ALW 0420/325/1

716 Hunt to Fearn March 19, 1980 in ALW 040/325/1

*“A decade after LADE flights had started operating, Malvinas settlers openly enjoyed the goods they received from Argentina. ... Gilbert’s wife was three months pregnant when she arrived. As medical care on the island was good, she decided to give birth in Malvinas. By mid-July 1980, Mariana was born in the King Edward Memorial Hospital. The birth accelerated the family’s integration into the community, although at first Gilbert family’s decision had caused resentment since it was feared that a propaganda manoeuvre with the baby’s Argentine citizenship would be used. Once they were convinced that would not occur, they showed friendliness towards the family. ... Beyond their pleasant attitude, Malvinas settlers traditionally rejected the sovereignty change. They resisted any actions that would represent an advance in negotiations. ... They did not understand or justify the Argentine claims based on history or on titles inherited from Spain. Furthermore, being receptive to propaganda, they considered Argentina a strange country, with a different language, religion, different costumes and habits. The few pieces of news they heard referred to the military government, inflation, strikes and other problems they did not experience because they lived on those far away islands. They suspected the British would abandon them and feared an Argentine invasion.”*⁷¹⁷

February 27th, at Port Stanley Rex Masterman Hunt arrives as Governor of the Falkland Islands.⁷¹⁸

*“The point that strikes one immediately, whether in town or in Camp, is the shortage of people, and not only working men but men, women and children of all ages.”*⁷¹⁹

*“By 1980 there were only three British territories whose governors merited a full-dress ceremonial uniform: Bermuda, Hong Kong and the Falklands, so he was duly measured for his uniform at Messers Hogg and Johnston of Sackville Street.”*⁷²⁰

March 18th, in London, an internal FCO memorandum notes that British businesses are likely to side with Argentina on the subject of Falklands sovereignty, which is viewed as an obstacle to a good trading relationship.⁷²¹

In **April**, a study into fish resources around the Falklands archipelago is released.

*“The study concluded that there were two principal species of fish found within 200 miles of the Falklands. Patagonian hake was fished intensively by Argentine, German, Japanese and Spanish vessels and was thought to have reached the maximum sustainable yield. The unexploited blue whiting stocks could produce an estimated yield of 800,000 to 1 million tonnes a year. There was an urgent need for conservation measures. The White Fish Authority identified a number of problems with the S.A.F.C.’s proposals. The fillet freezer trawlers, which were required for the exploratory voyage, had nearly all been sold or converted to whole fish freezing. The development of the fisheries would be constrained by Port Stanley’s limited facilities. Finally, the declaration of a 200 mile fishing zone would be unprofitable to police.”*⁷²²

April 27th, in New York, the day before Britain and Argentina renew negotiations over the Falkland Islands, Minister Ridley is presented with briefing notes by his Foreign Office staff:⁷²³

717 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

718 *The London Gazette* August 13, 1980. For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/hunt_sir

719 *Hunt to Fearn* March 19, 1980 in ALW 040/325/1

720 Pascoe 2022 vol.2 p.622

721 *Malcomson to Bright, Duggan and Fearn* March 18, 1980 FCO 7/3726

722 Ellerby 1990 p.252 citing *F.I.A. archive (London), box file 6, V.F.A., Fisheries Dec. 1979*. A surprising conclusion considering the success of the subsequent EEZ declared around the Islands in 1991; with fishing revenues by 2020 accounting for a large part of the FIG’s income. See - <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/how-the-falkland-islands-became-one-of-the-worlds-most-affluent-places-f9kc8fzjk>

723 *Brief No. A4 – A6 ALW 0420/325/1 (FCO 07-3801) 1980*.

“Sovereignty Options: Points to Make (only if raised by Argentines)... this exploratory round is not the place to undertake any substantive discussion of sovereignty proposals. 3. All these have to be seen in the context of the paramountcy of Islanders' wishes... International Arbitration: Points to make (Defensive) 1. We should not raise this question and it is most unlikely that the Argentines will. If they do ask whether we would consider taking the dispute to an international tribunal, Mr. Ridley should say that he will need time to consult his Ministerial colleagues before giving HMG's answer. ...

*Legal Advisers do not dissent from the views expressed by the Law Officers in 1966, nor do they consider the composition of the ICJ as any more favourable to the UK position than in 1966.”*⁷²⁴

On the issue of a leaseback option.

“It would be a formidable task to negotiate an agreement of this kind acceptable to Britain, Argentina and the Islanders. It would require Argentine agreement to leave the administration and way of life of the Islanders unchanged throughout the period of the lease. It would probably also require outside guarantees.”

April 28th, in New York, British and Argentine delegations meet for two days of talks. Britain's delegation includes Minister Nicholas Ridley, Ambassador Williams from the Buenos Aires Embassy, Councillor Monk representing the Islanders and three other civil servants. On the Argentine side is the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Carlos Cavandoli, Carlos Ortiz de Rozas (Ambassador to the UK), Ambassador Oliveri Lopez, Commodore Carlos Bloomer-Reeve, Colonel Luis Balcarce and one other.⁷²⁵

*“Comodoro Cavandoli welcomed Mr Ridley and said he was very hopeful about the talks ... He would like to underline Argentine satisfaction with Ambassador Williams. He looked forward to working with him and was grateful to have him. ... He emphasised the absolute confidentiality of the talks which had always been guaranteed. ... Mr Ridley expressed thanks for the welcome and said he was pleased to be sitting around a table with the Argentines. ... Only the problem of the Islands stood in the way of improving our relations and he hoped for frank and wide ranging discussions to day covering all aspects of the question.”*⁷²⁶

Ridley suggests that the discussions focus on – i) the search for oil in disputed seas, ii) fishing in the same areas, iii) the Islands themselves, iv) scientific co-operation and Southern Thule, v & vi) Conventions due to be signed relative to Antarctica, vii) co-operation between the Islands and Argentina and viii) plans for the development of the Islands. Cavandoli, in general terms, agrees. With regard to the Falkland Islands, Cavandoli first provides Ridley with an Argentine history lesson; *“There was only one outstanding problem, the Islands as they belonged to Argentina and had been taken from Argentina by force.”* Responding, Ridley says that he wants; *“... to separate out that part of the Argentine attitude to the Islands which had to do with the long-standing public and political problem, seen in the way children were educated in schools to believe that the Islands were Argentine, from any possible solution to the future of the Islands. ... we should forget the past: we had only the future to consider.”*⁷²⁷

724 Legal advice provided in 1966 remains embargoed (2024), but is understood to confirm a similar opinion given in 1947 which favoured British sovereignty. *cf.* 1947 & 1966

725 Argentina's Air Force was responsible for the Foreign Ministry at this time.

726 Link to the full record, below.

727 PREM 19/612 f41.

April 29th, in New York, on the second day of talks, Councillor Monk addresses the delegates.

“Mr Monk said he believed the discussion had been both frank and far reaching. He thought that the central question should not be elaborated further. But this did not mean that relations and economic co-operation could not be improved. Often in the past misunderstandings had been caused by insufficient communications between the Islanders and the Argentines. ... He was sure that the majority of Islanders would welcome increased co-operation on economic matters, without prejudice to the sovereignty position.”

Argentina’s Minister Cavándoli tells the meeting; *“Sovereignty was a sine qua non, an underlying condition, for progress on the other questions. ... Everything was possible, and all other matters could immediately be put into action, if we operated on the assumption that sovereignty would one day be returned to Argentina.”*⁷²⁸

At the end of the day, with little achieved, an impasse arises over the wording of the final joint *communiqué*. Britain wishes to refer to the meetings as ‘discussions’ while the Argentine’s want to call them, ‘negotiations’. A decision is deferred to the next day.

*“An April 1980 meeting between the Argentines and Nicholas Ridley in New York failed to agree co-operation on fishing, oil exploration and improved communications. The Islanders’ representative, Legislative Councillor Adrian Monk, a tough-talking farmer and anti-Argentine critic, was refused access to the briefing notes, with the excuse that he did not have security clearance.”*⁷²⁹

April 30th, in New York, after both delegations have left the city, the agreed *communiqué* is released.

“In accordance with separate announcements in London and Buenos Aires on April 15th 1980 by the Argentine and UK Governments, a Ministerial meeting was held in New York on 28 and 29 April to discuss the Falkland Islands question and related issues in the South Atlantic within the negotiating framework referred to in relevant Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. The British and Argentine Delegations were led respectively by Mr Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, and Comodoro Carlos R. Cavandoli, Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires. The discussions were of a comprehensive and wide-ranging nature and were conducted in a cordial and positive spirit. The two Government intend to hold future meetings in order to continue these exchanges.”

*“Ridley said that his recent meeting with the Argentines should be called “talks” rather than negotiations. He met with the Argentine Foreign Minister Cavandoli to test the Argentine position and report back to his government. An anodyne *communiqué* had been issued at the conclusion of the talks. The Argentine position is that they want to have a solution which enables them to say that the Islands have been returned to them. For the 1,850 British residents on the Islands, the problem is one of their interest which is not to be Argentinian. This is also an emotional political issue in the UK all out of proportion to the number of people involved. However, if nothing is done, the Argentines might harass the British on the Island. Ridley said that both sides would have to be flexible. He commented that perhaps one solution might be for the UK to recognize Argentine sovereignty, then lease the Islands, since no Argentines live on them; however, this raises questions of oil rights, etc.”*⁷³⁰

728 *Ibid.* For the full FCO record, see - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/9AAD955783FC4390A5EA07507CC5652F.pdf>

729 Briley 2022

730 *Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina May 7, 1980* in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

May 27th, an internal FCO minute considers the lobbying activities of the Falkland Islands Committee; *"It would clearly be useful to obtain a better parliamentary understanding on these issues and thus limit the FIC's scope for mischief-making. ... Meanwhile it would seem right to proceed cautiously and to confine informal briefing to the practical problem of developing the Falklands economy."*⁷³⁷

June 5th, visiting London, Dr. Jose de Hoz, Argentina's Minister for the Economy, meets with PM Thatcher.

*"Yesterday, Dr Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, the Argentine Minister of the Economy, who is on an official visit to Britain had discussions with ministers and officials and called on Mrs Thatcher, ... He said in an interview: "For the first time some progress has been made and there is a little light on the horizon ... and I think the economic side can help. We have two common interests, which could be oil and fishing. So long as some sort of discussions on sovereignty can go on at the same time we might be able to reach some kind of agreement on joint oil exploration or fishing which would be the beginning of a get-together on this issue". ..."*⁷³⁸

Dr. Hoz also speaks to Minister Nicholas Ridley.

*"(Ridley) understood that the Argentines' main problem remained the question of sovereignty over the Islands, but he had stressed to Comodoro Cavandoli that the dispute was a major political issue both in the UK and in the Islands and that it would be very difficult for HMG to make concessions on sovereignty."*⁷³⁹

*"... most controversially, and barely featuring in British collective memory, Sir Lawrence Freedman, professor of War Studies at King's College London recounts how Margaret Thatcher's government offered to hand over sovereignty of the Islands at a clandestine meeting with a senior member of the Argentine military junta in June 1980, less than two years before the conflict in the South Atlantic and, unlike in 1974, to a dictatorship rather than a democratically elected government."*⁷⁴⁰

June 6th, Britain's *The Times* newspaper reports:

"New moves are taking place between Argentina and Britain over the disputed Falkland Islands colony in the South Atlantic. Yesterday, Dr Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, the Argentine Minister of the Economy, who is on an official visit to Britain had discussions with ministers and officials and called on Mrs Thatcher, the Prime Minister. Dr Martinez de Hoz said he would be discussing the possibility of Anglo-Argentine ventures in offshore oil exploration and the development of fishing off the Falklands. He said in an interview: "For the first time some progress has been made and there is a little light on the horizon ... and I think the economic side can help. We have two common interests, which could be oil and fishing. So long as some sort of discussions on sovereignty can go on at the same time we might be able to reach some kind of agreement on joint oil exploration or fishing which would be the beginning of a get-together on this issue. We want you British to hurry up and be partners in our economic development". With Britain's recession there was an opportunity to develop further markets in his country, he said. He thought that because of the Falklands issue British investment had been losing its place in the Argentine economy, but the British Government now seemed determined to make up lost ground. ..."

737 Fearn to Harding May 27, 1980 in FCO7/3804 (f33). This appears to have followed an article in the *Daily Express* newspaper regarding fishing opportunities.

738 *The Times* June 6, 1980

739 FCO73. For the full record, see - https://e3392c052334bac88ffb-4c459826b1c4d51634c39169da9f8ca9.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/800605_FCO_cnv_RIDL-HOZ_Ridley_A_f32.pdf

740 Levey & Ozarow 2021 citing Freedman 2005 p.698. I can find no reference to this in Freedman's 2005 work.

June 27th, Lord Carrington, in a *memo* circulated to OD Committee members, proposes an agreement involving transfer of title over the Falklands and the Dependencies, provided that these were immediately '*leased back*' to the UK for an indefinite period. Arrangements could then be made regarding co-operation on fishing and oil exploration. ⁷⁴¹

July 1st, in Downing Street, the Cabinet Secretary, Robert Armstrong, submits a brief to PM Margaret Thatcher on the Falklands, ahead of the OD Committee meeting scheduled for the next day.

“The basic question posed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is whether we should be prepared on an exploratory basis to discuss with the Argentines the surrender of United Kingdom sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The legal justification for the Argentine claim to sovereignty is weak. The reasons for the United Kingdom taking this course of action are the entirely practical ones of saving ourselves money (both in maintaining the economy of the Islands and in defending them, if the Argentines threatened to attack them), solving a residual colonial problem, improving our relations with the Argentine, opening the way to developing the resources of the South-West Atlantic, and improving the economic prospects for the Islanders. But despite these practical arguments, there may well be considerable concern expressed in OD about the point of principle involved in a British surrender of sovereignty in these circumstances.” ⁷⁴²

July 2nd, in London, the Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee consider Carrington's proposals.

“In discussion there was general agreement with the practical advantages of the course of action proposed although considerable misgivings were expressed about its domestic political implications. The following points were made -

a. Argentina had a very weak legal claim to the Falkland Islands. Unfortunately the United Nations ignored this fact and sided with her over this issue.

b. Although the Islanders might be prepared to accept a surrender of sovereignty and lease back arrangement, it would be difficult to convince their lobby in this country that this course of action reflected the wishes of the Islanders. There would probably be difficulties in the House of Commons. ...

f. Any further exploratory discussions with the Argentines that involved any consideration of sovereignty would need to be carried out on an entirely confidential basis. Otherwise they would get nowhere...” ⁷⁴³

At the end of the debate, Lord Carrington is authorised to initiate '*exploratory*' and '*confidential*' talks with Argentina.

“Margaret Thatcher and members of the cabinet’s Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) Committee ... agreed, in July 1980, to begin exploratory discussions on a solution that could include a ‘surrender of sovereignty and simultaneous leaseback arrangements’...” ⁷⁴⁴

July 7th, from London, a message is sent via the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, to Cavandoli proposing a further round of “*private meetings*”. ⁷⁴⁵

741 CAB 148/191. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/7CCD1B54777F401C82E3497651828341.pdf>

742 PREM19/656.f82. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/7A74833E022B4847BA60D2104D7A0309.pdf>

743 CAB 148/189

744 Livingstone 2018

745 FCO7/3808 (f196)

July 30th, Britain's Government informs Parliament that it is to publish a White Paper on the issue of nationality; to contain proposals for new legislation. ⁷⁴⁶

“We have, ... been impressed with the argument that a separate citizenship should be established for the dependencies as a whole. We propose that this should be called citizenship of the British dependent territories. I emphasise that the establishment of this separate citizenship will not alter the United Kingdom's obligations and commitments to our overseas territories. Those who are now citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies but do not qualify for British citizenship or for citizenship of the British dependent territories will become British overseas citizens.” ⁷⁴⁷

“Nobody would doubt that, by 1981, British Nationality Law was in need of reform. The problem was, where to begin. ... For the Government matter were quite simple. The chief problem about existing nationality law was that it provided no clear statement as to who had the right of unrestricted entry.” ⁷⁴⁸

“The perception of the Government trying to get rid of the islands was reinforced in 1980 when its work on a reformed British Nationality Law was widely discussed. ...” ⁷⁴⁹

In **August**, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Minister for Trade, Cecil Parkinson, arrives with company executives from Lloyds Bank, Hawker Sidley, GEC and Wimpey.

“Neither the Falkland Islands nor human rights featured strongly in discussions...” ⁷⁵⁰

“The drive to capture more of Argentina's lucrative market was reflected in the growing number of British trade missions sent to Argentina in the Thatcher years: these rose from four in 1978 to eight in 1979, and ten in 1980. But ... British diplomats continued to lament that the Falklands factor inhibited trade and prevented British companies from winning large state contracts from the regime.” ⁷⁵¹

August 9th, in the Falklands, Royal Marine Alan Addis, a member of NP 8901, is reported missing. Following an evening with other marines and locals at North Arm in Lafonia. ⁷⁵²

August 29th, in London, an FCO briefing is handed to Minister Ridley for his upcoming talks with Cavandoli.

*“1. I recommend that Mr Ridley be guided broadly by the following in his talks with Comodoro Cavandoli. 2. Aim To explore with Comodoro Cavandoli the possibilities for a solution to the dispute, including a surrender of sovereignty and a simultaneous leaseback. 3. Nature of the Exchanges Secret exploratory and **deniable**. ...”* ⁷⁵³

746 See below. Also January, July and October, 1981

747 *HL Debate 30 July 1980 Hansard vol.412 cc891-8*

748 *Citizenship, Law and the State: The British nationality Act 1981* Charles Blake in *The Modern Law Revue* 1982 vol.45 no.2 March pp.179-197. The previous Labour Government had considered changes and produced a Green Paper which had failed to gather much support.

749 *The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands* L. S. Gustafson 1988

750 *Ambassador Williams to FCO August 11, 1980 FCO 7/3728*

751 Livingstone 2018

752 Naval Party 8901 was the name given to the detachment of Royal Marines based on the Islands from 1966: generally 43 marines on an annual rotation. The steamer MV *Forrest* was half an hour out of North Arm that morning, before Addis's absence was noticed and reported. Last confirmed sighting of the 19 year-old marine was established to be around 0130 that morning, following a function at the local social club. No body was ever found and no further information has ever come to light. Foul play or misadventure? Theories abound.

753 *FCO7/3808 (f148)*. My emphasis. See - <https://e8e62e492b4a1a43cd16-77325458036aa340f9e5dfc158bde804.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/800829> Duggan brief for Ridley FCO7 3808 f148.pdf

September 10th, near Geneva, Switzerland, Nicholas Ridley and Minister Cavándoli meet for two days of talks.

*“It was agreed at the outset that complete secrecy was essential to both sides. Mr. Ridley was ostensibly on holiday with his wife at the Hotel de Lac at Coppet. Comodoro Cavandoli and Comandante Bloomer-Reeve were on their way back to Buenos Aires from Cyprus, where they had been attending an Argentine Regional Heads of Mission conference ... Mr Ridley opened the proceedings by saying that he had the authority of his Ministerial colleagues to put forward the ideas which he was about to explain but that anything agreed at this meeting would have to be ad referendum and would be subject to endorsement by the British Cabinet and, no less important, would have to be acceptable to the Islanders.”*⁷⁵⁴

Ridley suggests a handover followed by a leaseback with a 200 year lease. Minister Cavándoli responds that; *“The only difficulty he saw was in the length of the lease ... a period of, say, 20 years would have to be ruled out as being much too short for the Islanders. We ought to think of some median figure (Comandante Bloomer-Reeve suggests 75 years).”*⁷⁵⁵

Cavándoli goes on to propose that the British Government remove the Royal Marine detachment from the Islands, to underline to Islanders that Argentina was no longer viewed as a threat; and to please Argentine public opinion. He also suggests that the terms of any lease should include an Argentine right to buy or rent land.

September 11th, Ridley hands over an 'exploratory proposal' to Cavandoli suggesting:-

1. Titular sovereignty to be transferred to Argentina;
2. Continued British administration via a lease-back arrangement for 99 years. Subject to periodic review;
3. British and Argentine flags to be flown side-by-side;
4. British Governor with locally elected Council responsible for the administration of the islands;
5. Argentina to be represented by a Commissioner-General;
6. A Joint-Council to arrange co-operation over economic development.

It is agreed that both parties will report back to their respective Governments.

*“In The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Freedman explains how the Foreign Office devised a plan to cede sovereignty to Argentina with a leaseback agreement to Britain for 99 years. This was agreed (sic) at a secret meeting between Foreign Secretary, Nicholas Ridley and his opposite number, Comodoro Cavandoli in Switzerland. Given that Britain had already enjoyed a cosy relationship with the ruling dictatorship, having sold Lynx helicopters and naval missiles (which were later used against the British forces in 1982) to the regime, the deal was a master-stroke from a business perspective as it would lay the ground for further multi-million pound arms sales for as long as the Junta remained in power.”*⁷⁵⁶

September 12th, on his arrival back in London, Minister Ridley reports to Lord Carrington.

“... we are left with a clear option ... We can either seek a solution by negotiation along the lines of the Geneva talks (to which I think we could get Argentina to agree), or we could say that the concessions

⁷⁵⁴ ALW 040/325/10 & FCO 7/3808 (Received in Registry 15 Sep 1980.). See -

<https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/06/summary-record-of-a-confidential-meeting-between-the-minister-of-state-and-the-argentine-deputy-foreign-minister-at-geneva-on-10-and-11-september-1980.pdf>

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁶ Levey & Ozarow 2021. In reality, nothing had been 'agreed' as everything was subject to referral.

are beyond our political ability to deliver, and break off the talks (with all the obvious consequences). I do not think that there is much to gain by attempting to find a different package: both sides are close to their rock bottom positions. ... I believe it can be sold to the Islanders, but I am not certain."

Carrington telegrams the British Embassy in Buenos Aires.

*"Talks with Cavandoli went well ... Cavandoli thought leaseback of 99 years could be acceptable to it was agreed exchanges were secret and ad referendum and that Islanders acquiescence in proposals as basis for negotiation would be required before formal negotiation could be undertaken. Argentine hope is for substantive and public progress before new President takes office in March, 1981."*⁷⁵⁷

In London, a letter concerning the British Nationality White Paper, is published in *The Times* newspaper.⁷⁵⁸

*"The Government White Paper – British Nationality Law (Cmnd 7987) – effectively reduces many Falkland Islanders to second class citizens. The White paper defines three classes of citizenship: British Citizenship, Citizenship of British Dependent Territories and British Overseas Citizenship. Falkland islanders whose parents were born, adopted, naturalized or registered in the United Kingdom qualify for British Citizenship, but there are several hundred Falkland islanders who only qualify for citizenship of British Dependent Territories and thus have no right of abode in the United Kingdom. The Islanders' case is different from other citizens of British Dependent Territories for several reasons. There was no indigenous population when the Islands were first settled by Britain. Falkland Islanders have no 'mother country' except the United Kingdom. There is no question of the Falkland Islanders seeking independence and the Service pensioner settlers who came out in 1832 (sic) were promised the right to retain full British citizenship. The Falkland Islands Office believe that Falkland islanders are British and should be given the full right of entry and abode in their mother country."*⁷⁵⁹

*"... second class citizenship (would be imposed) on several hundred Falkland islanders who do not have grandparents who were born in the United Kingdom, but whose pure British nationality extends unbroken since the early nineteenth century, ..."*⁷⁶⁰

September 22nd, from London, Minister Nicholas Ridley sends a message to Lord Carrington:

*"We are uncommitted and unencumbered ... So we are left with a clear option to decide what to do on the merits of the problem. We can either seek a solution along the lines of the Geneva talks (to which I think we can get Argentina to agree), or we could say that the concessions are beyond our political ability to deliver, and break off talks (with all the obvious consequences). ... I believe the key to this is the attitude of the Islanders. If we cannot sell it to them it is hopeless."*⁷⁶¹

September 25th, in New York, Lord Carrington and Argentine Foreign Minister Carlos Pastor meet.⁷⁶²

"While the meeting with Pastor went well climatically, there remains fuzziness on where we go from here. ... the Argentines now seem to want to reopen the Geneva package: and there is a risk of a misunderstanding developing on next steps. It is not clear whether Pastor believed that he was giving the Secretary of State the

757 FCO7/3808 (f137)

758 Signed by Sir John Lapsey who had been brought up in the Islands, and Lionel Daillie and Patrick Vincent, who were both born there.

759 Quoted in the *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1980 no.9

760 Gustafson 1988

761 FCO7/3808 (f128)

762 UN Doc. A.AC.109/670 *Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Working Paper by the Secretariat* August 5, 1981.

*expected Argentine reply. If so, it does not provide a sufficient basis on which to go back to OD: and we will have to try and straighten this out. As far as we are concerned, what we want is a formal indication from the Argentines of their view of the Geneva formula: without this we cannot go to Cabinet. We do not want any further clandestine meeting, nor do we want any further bargaining on the terms. It is important that the Argentines realise that we cannot agree to any shorter lease as a basis for formal negotiations: we could not sell that one to Cabinet, let alone the Islanders. Nor are we likely to be able to (or want to) move ahead at quite the brisk pace which Pastor and Cavandoli are hoping for.”*⁷⁶³

*“In September 1980, during the United Nations General Assembly, at New York, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brigadier Carlos W. Pastor, met with his British counterpart, Lord Peter A. Carrington and expressed that the Malvinas issue was vital for Buenos Aires. On the contrary, Carrington replied that the South Atlantic issue was almost at the end of the Foreign Office list.”*⁷⁶⁴

September 30th, in New York, Minister Ridley speaks to Argentina's Ambassador to the UK, Ortiz de Rozas.

*“Sr. Ortiz de Rozas said that the Argentine Foreign Minister had wanted him... to follow up some points arising from the meeting between the Secretary of State and Sr Pastor. When Mr Ridley explained that he had not heard more than the briefest outline account of that meeting, Sr Ortiz de Rozas gave the following summary account... According to him, Sr Pastor had expressed satisfaction to Lord Carrington, especially over the Geneva meeting. In the view of the Argentine Government this was the first serious attempt to solve the question on a basis that was mutually acceptable. The formula of a lease back presented 'good solid ground' to form an agreement. One point of difficulty for Argentina was the duration of the lease back, but aside from that it was a real step forward. Lord Carrington had made clear that he needed the agreement of the Cabinet on what had been discussed in Geneva, and then it was paramount that the Islanders should agree to those ideas. This would be difficult, but not impossible. Sr. Pastor had then asked what the next steps would be, and Lord Carrington had explained that first he would need to report to Cabinet, then Mr Ridley would need to go to the Falkland Islands, and then a further meeting between Mr Ridley and Comodoro Cavandoli could follow.”*⁷⁶⁵

October 2nd, an internal FCO minute notes; *“The Argentines may believe that Sr Pastor has given their official reply to the proposal, ie the suggestion to hold a further meeting to discuss the one apparent sticking point – the length of the lease. Whether or not this is the case, we require a more formal indication of the Argentines' views and we need to disabuse them of any idea about further negotiation on the terms of the proposal. This is best done by an approach in Buenos Aires by HM Ambassador.”*⁷⁶⁶

October 3rd, from Buenos Aires, British Ambassador Williams write to the FCO.

*“I now have very close relations with Cavandoli and, if you give me a formula, I think I can say whether I can make him buy it or not. But really, I think that you have what you want already – that the concept (lease back) is not only clever, but a solid basis for negotiation with the prospect of serious progress. The fact that the only cavil is over length of lease implies acceptance of the principle ... you should bear in mind that, while we are ad referendum to the Cabinet and the Islanders, the Argentines are ad referendum to the Junta.”*⁷⁶⁷

763 Fearn to Ambassador Williams October 1, 1980 in FCO7/3808 (f120). This letter refers to an attachment relating to the conversation between Carrington and Pastor on September 25, but it is missing from the file.

764 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

765 FCO record of conversation in FCO7/3808 (f115)

766 Fearn minute for Ridley October 6, 1980 in FCO7/3808 (f104)

767 Williams to Fearn October 3, 1980 in FCO7/3808 (f100)

October 7th, in London, Lord Carrington defers any further approach to the Argentines until the situation has been discussed at the next OD Committee meeting in November.

October 29th, in London, following a question asked by Minister Ridley, a Foreign Office official explains to him that the proceeds of any oil found around the Falklands would, by precedent, be paid to the Falkland Islands Government; *“(However)... in practical terms, we ought to be able to ensure ... that we get a substantial share of the action and the profit.”* ⁷⁶⁸

On the same day, an internal FCO note raises the prospect of a problem if negotiations over the Falklands linger too far into 1981; *“... the authority of the people with whom we had dealt would shortly begin to diminish with the change of Presidency and of Ministers in March. The Foreign Ministry could pass from the Air Force either to the Navy, which traditionally adopted a harder nationalistic attitude than the Air Force of South Atlantic matters; or to a civilian who would have little authority.”* ⁷⁶⁹

November 2nd, published in Argentine newspaper, *La Prensa*, a map of the Falklands archipelago employs Spanish language names for places in the Islands; many from the 18th century. ⁷⁷⁰

“... it called Port Egmont “Puerto de la Cruzada” and Kepple Sound “Bahia de la Cruzada” ... However, ... the 1973 map retained a few original English names, including Darwin, Fitzroy, “Puerto Howard” and “Puerto Stanley” ... The new maps ... look as if they were produced in preparation for taking the islands over. That was now becoming a confident expectation in Argentine government circles.” ⁷⁷¹

November 3rd, in London, an internal FCO memorandum considers the Falkland Islands Dependencies.

“1. ... (i) in our recent contacts, the Argentines have surprised us by showing (and saying specifically that) there was little Argentine interest in the Dependencies; (ii) in any settlement, however, it is likely that the Dependencies, their territorial waters and the seabed would form part of a sovereignty transfer and leaseback; (iii) the Dependencies are not entirely worthless: South Georgia is an important expression of our legal claims in the area; there are fish, which, if not of interest immediately to the UK industry, could generate licensing revenue; our all-year-round British Antarctic Survey scientific base at Grytviken in South Georgia is an influential part of our scientific effort in Antarctica and of political significance for our voice in Antarctic councils; (iv) there is (curiously) something of a South Georgia lobby in the House of Lords: Lord Shackleton's father is buried in South Georgia. 2. In sum, therefore, the Dependencies represent if not an asset at least a bargaining chip which may prove of some value in reaching an eventual settlement. It is clearly not in our interest to give them away in advance ...” ⁷⁷²

November 5th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams reports that the Argentine junta have been consulted and have endorsed the concept of *lease-back*, subject to negotiation over the length of the lease. ⁷⁷³

November 6th, in America's *Herald Tribune* newspaper, Argentina's State Petroleum Company (YPF) advertises for tenders for oil exploration licences over an area it calls, *'Magalenes Este.'* This extends to within 96 miles of the Falklands archipelago – crossing the median line between Argentina and the archipelago.

November 7th, in London, at an Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee meeting PM Thatcher is again presented with *'leaseback'* as the only viable option. The Committee decide that Minister Ridley should

768 Duggan to Ridley October 29, 1980 EG 14/93

769 FCO7/3808 (f85)

770 Based, seemingly, on a 1973 map produced by the Instituto Geografico Militar (Hoja 5260).

771 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.624

772 Duggan to Day November 3, 1980 in FCO7/3808 (f70)

773 Fearn to Ridley November 5, 1980 in FCO7/3808 (f65)

visit the Falkland Islands; “... in order to discover whether his proposals would command a sufficient degree of support there, and to report the outcome...”⁷⁷⁴

“... Margaret Thatcher and the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOP) agreed to seek the Islanders’ approval of leaseback. During this DOP meeting, ministers also noted: ‘It would be important to make satisfactory arrangements for any oil that might be discovered ... (and that) further thought should be given to ways in which the United Kingdom might be guaranteed entitlement to a substantial part of the revenues.’...”⁷⁷⁵

“The Foreign Office told Ridley to paint a grim picture of the alternatives of economic decline and Argentine aggression to make Falklands ‘Councillors flesh creep’. He had to avoid accusations of conspiracy and keep secret the progress with Cavandoli.”⁷⁷⁶

A note on the record of the OD Committee's conclusion, states: “The discussions and conclusions of a Ministers Confidential Report has been produced, a copy of which is held in the private office of the cabinet Office.” This states: “It seemed likely that, on balance, given the bleakness of their present situation, the majority of Islanders would be ready to support negotiations with Argentina on the lines proposed, recognising that, while the Government would not go back on its commitment to defend them, it was not able to offer alternative ways of improving their position.”⁷⁷⁷

“... it is clear from the official record that, while she had misgivings, she saw no other alternative. Nor did any of the other ministers present at the meeting. But when Ridley proposed the plan to the House of Commons three weeks later, no other minister came to his defence.”⁷⁷⁸

Researcher's Comment: Margaret Thatcher is often accused of being willing to hand over the Islands to Argentina in 1980 without the support of the Falklands people. Not true. Carrington, Ridley and the FCO attempted to railroad the Prime Minister, against her better instincts, into the leaseback option. Fortunately, the FCO had underestimated the resilience of the Islanders. Thatcher's instincts would be proven correct.

November 11th, in New York, the UN General Assembly defers the question of the Falklands until 1981.⁷⁷⁹

From Port Stanley, Governor Hunt telegrams the FCO in London.

“1. Spruce, Vice-Chairman of local Falkland Islands Committee, showed me Telex from Frow stating that the London Falkland Islands Committee were in favour of a Leaseback arrangement provided that it was for a minimum of 99 years and that it included rights to exploit oil and fisheries resources in a 200 mile exclusive economic zone.

2. Spruce said his Committee would be meeting this week-end to consider the Telex but present line-up was two for the Leaseback option and eight against.

3. Of the Councillors, Monk has stated at public meetings in Camp that he is in favour of the Freeze option and totally opposed to Leaseback, other Councillors remain indecisive.

4. Candidates for the West Falkland bye-election are Peter Robertson (Port Stephens) and Tim Blake (Hill Cove). Former is strongly in favour of Leaseback: latter is in favour of talks but undecided between Freeze and Leaseback.

774 CAB 148/189 & CAB148/196

775 Ibid.

776 Briley 2022

777 OD (80) 23rd Meeting, Confidential Record November 7, 1980 CAB 148/196 quoted in Livingstone 2018

778 Livingstone 2018

779 UN Doc. A.AC.109/670 Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Working Paper by the Secretariat August 5, 1981.

5. *Ex-officio members of Executive Council report that majority of people they have sounded out are against Leaseback.*”⁷⁸⁰

November 18th, Britain’s *The Times* newspaper reports.

“... it is stressed in London that British policy towards the Falklands remains as it has always been, that no solution would be acceptable that was not agreed by both the islanders and the British Parliament.”

November 19th, in London, an internal FCO minute considers tactics for Ridley's visit to the Falklands.

“Mr Ridley has asked, ... whether we might not induce the Argentines to take a tougher and more critical line on his arrival in Buenos Aires. It would clearly help Mr Ridley when talking to the Islanders to be able to refer to signs of Argentine impatience. Conversely the Argentine public line suggested by Sr Ortiz de Rozas that Mr Ridley's visit to the Islands was a welcome indication that negotiations were moving forward – would be counter-productive. ... The most suitable occasion for signs of Argentine impatience to surface would be in Foreign Ministry press comment following Mr Ridley's courtesy call at the MFA.”⁷⁸¹

November 20th, from London, the FCO America's Desk, telegrams the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires.

“... I do not think it fair to describe those in the know in London as a cohort. Knowledge of our clandestine activity has in fact been kept to the lowest number feasible in a direct chain leading between the Secretary of State and the desk officer, plus the Lord Privy Seal and the PUS. No other Under-Secretaries or Departments in the FCO are aware of it, nor is any other Ministry. Even other Ministers involved have been informed orally, not in writing. I naturally have no objection to your informing John Chick and Andrew Murray, provided that they fully understand that no word of what has already taken place must ever leak out, no matter what Mr Ridley manages to achieve in the Islands. We may now be going public on the leaseback concept; but the run-up must remain secret.”⁷⁸²

November 21st, in Buenos Aires, Minister Nicholas Ridley, en-route to the Falklands, stops off to speak to the Foreign Minister. Seemingly unaware that he had intended to do so, Argentine authorities appear irritated.⁷⁸³ However, Cavandoli and Ridley have a private meeting.⁷⁸⁴

“Ridley travelled to the Falklands through Buenos Aires, where he had a 'quiet drink' with Cavandoli and presented him with a silver spoon for his newly born grandson. Ridley urged the Argentines, not to be 'nice to him in public' but maintain antagonism and complain about 'lack of progress'...”⁷⁸⁵

“... Ridley mentioned to Cavandoli that he favored the leasing alternative and that, although the Prime Minister, Ms. Thatcher, did not support those negotiations, he had managed to get the Cabinet's approval to ask for the opinion of the Islanders on a basic plan towards that solution. ... Ridley's negotiations and proposals transformed the dispute since the Government of the United Kingdom publicly stated its disposition to consider handing over the sovereignty to the Argentine Republic.”⁷⁸⁶

780 ALW 040/325/12

781 Fearn to Harding November 19, 1980 in FCO7/3808 (f59)

782 Harding to Williams November 20, 1980 in FCO7/3808 (f50)

783 *Falkland Islanders at War* Graham Bound 2002. Ministers do not just 'turn up' in a foreign country. Farce or conspiracy? Perhaps both. See November 18, 1980 above.

784 At an International Conference on the Falklands in 1990, Argentine author Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse claimed that Ridley agreed the 'lease-back' arrangement with Argentina, before going to the Islands. Unlikely. cf. January 29, 1981 Briley 2022

786 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

Before leaving, Ridley speaks to journalists.

*“Mr Ridley told reporters that he had come to meet the islanders on whose total acceptance depended any solution to the dispute. Argentine feathers have been ruffled ... The local press enjoyed an orgy of indignation, and the Foreign Ministry replied in a communiqué that the British Government had not made one positive move to solve the sovereignty question.”*⁷⁸⁷

*“He made it clear that the Islanders' wishes would be paramount and that their readiness to contemplate lease-back could not be taken for granted. He also made it clear that the concept was not regarded with any enthusiasm in London and it would not be easy to satisfy Parliament...”*⁷⁸⁸

November 22nd, at Port Stanley, Minister Ridley arrives with a set of objectives agreed in London.

*“i) to persuade Councillors (and through them Islanders) that the prolongation of the dispute is not in their interests or those of HMG: and that we must work towards a negotiated settlement with the Argentines; ii) therefore to obtain their agreement that we should enter into negotiations with Argentina to explore the scope for a settlement based on leaseback; iii) to impress upon them our respect for their wishes to remain British, our interests in their welfare and our concern for their future.”*⁷⁸⁹

*“When Ridley arrived in Stanley, the local paper Penguin News reported that “the burning question is, what is he here for?”*⁷⁹⁰

November 24th, Nicholas Ridley meets Island Councillors.⁷⁹¹

“After the Governor had welcomed Mr Ridley on behalf of the Councillors, Mr Ridley explained why he had come. ... there was continuing pressure from the Argentines to resume negotiations. This pressure had been expressed when Lord Carrington met the Argentine Foreign Minister in New York in September, and again when he had passed through Buenos Aires on his way to the Islands. ... if we refused another round, we could expect the Argentines to become belligerent. ... If we filibustered, it was open to the Argentines to interrupt communications, withdraw medical services etc., while appearing not unreasonable in international opinion....

Mr. Bennet asked if the question could be taken to the ICJ. Mr. Ridley said that internationally, we were in a minority of one on the issue. The Argentines would not accept ICJ arbitration.... Mr Ridley said he believed that the Argentines were mainly interested in the political problem of sovereignty, rather than any oil or fish resources the Islands might have. ...

VISIT OF THE HONOURABLE NICHOLAS RIDLEY, M.P. MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, 22-29 NOVEMBER, 1980	
PROGRAMME	
<i>Saturday 22 November</i>	
1525 hrs:	Arrived Stanley airport. Met by HE the Governor and the Acting Chief Secretary and introduced to Executive and Legislative Councillors.
1900 hrs:	Drinks party to meet Councillors and their wives at the home of the Acting Chief Secretary.
2030 hrs:	Dinner party at Government House.
<i>Sunday 23 November</i>	
0800 hrs:	Fishing on river Murrell.
1200 hrs:	Call on Mrs. Perry (90th birthday).
1230 hrs:	Lunch with Mr. Milne, Stanley Manager, Falkland Islands Company.
1430 hrs:	Visit to site of new school hostel.
1530 hrs:	Inspection of Darwin Road.
1930 hrs:	Visit to m.y. <i>Copious</i> . Host: Mr. Julian Fitter.
2030 hrs:	Dinner at Government House.
<i>Monday 24 November</i>	
1100 hrs:	Joint Councils' meeting in Government House Conference Room.
1300 hrs:	Buffet lunch for Councillors at Government House.
1500 hrs:	Visit to Sheep Owners Association at Barton House.
1630 hrs:	Interviews with Mrs. Blyth, Mr. A. Betts.
1900 hrs:	Drinks party at Government House.
2100 hrs:	Dinner at Government House.
<i>Tuesday 25 November</i>	
0930 hrs:	Joint Councils' meeting in Government House Conference Room.
1130 hrs:	Meeting with General Employees Union at their Office.
1230 hrs:	Visit Royal Marines Detachment NP8901 for lunch. OC Major Robin Gliding. 2 i/c Lt. Philip Whitcombe.
1500 hrs:	Meeting with Falkland Islands Committee at Rose Hotel.
1645 hrs:	Meeting with young people of Stanley at Stanley Social Club.
1745 hrs:	Taped radio broadcast for Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service.
1900 hrs:	Reception at Town Hall to meet the general public. Host: Falkland Islands Government.
2100 hrs:	Dinner at Government House.
<i>Wednesday 26 November</i>	
0945 hrs:	To Stanley airport.
1000 hrs:	Flight to Darwin by Islander aircraft.
0920 hrs:	Met by Mr. and Mrs. Hardcastle, General Manager, Falkland Islands Company.
(Camp time)	Public meeting in Darwin and Goose Green Community Hall.
1145 hrs:	By Islander to Fox Bay East.
(Camp time)	
1205 hrs:	Met by Mr. and Mrs. Cockwell, Manager, Packe Bros. and Company Ltd.
(Camp time)	
1430 hrs:	Public meeting with people of Fox Bay East.
(Camp time)	
1630 hrs:	By boat to Fox Bay West. Met by Mr. and Mrs. Knight, Manager, FIC, Fox Bay
(Camp time)	West. Public meeting with people of Fox Bay West.
2000 hrs:	Dinner party given by Mr. and Mrs. Cockwell.
(Camp time)	

787 *The Times* November 23, 1980

788 PREM 19/656 f62 at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation.

789 ALW 040/325/1

790 *Invasion 1982: the Falkland islanders' Story* Graham Bound 2007

791 For the full FCO record of the meeting, see - [https://c59574e9047e61130f13-](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/331A7C61FED944688540DCBB6CD4242A.pdf)

[3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/331A7C61FED944688540DCBB6CD4242A.pdf](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/331A7C61FED944688540DCBB6CD4242A.pdf)

Mr Ridley believed that Islanders were not aware of the extent of Argentine pressure. He could not for ever do nothing. In any case doing nothing itself had implications for the Islands. He was not seeking to bounce the Councillors, rather seeking their advice as to what he should do with them." 792

After, at a public meeting, Ridley puts forward his three proposals.

"There was the 'freeze' idea, whereby both sides would agree to disagree and take no action to further their claims for a specified time. But the minister pointed out that at the end of the moratorium period the old problem would return with a vengeance. Then there was the possibility of 'condominium', joint government. The Argentine flag would need to fly alongside the Union Flag. There would also need to be two police forces, two governors, and two official languages. Even Ridley believed this was a non-starter. Finally he explained his preferred idea: 'leaseback'. This, he suggested, was a workable solution. Britain would formally cede sovereignty to Buenos Aires, and before the ink had dried on that document would sign another, leasing the Islands back for an agreed period, say 99 years. The Falklands' way of life would be maintained and everyone would be happy. Across Ridley's face spread a cadaverous grimace, which was as near as he could get to a smile." 793

Nicholas Ridley's proposals are met with annoyance and anger by his audience. He is shouted down. Clearly not expecting such a response, Ridley loses his temper and shouts back; *"They (Argentina) cannot be strung along for much longer."* 794

"Britain is suggesting that the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands be transferred to Argentina,... This is said to be one of a number of options which are being put to the islanders by Mr Nicholas Ridley ... who is now in the Falklands.... Air Commodore Frow said that the lease-back solution, which has been raised before, is the one which is preferred by Whitehall.... A spokesman at the Foreign Office said last night that he could neither confirm nor deny the reports... When asked if Britain intended to cede the sovereignty of the islands to Argentina the spokesman said ... no solution can be finally agreed without the endorsement of the islanders and Parliament..." 795

Ridley then says that the Islanders' would be to blame for any consequences.

Thursday 27 November

1000 hrs: Flight by Beaver aircraft to Chartres. Met by Mr. and Mrs. Luxton, Chartres Sheep Farming Co. Ltd.
 (Camp time)
 1100 hrs: Public meeting in Chartres shearing shed.
 (Camp time)
 1230 hrs: Lunch with Mr. and Mrs. Luxton.
 (Camp time)
 1400 hrs: Flight by Islander aircraft to Hill Cove. Met by Mr. and Mrs. Blake, Manager, Holmsted Blake and Co. Ltd.
 (Camp time)
 1500 hrs: Public meeting in Hill Cove Community Hall.
 (Camp time)
 1630 hrs: By Land Rover overland to Roy Cove. Met by Mr. and Mrs. J. Newell, Manager, Bertrand and Felton Ltd.
 (Camp time)
 1930 hrs: Dinner given by Mr. and Mrs. Newell.
 (Camp time)
 2000 hrs: Public meeting in Roy Cove Community Hall.
 (Camp time)

Friday 28 November

0930 hrs: Flight by Beaver aircraft to Carcass Island. Met by Mr. and Mrs. McGill, Owner, Carcass Island. Tour of the Island followed by lunch.
 (Camp time)
 1400 hrs: Flight by Beaver aircraft to Green Patch Settlement to meet the new owners of the farms within the Green Patch Scheme. Met by Mr. and Mrs. McPhee, Owner, Whittington's Rincon.
 (Camp time)
 1500 hrs: Public meeting in Green Patch Community Hall.
 (Camp time)
 1630 hrs: Depart by Beaver aircraft for Stanley.
 (Camp time)
 1750 hrs: Arrive Stanley.
 1900 hrs: Meeting with commercial community at Upland Goose Hotel.
 2000 hrs: Dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Growcott.

Saturday 29 November

0900 hrs: Interviews with Mrs. Stewart, Mrs. Hirtle.
 1000 hrs: Joint Councils' meeting in Government House Conference Room.
 1130 hrs: Interview with Mr. Patrick Watts for the Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service at Government House.
 1200 hrs: Press conference. Drinks with Councillors.
 1430 hrs: Depart for Stanley airport.
 1445 hrs: Farewell to Councillors in airport control tower.
 1520 hrs: Departed for Comodoro Rivadavia.

792 ALW 0400/352/12

793 Bound 2007

794 Quoted in Bound 2007

795 *The Times* November 26, 1980.

*“To many he had seemed aloof and intolerant of what he regarded as the short-sightedness of many Falklanders. ... A future member of the Islands Council, John Cheek, was harsher: "If anyone other than Ridley had tried to sell us leaseback, then it would have had a chance." ...”*⁷⁹⁶

*“His audience did indeed appear bellicose, but their bellicosity was directed at the British minister. It was clear that few in the Town Hall and throughout the Islands would accept leaseback.”*⁷⁹⁷

*“Meeting 400 Islanders in Stanley Town Hall, Ridley curtly rejected their objections.”*⁷⁹⁸

November 25th, further meetings takes place involving Ridley, businesses and local communities; commencing with a second session with islands Councillors.⁷⁹⁹

“Mr Wallace said ... They had reached no decision on the proposals Mr Ridley had put forward, and would like time to consider them further and for the public to react. Generally, their view was that preference should be given to freeze than to leaseback. Mr Goss personally felt that the Islanders were being bulldozed ... Mr Evan said that more than a week was needed to consider what Mr Ridley had said. If Islanders eventually allowed Mr Ridley to go ahead and discuss the freeze or leaseback with the Argentines, the islanders would be giving away a lot and it was not clear to him what they would be receiving. ... Mr Bowles ... could not see people agreeing to what Mr Ridley had suggested until the Argentines came up with some better ideas. Mr Miller said that if a leaseback agreement was eventually made, it would have to be so worded as to avoid admitting that Argentina had had rights to the islands in the past. Such an admission would be a betrayal of the last 140 years.”

*“During his meeting with the Sheep-owners, Mr Ridley said that another option would be to break off talks altogether but he felt that this might antagonize the Argentine Government.”*⁸⁰⁰

*“He then visited eight settlements in Camp together with Hunt, trying to "sell" the idea of leaseback, but was not noticeably successful. In meetings at Green Patch and Fox Bay he lost his temper and shouted at the islanders, banging his fist on the table; small wonder that they remained suspicious that he was preparing them for an Argentine takeover.”*⁸⁰¹

November 26th, in the UK, *The Times* newspaper reports:

“Britain is suggesting that the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands be transferred to Argentina, according to a report reaching London last night. The islands, which are in the South Atlantic some 450 miles off the coast of Argentina, have been the subject of a 100-year-old dispute between Argentina and Britain. This is said to be one of a number of options which are being put to the islanders by Mr Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, responsible for Latin America, who is now in the Falklands. According to Air Commodore B. G. Frow, of the Falkland Island Office in London, Mr Ridley addressed a meeting of the islands' Sheepowners Association and told them that Argentina was getting impatient at the lack of progress in the attempts to solve the problem. Mr Ridley suggested that it would be in the islanders' best interest if they agreed to a transfer of sovereignty. The other options are a 25-year freeze over the sovereignty issue, and a lease of the islands similar to that in force for Hongkong. Air Commodore Frow said that the lease-back solution, which has. been raised before, is

796 *Falkland Islanders at War* G. Bound 2002 p.10. Also Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.49

797 Bound in Tatham (ed) 2008

798 Briley 2022

799 See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/331A7C61FED944688540DCBB6CD4242A.pdf>

800 *The Times* November 26, 1980

801 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.626

the one which is preferred by Whitehall. A spokesman at the Foreign Office said last night that he could neither confirm nor deny the reports as they were awaiting a report themselves on the results of Mr Ridley's talks. ... When asked if Britain intended to cede the sovereignty of the islands to Argentina the spokesman said they were looking for a solution which everyone could live with. He added: 'The important thing is the wishes of the islanders. If they agree, we can explore the possible basis for a solution. However, no solution can be finally agreed without the endorsement of the islanders and Parliament.'

November 27th, in London, newspaper reports of Ridley's reception in the Islands are raised in Parliament. Both MP's and Lords demand a statement from the government. In the Lords:

“(The Earl of Lauderdale) My Lords, is my noble friend aware that following the visit of Mr. Ridley leaks have begun to appear in the London press in a fashion all too familiar to those of us who are Whitehall-watchers; and will he give us an assurance that this Government will put absolutely no pressure on the islanders to accede to whatever may be the Whitehall view?”

(Lord Paget of Northampton) My Lords, why are we talking to the Argentine at all? What is their locus standi here? They are 500 miles away from islands which, when uninhabited, were occupied by British people and have, in the period since then, been British territory. What has it got to do with the Argentine?

(Lord Carrington) My Lords, like it or not, over a great many years the Argentinians have claimed the Falkland Islands. We of course do not admit that claim, but the fact that there has been that claim has cast an economic blight over the Falkland Islands, as anybody who knows the subject will be well aware. Consequently, if an agreement could be reached which is acceptable to the Falkland islanders, to the Argentinians and to ourselves, it will be greatly to the benefit of all of us.

(Viscount Thurso) My Lords, can the noble Lord give us an assurance that before assuming that we know the views of the Falkland islanders they will be given some chance of being heard by a referendum or by a means that ascertains their views person by person?

*(Lord Carrington) My Lords, I think that at this moment we had better take one thing at a time. I have no idea at the moment what the views of the Falkland islanders are, but I should like to hear what my honourable friend the Minister of State says when he comes back to England, and then we can discuss it all. But certainly there will be a lot of opportunity in your Lordships' House to discuss how we go, if we go anywhere.”*⁸⁰²

Unaware of the reaction in Britain, Ridley's staff send an optimistic telegram back to London.

*“It will take time for a clear reaction to emerge and one cannot be optimistic on the prospects for leaseback.”*⁸⁰³

From Stanley, Governor Hunt telegrams his own thoughts; *“... In general he is receiving a serious and sensible response ... It will however take time for a clear reaction to emerge and one cannot be optimistic on the prospects of leaseback.”*⁸⁰⁴

November 28th, *The Times* newspaper reports:

“The Falklands are one of those difficult issues that have hung fire for many years and, while there can be no easy solution, it is healthy that their future should be openly discussed. The various possibilities, however unpalatable they may be to many people, have at least to be examined. ... The starting point

802 Hansard. Lords Chamber November 27, 1980. vol.415 col.200

803 PREM 19/656 Telegram No.183 of 27 November

804 FCO7/3809 (f127)

must be the principle, restated by Lord Carrington this week, that nothing will be done against the wishes of the islanders themselves. They are a small and isolated community, of almost entirely British origin, and there can be no question of simply handing them over to Argentina against their will. This would be true whatever the type of government that held office in Argentina, and is particularly true in view of the bloodstained record of the present military regime, itself the product of extraordinary political instability over many years.

November 29th, in Stanley, Ridley's final meeting with the Islands Councils fails to result in any decision.⁸⁰⁵ Ridley addresses the meeting:

"... People seemed well acquainted with the three proposals as explained on the radio. Station managers seemed strongly in favour of some form of settlement. ... There was a general acceptance that something needed to be done; but people looked first for the solution which was not available, ie. that the problem would simply go away."

Interviewed by *Penguin News*, Nicholas Ridley is asked whether Argentina was prepared to make life difficult for the Islanders.

*"I am a man of peace. I would feel that I had failed if that happened. I can't foresee what Argentina would do, your guess is as good as mine, because you live near them and know them perhaps better even than I do. I merely say that in the long term one has to come to terms with one's neighbours and one has to live in peace with them. What one cannot do is live in a perpetual state of siege and antagonism, suspicion and bellicosity."*⁸⁰⁶

*"Ridley was not going to stay a day longer than necessary, but shortly before leaving he told Penguin News of his assessment of the situation. He studiously avoided the 'I-word', but in doing so could not find another to adequately describe the threat. "It's a mood of impatience," he said of the climate in Argentina. "No, not of impatience; it's a mood of sooner or later, sometime, one way or another, we have to get further on. We have to make more progress. That's their mood, not my mood."..."*⁸⁰⁷

As Minister Ridley departs on a LADE flight back to Argentina, he is jeered by an angry crowd of Islanders.

*"Ridley left Stanley Airport - ironically, aboard an aircraft of LADE, the Argentine Air Force airline - to the sound of furious demonstrators and the rare sight of normally rather supine Islanders waving banners and fists."*⁸⁰⁸

*"But for the intervention of Councillor Adrian Monk the "lease back" proposal may have obtained enough support to encourage the British Government to approach the Argentines and seek their cooperation with the plan. Mr. Monk, who lived at San Carlos, and fearing censorship, secretly recorded a message on a cassette which he sent for broadcast to the Radio Station in Stanley. He urged the inhabitants not to accept any form of lease-back and that in the event of any aggression by Argentina that the British Government had a duty to defend the Falklands in the future. His words changed the mood and attitude of the population and within a few days it was obvious that leaseback back was a dead duck in the water."*⁸⁰⁹

805 ALW 040/325/12. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/BCB84EC19CC24F1AB48CC1E09AAED79A.pdf>

806 Bound 2002 p.10

807 *Ibid.*

808 Bound in Tatham (ed) 2008

809 Patrick Watts MBE quoted in *Penguin News* February 26, 2021

In Buenos Aires, on the same day, it is reported that Argentina's State Petroleum Company has submitted a bid to drill for oil in an area straddling the median line between the Falklands and Patagonia.

November 30th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Embassy reports that the Islands Councillors are split on the proposal of leaseback.

"Mr Ridley held final meeting with Councillors before departure on 29 November. Discussion was inconclusive with most Councillors (Monk and Luxton absent) taking cover and reluctant to take a personal position on negotiating options. ...

Councillors' general assessment was that of those in Port Stanley who had already declared their views the majority was strongly opposed to the leaseback concept ... There was however real division of opinion and everyone needed more time for thought. Opposition to leaseback rested principally on emotional hostility to any idea of ceding sovereignty.

*In final radio broadcast on 29 November Mt Ridley concentrated on HMG's wish genuinely to seek Islander opinion: on need for clear appreciation of effects of dispute and for thorough and careful debate in what should be done."*⁸¹⁰

*"There are conflicting accounts of the islanders stance before the Ridley debate, some asserting that the population were always steadfastly opposed to leaseback. The correspondence in the newly-opened FCO files suggest a more mixed response: officials in the British embassy in Buenos Aires reported that four Island councillors would be ready to see leaseback explored, four were undecided and two against."*⁸¹¹

December 2nd, in London, Minister Nicholas Ridley makes a statement to the House of Commons.

*"We have no doubt about our sovereignty over the islands. The Argentines, however, continue to press their claim. The dispute is causing continuing uncertainty, emigration and economic stagnation in the islands. Following my exploratory talks with the Argentines in April, the Government have been considering possible ways of achieving a solution which would be acceptable to all parties. In this, the essential is that we should be guided by the wishes of the islanders themselves. I therefore visited the islands between 22 and 29 November in order to consult island councillors and subsequently, at their express request, all islanders on how we should proceed. Various possible bases for seeking a negotiated settlement were discussed. These included both a way of freezing the dispute for a period or exchanging the title of sovereignty against a long lease of the islands back to Her Majesty's Government. The essential elements of any solution would be that it should preserve British administration, law and way of life for the islanders while releasing the potential of the islands' economy and of their maritime resources, at present blighted by the dispute. It is for the islanders to advise on which, if any, option should be explored in negotiations with the Argentines. I have asked them to let me have their views in due course. Any eventual settlement would have to be endorsed by the islanders and by this House"*⁸¹²

In the debate that follows, nine Conservative MPs denounce the 'leaseback' proposal, as do six Labour MPs. Among the latter is Labour's shadow Foreign Affairs spokesman, Peter Shore.

810 *British Embassy, Buenos Aires to FCO November 30, 1980 FCO 7/3809. Also ALW 040/325/12. Ambassador Williams would later be accused of providing misleading information by Lord Carrington.*

811 Livingstone 2018 citing *British Embassy, Buenos Aires to FCO November 30, 1980 FCO 7/3809.*

812 *HC Deb 02 December 1980 vol.995 cc128-34. See -*

<https://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1980/dec/02/falkland-islands>

“This is a worrying statement. Will the Minister confirm that involved here are the rights and future of 1,800 people of British descent in a territory which was originally uninhabited—people who, above all, wish to preserve their present relationship with the United Kingdom? Will he reaffirm that there is no question of proceeding with any proposal contrary to the wishes of the Falkland islanders? Their wishes are surely not just “guidance” to the British Government. Surely, they must be of paramount importance. Has the hon. Gentleman made that absolutely clear to the Argentine Government? Is not the Minister aware that proposals for a leasing arrangement represent a major weakening of our long-held position on sovereignty in the Falkland Islands, and that to make them in so specific and public a manner is likely only to harden Argentine policy and to undermine the confidence of the Falkland islanders? Will he, therefore, make it dear that we shall uphold the rights of the islanders to continue to make a genuinely free choice about their future, that we shall not abandon them and that, in spite of all the logistical difficulties, we shall continue to support and sustain them?” ⁸¹³

No Conservative MP speaks in support of Nicholas Ridley. ⁸¹⁴

“No one listened. Alerted by the Falkland Islands Committee to the Minister's leaseback enthusiasm, MPs gave Ridley a battering worse than anything MPs could recall in the course of the Parliament.... One MP said that he had just watched a man wreck his career on a pile of rock.” ⁸¹⁵

“I have never seen such a mauling, of any of my colleagues, in all my life. Nicholas Ridley, who had shown great courage in putting this forward, was looking pretty white by the end of it, poor chap.... Now that rough ride was not just from the Conservative side; it was from the Labour side; it was from the Liberals. It was absolutely united in its violent sense of opposition to the idea of leaseback.” ⁸¹⁶

“Back in the UK, the strong pro-Falklands lobby had been galvanised into action, and Ridley was savaged in a debate in the House of Commons on 2 December for his alleged treachery.” ⁸¹⁷

“The leaseback plan, ... was effectively killed on 2 December 1980 when MPs from all parties reacted with horror when it was proposed by Ridley in the House of Commons. ... Almost half of MPs who spoke were supporters of the Falkland Islands Committee or had previously taken a strong interest in the Falklands, which suggests that the Falklands ‘lobby’ was influential” ⁸¹⁸

In Downing Street, a minute on the days events is prepared for the Prime Minister.

“Mr. Ridley had an awful time in the House this afternoon, following his statement. I do not immediately recollect an occasion when a statement has been greeted with such a degree of hostility from the Government benches – to the extent that not a single Government backbencher supported it.” ⁸¹⁹

December 3rd, in London, *The Times* newspaper reports:

“The House of Commons came together in total concord yesterday to voice its deep suspicion of the intentions of the Foreign Office and of Mr Nicholas Ridley, a Minister of State, for the future of the

813 *Ibid.*

814 See p.3 - <https://www.fiassociation.com/newsletter/FIA-NL-09.pdf>

815 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.50

816 Richard Luce quoted in Charlton 1989 p74

817 Bound in Tatham (ed) 2008

818 Livingstone 2018

819 PREM19/656 f63. See - [https://c59574e9047e61130f13-](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/A3D7EAE4F6BE4937A8EFE154487E7818.pdf)

[3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/A3D7EAE4F6BE4937A8EFE154487E7818.pdf](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/A3D7EAE4F6BE4937A8EFE154487E7818.pdf)

Falkland Islands and their relationship with the Argentine. Seldom can a minister have had such a drubbing from all sides of the House, and Mr Ridley was left in no doubt that whatever Machiavellian intrigues he and the Foreign Office may be up to, they will come to nothing if they involve harming a hair on the heads of the islanders. ... From the Conservative benches, Mr Julian Amery told the minister that his statement was profoundly disturbing. For years the Foreign Office had wanted to get rid of this commitment, although the islands had an important part to play in the future of the South Atlantic... A few moments later, Mr Ridley floundered into deeper water when he was asked whether the Government would accept the views of the islanders if they opted for the maintenance of the status quo. The minister seemed to many to be dodging the issue...

During the morning, the London Falkland Islands Committee meet with Minister Ridley. ⁸²⁰

"The meeting was most cordial, and it was clear that the Committee members were considering carefully, without emotion, the various ideas that Mr Ridley had put forward in the Islands during his visit." ⁸²¹

A message for Argentina's Minister Cavándoli, is despatched via the British Embassy in Buenos Aires.

"... it became clear after my arrival in the Islands, that the issue had to be dealt with fully and in public. I cannot at this stage predict the outcome. I encountered a general recognition of the need to solve the dispute. But, as you know, emotions and distrust run deep, both here and in the Islands, and it will require time as well as patience to resolve the problem. I appreciate that this leaves the future timetable uncertain. As you are aware, we cannot on our side proceed until we have the Islanders' concurrence." ⁸²²

At Downing Street, a further meeting of the Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee considers the situation. ⁸²³

"In discussion the following points were made -

a. In Her Majesty's Government's view, there was no legal doubt about British sovereignty over the islands. This view was not accepted by the Argentine Government, but they were unwilling to see the matter referred to the International Court.

b. There had been good reasons for the Government's decision to explore the possible basis for a settlement which, because they underlined the extent of the islands' dependence on Argentina, it was impossible to develop in public.

c. It would be necessary, in the islands' own interests, to keep the Argentine Government in play. The latter would no doubt be content to wait until the islanders' considered views were known, but they would not be easy to handle thereafter, if the islanders rejected any idea of seeking a settlement. ...

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the Committee would wish to resume consideration of the subject when the Islanders' leaders had reported further on local opinion. Unfortunately, Parliamentary hostility to the idea of a settlement was now so strong that, even if the Islanders considered view was that one should be sought, this might be regarded as merely the result of pressure from Government. It should therefore be made clear that, if the islanders favoured

820 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1980 no.9

821 *FCO7/3805 (f90)*

822 *FCO7/3808 (f51)*. See - [https://c59574e9047e61130f13-](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/BF3E0D8EAB4B438B8626BD851FBF17D1.pdf)

[3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/BF3E0D8EAB4B438B8626BD851FBF17D1.pdf](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/BF3E0D8EAB4B438B8626BD851FBF17D1.pdf)

823 *CAB 148/189*

maintaining the status quo, they would be fully supported. Further thought would need to be given to the way in which the proposed nationality Bill would affect the Islanders... ”

*“It agreed that this was a highly emotive issue for parliamentary and public opinion, while noting that the Islanders' hostility to Ridley's appeal seemed to have been exaggerated; and concluded that it would be 'tragic' if the Islanders' chances of escaping from economic blight were to be dismissed by the attitude of their champions at Westminster. This was not quite to appreciate the depth of the Islanders' feelings...”*⁸²⁴

In the evening, Minister Ridley speaks to Sir Nigel Fisher MP, a member of the London Falkland Islands Committee; *“The latter had been among the delegation from the London branch of the Falkland Islands Committee which had called on Mr Ridley yesterday morning. ... Sir Nigel Fisher last night told Mr Ridley that the Committee had concluded that it would advise Islanders that they should ask Mr Ridley to explore the possibilities of leaseback in negotiations with Argentina. But according to Sir Nigel Fisher, the Committee would suggest that Islanders should seek concessions in return, namely unrestricted right of abode in the UK for Islanders, and some improved financial provisions (whether increased aid or assistance in access to capital was not clear). ... This is good news. Sir Nigel Fisher also told Mr Ridley that Lord Shackleton is close to deciding in favour of exploring leaseback.... If we could persuade him to come out in favour of negotiations on the basis of leaseback, it would have enormous influence both in the Falkland Islands and in the lobby here.”*⁸²⁵

December 4th, in Downing Street, at a full Cabinet meeting, it is noted that: *“... while there was no legitimacy in Argentina's claim to the Falkland Islands, her stranglehold over their communications and supply routes was having a blighting effect on their prospects.”*⁸²⁶

December 5th, from London, Lord Carrington telegrams the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires; *“... we understand and sympathise with Cavandoli's domestic difficulties: but it is politically impossible for Mr Ridley to meet him, either openly or otherwise.”*⁸²⁷

December 9th, in Buenos Aires, Britain Embassy formally protests to Argentina regarding licences issued for oil exploration in areas that cross into Falklands waters; *“The Argentinians refused the British note as ‘flatly unacceptable’ and went on to say ‘there does not exist any boundary dispute in the area in question, for the simple reason that the whole area corresponds to Argentine sovereignty’. ...”*⁸²⁸

December 11th, in New York, the United Nations adopt *Resolution 35/118* entitled - *'Plan of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.'*⁸²⁹

*“Annex – 8. Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to **discourage** or prevent the systematic influx of outside immigrants and settlers into Territories under colonial domination, which disrupts the demographic composition of those Territories and may constitute a major obstacle to the genuine exercise of the right to self determination and independence by the people of those Territories.”*⁸³⁰

824 Boyce 2005

825 FCO7/3805 (f90)

826 CAB128/68

827 FCO7/3808 (f43)

828 *Towards a Theory of State and Sovereignty in Contemporary Britain* Ellen Kennedy in *Britain in the World* Lawrence Freedman (ed) 2010 p.154

829 See https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/35/118

830 My emphasis.

Researcher's Comment: Worthy of note, as Argentina regularly argues that its citizens have never been allowed to settle in the Falklands archipelago.

In London, on the same day, Argentina's Ambassador Ortiz urges Minister Ridley to arrange more talks.⁸³¹

*"I am not at all sure ... about postponing discussions with the Argentines until after the change of Government in Buenos Aires. The present Air Force team at the Foreign Ministry have shown unexpected prudence and good sense in their dealings with us on this complex issue. ... If and when we have to beak to them the unpleasant news that the Islanders will not stomach lease-back, even as an avenue of exploration at the negotiating table, we shall need to draw on whatever goodwill we can muster on the Argentine side. The Air Force would, I am pretty sure, do their best to present such a disappointing reply to the Junta in sympathetic terms. ... I think that the Minister of State should, even in the case of a 'no' from the Islanders, offer to meet Comodoro Cavandoli for another round of negotiations, with Islanders present. The aim of such a meeting would be to maintain contact ... and at the same time to expose the Islanders to the full force of Argentine reaction to their 'no'."*⁸³²

December 15th, in Britain's House of Lords, answering a question regarding Argentina's advertisement for oil tenders on November 6th, Lord Carrington states:

*"No agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and Argentine Governments on the delimitation of the continental shelf as between the Falkland islands and Argentina. In the absence of an agreed boundary, neither party, in Her Majesty's Government's view, would be entitled to exercise continental shelf rights beyond the median line between the Falkland Islands and Argentina. We have protested to the Argentines about the YPF tender which does indeed go beyond the median line ..."*⁸³³

December 17th, in London, during an unattributable press briefing, Minister Ridley tells selected journalists that the dispute with Argentina blights the daily lives of the Islanders and cannot be ignored.

*"The Islanders were, (Governor) Hunt said, 'mature, intelligent, law-abiding people, not a bunch of impossible schoolchildren who need to be told what is in their best interests.'..."*⁸³⁴

December 18th, in Britain's House of Commons, Minister Ridley answers MPs' questions.

"... we want to maintain the British link, British rule and the British way of life, of which my hon. Friend and I are so proud. We desperately want to develop the economy of the islands. My hon. Friend mentioned improved farming and markets for farming produce. A great deal of credit is needed to open up those possibilities, and we must get commercial banks to perform their functions in the islands. There is also the question of revenue from the rich harvest of fish and the possibility – there can be no certainty – of finding oil. My hon. Friend wanted us to exert our undoubted rights over the fishing zones and the economic zones that surround not only the islands but our dependencies. My hon. Friend mentioned the vexed question of Magellanes Este, the oil block that straddles the median line. Nothing would give us more pleasure than to be able to say that we had agreed the median line and that we and the Argentine respected that median line, so that oil exploration and exploitation could go ahead. That is also common ground. We hold the same view about control of the seas. There have been two incidents recently, when seas that would have been in the Falkland Islands maritime zone were subject to harassment by Argentine vessels."

831 FCO7/3808 (f31)

832 Harding to Temple December 18, 1980 in FCO7/3808 (f20). Temple was Ridley's personal secretary.

833 HL Deb 15 December 1980 vol.415 col.972

834 Boyce 2005

*My hon. Friend was right to raise the question of Southern Thule. At the talks in New York in April, I protested again to the Argentine Foreign Minister about the presence of the Argentine mission on Southern Thule without the permission or consent of the British Government. It is impossible to establish any of these things because the Argentine Government have never conceded our sovereignty over either the Falkland Islands or the dependencies, nor have they agreed that we should declare the various zones of the seas around them to which we would normally be entitled... At present, the relationship between Great Britain and Argentina is good and friendly. We are still negotiating in a series of talks with the Argentine Government, as we were for many years before this Government took over. In spite of that, it is still not possible to declare those 200-mile fishery zones, to get the licence fees from foreigners fishing in those zones, to explore or exploit oil or to legalise the position of Southern Thule. Even the commercial banks are unwilling to set up in the islands because of the political risks. These hazards are real. It must be recognised that solving these problems requires an overall political settlement.”*⁸³⁵

With regard to Shackleton's Report, Ridley adds; “... a very large number of the recommendations have been implemented – 49 out of 90. Of the remainder, 14 have been rejected, 20 are in train and 7 are undecided. I concede that the bulk of the recommendations in terms of money have not been implemented because we come immediately to the question of the runway.”⁸³⁶

In London, the Falkland Islands Office issue a press statement.

*“On 18 December the Falkland Islands Office issued a statement which said that the intentions of the Argentine government on the proposal to cede sovereignty and immediately lease the islands back to the United Kingdom should be publicly known before any comment could be made. This reservation should also apply to the Falkland Islands government and the Islanders themselves. In addition, the committee considers that there is no urgency in deciding this issue or other options, and that the Falkland Islanders should demand more time – possibly six months or more – for discussion. A formal referendum under United Nations auspices is probably needed, once the issues have been properly studied and the various options examined, said the committee. The committee unanimously agreed that the principle of 'full rights of Class One British Citizenship' for Falkland Islanders under the terms of the recent Nationality White Paper should be a prerequisite in any further discussions.”*⁸³⁷

In Buenos Aires, *La Nacion* publishes a private letter from banker César Alberto Cao Saravia, demanding that his Government interrupt communications to the Falklands; ban the importation of British goods and break off diplomatic relations with the UK.⁸³⁸

December 31st, in the Falklands, Islander Adrian Monk is interviewed on local radio.

*“I think the whole campaign stinks... Don't be misled. Don't be worried about the consequences of saying “We are British.” Our country will remain British.”*⁸³⁹

*“(It) certainly changed the minds of a lot of people in the Falklands without doubt, and a lot of people will not now admit that they considered leaseback as a possibility.”*⁸⁴⁰

835 *HC Deb 18 December 1980 vol.996 cc647-52*

836 Quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.218

837 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1980 no.9 p.1

838 Savaria had previously been reported as being willing to purchase the islands from Britain.

839 Quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.260. Also *United Nations A.AC.109/670*

840 *P. Watts interview, H. of C. Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1982-83, Falkland. Minutes of Evidence (H.M.S.O., London, 4 Feb. 1983), p.293.*

1981 – January 1st, Councillor Monk's radio broadcast is reproduced in the *The Falkland Times*:

“... "You all know what would happen if we agreed to negotiate a leaseback", Monk said, "no matter how favourable the final terms of the contract are for us ... we will be living in a borrowed, rented country". ... The argument that London would negotiate a long leaseback period did not satisfy him. "Not even a million years would be enough for me", he said. ... The conclusion, therefore, was to confront London: "... We may have opposition from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and some Ministers, but we have enormous support in Parliament".”⁸⁴¹

“Through the analysis of the recording, the Dirección General de Antártida y Malvinas de la Cancillería (Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malvinas and Antarctica General Directorate) was able to know the opinion of the population. The Malvinas settlers did not spare their condemnation at Nicholas Ridley's farewell either. In short, the islanders only accepted having commercial relationships with Argentina.”⁸⁴²

January 7th, in Stanley, Councillors pass a motion.

“While this House does not like any of the ideas put forward by Mr. Ridley for a possible settlement of the sovereignty dispute with Argentina, it agrees that Her Majesty's Government should hold further talks with the Argentines at which this House should be represented and at which the British delegation should seek an agreement to freeze the dispute over sovereignty for a specified period of time.”⁸⁴³

“In withholding support for leaseback, Councillors' response is less than we had originally hoped. But it could have been worse. A mandate for further talks has been given: and leaseback has not been ruled out for the future. ... It is necessary to allow time and the realities of the Argentine position to sink into Islander opinion. ... Our aim must now be to keep negotiations going: and, while applying no pressure, to let the Islanders come to see the need to explore a realistic settlement based on leaseback”⁸⁴⁴

“At their next meeting in January 1981, a little over a year before the invasion, councillors agreed a motion stating that they did not like any of the Ridley proposals but that they could reluctantly accept a moratorium, or freeze. Only Adrian Monk opposed the motion. Of course this was a failure for London. The hopeless freeze concept had only been included in the Ridley package to make leaseback look more attractive.”⁸⁴⁵

“... the Legislative Council voted by 7 votes to 1 for the option that they knew would not be acceptable to Argentina: freezing negotiations on the question of sovereignty for twenty-five years. The lone vote was that of Monk who proposed no further discussion on the issue with Argentina.”⁸⁴⁶

The same day marks the 10th anniversary of the commencement of Argentine air services to the Falkland Islands.

“The opening of LADE House residence coincided with the tenth anniversary of air services to Malvinas and generated another disagreement. A social meeting that would be attended by authorities of the Argentine Air Force, the Argentine Foreign Office and the islands was organized. Upon learning about it, UKFIC's members showed their opposition and threatened to manifest repudiating Argentina's representatives. The reaction was so hard and determined that the local government and the Vicecomodoro were concerned about it: the

841 Caressai 2022 citing *The Falkland Times* January 1981

842 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

843 Quoted by Sir Ian Gilmour in *HC Deb 21 January 1981 vol.997 cc248-9*

844 *CAB 148/197*. Memorandum by Lord Carrington for the OD Committee meeting scheduled for January 29, 1981.

845 Bound 2007

846 Caressai 2022

celebration could turn into an embarrassing episode and complicate relations. The previous week to the scheduled date, tension had risen so much that the British proposed to cancel the ceremony and, in replacement, hold a modest open house without the presence of Argentines. Gilbert, who was about to accept that condition, visited the UKFIC's most influential members to especially invite them; he nicely appealed to the proverbial British chivalry. The celebration was a success. Most people attended and fraternized with the authorities.”⁸⁴⁷

January 12th, Britain's Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, responds to questions regarding the status of the Falkland Islanders under the proposed Nationality Bill.

*“I am of the firm opinion that no special provision can be made in the Nationality Bill to accommodate the Islanders. Almost all the Islanders are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and it is estimated that about 65% of them are exempt from immigration control under the patriality provisions of the Immigration Act 1971. Islanders who are patrial will become British Citizens under the new nationality provisions (and retain their exemption from immigration control) as well as Citizens of the British Dependent Territories.”*⁸⁴⁸

*“However, the position of the 600-700 Islanders with no right of abode in the UK is likely to provide a further, and emotional, argument for those who oppose the Government's current initiative over the Falkland Islands. Mr Ridley has already encountered considerable hostility on both sides of the House and feelings on the Nationality Bill point could make matters worse.”*⁸⁴⁹

January 13th, from London, Carrington sends a message to Cavándoli in Buenos Aires.

“Ministers will need to give careful consideration to the Islanders' response and to next steps before any decision can be taken on a meeting... we may be unable to present firm proposals before the end of the month.”

In Buenos Aires, the Foreign Ministry issue a statement rejecting Islander opinion.

*“15 years of useless negotiation: London's proposals are unacceptable from every point of view.”*⁸⁵⁰

*“In Buenos Aires the British Ambassador, Anthony Williams, fussed around the Argentine Foreign Office, apologising for Islanders' hostility and trying to patch up relations. The Argentines issued a statement dismissing the importance of Islanders' opinions. They would, they said, only negotiate with Britain.”*⁸⁵¹

In Britain, Secretary for Defence, John Nott, orders a review of Britain's defence capabilities.

*“The review which took place under Sir John Nott's tenure at the MOD ran from January to June 1981. It was conducted in the international context of a Soviet military build-up and the domestic context of a severe economic downturn and the introduction of cash planning to control public spending.”*⁸⁵²

January 20th, from London, the US Embassy sends an assessment of the situation to Washington DC.

847 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

848 PREM19/656 f52. Requests for special treatment had also been received from Gibraltar and the Cayman Islands. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/0C13B81403E1433AB2F68E6A1FE76126.pdf>

849 *Cabinet Office Minute* in PREM19/656 f39

850 *La Prensa* newspaper

851 Bound 2007

852 Select Committee on Defence 8th Report. See -

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmdfence/138/13804.htm>

*“The end-of-year push to achieve some movement toward a settlement with Argentina on the Falklands dispute came to naught. Ridley's efforts to employ a forcing strategy in negotiations with the Islanders were thwarted by a small but highly-effective Falklands lobby in London, concentrated in the House of Lords and the Conservative media. As a result, Ridley was forced to back off and give public assurances that nothing would be done to change the status of the Islanders without their express approval. The Foreign Office, though discouraged, will probably have another go at moving things off dead centre before the current Parliament is dismissed. Ridley may have decided it is simply not worth the trouble.”*⁸⁵³

January 21st, in Britain's House of Commons, William Shelton MP asks if the Government has received the views of the Falkland Islanders regarding the proposals presented to them by Nicholas Ridley. Responding, Sir Ian Gilmour quotes the Council motion from the Falklands (above) before confirming that the “*interests*” of the islanders remain paramount. He does, however, confirm that the leaseback proposal is not currently on the government's agenda.⁸⁵⁴

January 27th, from Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry demands that negotiations on sovereignty are resumed, “*sooner, rather than later.*” They also complain about a group of new emigrants to the archipelago.⁸⁵⁵

*“The Falkland government's plans to obtain a small number of immigrants from St. Helena have met with a large stumbling block in the form of Argentine official anger. Commodore Carlos Cavandoli told the British Ambassador to Buenos Aires that his government was concerned at reports from various sources of migratory movements towards the Falklands. Many Argentine newspapers appear to be disturbed that the potential immigrants may be black and are somewhat obsessed with the fact. There are very few black people in Argentina. The Penguin News has checked with the government here, and they have confidence that the race of potential immigrants is not being taken into consideration, and providing they are suitable in other ways, they will be welcomed regardless of race. Only four families are to be accepted for the present. Should this pilot scheme prove successful more families could follow at a later date.”*⁸⁵⁶

January 28th, in London, the British Nationality Bill has its second reading in the House of Commons; moved by the Secretary of State for the Home Department – William Whitelaw.

“The first is that the Bill provides for a composite citizenship covering all the dependent territories. I am sure that this is right. ... I should like to reaffirm that the proposed legislation is in no way intended to weaken those links to which we attach great importance. I do, however understand the feelings of some of the dependencies which feel that their particular situation is special. We have taken with great seriousness the approaches which have been made to us by Gibraltar. It is obviously important that the Gibraltar House of Assembly has unanimously passed a motion asking us to reconsider the position so as to categorise them as British citizens. The position of the Falkland Islands also commands a great deal of sympathy. Nevertheless, it remains right that the citizenship of our dependent territories should apply in a uniform way throughout those territories. Unimaginable confusion would result if this were not so. What I want to stress, however, is that the Bill in no way alters the position as regards the United Kingdom's moral and constitutional responsibilities for the territories in question. Nor does it in any way affect the special position of Gibraltar as part of the European Community. On the Falkland Islands, I want to say this. In December 1979, following the publication of the White Paper on the

853 Telegram 1165 from London, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File D810029-0299

854 HC Deb 21 January 1981 vol.997 cc248-9

855 PREM 19/656 Telegram No. 27 of 27 January. In 1980, the FIG had advertised in St. Helena for people willing to live and work in the Falklands. With spare housing for three families, the FIG expected to get few applications. In fact, over 300 Saints applied to move.

856 *The Penguin News* March 5, 1981

*revision of the immigration rules, my hon. Friend the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office sent a message to the people of the Falkland Islands assuring them that in the event of an emergency the problems of any islander who did not possess the right of abode in the United Kingdom and who was in trouble at that time would be most carefully and sympathetically considered. In the light of the concern recently expressed on behalf of the islanders, I wish to reaffirm that pledge and assure the islanders that in such circumstances they can depend upon the most sympathetic consideration of their position.”*⁸⁵⁷

*“An amendment to the Nationality Bill claiming special status for Falkland Islanders was put down by Mr Michael Shersby MP (Con – Uxbridge) during the Committee stage, but was not carried.”*⁸⁵⁸

In Britain's House of Commons, Michael Brown MP puts down a question for a Written Answer the next day; prompting a reaction at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*“Mr Michael Brown MP has tabled a Question for Written Answer on 29 January to ask whether there have been talks with the Argentines on leaseback. ... The talks which Mr Ridley held with Comodoro Cavandoli in Geneva last September were secret. The fact that they even took place is known to very few people in Buenos Aires and London. When OD agreed in July 1980 that leaseback should be explored with the Argentines on a confidential basis, it was recognised that, if the talks ever became public knowledge, this would not only prejudice our hopes of making headway in the dispute, but also lay the Government open to severe criticism from public and Parliamentary opinion. ... If we were now to reveal that leaseback had been discussed with the Argentines before Mr Ridley's visit to the Islands last November, the repercussions in Parliament and in the Islands would be very damaging. Suspicions of a "sell-out" would appear to be confirmed....”*⁸⁵⁹

January 29th, at Downing Street, the Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee meet; *“(Mr Ridley) said that the Islanders were slowly coming to see that lease-back would be an essential element in the negotiated settlement they required.”*⁸⁶⁰

*“In January 1981 at a further meeting of that committee – the eighth collective discussion – was held to review the situation in the light of the islanders' reactions to the leaseback proposal and the comments in both Houses on the Statement of December 1980. The committee endorsed the noble Lord, Lord Carrington's, proposal that the aim should be to keep the negotiations going with a view to finding an acceptable basis for a negotiated settlement. They agreed to early talks for which Argentina was pressing, and at which the islanders were to be represented.”*⁸⁶¹

*“On 29 January 1981 the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, endorsed Lord Carrington's recommendation that the aim should be to keep the talks going and to let the Islanders come to see the need to explore a solution based on leaseback.”*⁸⁶²

857 Hansard HC Deb 28 January 1981 vol.997 cc935-1047. cf. July, 1980, July & October 1981

858 Falkland Islands Newsletter June 1981 no.10

859 FCO7/3808 (f6) at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, albeit misfiled under January, 1980. See -

https://e8e62e492b4a1a43cd16-77325458036aa340f9e5dfc158bde804.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/800128_Fearn_mnt_for_Ridley_FCO7_3808_f6.pdf

860 CAB 148/197. All evidence to the contrary.

861 Baroness Young in HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247

862 Ellerby 1990 p.260

In the House of Commons, a written Answer is provided to Michael Brown's question.⁸⁶³

“Since May 1979 there has been one round of formal talks on the Falkland Islands dispute with the Argentine government. In addition in the frequent contacts which we have with the Argentine government over the whole range of Anglo-Argentine relations many possible approaches to the solution of the Falklands dispute have been mentioned informally.”

A note states; “Mr Ridley considers this to be a true answer...”⁸⁶⁴

January 30th, from London, in reference to Michael Brown's question, Lord Carrington sends a message to the UK's Embassy in Buenos Aires for Ambassador Williams.

*“Grateful if you would inform Cavandoli immediately that Ministers cannot deny outright in the House that any discussions have been held and tell him we propose to answer thus: Begins. Quote there has been one round of **formal** talks on the Falkland islands dispute with the Argentine Government in April 1980. In addition. In the frequent contacts which we have with the Argentine Government over the whole range of Anglo-Argentine relations many possible approaches to the solution of the Falklands dispute have been mentioned **informally**. Unquote.”*⁸⁶⁵

February 23rd, in New York, representatives from Argentina and Britain meet for two days of talks. Adrian Monk and Stuart Wallace represent the Islanders. Britain's delegation report back promptly to London.

*“Comodoro Cavándoli ... could not understand or accept that Argentina's one requirement, sovereignty, should be ignored permanently. The British side had said that Islander wishes had to be taken into account; why could not Argentine wishes be taken into account? ... any progress had to include the question of sovereignty... The two sides could not go on endlessly meeting in New York. Time for Argentina had now run out; these meetings could not continue year after year simply expressing views ... **Mr. Ridley wanted to make it quite clear that the British Government had no doubt at all of the legality and strength of their title to the Islands.** He had always said to the Islanders that the legal position was not in doubt. It would indeed be possible to go on resting on that position for all time...*

Mr. Monk pointed out that one of the UN's basic principles was the right to self-determination. Why were the Argentines not prepared to accept the Islanders' rights to determine their own future?

Sr. Ortiz de Rozas said that the relevant UN resolutions referred to the principle of territorial integrity. Argentina's had been harmed.

*Mr. Ridley said that the principle of self-determination was nevertheless overriding; ... ”*⁸⁶⁶

February 24th, on the second day of talks, Minister Cavándoli speaks directly to the Islanders' representatives.

“Comodoro Cavandoli ... thought the Argentines understood perfectly what the needs of the Islanders were. In particular, he could understand their fears. But he thought that both parties could be confident that anything that was agreed between them would be observed. ...Mr Wallace was grateful for the Argentine assurances but regretted that no details had been given as to how to put these sentiments into

863 FCO7/3808 (f9) at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, misfiled under January, 1980. See -

[https://e8e62e492b4a1a43cd16-77325458036aa340f9e5dfc158bde804.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/800129 Temple mnt for Ridley FCO7 3808 f9.pdf](https://e8e62e492b4a1a43cd16-77325458036aa340f9e5dfc158bde804.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/800129_Temple_mnt_for_Ridley_FCO7_3808_f9.pdf)

864 *Ibid.*

865 Carrington telegram to UKE Buenos Aires in FCO7/3808 (f10). My emphasis. Cavandoli agreed to follow the line laid out by Lord Carrington.

866 PREM 19/612. My emphasis.

practical effect. He was also disappointed that the Comodoro should feel it necessary to talk even at this early stage about putting limits on any agreement. ... Finally he wanted ... it clearly understood that most Falklands' public opinion was opposed to any concessions on sovereignty to Argentina." ⁸⁶⁷

"The leader of the Argentine delegation reaffirmed the Argentine rights of sovereignty over the Falkland islands... He went on to explain that the British proposal for a freeze on the sovereignty issue was unacceptable to the Argentine delegation, because it disregarded the request addressed to both parties by resolution 31/49 of the United Nations General Assembly to expedite negotiations with a view to resolving the dispute." ⁸⁶⁸

"He offered them 'most pampered region status' within Argentina; they could keep their laws, local government, language and customs, yet receive roads, school, television. Just let him have the one word: sovereignty." ⁸⁶⁹

"It was a dismal meeting and it was announced on 24 February that the Argentines had thrown out the freeze concept. That was no surprise. Of more interest was the desperate personal appeal by the leader of the Argentine delegation to the two Islanders. Recognising that they hobbled British policy, Wallace and Monk were told that Argentina would give them all the material comforts and special status that they wanted in exchange for some symbolic gesture over sovereignty. Any mealy-mouthed mumbo-jumbo would do so long as the Argentines could hold a piece of paper up to their people saying that the 1833 score had been settled. It was clear that leaseback would have been seized enthusiastically by the Argentines." ⁸⁷⁰

"The Argentine ambassador promised the Islanders all sorts of advantages if sovereignty was transferred, but Falkland Islands councillor Stuart Wallace impressed on the Argentines that the Islanders 'were primarily concerned with the structure of their way of life; that came before any economic benefit.'..." ⁸⁷¹

February 26th, from New York, a final *communiqué* is released. Following a last minute intervention by the Argentine Embassy, this is a dramatically shorter version than the one agreed by the delegates. Amended, all the final *communiqué* has to say is that the question will be examined in "*further negotiations*." ⁸⁷²

"With the failure of the talks in New York we are faced with the problem of deciding what to offer them (the British and the Argentines) next. The choice has been narrowed down, and of the Ridley proposals we are left with only one: leaseback. There is, however, one other choice that was not offered in Mr. Ridley's package. That is independence. More and more people are now beginning to give the idea some consideration and we have seen the subject brought up at recent Council meetings and even at the negotiations in New York. It is certainly not as ridiculous as many people like to think." ⁸⁷³

"The victor in the sterile talks had been Britain, since she had won time." ⁸⁷⁴

"Argentine Government hopes that recent New York talks have convinced Falkland Islanders and HMG that freeze in the status quo is unacceptable. The GOA would be willing to consider a lease-back arrangement. EmbOff called on Ricardo Forrester of the Foreign Ministry's Office of Antarctic and Malvinas Affairs. Although Argentines firmly maintain that the negotiations are bilateral between the UK and Argentina,

867 PREM19/612 f8. In full - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/978295C4D85044CE926374FE4C032969.pdf>

868 *The Penguin News* March 5, 1981

869 Jenkins & Hastings 1997

870 Bound 2007

871 Livingstone 2018 citing *Anglo-Argentine ministerial Talks on the Falkland Islands February 23/24 1981 PREM 19/612*

872 See PREM 19/612 Annex B (Original Joint Communiqué) and Annex C (Agreed Joint Communiqué).

873 Editorial in *The Penguin News* no.12 March 5, 1981

874 Editorial in *La Prensa* March 6, 1981 quoted in *ALW 040/325/2 Part B 76-150*

Forrester did not indicate that GOA is miffed at the participation in the UK Delegation of the two Islanders, known as "Kelpers" (for the seaweed that grows along the Islands' shorelines). Noting that the Kelper lobby is strong in London, he implicitly acknowledged that Islander attitudes are an important factor in finding a solution. He said he hopes that a more realistic debate will now take place on the Islands. An Argentine Army Colonel who works on Malvinas matters told EmbOff that he was cautiously optimistic that negotiations would not get off dead center, although, he added, previous talks have gone through cycles of hope and disillusion in the past. Argentines, therefore, seem to approach a new phase in the discussion with circumspection." ⁸⁷⁵

February 27th, in Washington DC, Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and US Secretary Haig meet.

*"Carrington briefly outlined what he regards as the principal elements of the UK dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands. **Argentina will not agree to put its claims before the International Court because they are not valid.** Problem for Britain is similar to what they frequently encounter when they try to cast off a colony: The people who live on the Falkland Islands do not want to become Argentines. The British tactic is to keep the ball in the air as long as possible in order to avoid a showdown with Argentina. One idea the British are considering is to cede sovereignty of the Falkland Islands to Argentina on the understanding that Argentina would lease back the Islands to Britain for 99 years. The Falkland Islanders don't like this idea."* ⁸⁷⁶

February 28th, in New York, at the UN building, Islanders Adrian Monk and Stuart Wallace hold a press conference; attracting international attention. This raises some political issues within Argentina, as the negotiations have not been made public there.

March 6th, Argentina's Foreign Ministry issues a communique referring to rumours regarding the status of negotiations with the UK; declaring that they reject any proposal that does not recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Islands as a first principle. ⁸⁷⁷

"Late of Friday 6 March the Foreign Ministry issued a statement making three points: (A) The Argentine claim for the restitution of sovereignty had not changed and any proposal which did not give priority to this Argentine right of restitution had been completely rejected. (B) the negotiations had intensified since April 1983. © The negotiations were being held within the framework established by resolutions of the United Nations and, on the basis of confidentiality as agreed with the British in 1977." ⁸⁷⁸

Argentine newspapers pick up the story; *"La Nacion ran an interesting article, in their edition of 6 March. Based on sources close to the Argentine delegation to the New York talks, the newspaper commented briefly on the leaseback idea stating that the persistence of this suggestion meant that it had taken on the nature of a British proposal ... The editorial in La Prensa ... discussed British motives in putting forward a freeze. The paper concluded that the proposal was a front ... trying to obstruct and postpone indefinitely a final solution to the dispute."* ⁸⁷⁹

March 7th, in the Falklands, an Argentine ship *Yehuín*, is ordered away from Weddell Island.

875 Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 30, 1981 in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981-1984*

876 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol. xiii: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 - 1984* p.13. My emphasis.

877 Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 30, 1981 in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981-1984*

878 UKE Buenos Aires to FCO March 10, 1981 in *ALW 040/325/2 Part B 76 - 150*

879 Noted in *ALW 040/325/2 Part B 76 - 150*

*“The Captain of Yehuín said that he was sheltering from south-westerly gales and he was instructed by the Master of Endurance to leave the harbour as soon as weather permitted. Weddell Island Manager Bob Ferguson reported that the Argentine ship had left later that day.”*⁸⁸⁰

March 10th, Britain's Foreign Office speak to the US Embassy in London.

*“On March 10, Ron Deare, Head of the Foreign Office’s West Indian and Atlantic Department, reviewed the status of discussions with Argentina on the future of the Falkland Islands. The ministerial level talks in New York at the end of February produced a stalemate. Argentina still insisted on its sovereignty, and the Islanders were determined to remain British. Minister of State Nicholas Ridley had carried a mandate from London to support the Islanders. ... There was, however, a positive aspect. The inclusion of two Islanders on the British side of the table was a useful educational device. They were “shocked” to learn first hand of the depth of the Argentine feeling on the sovereignty issue. They went home in a sober mood. Through them, Deare opined, the Islanders may finally realize that the status quo cannot be maintained indefinitely.”*⁸⁸¹

March 12th, from the US Embassy in London, a telegram is sent to the State Department in Washington.

“Summary: Although last month’s talks in New York produced no progress toward a settlement of Britain’s dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands, they may have served a useful purpose. Island negotiators may finally realize that the current arrangement cannot be maintained indefinitely. The Islanders are considering new proposals as a basis for further discussions with the Argentines. Another round of talks, however, is unlikely before the end of the year. While the search for a settlement continues, the status quo serves as a useful reminder to Britain of its continuing responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere. End summary. ...

*The Argentines were in a belligerent mood even before the talks began. They were incensed by a proposal being considered by the Islanders to encourage the immigration of laborers from the British dependency of St. Helena. The Falklands have a labor shortage and St. Helena has a labor surplus. What the Islanders viewed as a mutually beneficial economic arrangement sent the Argentines straight up the wall. They regarded it either as a scheme to ensure long-term British domination or as an insidious plot “to dilute Argentina’s racial stock.” Not the best way to start negotiations.”*⁸⁸²

March 13th, in London, Lord Carrington tells the Prime Minister that there is little point in further talks while the Islanders remained hostile to the leaseback proposal.

*“We can reach no conclusions now; ... If in the end the Islanders decide that they would prefer the status quo to any deal involving cession of sovereignty, then we must prepare for the possibility of a deterioration of our relations with Argentina:...”*⁸⁸³

March 17th, a Papal arbitration panel considering the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile, gives its verdict. As with the 1977 arbitration decision, this favours Chile. Despite agreeing to abide by the panel’s decision, Argentina immediately rejects the result.⁸⁸⁴

880 *The Penguin News* no.13 April 19, 1981

881 *Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State March 12, 1981 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

882 *Foreign Relations of the United States 1981–89 (Volume XIII) Conflict in the South Atlantic (2015) p14*

883 Carrington minute to MT March 13, 1981 in PREM19/656/f39. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/FE0DE7C4540341DEAEFDE6CF0FE9B0DA.pdf>

884 See 1977, January, 1978, 1980, 1982 & November, 1984

March 18th, in London, HM Treasury requests an assessment of costs from the FCO in the event of Argentine non-co-operation in the Falkland Islands. ⁸⁸⁵

March 29th, in Buenos Aires, Lt.-General Roberto Eduardo Viola is sworn in as the 37th President of Argentina.

“At 10:15, Army Commander Leopoldo Galtieri draped the blue-and-white sash of the presidency over Viola's white-jacketed chest. Then he handed Viola the presidential scepter and shook his hand. With that, Viola became the second Army general to rule Argentina since the military took power in a 1976 coup. The general who led that coup, retiring president Jorge R. Videla, embraced Viola moments after the presidency was officially handed over. Like Videla, Viola was selected as president by the three-man military junta that officially is to share power with the president until the restoration of a "republican and representative democracy" some time in the future.” ⁸⁸⁶

Oscar Héctor Camilión is appointed Foreign Minister, with Enrique Jorge Ros as his deputy. ⁸⁸⁷

“The developments of the ever more difficult situation (in the Islands) were sent to the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Argentine Air Force, once a week and through diplomatic channels. A file summarized the approach actions as compared to the profits. Results were poor due to the fact that the beneficiaries themselves blocked the actions and no support could be expected from them unless they were offered some advantage. Given the state of things, from the Malvinas settlers' point of view, they had everything to lose. The conclusion awoke Foreign Minister Oscar Camilión's interest so much that he met with Gilobert and listened to his reasons. For the first time after Capozzolo's initiative, the idea of offering financial compensation as an incentive for the islanders to reconsider their rejection was entertained. Camilión was not excited about it but he had no objections.” ⁸⁸⁸

March 30th, in London, at the Foreign Office, British National Oil Company (BNOC) executives meet officials.

“During a meeting at the FCO, a BNOC executive emphasised: ‘The Government should be careful not to give away what could be of great worth i.e. the prospects for oil finds in the Falklands Continental Shelf.’ The chairman of the company, Philip Shelbourne, added: ‘Above all BNOC did not want to wake up one day to find that someone else had picked up concessions in Falkland Islands waters without their having been given a chance to compete.’” ⁸⁸⁹

On the same day, from Buenos Aires, the US Embassy telegrams Washington with their perspective on Anglo-Argentine negotiations.

“EmbOff called on Ricardo Forrester of the Foreign Ministry's Office of Antarctic and Malvinas Affairs. Although Argentines firmly maintain that the negotiations are bilateral between the UK and Argentina, Forrester did not indicate that GOA is miffed at the participation in the UK Delegation of the two Islanders, known as “Kelpers” (for the seaweed that grows along the Islands' shorelines). Noting that the Kelper lobby is strong in London, he implicitly acknowledged that Islander attitudes are an important factor in finding a solution. He said he hopes that a more realistic debate will now take place on the Islands.

885 ALW 040/325/2 Part B 76 - 150

886 *The Washington Post*

887 Previously Ambassador to Brazil, Camilión was not a member of the armed forces. Nor was Ros. The importance of the Foreign Ministry to the junta was therefore effectively downgraded.

888 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023. The reference to Capazolla is a reference to the suggestion that an Argentine businessman purchase the Falkland Islands Company. See above.

889 Livingstone 2018 citing *Record of Meeting with BNOC March 30, 1981 FCO 7/3984*

An Argentine Army Colonel who works on Malvinas matters told EmbOff that he was cautiously optimistic that negotiations would not get off dead center; although, he added, previous talks have gone through cycles of hope and disillusion in the past. Argentines, therefore, seem to approach a new phase in the discussion with circumspection. ...

*The Argentines are prepared to wait a while, but their patience is limited, according to Forrester. He acknowledged that Argentina would be willing to consider a lease-back arrangement, depending on the formulation. Economic decline of the Islands is of concern to all parties, although he noted that in addition to promising geological structures indicating that the area has petroleum potential, there are substantial fishing resources. These at present are exploited mostly by the Poles and Soviets. Argentina and the UK, according to Forrester, share the hope that the sovereignty issue can finally be resolved so that progress can be made on economic problems.”*⁸⁹⁰

April 30th, following an expression of interest by the oil company Shell to Argentina's invitation for oil exploration tenders, the UK takes out an advert in the *International Herald Tribune*. This restates Lord Carrington's announcement of December 15, 1980.

*“No agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and Argentine Governments on the delimitation of the continental shelf as between the Falkland islands and Argentina. In the absence of an agreed boundary, neither party, in Her Majesty's Government's view, would be entitled to exercise continental shelf rights beyond the median line between the Falkland Islands and Argentina. We have protested to the Argentines about the YPF tender which does indeed go beyond the median line. Her Majesty's Government assume that oil companies will take the above into full account in considering whether to place tenders to drill for oil in the Magallanes Este block.”*⁸⁹¹

*“Emphasising a need for action, a Foreign Office official wrote: ‘We must maintain that any oil in the Falkland Islands continental shelf is British, without specifying whether we mean HMG or Falkland Islands have the right to exploit it. The important point is that it is ours not Argentine.’ ...”*⁸⁹²

May 5th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams telegrams the Foreign Office to urge a further round of talks, which he sees as necessary to keep diplomatic channels open.

*“Not only the Argentines, but the majority of the UN membership including the USA and most of our western allies are openly sceptical about the legitimacy of our positions in the Falklands and have only really kept the dogs off us on the understanding that we have committed ourselves to significant negotiations of the issue. We had already stretched this understanding over some 14 years when the last Labour Government fell ... No negotiations can be convincingly confined for long to one day-and-a-half session a year, particularly when it has been 16 years a-starting. We shall not, consequently, look reasonable in either Argentine or world eyes, if we are not even prepared to contemplate another round this year.”*⁸⁹³

Argentine Admiral, Armando Lambruschini, speaks to an audience at the *Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* (Center for Strategic Studies of the Superior School of War).⁸⁹⁴

890 *Foreign Relations of the United States 1981-89 (Volume XIII) Conflict in the South Atlantic (2015) p16*

891 Quoted in *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1981 no.10 See. *HL Deb 10.11.1981 vol.425 c170 Hansard*

892 Livingstone 2018 citing *Smith to Williams December 4, 1981 FCO 7/3985*

893 *ALW 040/325/2 Part B 76 - 150* See - [https://c59574e9047e61130f13-](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/8237A63020774918B55BE55713DBCCF9.pdf)

[3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/8237A63020774918B55BE55713DBCCF9.pdf](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/8237A63020774918B55BE55713DBCCF9.pdf)

894 Lambruschini was head of the Navy Chiefs of Staff. Jailed following the 1982 war, he was pardoned in 1990.

*“... as a sovereign nation, we must place ourselves on the international stage in our rightful position and play our rightful role accordingly... the South Atlantic is a vital area for the Argentine Republic, it has political, economic and strategic rights that arise from its geography, its history, its future projection, all of which legitimize and impose an adequate national presence in the area.... an approach to the current situation in the strategic area of the South Atlantic cannot dispense with the historical imperative of the return of the Malvinas Islands to the national heritage, as these represent a key factor in our strategic conception.”*⁸⁹⁵

HMS *Endurance* arrives back in the UK; *“HMS Endurance, the Royal navy's ice patrol ship, and the British Antarctic Survey ship Bransfield, have recently returned to British ports after seven-month voyages throughout the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.”*⁸⁹⁶

May 18th, in London, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Defence Keith Speed, is removed from his position for criticising the government's proposed defence cuts, and particularly any withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* from the South Atlantic; *“Speed had protested vehemently against the proposed cuts in the Royal Navy – and was sacked for his pains in May 1981.”*⁸⁹⁷

May 28th, reported in Britain's *Financial Times*:

*“(The) idea of a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation has come to birth successfully, if a little furtively, this week in Buenos Aires, despite the fact that its parents are somewhat shy of acknowledging parenthood. Called together under the auspices of private institutions in Argentina and the US, strategic experts from Washington, South Africa, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil are meeting in the Argentine capital to consider the next steps in a plan, long proposed, to link the armed forces of the US, South Africa and Latin America in an effort to counter a perceived Soviet threat in the South Atlantic. ... A notable absentee from the reported meeting is Chile, which is in dispute with Argentina over the ownership of three islands in the Beagle Channel... The importance of the Falkland Islands within the sphere of activity of such a group cannot be understated. The Islands ... would be an ideal base for such a force. ... The strategic value of the Falkland Islands to a naval power has never been in doubt.”*⁸⁹⁸

May 29th, in Argentina, General Galtieri, Commander in Chief of the Army, refers to the dispute in a speech.

“Neither are we prepared to allow those who are discussing with us the return of island territories that are Argentine by historical inheritance and legal right to interfere in the slightest way with the search for and exploitation of the wealth of our continental shelf... Nobody can or will be able to say that we have not been extremely calm and patient in our handling of international problems, which in no way stem from any appetite for territory on our part. However, after a century and a half they are becoming more and more unbearable.”

In London, the Ministry of Defence is asked by the Foreign Office for a short assessment of the UK's ability to respond to military acts by Argentina in the South Atlantic in light of Defence Secretary John Nott's defence review.⁸⁹⁹

895 Quoted in Carbone 2008

896 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1981 no.10

897 *The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy since 1945* R. Gerald Hughes 2014

898 Quoted in *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1981 no.10

899 See June 25, 1981, below.

*“Admiral Leach sent the prime minister a forthright note in May 1981 regretting that she was too busy to see him ... “The [defence cuts programme] has been devised ad hoc in two months” he wrote. “It has neither been validated nor studied in depth. No alternative options have been considered.”... His note was copied to the defence secretary, John Nott, ...”*⁹⁰⁰

*“Before the 1982 crisis, the JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee) had placed the Falkland Islands in 'Priority 4', the lowest group of intelligence priorities, alongside Brunei and below Belize, Gibraltar or Hong Kong. ... In 1981, the MOD's Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) tried to place the islands in Priority 2, without noticeable effect on what the DCDS(I) later described as a 'complacent' level of collection and analysis effort. These decisions were wrong, so too was GCHQ's belief that it would predict hostility in time to deter Argentine action.”*⁹⁰¹

June 1st, Argentina's new Foreign Minister, Oscar Camili6n, is quoted in Britain's *Daily Express* newspaper:

*“I can understand the Islanders ... and I can understand that this very peculiar isolation of the Islanders creates a very peculiar attitude to the world. We are the eighth largest country in the world and the islands are just a fragment of what we regard as our territory. They are outmoded – an anachronism, some people say.”*⁹⁰²

June 2nd, Robin Fearn, head of the South American Department, lists the Foreign Office's objectives for a possible oil deal with Argentina.

*“1. We get the maximum possible preferential treatment for British companies in the issue of licences... 2. British equipment is used as much as possible. 3. A share of the oil goes to the UK... 4. FIG obtain an appropriate share of the proceeds consistent with its developmental needs and its capacity for absorption... 5. The impact of oil related development on the Islanders traditional way of life should be kept to a minimum. 6. The Argentines should not benefit to any greater extent that we can help...”*⁹⁰³

June 5th, in London, aware of a proposal to withdraw HMS *Endurance*, Lord Carrington writes to Defence Secretary John Nott.

*“Finally, HMS Endurance, which plays a vital role in both political and defence terms in the Falkland Islands, their Dependencies and the British Antarctic Territory (BAT). Although we continue to seek a solution to the dispute with Argentina it cannot at present be said that a solution is in sight... Unless and until the dispute is settled, it will be important to maintain our normal presence in the area at the current level.”*⁹⁰⁴

*“... any reduction would be interpreted by both the Islanders and Argentina as a reduction in Britain's commitment to the Islands and in its willingness to defend them.”*⁹⁰⁵

“One aspect of the Navy response ... was its proposed reduction in the 'teeth' rather than the 'tail' of the naval programme. The Navy report cut the number of frigates to thirty, cancelled the carrier Ark Royal, and abandoned the Mine Counter Measures Vessel (MCMV) programme. In addition, the Antarctic Survey ship HNS Endurance and the royal yacht, HMS Britannia, both high-profile politically important vessels, were

900 Thatcher warned of defence cuts danger before Falklands War in *The Guardian* December 30, 2011

901 John Ferris 2020 citing memorandum by DCDS(I), 'Operation Corporate – the Intelligence Lessons, December 21, 1982 P/8210/7/1 Pt.1.

902 Quoted in *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1981 no.10

903 Quoted in Livingstone 2018 citing Fearn to P. Harding June 2, 1981 FCO 7/3984

904 PREM19/416 f129

905 *Falkland Islands Review (Franks Report)* January 1983 para.114

placed on the list of proposed cuts. ... The rationale for cutting *Endurance* and *Brittania* was that these ships had little military value and were thus less important to the Navy than they might be, for instance, to the Foreign Office. The Navy had proposed cutting *Endurance* previously, only to have the Foreign Office argue that the cut was unacceptable.”⁹⁰⁶

June 8th, in Buenos Aires, Foreign Office Assistant Under-Secretary John Ure arrives for two days of talks with the Foreign Ministry.

*“In Argentina, I found the Ministers and officials with whom I spoke reasonably relaxed about the progress – or lack of progress – on the Falklands negotiations and well disposed towards the lease-back idea... while they themselves appreciated the constraints on our progress in the Falklands negotiations, their military masters were less patient and might require a more "forward" policy at any time.”*⁹⁰⁷

June 9th, at Grytviken, South Georgia, the base commander reports that an Argentine C130 Hercules aircraft, with military markings, has flown over the facility.

*“It would seem that despite our protests Argentina overflights of Falkland islands and Dependencies are increasing. Such incidents only harden the Islanders' resolve to stand firm against any proposal to have closer links with the Argentines.”*⁹⁰⁸

John Ure arrives in Port Stanley.

*“In the Falkland Islands, I found that Mr Adrian Monk (a member of both the Legislative and Executive Councils) had been campaigning vigorously and fairly successfully since his return from New York talks last February, against the concept of lease-back. He had been instrumental in turning Mr Stuart Wallace – his fellow Councillor – against the idea, and had aroused much emotional feeling on the Islands to this effect. Without any justification, he had accused both the Governor and the British Government of pressurising the islanders in favour of a lease-back. ... However, I formed the impression that opinion was not yet irrevocably hardened against the lease-back proposal and that many of the better informed and more progressive islanders recognised that an accommodation with Argentina was necessary to secure the continuance and development of their existing way of life. A number of people, ... told me privately that they thought it should not be beyond the capacity of the British Government to convince the majority of the elected representatives to the new Councils that they should authorise a realistic dialogue and negotiation with the Argentine Government designed to secure the best possible lease-back arrangements for the islands.”*⁹⁰⁹

June 10th, in London, Foreign Office and Defence Department officials meet to discuss retaining HMS *Endurance*; “... following which Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials judged that there was no prospect of the decision being reversed...”⁹¹⁰

June 15th, in Paris, France, Minister Nicholas Ridley meets with Deputy Foreign Minister Enrique Ros.⁹¹¹

“There had been two main purposes: to establish a personal relationship with Comodoro Cavandoli's successor, and to convince the Argentines of our determination to reach a settlement. Both sides confirmed their view that leaseback seemed to provide the best basis for a solution. Mr Ridley had made it plain to Sr Ros

906 Boren 1992

907 Ure to Ridley June 26, 1981 in ALW 040/325/2 Part C 151 - 225

908 ALW 040/325/5

909 Ure to Ridley June 26, 1981 in ALW 040/325/2 Part C 151 – 225. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/CA66527DA50E4DCDA76C5B85641E4ABE.pdf>

910 *Falkland Islands Review (Franks Report)* January 1983 para.114

911 There is no record of this meeting at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, but it was mentioned at the June 30, 1981,

review. See below.

that, while we understood the difficulties faced by the Argentine Government, there could be no question of our acting other than in accordance with the Islanders' wishes. ... Sr Ros had been generally relaxed, but it was clear that they expected a further round of talks to take place after the Islands' elections in October. One point of particular interest was the emphasis placed by Sr Ros on the question of oil exploration in the South Atlantic. ...There was only one point which might have been interpreted as an Argentine threat: Sr Ros' comment on the widespread feeling in Argentina that all Argentine attempts to soften Islanders' hearts by providing essential services met only a negative response and that there might in consequence be no purpose in continuing negotiations.”⁹¹²

June 16th, in London, aware of Ure's visit to the South Atlantic, Britain's Department of Energy suggests that the Falkland Islands Continental Shelf should be excluded from any deal on leaseback with Argentina.

“... an official noting, ‘Such a surrender of sovereignty must surely make more difficult ... an oil regime which secures HMG control over those rights (e.g. to petroleum exploration and production activities).’ The Department recommended that, if the continental shelf were included in the leaseback, then Britain should have the ‘exclusive’ right to explore for oil within it and that there should be no joint administration with Argentina. ... while British oil companies had been a lobbying force for a sovereignty deal with Argentina in the 1970s, they had now become, if anything, a gentle brake on the process.”⁹¹³

From the Falklands, John Ure departs for Chile.

“... I think we should explore urgently the possibility of developing communication links between the Islands and Chile or Uruguay. This would not be easy and indeed might not be possible. For instance, the Chilean officials and Naval officers with whom I talked ... were unanimous that, although the idea of providing logistical support to the Falklands was an attractive one to them, it would be too explosive in the context of their relations with Argentina to be contemplated ...”⁹¹⁴

June 18th, First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Henry Leach, has a meeting with PM Thatcher about defence cuts.

“The point he wished to emphasise was the most serious miscalculation which we would be making [if] we disregarded the deterrent effect of a major maritime capability in peacetime.”⁹¹⁵

“Lord Peter Carrington, foreign secretary, wrote in a letter to Sir John Nott, the defence secretary, in June 1981 that “any reduction [of military force in the region] would be interpreted by both islanders and the Argentines as a reduction in commitment to the island and our willingness to defend them” ...”⁹¹⁶

June 25th, in Britain's House of Commons, Defence Secretary John Nott presents the results of the government's defence review – *The United Kingdom Defence Programme: The Way Forward*.⁹¹⁷

“The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Nott): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement.

The Government have reviewed the defence programme, and a full account of our conclusions is contained in a White Paper, which will be available shortly in the Vote Office. The Government intend to honour the NATO aim of 3 per cent. real growth in defence expenditure, and have, exceptionally,

912 ALW 040/325/2 Part C 151 – 225. Link below.

913 Livingstone 2018 citing H.M.L. Ross to Mary Dickson June 16, 1981 EG 14/93 and Dickson to Fearn July 22, 1981 FCO 7/3985. Original emphasis.

914 Ure to Ridley June 26, 1981 in ALW 040/325/2 Part C 151 - 225

915 Thatcher warned of defence cuts danger before Falklands War in *The Guardian* December 30, 2011

916 Ministers were warned of Falklands threat Michael Stothard in *Financial Times*, December 30, 2011

917 For the defence review report see - [https://c59574e9047e61130f13-](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/991284B4011C44C9AEB423DA04A7D54B.pdf)

[3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/991284B4011C44C9AEB423DA04A7D54B.pdf](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/991284B4011C44C9AEB423DA04A7D54B.pdf)

taken a firm decision now to plan to implement the increase until 1985–86, a full four years forward and two years beyond the published plans for public spending generally. This may mean that defence absorbs an even greater share of our gross domestic product, and, while it will be necessary to curb several of our forward plans and aspirations, the additional funding should enable us to enhance our front-line capability above its present level in very many areas.

The House knows of our basic problems, which are not unique to Britain. We have a defence programme which is unbalanced and over-extended. Last year, we suffered from severe cash problems, and similar difficulties are already emerging in the current year.

*We cannot go on like this. We have no choice in the longer term but to move towards a better balance between the various components of our effort—front-line numbers, quantity and quality in equipment, and military and civilian support. We must determine this balance in terms of real defence capability rather than as the outcome of a debilitating argument over each Service's budgetary share. ...”*⁹¹⁸

*“The 1981 review took place during a major shift of influence within the ministry away from the Service Departments and toward the central staffs. Previously the Chiefs of Staff had assessed Britain's strategic priorities, but in 1981 this was done by the central staffs. This informal shift in responsibility took place due to growing economic constraints which created pressure for deep cuts in the defence budget.”*⁹¹⁹

June 26th, in Stanley, aware of the proposal to withdraw HMS *Endurance* from the South Atlantic, the Falkland Islands Councils hold a joint meeting. Their conclusions are transmitted to Lord Carrington.

*“The people of the Falkland Islands deplore in the strongest terms the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service. They express extreme concern that Britain appears to be abandoning its defence of British interests in the South Atlantic and Antarctic at a time when other powers are strengthening their position in these areas. They feel that such a withdrawal will further weaken British sovereignty in this area in the eyes not only of islanders but of the world. They urge that all possible endeavours be made to secure a reversal of this decision.”*⁹²⁰

June 30th, in London, a review of policy takes place at the Foreign Office in a meeting chaired by Secretary of State Nicholas Ridley. Falklands' Governor Rex Hunt is present, as is Ambassador Williams from Buenos Aires. Hunt makes it clear that the Islanders wish to have nothing whatsoever to do with Argentina, and that they do not believe that a leaseback settlement can provide the guarantees they want. The meeting concludes that the British Government should play for time; that the new Legislative Council, when elected, should be persuaded to allow negotiations to continue; that the Islanders should be educated as to the various pros and cons; and that contingency defence plans should be updated.⁹²¹

*“We agreed that there was no alternative to the leaseback idea which stood any chance of solving the dispute. However, the prospects for negotiating a sovereignty solution with Islander agreement have receded in recent months. ... partly because of the Islanders' ostrich-like mentality and partly because of active campaigning by some Island Councillors...”*⁹²²

918 *HC Deb 25 June 1981 vol 7 cc385-400.*

919 Boren 1992

920 *ALW 076/1 Part A 1 - 50*

921 *ALW 040/325/2 Part C 151 – 225.* See - [https://c59574e9047e61130f13-](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/C57F83C53B1345E4A7E76FB4B9DD14E9.pdf)

[3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/C57F83C53B1345E4A7E76FB4B9DD14E9.pdf](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/C57F83C53B1345E4A7E76FB4B9DD14E9.pdf)

922 *ALW 040/325/2 Part C 151 - 225*

*“While on leave in Britain, (Rex Hunt) attended a meeting with Nicholas Ridley, the British Ambassador to Argentina and other senior officials, at which the prevalent view was that Islanders should still be pressed to make concessions to the Argentines. It was reported that Argentina was well disposed towards the leaseback idea and that they were 'reasonably relaxed' about the progress of negotiations. However, Argentine diplomats had said their military compatriots were less patient. Rex Hunt listened, amazed, as the diplomats disregarded all the evidence that must have been gathered by Ridley and subsequently by a senior Foreign Office official who visited Stanley to quietly confirm opinion. The tack was to change slightly. Rather than emphasising the supposed benefits of friendship with Argentina, Islanders should be educated about the dangers of hostility to change. It was suggested that Islander confidence could also be secured with offers of resettlement in the UK for those who could not accept leaseback, promises of more distribution of farming land and economic development initiatives. To his credit, Rex – who clearly risked confirming he had gone native – repeated the message that had been reiterated many times: Islanders were not going to buy any of this. "There was an air of unreality in the meeting, far removed from the realities of the situation in the Falklands," he wrote. Pouring cold water on the Foreign Office dogma might have had some impact. Rex recalled that by the end of the meeting it had simply been decided to play for time with Argentina, and persuade the new Falklands Council, when elected, to allow talks to continue.”*⁹²³

*“The ambassador (Williams) said: ‘If we allowed the leaseback initiative to die then we would be left with no way out of our dilemma,’ while Assistant Under Secretary John Ure, warned: ‘Time is running out.’ Ure argued that ‘the most important single factor in influencing the Islanders views was the public debate in the UK.’ Ridley was insistent that the Islanders should not be seen to be put under pressure, but agreed that a public relations campaign explaining leaseback should be launched.”*⁹²⁴

On the same day the House of Lords debates the question of the Falkland Islands.⁹²⁵ Lord Trefgarne, speaking for the government, sums up the debate.

*“I can confirm that HMS "Endurance" will be paid off in 1982 on her return to the United Kingdom, following her deployment in the South Atlantic and the Antarctic Region later this year. There are no plans to replace her. However, the Royal Marines garrison in the Falkland Islands will be maintained at its present strength, and from time to time Her Majesty's ships will be deployed in the area. ... we have every wish to continue the discussions with the Argentines in order to solve the sovereignty dispute. The decision does not, however, lie entirely in our hands: the Islanders have to decide for themselves which avenues they wish us to explore for them, in the knowledge that the situations has to change if the dispute is not to be allowed to stifle all hopes of development. The Islanders have to be the best judges of their own interests. We await their decision.”*⁹²⁶

*“Next year the British Navy will give up vigilance over the Falklands and Antarctic Territories claimed by that country when the patrol ship Endurance goes.”*⁹²⁷

July 9th, in London, the Cabinet are informed that intelligence threat assessments suggest that Argentina is more likely to pursue diplomatic and economic measures than any use of force. However, an attempt to establish

923 Bound 2007

924 Livingstone 2018 citing *Record of a Meeting held in 1 Carlton Gardens on 30 June 1981 FCO 7/3964*

925 *HL Deb 30 June 1981 vol.422 cc166-87*. For the full record, see - <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1981-06-30/debates/1c0a9643-ff36-494a-8897-a99f5206bc2f/TheFalklandIslandsSovereignty>

926 *HL Deb 30 June 1981 vol.422 cc185-187*

927 Unnamed Argentine newspaper quoted in *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December, 1981 no.11. A number of protest letters were published in *The Times* and other newspapers.

a foothold on one of the Dependencies, or even on one of the more remote Falklands Islands, is considered a possibility.⁹²⁸

From Buenos Aires, the British Embassy report that several Argentine newspapers are carrying articles about the withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* from the South Atlantic – claiming that Britain is; “*abandoning the protection of the Falkland islands.*”⁹²⁹

July 20th, at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Minister Ridley writes to Lord Carrington:

*“If the Argentines conclude, possibly by early next year, that we are unable or unwilling to negotiate seriously, we must expect retaliatory action: in the first instance through the withdrawal of communications, fuel and other facilities, which the Argentines now provide: in the longer run through some form of military action.”*⁹³⁰

*“Ridley wrote to Carrington recommending that a PR campaign should be discussed at a meeting of the Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) Committee. Officials drafted a paper for the committee, which said it was ‘increasingly urgent’ to find a solution, adding: ‘Simply playing for time ... is not a viable option.’ Three possibilities were outlined • to talk to Argentina without Islander concurrence. • to launch a PR campaign explaining leaseback; • or to break off negotiations and take contingency defence measures.”*⁹³¹

July 22nd, from Buenos Aires, the Government of Argentina (GOA) urges the British Government to “*accelerate the pace of negotiations over the Falkland Islands*”.

*“The announcement revealed some details of a strong and detailed reiteration of the GOA’s position contained in a note handed to the British Ambassador here. The timing and vigorous tone of the statement took the British here somewhat by surprise, but the substance was not new, according to a source at UK Embassy. FonMin Camilion said that the GOA acted now because the Falklanders will hold municipal elections in September... Key points of the GOA note are: (A) No significant progress has occurred since the recommencement of Falkland negotiations in 1977. (B) Better communications between the Islands and South America have not produced the intended results of “improving mutual understanding” and “contributing to a successful negotiation”. (C) The question of Island sovereignty is a subject for bilateral negotiation between GOA and HMG exclusively; Islander attitudes are not a factor. (D) There are only two alternatives: effective Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands or a continuation of the status quo, and the latter is not only intolerable to GOA and world community but also means a constant deterioration in the economy of the Islands. The note goes on to state the long-standing GOA position on sovereignty and willingness to respect the interests of the Falklanders. It adds that Argentina will continue to provide services to the Islanders (among other things, air transport, fuel and some foodstuffs) as long as there is “an evident British political will to advance constructively” in the negotiations. The GOA states that it is prepared to have the United Nations guarantee that the interests of the Islanders will be protected. ... Finally, the communique indicates that “Argentina will consider practical arrangements that take into account the interests of those who could benefit from the development of the Islands’ resources”.*⁹³²

July 27th, in Buenos Aires, Dr. Oscar Camilion writes to Ambassador Williams expressing his concern at the lack of progress in the decade following the communication agreements.

928 *Falkland Islands Review (Franks Report)* January 1983 para..94

929 *Ibid.* para.116

930 *FCO 7/3964*. Also *ALW 040/325/2 Part C 151 - 225*

931 Livingstone 2018. See September 7 below

932 *Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State July 30, 1981* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

“... to postpone further a profound and serious discussion of the complex essential constituents of the negotiations – sovereignty and economic co-operation – in a simultaneous and global fashion with the express intention of achieving concrete results shortly. A resolute impetus must therefore be given to the negotiations. The next round of negotiations cannot be another mere exploratory exercise, but must mark the beginning of a decisive stage towards the definitive termination of the dispute.”

That same day, in a press statement, the Argentine Government declares that negotiations to have become; “... an unpostponable priority for its foreign policy ... it is not possible to defer this question which affects territorial integrity and national dignity.”

*“Ominously, there was an understated reminder that the air and fuel services could be withdrawn if there was no progress. These veiled threats were precisely what many Islanders had feared since the Communications Agreement was signed in 1972.”*⁹³³

July 28th, in the House of Lords, during a debate on the proposed British Nationality legislation, an amendment to give the Falkland Islanders full British citizenship is withdrawn.⁹³⁴

*“Lord Trefgarne ... It was argued that Gibraltar was thus a special case; now it is being argued that the Falkland Islands are another special case. Nearly all the dependencies believe that they have a special case to make for exceptional treatment in this Bill and they have represented their views to us. But if we are to have a distinctive citizenship for the United Kingdom, then we must have another citizenship for the dependencies, not an inferior or second-class citizenship but a parallel citizenship, and having created that citizenship all the people of the dependencies should be entitled to it. It would be invidious and discriminatory to make exceptions, especially if these were on grounds of race, as has been alleged. We are very conscious of the problems that the people of the Falkland Islands face, and we are concerned to help them with these, but we do not believe the grant of British citizenship to them, with all the anomalies that would cause elsewhere in the dependencies, can be justified. We believe that the pledges we have given to the Falkland Islanders are much to be preferred to measures which, however well intentioned, would have consequences which could go a long way to nullifying the objectives of this long overdue legislation. I am afraid the Government see very real difficulties with these amendments. I hope that, in the light of what I have been able to say and the pledges I have been able to repeat, the noble Baroness and her noble friends will not press them.”*⁹³⁵

*“When the Bill reached the House of Lords, an amendment was put down ... by Baroness Vickers with all-party support. This was later withdrawn as the debate took place. On July 28th, the night before the Royal Wedding and the House was not well attended.”*⁹³⁶

In Buenos Aires, Argentine scrap metal dealer, Constantino Davidoff, applies to the Argentine Navy for permission to use one of its Antarctic transport ships to get to South Georgia. The stated purpose is to inspect the whaling stations in order to assess what needs to be done in fulfilment of his contract with *Christian Salvesen*. Argentina's naval command sees an opportunity.

933 Bound 2007

934 *Hansard HL Deb 28 July 1981 vol.423 cc694-732*. Introduced by Baroness Vickers but, on the day, moved by Lord Mishcon. Full debate here - <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1981/jul/28/british-nationality-bill-1>

935 *HL Deb 28 July 1981 vol.423 cc694-732*

936 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1981 no.11

*“177. Informed our Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mr. Davidoff’s activities, the Director of Antardida and Malvinas of said Portfolio of State, Ambassador Blanco, sent a memorandum dated 10-AUG-81 to the Undersecretary of Foreign Relations, by which he It recommended the approval of the activities of the Argentine private company in the South Georgia Islands and advised the Navy to give it its support.”*⁹³⁷

*“Ministry officials, acting on the perceptions of the moment regarding the need to reaffirm an Argentinian presence on all South Atlantic islands, enthusiastically recommended Davidoff to the Transportation Bureau of the Navy (auxiliary ships). The legal presence of Davidoff’s men would prevail long after the British Antarctic Survey left the place, ... In international forums this action would reassert Argentina’s interests in the sub-Antarctic.”*⁹³⁸

*“... in August 1981 (Davidoff) applied to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Argentine Navy for permission to use its Antarctic transport ships at a favourable rate. This would involve a place on the ship to get to the Islands and then subsequent logistic runs over the four-year span of the contract. It was quite standard for naval transports to be used in this way in the Sub-Antarctic. When they were approached by Davidoff the Argentine authorities were aware that the British Antarctic base at Grytviken could be removed in the near future, and that the decision had been made to withdraw Endurance from the South Atlantic. An Argentine presence for the next four years, with yearly runs by transports to the Islands, under a legal contract between a British and an Argentine company, offered a way of strengthening their position in the disputed territories while setting precedents for joint ventures in the South Atlantic. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs therefore recommended to the Navy that it agree to Davidoff’s request.”*⁹³⁹

*“In August 1981 Constantino Davidoff, having failed to obtain any civilian means of transport, applied to the Argentine navy for permission to use Argentine naval ships to go to South Georgia to assess the potential to make a big profit from recovering scrap metal at the derelict whaling stations.”*⁹⁴⁰

*“... in 1976, the Argentine Navy (ARA) had established a scientific base on the South Sandwich Islands. This action only triggered a tepid reaction from Britain. In August 1981, in view of this alleged lack of interest, the Navy, in mutual agreement with the Argentine Foreign Affairs Department, planned a similar operation on the South Georgias, occupied by the British Antarctic Survey. In order to carry it out, a Task Group made up of ten scientists and military personnel was drafted, known as Grupo Alfa (Alpha Group).”*⁹⁴¹

From France, the first of five Super Éntandard fighter aircraft, together with five anti-ship, sea-skimming Exocet missiles are transported to Argentina.⁹⁴²

September 4th, in Britain, the Ministry of Defence consider a Foreign Office request for an assessment of the implications of any Argentine military action against the Falkland Islands.

“Military measures to deter or counter Argentine military action against the Falkland Islands would require the despatch to the area of additional forces, primarily naval, and possibly on a substantial scale. Any such deployment would be costly and pose considerable logistical difficulties. To deter or

937 *Junta Militar: Comision de Analisis y Evaluacion de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlantico Syr – Inform Final* a.k.a. The Rattenbach Report (undated).

938 *The Falklands/Malvinas War: A Model for North-South Crisis Prevention* Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse 1987 p.121.

939 *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflicts* Lawrence Freedman & Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.40

940 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.633

941 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023. See December 20, 1981, below.

942 Part of an order for 14 of each, the last of the first five aircraft arrived in Argentina in November, 1981. The arms embargo imposed by the EU in April, 1982, then delayed completion of the order for both the aircraft and the missiles. After the war, France recommenced deliveries in November, 1982 and the order was finally completed by 1984.

*repel even a small scale invasion would require a significant commitment of naval resources, at the expense of commitments elsewhere, for a period of uncertain duration. To deal with a full scale invasion would require naval and land forces with organic air support on a very substantial scale, and the logistical problems of such an operation would be formidable.”*⁹⁴³

*“They, ... concluded that to deter a full-scale invasion, a large balanced force would be required, ... There was a danger that its dispatch could precipitate the very action it was intended to deter.”*⁹⁴⁴

September 11th, Admiral Jorge Anaya is sworn in as Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Navy. He almost immediately instructs his planning staff to consider the options for establishing a presence on South Georgia - 'Project Alpha.'⁹⁴⁵

*“... there was ... a scheme to take advantage of the Davidoff venture to establish a base covertly. ... This was to replicate the successful venture in 1976 when, in one of the first Junta's earliest acts a presence had been established on South Thule in the South Sandwich Islands. ... The precedent was enticing. ... The plan was to infiltrate Davidoff's workforce with military 'scientists' who would then be part of the 'legal' landing party on South Georgia. They would later be joined by a group of marines ... and establish a more permanent military base of some fourteen men from April onwards.”*⁹⁴⁶

*“The Argentine Navy saw Davidoff's contract as an opportunity to assert Argentine sovereignty over South Georgia and, in September 1981, began planning 'Project Alpha' to infiltrate Argentine marines into Davidoff's team of workers and establish a permanent presence on the island.”*⁹⁴⁷

*“Anaya, ... was considered an officer who was not very flexible and had little judgment for difficult issues. It was known that one of his obsessions was the question of the Malvinas Islands,”*⁹⁴⁸

Davidoff is informed that he can use a Naval ice-breaker, the *Almirante Irizar*, from the Antarctic Squadron to get to South Georgia.⁹⁴⁹

From Buenos Aires, Britain's *defence attache* supports an Argentine request to purchase 12 *Vulcan* bombers from the UK. He confirms that the aircraft would not be appropriate for use against the Falkland Islands.⁹⁵⁰

In the UK, Argentina's *naval attach*, Rear-Admiral Walter Alara, is invited aboard HMS *Invincible*, to watch a *Sea Harrier* display.

September 7th, in London, at a meeting with Sir Ian Gilmour MP,⁹⁵¹ Lord Carrington decides to ask for a review of the possibility of taking the Falklands dispute to the ICJ.⁹⁵²

September 14th, Lord Carrington *minutes* the Prime Minister with an update regarding the Falkland Islands

943 *ALW 040/325/10*. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/5318208207B04EB69FC78453DA8C7564.pdf>

944 Charlton 1989 p.141

945 *Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change* David A. Welch 2005 p.78

946 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

947 *Remember the Falklands? Missed Lessons of a Misunderstood War* David A. Welch 1997

948 1982: *Los documentos secretos de la guerra Malvinas/Falklands y el derrumbe del pro* J. B. Yofre 2011

949 See November, 1981 below.

950 *The Daily Express* September 6, 2015. In fact these long-range aircraft could have been easily adapted to take a conventional bomb load. The purchase was cancelled in early 1982.

951 Lord Carrington's spokesman in the House of Commons

952 Livingstone 2018 citing *Fearn to Williams September 23, 1981 FCO 7/3965*. Also *ALW 040/325/1 Part B 26*. Noted in the Franks Report, there is no official record of the meeting between Carrington and Gilmour. However, see October 14, 1981, below.

dispute with Argentina.

*“... the Argentines are showing renewed impatience for an accelerated rate of progress. They have sent us a Note and circulated a communique at the United Nations deploring the hitherto slow speed of negotiations and the lack of results and making clear that, if progress is not made soon, they may have to look to other means of achieving their purpose. I remain convinced that a leaseback, ... provides the most likely, and perhaps the only, basis for an agreed solution to the dispute. ... Unless and until the Islanders modify their views, there is little we can do beyond trying to keep some sort of negotiation with Argentina going (and even for this we cannot take Islander concurrence for granted). ... when I see him in New York, the Foreign Minister will undoubtedly ask for early British pressure on the new Councillors to bring them to the negotiating table. I propose to tell him that we want to end the dispute: but that we can act only in accordance with the wishes of the Islanders. ... The Argentines will not like this. ... Furthermore, we cannot discount the risk that we might ultimately become involved in a military confrontation with Argentina.”*⁹⁵³

Britain's Ministry of Defence announces that HMS *Endurance* will be withdrawn before the end of March, 1982.

*“Her withdrawal is taken to be an indication that Britain will be less committed in the future to the Falkland Islands and the South Atlantic. Islanders are also convinced that the British Government is not taking account of the massive economic potential of the waters surrounding the Falkland Islands, where there are vast fishstocks and known hydrocarbon resources.”*⁹⁵⁴

An intelligence report quotes Argentine diplomatic correspondence as believing that; *“... the withdrawal of HMS Endurance had been construed ... as a deliberate political gesture.”*⁹⁵⁵

Minister Nicholas Ridley is transferred to the Treasury. Richard Luce MP is promoted Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

September 22nd, in New York, at the UN, Argentina's Foreign Minister addresses the General Assembly.

“It is a strange paradox that our country, which was in the vanguard of the struggle for national independence, should still suffer from a breach of its territorial integrity, and anachronistic persistence of colonialism. The Malvinas Islands have not been restored to Argentina in spite of the long time elapsed since this General Assembly adopted Resolution 2065 (XX) in 1965. The Malvinas are still a colony to this day, with a formal status of one, basically exploited by a company built on the pattern of those of the times of the mercantilist States. Perhaps a unique case in the times of demographic explosion, the Malvinas at present have a smaller population than that which inhabited them at the time of the above mentioned revolution. Large food and energy resources are awaiting their exploitation, which is not possible as long as the present illegal occupation continues. This situation is still less understandable when the Islanders have had every practical means to understand that their association with Argentina is a source of benefits that are otherwise unobtainable. Obviously, Mr President, the Malvinas cannot remain a colony, nor can Argentina passively accept that part of its territory be one of the last colonies. I would also like to inform this Assembly that Argentina has addressed the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to propose a decisive impetus to the negotiations regarding sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Sandwich and South Georgia Islands. The Argentine

953 ALW 040/325/2 Part D 226.

954 Falkland Islands Newsletter December 1981 no.11

955 Falkland Islands Review (Franks Report) January 1983

Republic hopes to be able to report in due course to the General Assembly that this series of negotiations concerning the Malvinas, South Sandwich and South Georgia Islands, which we hope will begin soon, was the last one." ⁹⁵⁶

September 23rd, Lord Carrington informs Dr. Camilion that the British Government cannot coerce the Islanders and that, therefore, it would be preferable if Argentina put forward proposals when talks resumed. Camilion responds that the key question remains that of sovereignty, which can only be negotiated between the UK and Argentina; and that the Islanders cannot be allowed a veto. ⁹⁵⁷

"For the British, the Falklands are item 242 in the order of priorities in foreign policy." ⁹⁵⁸

"HMG's Ambassador here (Buenos Aires), Anthony Williams, told me that Lord Carrington made clear to Camilion in New York that the question is not one of respecting the "interests" of the Islanders, but rather of respecting their "desires." Williams says that the current elections in the Islands seem to be producing an even harder line there. The general sentiment in his understanding is against any more talks whatsoever with the Argentines. Williams nevertheless expects a new negotiating session, if not before the end of the year, in the early months of 1982. But he looks for nothing positive by way of results. In his view HMG has about exhausted its ingenuity, particularly with the idea of ceding sovereignty and then leasing back the Islands. The Argentines, on the other hand, seem unwilling or unable to go beyond saying "the Malvinas are ours." ..." ⁹⁵⁹

September 24th, in the Argentine press, Dr. Camilion is quoted as saying that; *"Lord Carrington advanced to the point of saying that the present status quo is difficult to sustain today."* Camilion is also reported as dismissing the forthcoming Island elections as of no importance to Argentina. ⁹⁶⁰ When questioned about this by the British press, Lord Carrington responds that the Argentine Minister; *"... can have been left in no doubt about our commitments to respect the wishes of the Islanders."*

October 1st, in the Falkland Islands, elections are held for positions on the Legislative Council. Elected, following a brief campaign, are Anthony Thomas Blake, Ronald Eric Binnie, William Henry Goss, Terence John Peck, Lionel Geoffrey Blake and John Edward Cheek.

"The conflict with Argentina had lit the flame of patriotism in the islands. The campaign for the November (sic) 1981 elections to the Legislative Council was so anti-Argentina that it angered Argentines in the islands and on the mainland." ⁹⁶¹

October 2nd, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador Williams expresses his opinion that there is now a clear risk that Argentina will conclude that talking is a waste of time. He believes it better to speak frankly, and face the consequences. ⁹⁶²

October 4th, in Buenos Aires, following his return from the USA, Oscar Camilion, is interviewed.

"The Minister replied to a question on the attitude of the inhabitants of the Islands with the statement that

956 UK MIS (Parsons) to FCO September 22, 1981 in ALW 040/522/1

957 ALW 040/522/1 Telegram No. 909

958 Camilion quoted in *Falklands: The Secret Plot* Oscar Cardoso, Ricardo Kirschbaum & Eduardo van der Kooy 1983.

This appears to have been 'borrowed' from a statement by Carrington referring to his appointment as Foreign Secretary (see above).

959 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810469-0965*

960 PREM 19/656 Telegram No. 259 of 24 September

961 Carassai 2022

962 *Williams to Fearn October 2, 1981* in ALW 040/325/2 Part D 226. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/EC344DAB8F85452ABC193FEE4464C668.pdf>

*Argentina is committed to respect their interests but will not consult them. In his view, the Islanders have no right to veto in a negotiation that is between the UK and Argentina. According to the press, the Minister became irritated and refused to answer when questioned as to what specific steps the GOA (Gov of Argentina) might take to resolve the issue.”*⁹⁶³

October 7th, in Britain's House of Lords, a *British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Amendment Bill* is laid before the House by Baroness Vickers.

*“Today's debate, therefore, provides our first opportunity to debate the matter thoroughly. We do so on the basis of my noble friend's Bill, which seeks to ensure that all the Falkland Islanders become British citizens. As things stand, about three-quarters of all Falkland Islanders will become British citizens when the British Nationality Act 1981 comes into force on 1st January next year. That will be the case whether my noble friend's Bill becomes law or not. But the remainder, about 400 people in all, may not do so because their ties are mainly with the Falkland Islands, while their connections with the United Kingdom are more distant. Those 400 would therefore hold the important parallel citizenship which is called British Dependent Territories citizenship.”*⁹⁶⁴

On October 7th, Baroness Vickers reintroduced the amendment. After a debate which lasted over an hour the vote was 90 'contents' and 90 'non-contents', an almost unprecedented occurrence in the House of Lords. Understanding orders, a casting vote from the Chair disagreed the amendment. The Bill went back to the Commons towards the close of the Parliamentary session and Mr Shersby put an amendment to give Islanders the same status as the Gibraltarians who had won their amendment in the House of Lords... However, the Falkland Islands amendment was not called during the proceedings and when Mr Shersby tried to raise it, he was ruled out of order.”⁹⁶⁵

October 8th, from London, Lord Carrington telegrams Governor Hunt in the Falkland Islands.

*“... our aim remains to solve the dispute by negotiation. But we recognise the hardening of opinion in the Islands against substantive sovereignty negotiations: and, given the likely positions of the new Councillors, we cannot realistically expect to make quick and easy conversions. Our minimum objective however must be to obtain Councillor's early agreement to a further round of talks in order to listen to what the Argentines have to say and to avoid the consequences of a breakdown in the dialogue. ... Councillors should be clear that we have no doubt about our sovereignty, but they should also be reminded of the advantages which a settlement would bring in terms of expanding the economy and exploiting natural resources. ... There have been no overt threats yet, but implicit in all the Argentine pressure on us has been the thought that they have the means to make Islanders' lives difficult. ... There is, also, ultimately, the risk of military confrontation.”*⁹⁶⁶

October 13th, from Portsmouth, HMS *Endurance* (Capt. Barker) sails for the Falkland Islands.

*“... the decision to pay her off next year was not an easy one to take. But the Government has to see to it that the resources allocated to defence are spent to the very best effect. ... the relatively limited contribution made by HMS *Endurance* to our defence capability does not justify the continued expense*

963 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810469–0965

964 *HL Deb* 29 November 1982 vol 436 cc1076-106 . Lord Elton opening the debate. See -

<https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1982/nov/29/british-nationality-falkland-islands>

965 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1981 no.11

966 *PREM19/656 f21*. See - [https://c59574e9047e61130f13-](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/0978A5B858414101B602ACBD1E14774C.pdf)

[3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/0978A5B858414101B602ACBD1E14774C.pdf](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/0978A5B858414101B602ACBD1E14774C.pdf)

of running her. I regret this as much as you do. ... I cannot accept your view that paying her off will be tantamount to surrendering any stake we may have in Antarctica's resources. ... the decision to pay off Endurance was a collective Government decision. ... I would ask you to believe that this does not foreshadow any loss of interest on the Government's part in the Falkland Islands, their dependencies or our important stake in Antarctica." ⁹⁶⁷

October 14th, in London, having reviewed a possible submission to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding the Falkland Islands, the Foreign Office reports.

"... 2. The attached paper, prepared for the last round of negotiations with the Argentines, sets out our view of the legal position on the Falkland Islands and Dependencies. [REDACTED].

3. The question of British sovereignty in the area has not been submitted to the ICJ or to any other international tribunal. In 1947 and subsequently HMG offered to submit the dispute over Argentine claims in the Dependencies to the ICJ; and in 1955 HMG applied unilaterally to the Court against encroachments on British sovereignty in the Dependencies by Argentina and Chile. However, the matter could not be pursued since both Argentina and Chile declined to submit to the Court's jurisdiction in the matter. ⁹⁶⁸

4. In 1966 the question arose as to whether in the course of negotiations with the Argentines, the UK should offer to refer the dispute over the Falkland Islands to the ICJ. The Law Officers were asked to advise whether the strength in law of the British case for sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies was sufficient to justify such a reference. [REDACTED]... ⁹⁶⁹

5. The question was not, however, pursued further. This was partly because reference to the Court would have had no attraction for Argentina (as Argentina does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, any reference to the Court could only be made with the agreement of the Argentine Government.), [REDACTED]...

6. [REDACTED] If for political reasons it seemed advisable to offer international adjudication or arbitration to the Argentines again as a method of resolving the dispute, the Law Officers would first need to be consulted. Legal Advisers also consider that reference to an ad hoc arbitration tribunal might be preferable to reference to the ICJ since the composition of the former would have to be agreed between us and the Argentines. But given the Argentines repudiation of the award made by an arbitration tribunal in the Beagle Channel case, despite their prior agreement to accept its findings, no reference to international arbitration is likely to help solve the dispute. The Argentines would be unlikely to accept a ruling that the Islands were British and it would be politically very difficult for the UK to hand them over to Argentina, if the ruling went the other way. If arbitration went in our favour we might gain some advantage at the UN, but this would be only temporary as the great majority of UN member-states will continue to see the dispute as a colonial problem." ⁹⁷⁰

⁹⁶⁷ Thatcher to Lord Buxton October 13, 1982. Thatcher MSS (Churchill Archive Centre): THCR 3/2/71 f31. Thatcher was responding to a letter from Lord Buxton of September, 1981.

⁹⁶⁸ See 1955.

⁹⁶⁹ The first round of negotiations with Argentina commenced in July, 1966. The legal advice which predates that (exact date in 1966 unknown) remains embargoed. What is known, is that the 1966 opinion generally approved of the legal advice provided in 1947; which was favourable to the UK. This letter suggests that it also dealt specifically with an approach to the ICJ. There is some evidence that in 1969 an offer to put the question before the ICJ was made to Argentina, but that this was turned down. cf. 1947, June, 1966 & March 24, 1969.

⁹⁷⁰ ALW 040/325/1 Part B 26. There is no attachment with this file.

*“Thank you for your secret and personal letter FST.462/47/09 of 24th June (1966) regarding the Anglo-Argentine talks on the subject of the Falkland Islands. I note that the memorandum summarising the opinions of the Law Officers is for my personal information only.”*⁹⁷¹

On the same day, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams reports on a conversation with Dr. Camili6n; *“For serious and constructive negotiations it was necessary to tackle all the component parts of what was a complex issue.”*⁹⁷²

*“I was trying to convey first of all that it was necessary to start meaningful negotiations, and it was necessary to find a new approach. In those days I was toying with something like a Hong Kong style approach ...”*⁹⁷³

October 25th, a documentary is aired on British television – *More British than the British* – concerning the political issues facing Falkland Islanders.

October 29th, from Buenos Aires, the British Embassy requests information from the FCO as regards the legal status of the Falkland Islands Dependencies.⁹⁷⁴

October 30th, in Britain, the British Nationality Act receives Royal Assent; to take effect on January 1st, 1983.⁹⁷⁵

*“The British Government, by successfully blocking every attempt to modify the Nationality Bill in favour of Falkland Islanders who do not have grandparents born in the United Kingdom, has forced some 300 or so to accept second class citizenship. This gives them no right of abode and employment in the United Kingdom”*⁹⁷⁶

*“... Margaret Thatcher stripped them – and all other overseas territories – of (full UK citizenship) in 1981 in order to stop the people of Hong Kong moving to Britain before the handover to China.”*⁹⁷⁷

*“Its main purpose was to prevent millions of Hong Kong citizens from coming to Britain before and after the return of the territory to China in 1997, but some 600-700 native born Falkland Islanders who were not “patrial”, i.e. who did not have at least one British parent or grand parent (precisely those who had lived longest in the islands), also lost their full British citizenship including their right of abode in Britain. ... The Act was seen both in the Falklands and in Argentina as a step on the road towards the abrogation of all responsibility for the islanders by Britain.”*⁹⁷⁸

November 9th, in Buenos Aires, President Viola, is rushed to hospital with excessively high blood pressure.

November 10th, in Britain's House of Lords, the proposed withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* is again opposed.

“... Argentina continues to press her claims to the Falkland Islands. The recent argument put forward is that they form part of the Argentinian continental shelf.... Against the general background of uncertainty in the region it seems improvident of the Ministry of Defence – one presumes with the tacit

971 Haskard to Bennet July 31, 1966 in CO 1024/585

972 Charlton 1989 p.106

973 Oscar Camilion interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.107

974 Referred to in *FCO to UKE Buenos Aires November 26, 1981* in ALW 040/325/5. See below. This appears to have arisen as a result of an editorial in the *La Nacion* newspaper, which discusses a suggestion that if Argentina gained the Falkland islands, then the UK would automatically lose all rights to the Dependencies and the British Antarctic Sector.

975 Section 14 was the relevant part of this legislation for the Dependent Territories. For those with a strong constitution, and a lawyer's eye, it can be viewed here - [https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61/section/14#:~:text=14,Meaning of British citizen \(by descent\).&text=\(b\)in service under a a member of the Communities.&text=\(b\)service of any description,under section 2\(3\)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61/section/14#:~:text=14,Meaning%20of%20British%20citizen%20(by%20descent).&text=(b)in%20service%20under%20a%20member%20of%20the%20Communities.&text=(b)service%20of%20any%20description,under%20section%202(3).). The Falkland Islanders would be removed from the provisions of this enactment by the British Nationality (Falkland islands) Act 1983. See March, 1983.

976 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1981 no.11

977 *Banished Islanders are Citizens Again* Anthony Browne in *The Guardian* May 12, 2002

978 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.629-630.

acceptance of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – to withdraw the Royal Naval Ice Patrol Ship HMS "Endurance" from Antarctica in 1982 as part of the wider decision to reduce the size of the active fleet. ... Could this decision not be interpreted by all other involved nations as a sign of declining interest in the Antarctic by Great Britain? Obviously there can be no such intention. But the best and most obvious way to prove it, in my view, is to reverse the decision to scrap HMS Endurance." 979

On the same day, Argentine Army General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri returns to Buenos Aires following a successful trip to the USA; "Galtieri was warmly received on his 1981 visit to Washington and returned convinced the US would turn a blind eye to the invasion." 980

November 16th, in Buenos Aires, US envoy, Vernon Walters, arrives for discussions with General Galtieri.

"Walters was in Buenos Aires, intermittently, for many days, between October 1981 and February 1982. He discussed, inter alia, the establishment of a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation. He also discussed the advantages for such an organisation of an island-base in the Falklands, somewhat along the lines of Diego Garcia. However, the understanding was that the agreement on Hemispheric and other grounds should be between the United States and Argentina, the bulwark of American policy in the South Atlantic, and not between the US and Britain. Asked by the Argentine Military what Britain would do, the American replied to the effect that the British would huff, puff and protest, and do nothing, with the implication that the Americans could soothe ruffled British feathers." 981

"When asked whether the United States would remain neutral in the event of a conflict, Walters intimated that neutrality would be contingent upon the absence of any British casualties from Argentine military action." 982

"Between November 16 and December 4, a series of conferences was held at the Navy Mechanics Schools (ESMA), the contents of which were not published in the media. ... These were titled 'Argentine Objectives in the South Atlantic' and (in attendance) you could see the most qualified of the Argentine leadership ... They talked about Patagonian development, oil exploitation and fishing resources; the relevance of the merchant fleet, the South Atlantic and its geopolitical projection ..." 983

"... Galtieri unjustifiably trusted that the United States would appreciate the role played by the Argentine army in the armed repression of Honduras and the fight against Sandinismo in Nicaragua – in the so-called "Plan Charlie". This Argentine role in Central America – carried out at the instigation of the United States – together with Galtieri's radical anti-communist discourse, made him believe, in Cold War logic, that US support for his cause would be unconditional. ... It should not be forgotten that the close alliance between the United States and England was a long-standing reality, especially during the history of the 20th century. Therefore, to suppose that the North American country would support Argentina to the detriment of England was one of the great strategic errors of the Military Junta." 984

November 25th, at the UN, the General Assembly defer consideration of the Falklands' question until 1982.

979 Lord Murton in *HL Deb 10.11.1981 vol.425* Hansard

980 Galtieri obituary in *The Guardian*, January 13, 2003. Galtieri had held meetings with a number of American diplomats including Vice-President George Bush, but there is nothing to suggest that the Falklands were ever discussed. Galtieri's ego, however, had certainly been massaged by effusive comments to the press; being described as "majestic".

981 *One Man's Falklands* Tam Dalyell 1982 pp.133-4

982 *The Reagan Revolution II: Rebuilding the Western Alliance* R. C. Thornton 2004

983 Yofre 2011

984 *Guerra Fría e intervención estadounidense en Malvinas (1982)* Ana Laura Bochicchio 2021 in *Quinto Sol: Revista de Historia* vol.25 no.1

November 26th, from Britain's Foreign Office, responding to the British Embassy in Buenos Aires' request for information, a review of sovereignty over the Falklands Dependencies and British Antarctic Territory is supplied.

“The basis of British sovereignty over these territories was conveniently summarised in the application made to the International Court of Justice in May 1955 by HMG. ... (i) the claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands Dependencies was separate from and independent of the British title to the Falkland Islands themselves. ... the title to sovereignty was based on discovery accompanied by a formal claim in the name of the British Crown and occupation of the various parts of the Falkland Islands Dependencies. ...

Argentina's claims were made at different dates. It was only in 1925 that she first claimed the South Orkneys and in 1937 that the claim was extended to cover the South Shetlands and Graham Land (formally defined in 1946). ...

*Clearly, we have a good, separate root of title to the BAT and each FI Dependency. ... it is the opinion of legal advisers that the sovereignty of the Crown over the British Antarctic Territory would not be prejudiced in any way were HMG to cede or to offer to cede sovereignty over any part of the Falkland Islands and their dependencies to Argentina.”*⁹⁸⁵

On the same day, Robin Fearn (South America Department), writes to Ambassador Williams in Buenos Aires.

“1. ... Research Department have now completed their paper (on which we were consulted while it was in draft) and I enclose a copy.

2. Our original intention had been, ... to produce a classified paper and an accompanying sanitised version for use with suitable contacts. However, the nature of the paper and its conclusions have led us to decide to have the whole classified secret and not to produce any companion unclassified paper. The facts would seem to be that our case rests almost entirely on 148 years of continuous settlement, and that while the Law Officers have previously been relatively certain that this would be sufficient in International Law to uphold our claim, there is certainly some risk in putting the contention to the test, particularly given the probable in-built anti-colonial bias of most of the international institutions which might be involved if the case went to arbitration.

*3. This paper, then, is for the information of you and your staff only: I do not need to stress how potentially damaging the consequences would be if the Argentine's came to suspect that we doubted our ability to justify our claim to sovereignty before 1833.”*⁹⁸⁶

In Buenos Aires, Davidoff puts his final plans together for the dismantling of the scrap metal on South Georgia.

“... in late November, two high-ranking naval officers and two foreign office officials met with Constantine Davidoff at a restaurant in Calle Florida a popular shopping district in down town Buenos Aires. One of the navy men was Captain Adolpho Palau, of naval transport command, and the other was Captain Cesar Trombetta, of the navy's Antarctic Squadron.... the purpose of their meeting was for the navy officers to tell Davidoff that the Argentine navy was now prepared to transport him free of charge to South Georgia and for the foreign office officials to confirm that the scrap metal he brought back would enter duty-free, increasing his

⁹⁸⁵ FCO to UKE Buenos Aires November 26, 1981 in ALW 040/325/5. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/74E0B9557BB8414DBC282834A356AC4E.pdf>

⁹⁸⁶ Fearn to Williams November 26, 1981 in AW 040/325/1. The attachments are subject to embargo. Closed for 47 years under exemption 27(1)(c) dated August 28, 2012. Likely to include both the legal opinions of 1947 and 1966; despite the 1947 opinion being available at the Public Records Office at Kew. cf. 1947

profit margin... Davidoff, never having been to South Georgia, proposed to make a brief trip to inspect the whaling stations. Trombetta agreed; it would provide an opportunity to take a closer look at the island and test the likely British reaction.”⁹⁸⁷

December 2nd, in the UK, Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington writes to the Prime Minister.

“... talks are due to be held on 17 and 18 December in Geneva;... Islander opinion is even more strongly opposed to any 'deal' with the Argentines over sovereignty. ... We therefore have little room for manoeuvre,... Argentines have requested this meeting, so we can allow them to make the running.”⁹⁸⁸

December 3rd, in Buenos Aires, President Viola is once again hospitalized following a suspected heart attack.

“As we had already anticipated, between today and the beginning of next week the definitive departure of General Viola will be resolved.”⁹⁸⁹

“Before waiting for the medical tests, the President of the Nation was considered displaced, not for clinical reasons but for political and economic reasons.”⁹⁹⁰

December 4th, Admiral Jorge Anaya attends the last of the Navy Mechanics School debates.

“Anaya improvised some words in which he spoke of the value of the Malvinas and the changes that were in the air, about to happen.”⁹⁹¹

December 8th, in London, Robin Fearn, Head of the Foreign Office's South American Department, informs the US Embassy that two days of negotiations with Argentina over the Falkland Islands are due to resume; with two representatives from the Islands in attendance.

“HMG views Argentina as the proposer and HMG as the responder in the upcoming talks. The sovereignty issue remains central, and the Islanders seem more determined than ever to remain British. HMG's position is straightforward: It seeks a resolution of the issue, but will not agree to a settlement "over the heads of the Islanders". HMG is pessimistic about possibilities for any dramatic breakthroughs. The Islanders have rejected the lease back arrangement, and few options seem available. ... It is easy to understand, he said, why those currently in charge in Buenos Aires are not well loved. The Falklanders argue with considerable effect in London that they do not wish to become "1800 more disappeared persons".”⁹⁹²

December 9th, from Port Stanley, Governor Hunt sails in HMS *Endurance*; to visit the Dependencies.

In the evening, following press reports of Viola's deteriorating health, Galtieri and Anaya meet.

“There are those that maintain that at a dinner held on December 9, 1981, with their wives present, Admiral Anaya convinced Galtieri to help him overthrow Viola if in exchange he (would) support a joint military operation to recover the Malvinas Islands ...”⁹⁹³

December 11th, in Buenos Aires, it is announced that General Leopoldo Galtieri will assume the Presidency on December 22 - to complete Viola's term.⁹⁹⁴

987 Thornton 2004. There are different versions of this story; none of which can be confirmed.

988 *ALW 040/325/2 Part E 301*. US sources refer to the talks being scheduled for December 18/19.

989 Journalist Jesus Iglesias Rouco in *La Prensa* December 3, 1981. Quite how ill President Viola was, is much disputed.

990 Yofre 2011

991 *Ibid.*

992 *Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State December 10, 1981 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

993 Yofre 2011

994 President Viola refused to offer his resignation. He was dismissed on the grounds of ill health.

“... what I would stress is that I doubt whether, from our point of view, any change is going to make a vast difference.”⁹⁹⁵

“In the 19th and 20th centuries Argentine elites deliberately used irredentism to cultivate an Argentine national identity among a diverse immigrant population. By all indications this was enormously successful: to this day Argentine nationalism is an unusually potent strain. The Junta that came to power in 1982 was the first to have passed through Argentine schools after the claim to the Malvinas gained prominence in the textbooks. In this sense the moral claim itself has a domestic political explanation. Nevertheless, the Junta's perception of historical injustice was sincere.”⁹⁹⁶

In a deal with Anaya, Galtieri controversially retains his position as head of the Army.⁹⁹⁷

“Seeing the Argentina flag fly over the Malvinas was the life-long dream of Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, commander-in-chief of the navy and the driving force behind Argentina's policy on the sovereignty dispute. In December 1981 he supported his boyhood friend Leopoldo Galtieri's bid for the presidency on the condition that Galtieri would secure sovereignty over the disputed islands once and for all.”⁹⁹⁸

“It is said by associates of both men that this agreement ... involved assurances on a number of policy issues. One of these was an understanding that the recovery of the Falklands should be achieved within the two years of Galtieri's presidency term, preferably before January 1983...”⁹⁹⁹

“(Anaya) was an ardent 'Malvinist', but the suggestion that he made the recovery of the islands a condition of his support for the new President is not supported by senior Argentine Admirals. They believe that when Galtieri became President he asked Anaya and Brigadier Lami Dozo, the air Force member of the junta, what future plans the old junta had been developing ... the head of the list for foreign policy was the resolution of the 'Malvinas problem.' ...”¹⁰⁰⁰

“Contrary to popular impression, however, Galtieri obtained neither a mandate nor a full term of office, and would be required to relinquish his army command in a year. In short, as president, Galtieri could count on exercising considerable power for a year, after which the junta would be enlarged by an additional member, Galtieri's replacement as army chief. This arrangement was clearly an incentive for Galtieri to take action while his power was relatively unconstrained.”¹⁰⁰¹

December 12th, at South Georgia, Governor Hunt speaks to the BAS base commander, Peter Witty and visits the old whaling station at Grytviken.

December 14th, in London, dealing with a question regarding the occupation by Argentina of Southern Thule, Lord Carrington states; “... if my noble friend is suggesting the use of force, he will recollect that international law and the United Nations Charter require disputes to be settled by peaceful means. That is what we have been trying to do...”¹⁰⁰²

995 Williams to FCO December 3, 1981 FCO 12/384 f29

996 Welch 1997

997 Military governments had tended to comprise the Head of State (President) and the heads of the three services. A four-man junta (board). Galtieri appears to have negotiated this concession on the basis that he would voluntarily 'retire' once he had completed his predecessor's term at the end of 1982.

998 Welch 1997

999 Jenkins & Hastings 1997

1000 *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* Martin Middlebrook 2003

1001 Thornton 2004

1002 *HL Deb 14 December 1981 vol.426 cc5-6*. At this time, Argentina's meteorological station on Southern Thule was staffed by seven naval scientists and four civilians, of which three were radio technicians.

December 15th, Argentina requests a postponement of the negotiations due to start on the 17th. Britain agrees.

From Buenos Aires, Admiral Jorge Anaya flies to Puerto Belgrano.

*“On Tuesday 15 December 1981, Admiral Jorge Anaya flew from Buenos Aires to the main Argentine naval base at Puerto Belgrano, 280 miles away to the south-west. He went there to perform the official installation of Vice-Admiral Juan Lombardo as the new Chief of Naval Operations; ... After the ceremony, Anaya surprised Lombardo by quietly telling him to prepare a plan to occupy the Falkland islands: to 'take them but not necessarily to keep them' are the words Lombardo remembers.”*¹⁰⁰³

From the Rio de la Plata, on the same day, an Argentine naval transport - *Almirante Trizar* (Capt. Cesar Trombetta) - sails for South Georgia.¹⁰⁰⁴ Constantino Davidoff is on board.

*“178. Once the transfer of Davidoff and a small group of people have been agreed to evaluate the work to be carried out, on 15-DEC-81 the ARA "Almirante Trizar" set sail from Buenos Aires.”*¹⁰⁰⁵

*“Davidoff and his men were issued with the 'white cards' that served as bilateral documentation in the dealings of both countries in the South Atlantic region as per the 1971 Communication Accords.”*¹⁰⁰⁶

*“... Davidoff's enterprise lay dormant until activated on late 1981. At that point scrap metal prices began to plummet from \$93 to \$63 per ton, suggesting that profit was not necessarily the reason for the venture...”*¹⁰⁰⁷

*“The business was inviting. It was estimated according to The Sunday Times that (for) those 35,000 tons of metal Davidoff had paid £115,000, when in 1979 a tonne of scrap was sold at £214, representing a profit of £7 million.”*¹⁰⁰⁸

December 16th, in London, the House of Lords debates the “South West Atlantic”.¹⁰⁰⁹ Lord Shackleton speaks:

“But I want to repeat something of which no Government will ever take cognisance, although it is in my report, which was rather long, and I shall not blame the noble Lord, Lord Skelmersdale, if he has not had time to read it. But the fact is that over the 23 years up to 1973, the Falklands effectively contributed to the United Kingdom Exchequer—that is, out of profits repatriated to this country—more than twice what they received by way of assistance at current prices. In certain years, it may have been the other way round. I am not making a racist point, but if the inhabitants had been not British but Indian, coloured or black, there would have been a howl at the United Nations, because this is a classic example of colonial exploitation. I say that without any hesitation. The British have failed to repay a debt which they owe to the Falklands.

The fact is that at the moment the people there, for good or for ill, are totally opposed to the idea of being joined up with the Argentine. But it is not only the Falkland Islands. There are the dependencies. There is that marvellous island of South Georgia, one of the most beautiful islands in the world, which

1003 *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* M. Middlebrook 2003. In *El fracaso de la cumbre entre argentinos y británicos que decidió la guerra: “En un mes tomamos las Malvinas”* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022 the date is given as December 22, 1981.

1004 *Junta Militar: Comision de Analisis y Evaluacion de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlantico Syr – Inform Final* a.k.a. The Rattenbach Report (undated). Other sources suggest the 16th.

1005 *Ibid.*

1006 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.42. In fact the white cards did not apply to South Georgia or any of the Dependencies. *cf.* 1971

1007 Thornton 2004. There are different versions of this story. None can be confirmed.

1008 *Malvinas: las causas inmediatas de la Guerra* M. Meneghini 2015

1009 See - <https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/1981-12-16/debates/cc6d37d9-cf28-46a2-8ece-879f0d4b9f09/South-WestAtlanticDevelopmentOpportunities>

*is on the other side of the Antarctic convergence. Although it is only the same latitude South as Manchester is North, it is very sub-arctic. It has marvellous wildlife, abandoned ghost towns from the days of the whaling stations, tens of thousand of pounds worth of equipment. It is the centre of one of the richest fishing areas in the world. These ports are properly British. We have developed them. Although at the moment there is only a British Antarctic survey base, it would be intolerable if the Falkland Islands were leased or given away and if South Georgia should also go that way. ”*¹⁰¹⁰

Representing the Government, Lord Skelmersdale adds:

*“My noble friend Lord Buxton asked why we are talking to the Argentines at all. The claim of the Argentines simply will not go away. As long as the dispute continues, it will remain difficult for the islands to be developed properly and there will be a shadow of uncertainty over the islanders' daily lives. That is why successive British Governments have held talks with the Argentines, and we are continuing to do so. But the wishes of the islanders themselves are paramount. No solution could be approved which was not acceptable both to them and to Parliament. ”*¹⁰¹¹

During the course of the debate, the expected withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* is mention sixty-five times.

*“... around mid-December 1981, at the request of the Legislative Council at Stanley, the Parliament called for an increased naval presence in the area, aiming at the Antarctic projection. The authors of this initiative, who were deeply reluctant to negotiate sovereignty, were part of the most recalcitrant group of islanders. They, together with the British corporations having economic interests in the islands, who were afraid of losing their privileges, prevented Argentina from consolidating her bonds with the islanders and demanded military protection from the United Kingdom, that would dissuade any armed actions. The members of the UKFIC saw in this demand the best excuse to create lobby groups in the British Parliament. The Houses, made up of Members of Parliament with radicalized ideas, the far-right press and the admiralty itself joint forces to ensure sovereignty was not handed over to Argentina. On the pretext that they aimed at protecting the natives' wishes, they coerced both the UK Government and public opinion. Moreover, they counted on Governor Rex Hunt's collaboration. ”*¹⁰¹²

In Buenos Aires, the British Embassy receive a letter from Constantino Davidoff.¹⁰¹³

*“We have received a letter from Davidoff, whose name will be familiar to you, informing us that he intends to visit the installations at Leith, Stomless (sic) and Husvic, accompanied by seven or eight civilian assistants, to take an inventory of the equipment. He does not say how he is getting there,... This is the first we have heard of Davidoff for some time. We have since tried to contact him by telephone, so far unsuccessfully, so he may have departed already. ”*¹⁰¹⁴

*“Although Davidoff had permission for the visit, the manner in which he was taken by the Argentine Navy was not calculated to ease British suspicions. He notified the British Embassy in Buenos Aires of his date of sailing, but the letter arrived after he had left and it was vague in detail and did not ask for diplomatic clearance for the Almirante Irizar. ”*¹⁰¹⁵

1010 Hansard: Lords: 16 December 1981: South-West Atlantic Development Opportunities vol.426 col.211

1011 Ibid. col.232

1012 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1013 In correspondence with the British Ambassador dated March 25, 1982, Davidoff would claim that this letter was delivered to the Embassy on December 11, 1981

1014 *UKE Buenos Aires to Governor Falkland Islands December 18, 1981* in FCO12/384 f43

1015 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.42

*“Davidoff deliberately delayed sending the letter to the embassy, on Trombetta's advise, who intended it as a "provocation". But Davidoff also sent a telex to Christian Salvesens in Edinburgh, informing the company of his trip, and Salvesens had promptly informed the Foreign Office. London had thus been informed of Davidoff's visit well in advance of his arrival.”*¹⁰¹⁶

In Buenos Aires, a group of politicians sign a declaration calling for unconditional democratic elections.¹⁰¹⁷

December 17th, in Argentina, Basilio Arturo Lami Dozo is promoted to head the Air Force.

On the same day, the company of Christian Salvesens informs the Governor of the Falkland Islands that Davidoff and seven others are sailing for South Georgia; *“to photograph and inventory scrap. BAS commander Grytviken and BAS Cambridge have been informed through BAS channels.”*¹⁰¹⁸

December 18th, in Buenos Aires, the new junta meet to discuss their objectives in international relations. These, for the Argentine government 1981-1984, are identified as:

“Contribute to the solution of the conflict with Chile by developing actins established by a military committee.

Defend and control Argentine interests in the Southern Cone.

Preserve Argentina's Antarctic rights and develop the Argentine presence in the region

*Intensify all necessary and appropriate courses of action to obtain recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.”*¹⁰¹⁹

*“(ex Chancellor Dr. Nicanor Costa Méndez) ... briefed the Junta ... as to the dismal state of negotiations with Britain and the need to develop a policy prior to the resumption of talks in the coming February. ... From the Argentine perspective serious discussions, addressing the sovereignty issue, only took place for two short periods during ... sixteen years: between 1966 and 1967, and from 1977 to 1980. For the rest of the time the Falkland Islands lobby undermined the flexibility of the Foreign Office and its conduct of the negotiations. ... The immediate Argentine objective was to return to the original negotiating framework of 1965-7.”*¹⁰²⁰

*“Why Malvinas? ... it contained that element that would guarantee, in some way, unquestionable support from Argentine society as a whole. But in addition, it had the potential capacity to transform the character of the Armed Forces, since for the latter it could mean – in the words of Leon Rozitchner – to move from "dirty internal war to external clean war", by recovering that part of a formerly usurped country, finally re-establishing true national integrity, and at the same time making the "enemy" of the Argentine people to England and not the Military Junta. In this way, what was intended was to "reconquer" the Falkland Islands to "conquer" the Argentine people.”*¹⁰²¹

*“In reality, Galtieri did not have a plan for the Malvinas because the Army (had) never worked on it as a conflict hypothesis. The one that did have a plan that was permanently updated was the Navy.”*¹⁰²²

1016 Thornton 2004

1017 Yofre 2011

1018 FCO12/384 f41

1019 Yofre 2011

1020 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990. Costa Méndez had been Foreign Minister under President Ogania 1966 to 1969.

1021 Carbone 2008

1022 Yofre 2011

December 19th, arriving in Buenos Aires, Argentina's ambassador to Peru, Luis Sánchez Moreno, is updated in a meeting with Admiral Anaya.

"Anaya told Vice Admiral Luis Sánchez Moreno, ...: "The Reorganization Process National has deteriorated greatly and we have to look for an element that brings society together. That element is Malvinas". Sánchez Moreno answered: "I have studied several years in an English school. I know the English as much as you do, Margaret Thatcher is not going to let herself be carried away by a military government. The English are like bull dogs, when they bite their prey they don't let go". ..., the head of the Navy (promptly) ended the meeting. He assumed his role as Commander and with a formal "that's all Sánchez Moreno" dismissed him." ¹⁰²³

"(Admiral Anaya) ... told a retired admiral on 19 December that the military government faced collapse and had to find an element 'to bring cohesion to the country and that element is the Malvinas'..." ¹⁰²⁴

December 20th, at Stromness Bay in South Georgia, *Almirante Irizar* anchors. ¹⁰²⁵

"En route the Almirante Irizar maintained radio silence and did not notify the Magistrate (the designation given the commander of the British Antarctic Survey to indicate Crown authority) at King Edward Point, Grytviken, to notify him of the arrival. King Edward Point was the official point of entry where Customs and Immigration clearance was obtained." ¹⁰²⁶

"Trobetta traversed the 1,650-mile passage in four days maintaining radio silence, an unusual procedure, and without radioing the magistrate at Grytviken, the official port of entry, of his impending visit. Upon arrival on December 20 (?), Trombetta declined to follow prescribed landing procedures by obtaining clearance at Grytviken. Instead he proceeded directly to Leith,..." ¹⁰²⁷

"There he inspected the material that (he) had purchased: 30 fuel storage tanks, cooking plant, diesel power plant of 1,500kw, boiler and machinery, in Leith; other facilities in Husvik and Stromnes, plus two floating docks of 700 and 1,000 tons in the latter port." ¹⁰²⁸

"On board the icebreaker Almirante Irizar, the Grupo Alfa sailed to Tierra del Fuego in order to train in cold weather areas. Having nothing to do with them, Davidoff and six other people were also on board the Irizar heading for South Georgia Island in order to survey the terrain for scrapping." ¹⁰²⁹

December 22nd, in Buenos Aires, during his inauguration speech at the National Congress Building, General/President Galtieri surprisingly makes no reference to the Islands. Admiral Anaya passes a hand written message to his Chief of Staff, Vice-Admiral Alberto Gabriel Vigo.

"It was the first order of the armed conflict that was approaching: 1.1.- The NOC (Commander of Naval Operations) will present me with an updated plan. 1.2- Send selected personnel for recognition. 1.3.- Plan after occupation. 1.3.1. - Effective to stay in Stanley. 1.3.2. - Support for these troops. 1.3.3. – Logistics for Stanley.

1023 *El día que la Flota de Mar cortó las comunicaciones y no hubo vuelta atrás en la recuperación de Malvinas* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* March 30, 2024

1024 Briley 2022

1025 According to the *Junta Militar: Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur – Informe Final* a.k.a. The Rattenbach Report (undated), the ship arrived on the 18th. However, four days from Buenos Aires is unlikely. This Report also states that the Argentine ship stayed only a few hours before leaving for Ushuaia, from where Davidoff flew to Buenos Aires. Other sources suggest that the vessel remained three days.

1026 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.42

1027 Thornton 2004.

1028 Meneghini 2015

1029 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023. See August, 1981, above, and February, 1982, below.

2.- *Super Etendard*. They must be brought into the country with all their weapons as they are ready. Before 01 Jun '82. 3.- P-3 Before 01 Jun '82.”¹⁰³⁰

On the same day, Dr. Nicanor Costa Méndez is appointed as Argentina's Foreign Minister.

“According to the Rattenbach report, when he took over the Chancellery, Dr. Nicanor Costa Méndez had two meetings with Galtieri in which he was given the directive of activating as much as possible the diplomatic negotiations aimed at the recognition of Argentine sovereignty in Malvinas,

adding that he would not rule out the need to reach something more than diplomacy in the event that Britain once again attempted to delay the resolution of the question. Thus, during the months that followed, the Junta appealed to both formal and informal channels to make British diplomats understand that the option of the invasion was a reality and not a mere bluff to coerce them to sit down and negotiate.”¹⁰³¹



“The new Junta updated its invasion plans and gave public clues as to its intentions. Galtieri appointed Dr. Nicanor Costa Méndez as Foreign Minister, a diplomat obsessed with seizing Falklands sovereignty. Galtieri made a speech saying he wanted to create a 'Greater Argentina', which, my Argentine contacts told me, meant getting possession of the Falkland Islands and the Beagle Channel from Chile.”¹⁰³²

December 23rd, at the Leith whaling station on South Georgia, after Davidoff and the Argentine ship have sailed, a member of the BAS checks the station; finding the phrase – '*Las Malvinas son Argentinas*' – scrawled on the walls. Governor Hunt is informed by radio.

“By the time that the BAS discovered that the visit had been made, the *Almirante Irizar* had gone. The Magistrate visited Leith on 23 December to find traces of the Argentine visit including a wall defaced with the slogan '*Las Malvinas son Argentinas*', helpfully dated 20 December. The news of the visitation was passed on to Governor Hunt, who in turn passed it to London on 31 December.”¹⁰³³

In Argentina, during the evening of the same day, Vice-Admiral Vigo issues written instructions to Vice-Admiral Juan José Lombardo to; “personally prepare and deliver to me the updated Plan for the recovery of the Malvinas.”¹⁰³⁴

“By order of Senor COAR, he must personally prepare and hand over to me the updated plan for the recovery of Malvinas.



1030 Yofre 2011. The *Dassault-Breguet Super Étendard* was a French built carrier born strike fighting aircraft. In 1981, Argentina had ordered five of these aircraft, together with five Exocet missiles. The *Lockheed P-3 Orion* was a maritime patrol aircraft.

1031 Carbone 2008

1032 Briley 2022

1033 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.43

1034 Yofre 2011

A. For this purpose, (he) will arrange for the sending of selected personnel to carry out the necessary reconnaissance with adequate coverage.

B. Said plan must include the detailed development of the following aspects of the occupation:

1- Personnel that should remain in Port Stanley

2- Support these troops

3- Defense of Port Stanley

4- Port Stanley support logistics

Plan delivery date: 31 Mar 1982”¹⁰³⁵

“(Admiral) Lombardo, who commanded the South Atlantic operations, had a series of meetings with the head of Marine Special Forces who was to lead the invasion, Admiral Carlos Bússer...”¹⁰³⁶

In Buenos Aires, a number of discreet press briefings take place at the Foreign Ministry.

“... the task of preparing the Argentine people for the possible military operation to be carried out, was also in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This task had begun in late December 1981 when Costa Méndez began to inform a select group of journalists about the government's intentions. He told them that Argentina was determined to recover the Malvinas by the end of 1982, through diplomatic channels if possible, by force if necessary.”¹⁰³⁷

December 29th, in Argentina, the bulk of the conscript army are demobilized at the end of the year.¹⁰³⁸

“From 1901 to 1996, Argentina required universal military service for all males. After 1976, eighteen year-olds were inducted into service. Of the total available pool, some received exemptions on the basis of being unable to meet physical requirements or having dependency considerations. The total number of conscripts was then determined by the current training budget. All males of the total pool were assigned by lottery to the Army, Navy, or Air Force, and the conscripts served for only one year. The principal advantages of such a conscript system are, first, that it provides a large standing force of young men. Second, as soon as conscripts finish their period of active duty, they became part of a reserve. Third, the system provides the state with substantial, immediately usable forces, at a fairly cheap cost. Finally, it provides a state with the means for quick mobilization in wartime.”¹⁰³⁹

December 30th, in London, the Argentine Ambassador, Ortiz de Rozas, calls for a new round of negotiations early in the New Year.¹⁰⁴⁰

December 31st, from Port Stanley, London is informed of the unauthorised visit of the *Almirante Irizar*.

“Davidoff is required by Dependencies legislation to obtain entry clearance at Grytviken. He knows this and cannot plead ignorance. If he did land at Leith both he and master of vessel have placed themselves open to prosecution under the Immigration Ordinance 1965 and may, if found guilty, be fined or imprisoned for six months. Base commander wants guidance on action to be taken if Davidoff should appear at Grytviken, we advise him to institute proceedings.”¹⁰⁴¹

1035 Armada Argentina No. 326 “S”/81 JEOP, P14

1036 Briley 2022

1037 Carbone 2008

1038 The 'Class of '62' having finished their required service, were in the process being demobilised. The 'Class of '63' were in the process of being called up. Untrained conscripts.

1039 Reassessing the Fighting Performance of Conscript Soldiers during the Malvinas/Falklands War (1982) A. L. Carbacho 2004. This system also robbed Argentina of a majority of its trained troops.

1040 Ure minute to Luce December 30, 1981 in ALW 040/325/2 Part E 301

1041 Governor Falkland Islands telegram to FCO December 31, 1981 in FCO12/384 f45


From London, responding immediately, Lord Carrington telegrams the Falkland Islands' Governor.

“1. It seems to us that any attempt to institute proceedings against Davidoff and/or Master of Argentine naval vessel would risk provoking a most serious incident which could escalate and have an unforeseeable outcome. ...

2. Base commander should therefore NOT, repeat NOT, attempt to institute proceedings. Instead: a) If Davidoff and party present themselves at Grytviken and request entry clearance in appropriate manner, Base commander should grant clearance subject to fulfilment of normal entry requirements. b) if Argentine vessel is naval, then unless party also formally seek clearance for her, Base commander should deliver a formal written protest against her unauthorised entry into British territorial waters. c) if Davidoff and party attempt to land at Grytviken without proper clearance, they should be ordered to depart immediately, but without using threats. d) if they refuse to comply, incident should be reported immediately to FCO for further instructions.

3. Base commander may at his discretion also question Davidoff about the reported landing at Leith. If Davidoff admits the offence, but is otherwise complying with immigration requirements, Base commander should admonish him not to repeat the offence but take no further action.

*4. We shall probably wish in due course to make a protest to the Argentine Government about this incident ... but will first wish to see what transpires at Grytviken and have as full a report as possible of the facts.”*¹⁰⁴²



1042 Carrington to Hunt December 31, 1981 in FCO12/384 f46

1982 – January 1st, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams sends a report to the Foreign Office, evaluating the previous year’s events with regard to the Falkland Islands.

“... it has not been an easy year for the UK in its relations with the Argentine Republic, either politically or in export promotion. In the former, as regards the Falklands, we have had to walk like Agag all year to avoid offence to Argentine, Islander or Falkland lobby sensitivities ... We have come through without a bust-up, but certainly with the Argentines and the Islanders more on each others' nerves than a year ago.” ¹⁰⁴³

January 2nd, in Argentina, the junta meet to debate plans for military solutions in the South Atlantic.

“... on 2 January 1982, the Junta considered the so-called "Alpha Project", first produced in May of the previous year at the request of the Admiral Lombardo and never executed. Seen against the success of 1976, when one of the first acts of the (military) had established a military presence in Thule, ... with the objective of founding a base with a view to the scientific research in the future. Despite English protests about this presence on "British territory", the program was not suspended, which made an attractive precedent. Supporters of the "Alpha Project" assumed that Britain would learn to tolerate an Argentine presence in South Georgia as they had in South Thule. However, at the request of the Naval Operations Command, it was again considered that the time to execute it was not appropriate, since any isolated action could be inconvenient in the circumstances in which the negotiations were held, and it was intended to avoid a potentially negative event for the development of future dialogue with the English. Despite this, the meeting was not unsuccessful as the Junta ... resolved "to explore the possibility of using military power to achieve the political objective"...” ¹⁰⁴⁴

January 4th, from London, Ambassador Williams is instructed to make a formal protest to the Argentine Foreign Ministry with regard to events at South Georgia. ¹⁰⁴⁵

January 5th, in Buenos Aires, the junta again meet to consider the Falklands question.

“It resolved to 'reactivate to the fullest extent all negotiations for the sovereignty of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands' and at the same time 'prepare a contingency plan for the employment of military power should the first alternative fail.'...” ¹⁰⁴⁶

“It was only a contingency plan. The mood was dictated by the absolute lack of progress in negotiations... at that time, at the end of five years of fruitless negotiations, we had become very frustrated.” ¹⁰⁴⁷

“The meeting took place at the Libertador Building, Army headquarters, starting at 9 in the morning. At that meeting the Malvinas issue was analyzed in the context of foreign policy and it was concluded that an "aggressive" policy should be adopted. At the same time it was determined that Operation Davidoff "would not be carried out before the round of negotiations scheduled for the purposes in February of that year in New York with the representatives of the United Kingdom, in order not to give them any reason to make it difficult”. ¹⁰⁴⁸

“According to the report of the Military Junta, "At that meeting, the Malvinas case was dealt with outside the agenda of the Military Junta" and it was decided to commission an "abbreviated" General Staff study with the

1043 FCO Diplomatic Report 14/82 ALA 014/2. To “walk like Agag” apparently means – to walk on eggshells.

1044 Carbone 2008

1045 Franks 1983

1046 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

1047 Rear-Admiral Gaulter Alara quoted in Middlebrook 2003

1048 Yofre 2011. The reference to 'Operation Davidoff' is intriguing.

participation of one representative for each armed force. Also "it was discussed that not only had to obtain a restructuring of the negotiations with Great Britain with a view to the new round of negotiations, but also that studies should be started to analyze the feasibility and convenience of an occupation of the islands." ... As emerges from the exposed documentation, the determining date was January 5, 1982. On that day, it was considered to take a military step in the event that the diplomatic channel did not progress. The decision was made with the formal participation of the three commanders in chief. However, the matter had (already) been analyzed and planned by the Navy, first, and discussed between Anaya and Galtieri later." ¹⁰⁴⁹

"On January 5th, 1982, after a meeting to designate governors, the Military Junta decided, by mutual agreement, to initiate planning for the recapture of the Malvinas Islands in utmost secrecy, since it was based on the scenario that the operation would only be feasible if the United Kingdom did not increase its military strength." ¹⁰⁵⁰

"This decision was made considering the rigidity and emotionality that the issue had demonstrated in Great Britain during 1981." ¹⁰⁵¹

January 6th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams acts on London's instructions to formally protest Davidoff's violation of British sovereignty; "When he approached the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs ... he was told that the Ministry had no knowledge of the incident and was investigating." ¹⁰⁵²

January 7th, from London, the FCO inform Ambassador Williams in Buenos Aires that the British Government can now offer a new round of negotiations on 22/23 February. ¹⁰⁵³

January 8th, in Argentina, *La Nacion* reports that inflation during 1981 reached 331.6%.

Four US Senators arrive in Buenos Aires, including Howard Baker (Tennessee) and Paul Laxalt (Nevada).

"... an attempt was made to demonstrate the importance given to the (Malvinas) issue in front of third parties. This is how Chancellor Costa Méndez informed Senator Baker of the United States during his visit in January 1982, that the situation between Great Britain and Argentina was conflictive and asked him to make this issue known to his government." ¹⁰⁵⁴

From the Directorate of Antarctica and the Malvinas, career diplomat Carlos Lucas Blanco, forwards for the information of Enrique Ros, an outline of the failures of previous negotiations with the United Kingdom.

"After listing the topics that would be discussed at the New York meeting, and given the possibility of not receiving any satisfactory response from the United Kingdom, Banco said: "This would facilitate the acceptance by the international community of an eventual fait accompli, which would be presented as the only way open to obtain satisfaction of the Argentine claim, given the reluctant attitude of the United Kingdom". ¹⁰⁵⁵

1049 *El plan de la Armada que llevó a la guerra de Malvinas y los esfuerzos de un empresario por evitar el conflicto* in Cadena 105 February 28, 2021

1050 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1051 *El día que la Flota de Mar cortó las comunicaciones y no hubo vuelta atrás en la recuperación de Malvinas* Juan Bautista 'Tata' Yofre in *Infobae* March 30, 2024

1052 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.43

1053 *FCO telegram 8 to UKE Buenos Aires January 7, 1982* in PREM19/657 f116

1054 Yofre 2011

1055 *Ibid.* An anecdote to show that, despite the urging by the junta for secrecy, relatively minor officials at the Foreign Ministry were aware; and that therefore Nicanor Costa Méndez was fully involved with the junta's deliberations.

January 11th, the governor of Tierra Del Fuego is reported as saying; *“I feel like governor of the Malvinas Islands and I hope that God gives me the opportunity to govern from the islands themselves before our mandate ends.”*¹⁰⁵⁶

January 12th, Argentina's governing military junta establishes a planning group to refine potential invasion plans; to comprise Admiral Lombardo, Army General Garcia, and the Air Force's Brigadier Sigfrido Plessl.

*“The involvement of the Joint Staff and the Armed Forces Staffs was primarily ruled out. Instead, a Working Commission was set up with deeply trusted personnel: Vicealmirante Juan J. Lombardo, General de División Osvaldo J. García and Brigadier Mayor Sigfrido M. Plessl.”*¹⁰⁵⁷

The junta recognise that, in the case of invasion, casualties amongst the Islanders would be politically/diplomatically unacceptable.

*“The first issue was logical since the population, although they were not sympathizers of Argentina as such were situated inside Argentine territory and therefore should be protected as much as possible. The idea of a bloodless operation also meant no unnecessary destruction should accompany the operation. On the issue of British troops this meant that the fewer the military casualties for Britain, the less the need for an emotive reaction on the part of the population or of the British Government.”*¹⁰⁵⁸

*“The other armed services soon became involved. Their work was overseen by a Comisión de Trabajo – a Working party – which held its first meeting at Army Headquarters in the Libertador Building in Buenos Aires in mid-January 1982. ... Admiral Anaya's initial plan to take the islands but not necessarily to stay or to defend them was abandoned at an early stage... A date of 15 September was given for the completion of the planning. No move was envisaged before that date...”*¹⁰⁵⁹

*“Its role would be to draw up a military plan that would be an alternative to the diplomatic strategy, envisaging the seizure of the Malvinas by the Argentine Armed Forces. ... From (Galtieri's) point of view, a "triumph" on the Falklands issue would have historically and definitively justified the Military Government and would support Galtieri's leadership electorally in a future civilian-military transitional government.”*¹⁰⁶⁰

*“What was not revealed to the press was that on January 12, "military planning for the Malvinas was discussed as an alternative action in case the solution negotiated with Great Britain failed ... By a resolution not included in the Minutes, Major-General Garcia, Major-Brigadier Plessl and Vice-Admiral Lombardo were appointed to analyze the potential of the use of military power (combined) with a political approach and to specify possible courses of action.”*¹⁰⁶¹

In the presidential office, General Garcia meets with President Galtieri.

*“After the greetings, Galtieri told him that he had to give him an instruction under strict secrecy, which included his family, comrades and friends ... (Galtieri) informed him that "the mission was not "certain" but "tentative". The mission was aimed at "recovering the Malvinas Islands to negotiate later". "Occupy to negotiate", Galtieri reiterated. He also said it had to be "bloodless" ... he would repeat several times: "There must be surprise in the execution of the missions.”*¹⁰⁶²

1056 Quoted in Yofre 2011

1057 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023.

1058 *Operation Rosario* Admiral Carlos Busser 1984

1059 Middlebrook 2003

1060 Carbone 2008

1061 Yofre 2011. The press had been told that the meeting was to consider the appointment of governors and ambassadors.

1062 *Ibid.*

Instructions are prepared for Foreign Minister Mendez with regard to future Anglo-Argentine negotiations.

*“The Argentine delegation will keep in mind permanently the fact that it is a national objective and permanent recognition of the Republic, the recognition by Great Britain of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and that therefore it is crucial for the successful development of the negotiating process that the negotiations deal essentially on this topic.”*¹⁰⁶³

January 15th, in Argentina, the new Working Commission meet.

*“When the joint Working Commission met on January 15th to plan the Malvinas recapture, planning only existed for the Chilean scenario. Each Force appointed their respective Commission assistants: the operation Commanders representing the Navy – Contraalmirante Walter Allara, Commander of the Naval Fleet; Contraalmirante Carlos García Boll, Commander of the Naval Aviation; and, Contraalmirante Carlos Büsser, Commander of the Marine Infantry –, General de Brigada Julio Ruiz, representing the Army; and Comodoro Knud Erik Andreasen, representing the Air Force. ... The COMIL briefing indicated that the operation should be unexpected and bloodless, since the sole purpose was to negotiate sovereignty from a more favorable position. The Working Commission met at Puerto Belgrano and would complete the Campaign Outline Plan, using the one already prepared by the Navy as a reference and adding the actions to be executed by the Army and the Air Force.”*¹⁰⁶⁴

January 19th, from Port Stanley, the Governor forwards the 'Annual Review' for the information of the Secretary of State.; *“The Islanders' relations with Britain and Argentina deteriorated during the year. The community was split on the sovereignty issue. Attitudes hardened after the Argentines rejected the freeze proposal in February. Lease-back an insult to Islanders' loyalty, integrity and intelligence.”*¹⁰⁶⁵

January 20th, President Galtieri speaks to Argentina's Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Roza; seeking an opinion as to the reaction in London should Argentina seize the Falkland Islands.

*“Ambassador Ortiz de Roza's evaluation of the British response to the possibility of occupying the Malvinas was the following: Ignore the fact; Protest or withdraw Ambassador; Break off relations and impose diplomatic sanction.”*¹⁰⁶⁶

January 22nd, Argentina renounces the 1972 General Treaty on the Judicial Settlement of Disputes, that it had signed with Chile. Argentina stations troops on the border with Chile.¹⁰⁶⁷

*“Argentina has renounced peace treaty with Chile on their Beagle Channel dispute over three islands and the surrounding sea potentially rich in oil ... The dispute has soured relations for years and brought them to the brink of war in 1978... War was averted only at the last minute by the Pope's whose compromise peace plan has now been rejected by Argentina ... Argentina says the Pope's compromise breaches a century-old bi-ocean principle that what's in the South Atlantic is Argentina's and in the Pacific is Chile's.”*¹⁰⁶⁸

1063 Cadena 105 February 28, 2021

1064 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1065 PREM19/613 f109. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/3AE9B5662631462C8E0CDFF3A13CE483.pdf>

1066 Yofre 2011. Ortiz de Roza was visiting Buenos Aires in January, 1982.

1067 See 1881, 1971, 1977, 1978 & 1981

1068 BBC dispatch of January 22, 1982 in Briley 2022

January 24th, Argentine newspaper, *La Prensa*, predicts that Argentina will present strict conditions for the continuance of negotiations with Britain. In an article, journalist Iglesias Rouco also refers to probable US support and expresses a belief that; “... *Buenos Aires will recover the islands by force this year,.. an ambitious diplomatic and strategic plan which would assure the country of a relevant role in the South Atlantic.*”

*“I asked Forrester for his views on a recent article in (the) Buenos Aires daily La Prensa by gadfly Iglesias Rouco, who alleged that the Galtieri administration may be considering sending an "ultimatum" to Her Majesty's Government demanding recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas and significant movement toward resolution of the drawn-out dispute. Forrester brushed aside the article as Rouco's fantasy. He acknowledged that there are officials in the Armed Forces and the Foreign Ministry who would like to threaten or use force, but these people are not involved in the issue. He noted, for example, that in the Foreign Ministry the only officials involved are Under Secretary Ros, the Malvinas directorate, the legal division in a supporting role and, of course, Foreign Minister Costa Mendez. He said that he did not know the attitude of Costa Mendez or the President, but it appeared to him that the administration is fully engaged in other issues (e.g. the economy and, in foreign affairs, the Beagle dispute). The Malvinas problem is on the back burner.”*¹⁰⁶⁹

*“The references to military moves, however, are less likely to have been inspired by the Argentine MFA. 'La Prensa' has a history of supporting a military solution to the dispute, and it is to be expected that they would pursue the line in a major article like this.”*¹⁰⁷⁰

*“... it became clear that Argentina was contemplating invasion four months before it happened. We tried to persuade the Foreign Office in London it had a serious problem, either to build Fortress Falklands to avert invasion or negotiate sovereignty. The Foreign Office took the comfortable course of pretending nothing had changed. The blame really does lie in London...”*¹⁰⁷¹

January 25th, in Ushuaia, commanding officer Captain Nick Barker takes HMS *Endurance* into the southern Argentine port. In contrast to previous occasions, he receives a frosty welcome.

*“They declined to play football against the ship and even refused the use of their ground for a match against a local civilian side. All this was completely against the pattern of cordiality we had experienced on previous visits to Argentine ports, even as recently as our visit to Puerto Belgrano two months earlier. There was a partial belief that this may have had something to do with the fact that we were going on to Punta Arenas in Chile, but was this enough to explain such a complete snubbing? I did not think so and reported my misgivings in a signal. When I went to call on Captain Russo, in the absence of Admiral Zaratiegui, I was informed that I was in the Malvinas War Zone... I laughed and asked who the Argentines were fighting. 'You,' he said without a flicker of emotion... All this I reported to London.”*¹⁰⁷²

1069 *Memorandum of Conversation January 27, 1982 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984.* The conversation was held between Ricardo Forrester, Malvinas Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and John F. Keane, a political officer at the US Embassy in Buenos Aires.

1070 *Fearn to Ure February 8, 1982 in ALW 040/325/9*

1071 James Neilson, editor of the *Buenos Aires Herald* quoted in Briley 2022

1072 *Beyond Endurance: An Epic of Whitehall and the South Atlantic* Nicholas Barker 1997. Barker's warnings to the Admiralty appear to have been dismissed as an attempt to save his ship, which was due to be taken out of service. Captain Barker had been energetic in the defence of *Endurance* before the decision and had been active in the campaign to have that decision reversed. These actions had not endeared him to the MOD's political masters, in particular Michael Power, the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry. Nor, indeed, Secretary of State John Nott. The Frank's commission of inquiry that followed the Falklands War do not appear to have been fully informed of the warnings given by Barker. This may be seen as some tactical whitewashing by the Conservative Government.

*“As Endurance was leaving, the Argentine harbor pilot had confided to Barker that something was 'very wrong' with the Argentine navy.”*¹⁰⁷³

*“There were warnings aplenty from British official intelligence reports, from Argentina and from Falkland islanders who came back from visits to Argentina convinced the junta intended to invade at the end of March.”*¹⁰⁷⁴

In Argentina, the Commander of Argentina's Air Force Air Operations unit hears of the junta's planning for a military operation in the Falkland Islands.

*“On 25 January 1982, the Commander of Air Operations, upon learning of the planning imposed on the Working Commission, ordered his Planning Department to present the initial assessment on 2 February. After hearing it, the Commander concluded that none of the assumptions made by the Military Junta were right. Under his responsibility, he gave the order to accept as fact that the United Kingdom would launch a military response and anticipated it as an alternative for the occupation phase of the Plan Azul y Blanco. ... The Operations Plan 2/82 Mantenimiento de la Soberanía (Sovereignty Maintenance) – which would be completed in early April – assigned: tasks of exploration and reconnaissance in coordination with the commander of the South Atlantic Theater of Operations in the areas adjacent to the Malvinas Islands (500 nautical miles, or 925 km); strategic interdiction tasks against the United Kingdom fleet and tactical air operations on the islands through exploration and reconnaissance, close fire support, offensive reconnaissance, and direct air defense. It also established coordination measures with the Theater of Operations (TOM and subsequent TOAS58) and with the command that would exercise the leadership of the Air Force assets (FAS), specifying that the initial attack order would be given by the Theater Commander and confirmed by the Strategic Air Command. It further stated that the latter should assist the requests made by its subordinate command –the FAS– during the operations without interfering in their action.”*¹⁰⁷⁵

January 26th, in Buenos Aires, at the Libertad building, the military junta decide that the 'Malvinas Group' of Lombardo, Garcia and Plessl should; *“... prepare the presentation of the plans for the military alternative in mid-March 1982.”*¹⁰⁷⁶ At the same meeting, *Directiva Estrategica Nacional* (National Strategic Directive) 1/82 is signed off.¹⁰⁷⁷

*“Political Objective: to consolidate Argentine sovereignty in the Malvinas, Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and contribute to affirming its full exercise in the South Atlantic. Strategic Resolution National: the Military Committee, in the face of the evident and repeated lack of progress in the negotiations with Great Britain to achieve full recognition of our sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and convinced that the prolongation of this situation affects national honour, the full exercise sovereignty in the South Atlantic and the exploitation of renewable and non-renewable resources, has resolved to provide for the use of military power to achieve the political objective. This resolution must be kept in the strictest secrecy and should be circumscribed exclusively to the heads of the respective military departments.”*¹⁰⁷⁸

1073 Thornton 2004.

1074 Briley 2022

1075 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1076 Yofre 2011

1077 This document is undated and appears to be made up of 14 pages of handwritten notes – badly written in Spanish. It appears among the appendices of the original Rattenbach Commission Report from pages 297-310. None of the online copies of the Rattenbach Commission Report, officially published March 30, 2012, include the appendices. A copy for those with good eyesight can be found here - http://www.radarmalvinas.com.ar/dar/ENE_82_DENAC_1.pdf

1078 Quoted in Yofre 2011. See also Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.643 and Freedman 2005 vol.1 pp.156-157.

*"The junta charged Rear-Admiral Carlos Busser with planning "Operation Azul". "The order was not to update the plan but to draft a plan from scratch", Busser later recalled. "Argentina had made many plans in the past to recover the Malvinas, but the order we got was to make a out a new plan. We started doing so in January 1982. The basic idea was to negotiate throughout 1982, but at the same time have a military plan, just in case the negotiations failed. In that case we would take the military option. But that would only be towards the end of 1982, or the beginning of 1983."*¹⁰⁷⁹

*"DENAC 1/82 explains concepts referring to the National Power: "The Operation from a military point of view is suitable, feasible and acceptable" and "the Joint Force must be in a position to execute the operation from 15 May 1982". The instruction, however, had two conditions: "the current British state of defense of the islands had to be maintained and, in addition, if force had to be resorted to, it would be restricted to bloodless operations in order to minimize the British reaction and encourage the best negotiating position. Once the islands were recovered, the occupation forces would be withdrawn and a small garrison would be maintained"."*¹⁰⁸⁰

*"The plan considered the only opposing forces would be the ones existing in the Malvinas, and anticipated the temporary creation of a theater of operations that would encompass the Malvinas archipelago and the South Georgia Islands. ... it expressly specified that the operation would not be executed before May 15, 1982, as long as the element of surprise remained. The plan did not include any military response from the United Kingdom, nor did it consider a possible subsequent defense of the islands. ... The latter discussed the readiness of assets and personnel training, which was particularly critical for the Army, as it was in the process of incorporating the 1963-Class conscripts. An initial deadline of July 9 was set, but it was objected by the Argentine Air Force, which advised a date later than September, given that most combat aircraft lacked night offensive capabilities. After recapturing the islands, an Argentine Army garrison of around 500 men would remain on the Malvinas. Their aim was not to provide defense against any reconquest attempt, but rather to maintain local control and collaborate with the government. The Navy and the Air Force would leave a minimum number of personnel for specific tasks."*¹⁰⁸¹

January 27th, in Buenos Aires, the governing military junta delivers a *bout de papier* to the British Embassy.

"1. Argentine position: The Argentine position on the question of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands is well known by the British Government, but it would be useful to spell out once again to make any Argentine proposal easier to understand. The press communique put out by the Argentine Government on 27 July 1981 is a fundamental basis. Essential points in the negotiation were set out in it.

A) Question of Sovereignty: In the first place, British recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the above-mentioned archipelagos is the basic element of the Argentine position. It remains a sine-qua-non requirement for the solution of the dispute. So long as this question is unresolved the dispute will continue. Consequently neither must it nor can it be ignored, because the Argentine Republic, however much time may pass, will never abandon its claim nor relax its determination until this has been satisfied. From the beginning it has had recourse to negotiations as a means of seeking a peaceful solution to achieve its just claim. This negotiation has invariably been promoted by successive Argentine Governments on the basis of what was established by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolutions 2065 (XX), 3160 (XXVIII) and 31/49 (XXXI).

1079 *Justice and the Genesis of War* David A. Welch 1993 p.167

1080 Yofre 2011

1081 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

B) Essential Characteristics of the Negotiations on Sovereignty: In this context, the Argentine Government appeals for the negotiations to be serious and in depth, based on the greatest good faith and the political determination necessary resolutely to push forward from now on a process culminating, within a reasonable period of time and without procrastination, in the recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Islands in dispute. So far, and despite the negotiating meetings held in the past, there has been no concrete progress. It is almost idle to point out that there has been for some time growing awareness by the Argentine people of the lack of progress in the malvinas question, and that the matter has now reached a point which demands solutions, without further delays or dilatory arguments.

C) Interests of the Islanders: The above-mentioned resolutions of the United Nations give due attention to the "Interests" of the inhabitants of the Islands, in the context of the negotiation to which they invite both governments. At no point do the decisions of the world organisation refer to the "wishes" of the Islanders, because the dispute is confined to the Argentine and British Governments. The possibility exists of finding a meeting point between our respective positions in this aspect of the matter, in that the Argentine Government, always in the spirit of pushing the negotiation process resolutely forward, has repeatedly demonstrated its clear intention of respecting those interests, including the preservation of the way of life and cultural traditions of the Islanders. To this end, it is ready to draw up a special statute of safeguards. No-one can cast doubt on the fact that successive Argentine Governments have made great efforts to satisfy Islander interests in a practical way, as demonstrated by, among other things. The communications system which has been in operation since 1971. In spite of Argentine good will, this policy has not produced the results expected of it. There is a virtual absence of information in the islands about the real thinking of the Argentine Government. Furthermore, deliberately tendentious versions are put about to detract from the Argentine position and delay the progress of a negotiated solution. The next meeting should additionally serve to clarify and put an end to such a state of affairs. The object of the statute of safeguards mentioned above will be to consider and respect the different aspects which comprise the "interests" of the inhabitants, for example, matters relating to military service, tax exemptions, protection of property rights, maintenance of the language and certain institutions, etc. As an additional guarantee the agreement which the parties might reach on this might be submitted to the United Nations. It must be repeated here that Argentina has no intention of disturbing the islanders' way of life, so long as there is an adequate balance between their interests and the recovery of Argentine sovereignty. To make progress in this matter, it would be necessary for the British Government to make known what are the safeguards it considers necessary and conducive to the preservation of the way of life and traditions of the Islanders.

D) Natural Resources: The isolation in which the Islands have found themselves for many years, the scant economic development, the diminishing population figures and other negative factors favour a tendency towards immobility. These problems will remain while the dispute is unresolved, since this constitutes a serious obstacle to the exploitation of natural resources. The lack of exploitation on the one hand and the depredation of resources on the other, in the context of a world short of food and avid for energy, is an obvious nonsense and anachronism which must cease. The Argentine Republic, which views the Malvinas question as a global subject which must also be solved globally, is ready to seek a practical formulae to give concrete form to the exploitation of these resources to the benefit of all concerned. It must remain very clear however that any idea of making progress in the search for pragmatic formulae for exploration and exploitation which might mean a delay or paralysis of the solution to the sovereignty question is totally unacceptable to Argentina.

E) Security in the area of the South Atlantic: For the Argentine Republic, the security and defence of the area of the south-west Atlantic is a vital national interest. The Argentine Government has the responsibility of maintaining maximum vigilance for the protection of this area of the Atlantic, in which the islands of the South Atlantic have great importance. The maintenance of the dispute is incompatible with the appropriate defence of the area of the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of the Argentine mainland.

*Proposal: It is therefore in the understanding that the question of sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands must be resolved peacefully, definitively and rapidly in the interests of the parties to the dispute and of all those interested in resolving it, that the Argentine Government in order to develop the negotiating process, proposes the establishment of a permanent negotiating Commission, to meet in the first weeks of each month alternatively in each capital. This should be responsible for maintaining the continuity and impetus of the negotiations, without it having to depend upon only sporadic meetings, devoid of clear objectives and concrete results. Its technical-political level should allow a deep but agile treatment of the subject matter, in conditions favourable to proposing solutions to the Governments. The Commission would have the duration of one year. It would be open to denunciation by either side at any time with prior warning to the other side. The Argentine Government considers that the establishment of this Commission, preferably within the second two-month period of 1982, together with the sincerity and good faith taking account of the positions of both sides, would offer the best possibility of reaching success in its work. The Argentine Government will analyse the future of these negotiations in the light of the reply which the British Government gives to this proposal, hoping that this may be given before or during the next round of negotiations to be held in February, 1982.”*¹⁰⁸²

Argentina's Foreign Ministry suggests that the two sides meet in New York in February.¹⁰⁸³

*“... I commented that the paper seemed to lump the Malvinas (sic), South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands together: I thought we might regard them as three questions rather than one, To this Ros and Ambassador Blanco responded with some surprise, arguing that in 1977 and 1978 agreed statements had specifically lumped South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands with the Falklands.”*¹⁰⁸⁴

*“The document is a tough restatement of the Argentine view that the sole purpose of the negotiation is to cede sovereignty over the Falklands and the Dependencies to them and that all other matters are secondary. None of this is new.”*¹⁰⁸⁵

*“On 27 January, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a *bout de papier* to the British Ambassador which called for negotiations that would end 'within a reasonable period of time and without procrastination' in the recognition of Argentine sovereignty. Britain agreed to a series of talks in New York, but refused to accept preconditions to the outcome.”*¹⁰⁸⁶

*“The *bout de papier* was delivered by Ambassador Enrique Ros to Ambassador Anthony Williams on January 27, 1982, when a revealing dialogue took place. After reading it, the British man commented on his objections "in a personal capacity". If his government accepted the proposal "it should include islanders (in his delegation) who would find it difficult to travel monthly to the meetings ...". He added that the document spoke*

1082 FCO12/384 f74. Original emphasis.

1083 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984 Document 10*

1084 Williams to FCO January 27, 1982 in FCO12/384 f74

1085 Fearn to Luce February 1, 1982 in FCO46/3202 f132. See below

1086 Welch 1997

of the question of sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgia and South Sandwich Islands "when he understood that the negotiations were only about the Malvinas". With his characteristic coldness, Ros "pointed out his error in that Sandwich and Georgias were included in the negotiations..."" 1087

"Argentina produced a proposal on January 27, 1982 to constitute a permanent negotiating commission, with a mandate of one year, with the purpose of concluding the negotiations on sovereignty. This initiative had a considerable impact in London, due to the peremptory deadlines it contained." 1088

A very public discussion in newspapers such as *La Prensa*, *Convicción* and *The Buenos Aries Herald* consider the advantages and disadvantages of military action to seize the Falkland Islands.

"All the conditions are in place: we have a determined President and an excellent Foreign Minister. If after winning the war on terrorism, we recover the Malvinas, history will forget the economic stupidities. Argentina will be alive, aware of its vigor and willing to take a place in the world." 1089

"Argentina will set a series of pre-conditions before continuing talks with Britain on the future of the Malvinas/Falklands islands ... If not met, other forms of action, including recovery of the islands by military means would be considered." 1090

"What was published by a Buenos Aires morning paper on January 27, 1982, linked to retired admiral Emilio Massera, is symptomatic: "Right now we are in optimal conditions: we are governed by the Armed Forces, we have a president (Galtieri) with drive and a great decision-making capacity, and we have a luxury chancellor (Nicanor Costa Méndez). If, in addition to having won the war against terrorism, the Falklands are recovered, the Process will be marked by these events (...). Regarding the internal front, the public would feel invigorated (...) The Malvinas are prior to the Beagle." 1091

"On January 27, in the morning newspaper 'Convicción', with well-known links with the Navy, and especially with the political project of Emilio Eduardo Massera, an article appeared in which it was stated that the taking of the Malvinas would help solve the problem of Beagle, since it would strengthen the Argentine position." 1092

January 29th, Chile denounces Argentina's renunciation of the 1972 treaty.

February 1st, in Argentina, at a meeting at the 5th Corps HQ, Major-General García informs Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed Alí Seineldín, commanding the 25th Infantry Regiment; *"I have selected your regiment, the 25th Infantry, to recover our Malvinas Islands."* 1093

"Next, Garcia set out the conditions: "I must clarify that this operation will be characterized by a very important aspect, which must be taken into account without fail: there must be no casualties in the English forces or in the civilian population of the Islands. I repeat, even if they cause them to us, you will avoid causing casualties on the opposing side." 1094

1087 Yofre 2011

1088 *La política británica hacia las Malvinas* Vicente Berasategui 2013

1089 *Convicción* quoted in Yofre 2011

1090 *Latin American Weekly Report* February 12, 1982

1091 *Lessons from the Malvinas* Martin Balza in *Perfil* July 29, 2023. Balza served as a Lieut-Colonel in 1982 in charge of Artillery Group 3 and became Chief of the Argentine Army from 1992-1999.

1092 *El día que la Flota de Mar cortó las comunicaciones y no hubo vuelta atrás en la recuperación de Malvinas* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* March 30, 2024

1093 Yofre 2011

1094 *Ibid.*

In London, Argentina's *bout de papier* is considered.

“... our Ambassador should be instructed to reiterate to the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister our own position on the dispute while confirming that, provided it is accepted that any discussions will be as hitherto without prejudice to the sovereignty position of either side, we are ready to discuss in New York their proposal for a future negotiating mechanism. I further recommend that we instruct the Governor to explain this exchange in general terms to Councillors. ... The paper is couched in hectoring terms. It accuses both the islanders and HMG of deliberate prevarication and assumes not only that the Argentines are in the right, but also that they have the support of the international community for their position. It asserts that Argentina knows best where the Islanders' interests lie.” ¹⁰⁹⁵

Lord Carrington telegrams the British Embassy in Buenos Aires with an instruction for Ambassador Williams to speak to Ros; to make Britain's position clear.

*“Her Majesty's Government are grateful to the Argentine Government for the clear exposition of their attitude towards the inter-governmental talks on the Falkland Islands dispute, contained in the *bout de papier* ... Her Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that they are in no doubt about British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the Falkland Islands Dependencies, their maritime zones and continental shelves. They do not therefore accept the Argentine assumption that the purpose of the negotiation is the eventual recognition by HMG of Argentine sovereignty in the area. Our negotiations so far have been conducted on the basis that the sovereignty position of neither side is prejudiced. It is only on that basis that we can continue the negotiating process. Provided it is agreed that negotiations may continue without prejudice to the sovereignty position of either the Argentine or Her Majesty's Government, the representatives of HMG attending the forthcoming talks in New York will be ready to discuss in detail the proposal to establish working groups to look at particular aspects of the dispute. Her Majesty's Government wish finally to reaffirm that it is their wish to find, by negotiation, an early and peaceful solution to this protracted dispute which can be accepted by all concerned, namely the British and Argentine Government and the people of the Falkland Islands.”* ¹⁰⁹⁶

A telegram to Governor Hunt at Port Stanley requests that Islands' Councillors be informed; “in general terms”.

February 2nd, at the Libertador building in Buenos Aires, the junta meet to consider their next move. With the prospect of further negotiations with the British, Davidoff is instructed not to visit South Georgia. ¹⁰⁹⁷

“The military government ordered to postpone both departures (Grupo Alfa towards the Georgias Islands and Davidoff to South Georgia) until the round of negotiations was over...” ¹⁰⁹⁸

In the UK, regarding a possible reinforcement of the Royal Marines in the Falklands (NP8901), the MOD write to the FCO.

“... I returned yesterday from a meeting of the UK Commanders-in-Chief Committee (Overseas). ... at that meeting Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse (Commander-in-Chief (Fleet)) closely questioned Rear-Admiral David Brown (ACDS (Ops)) about possible reinforcement of the Royal Marine contingent on the Falkland Islands, in the light of the latest threatening noises from Buenos Aires. Admiral Fieldhouse

1095 Fearn to Luce February 1, 1982 in FCO46/3202 f132. Original emphasis. See - https://e75f6e9cfeb9a135aad4-518ea3b2de549204a48e1fd09592ed5a.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/820201_Fearn_mnt_BOUT_DE_PAPIER_FCO46_3202_f132.pdf

1096 Fearn to Luce February 1, 1982 in FCO46/3202 f132

1097 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.44

1098 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023. See August & December, 1981, above.

*said he did not know what was expected of the Navy in this regard or whether perhaps the existing British contingent should be regarded as expendable in the event of hostile action against the Falklands by the Argentine Government. Rear-Admiral Brown seemed unable to offer much guidance from the point of view of MOD operations, and smartly passed the buck to me for a Foreign Office view. I said, for lack of a better line, that no doubt part of the tough talk from the Argentines was intended to stiffen their position when negotiations resumed and we should not necessarily draw dire conclusions. I nevertheless suspect that there is very real uncertainty as between the MOD and the Commanders-in-Chief about what they would be likely to find themselves called to do if deliberate harassment or worse by the Argentines were to take place. Do we need to think more about this and is there a case for giving, or seeking, political guidance?"*¹⁰⁹⁹

In London, after considering an Argentine request to purchase 12 Vulcan Bombers, the Ministry of Defence decide against the proposal; "... a sale of strategic bombers to Argentina would bound to be misunderstood or at least misinterpreted (by Chile)." At the Foreign Office, Robin Fearn raises another problem; "On the face of it, a strike aircraft would seem to be entirely suitable for an attack on the Falklands."¹¹⁰⁰

February 3rd, from London, Ambassador Williams is instructed to lodge a further protest regarding the visit by the *Almirante Irizar* to South Georgia without clearance.¹¹⁰¹

On the same day at Stanley, Vice-Comodoro Roberto Manuel Gamen takes command of the LADE operation.

*"In welcome gatherings and during the early days, a friendly and optimistic atmosphere as regards the islands sovereignty future was sensed. ... Before moving to Malvinas, Vicecomodoro Gamen was aware of the secret plan to recover sovereignty by employing the Armed Forces, though he did not know the exact execution date."*¹¹⁰²

February 4th, off Patagonia, members of an Argentine diving club discover the remains of the British navy vessel *Swift*, which foundered in March, 1770.¹¹⁰³

February 7th, in Buenos Aires, a meeting takes place; "... between Capitan de Fragata de Infanteria de Marina [Lieutenant-Colonel of Marines] Guillermo Botto, an intelligence officer, ... and two naval officers who knew the islands well. They were Vicecomodoro [Wing Commander] Héctor Gilobert, who had been the local manager of LADE in Stanley in 1980-81, and Capitan de Fragata [Commander] Adolfo Aurelio Gaffoglio, liaison officer for Argentine naval transport services. Botto asked them questions in order to identify targets for the invading forces, ..." ¹¹⁰⁴

Argentine newspaper, *La Prensa*, publishes a further article by journalist Jesús Iglesias Rouco.

1099 *Weston to Fearn February 2, 1982 in FCO12/384 f102*. A note handwritten on the bottom of this letter by John Ure, and addressed to Fearn, states "I don't in fact think this is a specific crisis just at present." Ure was head of the FCO's Latin America Department. See - https://e75f6e9cfeb9a135aad4-518ea3b2de549204a48e1fd09592ed5a.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/820204_Ure_mnt_WESTON_CNV_FCO12_384_f102.pdf

1100 Quoted in *The Daily Express* September 6, 2015

1101 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.43

1102 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War Chapter 1* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1103 The loss of this vessel left the British garrison at Port Egmont on the Falklands with only one ship; facilitating the Spanish ejection of that garrison shortly thereafter. See 1770

1104 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.644

*“If London does not agree to stick to a timetable, Buenos Aires reserves the right to take other actions. We already announced fifteen days ago that among these actions, the recovery of the islands by military means is not ruled out, far from it.”*¹¹⁰⁵

*“Jesús Iglesias Rouco anticipated what would happen several weeks later. It was clear that either he had a very good "deep throat" in the Palacio San Martín, or he was a "seer”.*¹¹⁰⁶

*“Iglesias Rouca, writing in La Prensa, which had close contacts with the navy, warned ... Britain had no more than four months to acknowledge transfer of sovereignty...”*¹¹⁰⁷

Foreign Minister Costa Méndez speaks to Argentina's Ambassador to the Organisation of American States (OAS), Raúl Alberto Quijano, who is in Buenos Aires.¹¹⁰⁸

*“The Chancellor asked him what he thought of an Argentine occupation of the Malvinas. Quijano (asked whether) it was ... an act of force to demonstrate the vulnerability of the islands to the English and then negotiate. Costa Méndez said that it was to stay. Raúl responded that the United States was going to condemn the operation because (it would) consider us (Argentina) the aggressors. And that Margaret Thatcher was going to send us a force to throw us out. Conoro (Méndez) said that everything was to stay.”*¹¹⁰⁹

February 8th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador Williams, delivers Carrington's message regarding the Foreign Ministry's *bout de papier* of January 27th.

*“Blanco concluded: "In essence, the British document reiterates (that) government's position on the basis of the application of an 'umbrella of sovereignty', (and) accepts the continuity of the negotiating process, but does not respond to the Argentine initiative to establish a Permanent Negotiation Commission”.*¹¹¹⁰

In London, on the same day, the FCO consider Weston's letter of February 2nd, regarding the Royal Marine detachment at Stanley.

*“It is odd that there should be confusion within the MOD about the role of the Royal marines in the event of an attack on the Falkland Islands. The officer commanding the garrison has a clear directive about his responsibilities in such an event, according to priorities agreed by the FCO and the MOD. We see no reason to alter these. On the wider question of what the British armed services would be called on to do, there is no similarly agreed plan. We did however look at the various options with the MOD last summer and they prepared draft contingency plans. Although these reached a fairly advanced form, they were not fully cleared within the MOD ... It would however be on the basis of a final version of these plans that we should proceed in the first instance if the need arose. ...I shall suggest to DS11 that, given the uncertainties within the MOD, it would be useful to complete their internal action on the draft contingency paper.”*¹¹¹¹

February 9th, in the UK, during Prime Minister's Question Time in the House of Commons, ex-PM James Callaghan asks a question:

1105 Quoted in *El fracaso de la cumbre entre argentinos y británicos que decidió la guerra: “En un mes tomamos las Malvinas”* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022

1106 Yofre 2011. 'Deep throat' was a name given to an informant during the 1970s Watergate scandal in the USA.

1107 Briley 2022

1108 Quijano had been Argentina's Foreign Minister for a few months in 1976; at the end of Isabel Perón's term as President.

1109 Unidentified source quoted in Yofre 2011.

1110 Yofre 2011

1111 *Fearn to Ure February 8, 1982* in *ALW 040/325/9*

“... is the Prime Minister aware that the Government's decisions to withdraw and pay off HMS "Endurance" when she returns from the South Atlantic is an error that could have serious consequences? Is she further aware that this stale old proposition was put to me on more than one occasion when I was Prime Minister and after considering it I turned it down flat? Will she please do the same? “

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher responds:

*“I recognise that this was a very difficult decision for my right hon. Friend, the Secretary of State for Defence. The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that there are many competing claims on the defence budget, even though we are increasing it substantially. He will also know that the defence capability of that ship is extremely limited. My right hon. Friend therefore felt that other claims on the defence budget should have greater priority.”*¹¹¹²

*“The Government were warned by my right hon. Friend the member for Cardiff South-East (Mr. Callaghan), as early as 9 February, that General Galtieri would interpret the Secretary of State for Defence's decision to scrap HMS "Endurance" when she returns from the South Atlantic is an error that could have consequences. ... The point is that the announcement to scrap her was taken in Buenos Aires as a sign that, as far as Britain's Secretary of State for defence was concerned, the Argentines could do as they wished.”*¹¹¹³

In Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams protests Constantino Davidoff's unauthorised landing on South Georgia.

*“... some fifty days after the offence had been committed, he (protested). Ambassador Williams warned that this had been a violation of British sovereignty, and that if a further attempt were made to land without proper authority the British Government reserved the right to take whatever action necessary.”*¹¹¹⁴

*“... Ambassador Williams ... loudly protested Davidoff's three-hour (sic) December stay on South Georgia.”*¹¹¹⁵

Reported in *The Buenos Aires Herald*:

“New Argentine Governments, no matter what their provenance or their ideology, have at least two things in common: they all aspire to reduce the inflation rate and they all strive to establish, once and for all, unquestioned Argentine sovereignty over the islands known in English as the Falklands ... This Government is no exception but ... its Falklands approach will be far tougher than anything we have seen so far. Besides the attendant historical rights and the infinite patience so far shown by Argentina, the truth of the matter is that the Malvinas situation is seriously interfering with our security in the South Atlantic, is limiting our economic and geopolitical plans, including ones relating to Antarctica, and bears moreover in a most negative fashion on our dispute with Chile over the Beagle. Looking at the subject from an international, or western, viewpoint, the British presence there deprives Argentina of its proper participation in the defence of the region against constant Soviet penetration ... this makes any strategic planning for the area virtually impossible or of doubtful value. So if it is borne in mind that it is not only this country which finds itself daily more prejudiced by Britain's inexplicable

1112 See - <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1982-02-09/debates/a4590c34-fdda-4ff2-b631-9564a126ecba/Engagements>

1113 John Silkin MP in *UK Parliament- Hansard- Commons Chamber- Falklands Campaign* December 21, 1982. There is no evidence that the junta in Buenos Aires was swayed one way or the other by the announcement that HMS *Endurance* was to be withdrawn. See - <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1982-12-21/debates/90afde7b-521a-4032-ab34-92b3d6b3377c/FalklandsCampaign>

1114 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.43

1115 Thornton 2004

obstinacy, it seems easy to predict that an initiative involving force could count not only on the understanding of the international community, particularly of the third world, but also on the support, or at least the interested tolerance, of NATO.”

Grupo Alpha board the ARA *Bahia Paraiso*, bound for the South Orkney Islands. ¹¹¹⁶

February 11th, Argentina's Naval Transports department authorises the *Bahia Buen Suceso* to take Davidoff's workforce to South Georgia. ¹¹¹⁷

February 13th, on South Georgia, two members of the Joint Services Expedition arrive at Leith harbour to find three yachts moored there. *Isatis* and *Kim* are French registered and have complied with entry procedures, although *Kim* has overstayed. The third, *Caiman*, is of unknown origin although she is flying the flags of the UK, Belgium and Panama. Her crew are suspected to be in radio contact with Buenos Aires. ¹¹¹⁸

“Although flying the Panamanian flag, on board were an Italian crew of three and an Argentinean bank official, Adrion Marchessi. Marchessi claimed that his bank was financing Davidoff's enterprise and he was simply inspecting the whaling stations. Suspicions were raised when three "very sophisticated" radios were found aboard the yacht, and more so when Davidoff, contacted by the British embassy to verify Marchessi's story, denied it.” ¹¹¹⁹

In the Falkland Islands, aircraft overfly Stanley; *“By February the Argentines had become quite brazen in their sabre-rattling and intelligence gathering. There were unexplained nocturnal flights over Stanley. Those who heard the aircraft or saw the lights in the small hours believed that they were military Hercules planes. Twice they dropped flares as they flew over Stanley Airport. The flares may have been signals to LADE staff who would have confirmed the accuracy of their navigation.”* ¹¹²⁰

“By the end of February, he (Vice-Comodoro Gamen) participated in the coordination of a secret mission devised by the Argentine Air Force Jefatura III: a Malvinas VOR verification task would be simulated but, instead of being executed by the INAC radio aid verification Learjet 35 A, the flight would be performed by a photo reconnaissance Learjet 35 A of the II Brigada Aérea (2nd Air Brigade), with the purpose of carrying out a photographic survey of Puerto Stanley and its adjacent areas. The material would be used to plan the islands' recapture operation. Gamen (arranged) that an INAC's NCO would do the reception on the island for that operation's ground support so that the British would not be suspicious of the aircraft change. Due to unfavorable weather conditions and because the verification process could not last more than three days, the Learjet returned to Paraná without having completed the required survey.” ¹¹²¹

In Buenos Aires, President Galtieri is the guest of honour at a barbecue to celebrate 100 years since the end of the Conquest of the Desert. ¹¹²²

1116 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1117 *Ibid.*

1118 *Caiman's* owner was an Italian, Giovanni Raggio. It has been suggested that this vessel, and possibly the French yachts too, were on a spying mission for Argentina. See *Large Animals and Wide Horizons: Adventures of a Biologist* Richard M. Laws *Scott Polar Research Institute* undated.

1119 Thornton 2004

1120 Bound 2007

1121 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1122 Argentina's conquest of Patagonia after 1860. Now viewed by some as genocide. See - <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/13/argentinian-founding-father-genocide-row>

February 15th, in London, Lord Carrington writes to the Prime Minister regarding Argentina's demands.

*“The Argentine Government have given us, as a prior notification of their position and objectives at New York, a substantial and toughly worded document which asserts that the sole purpose of the negotiations is to cede sovereignty to Argentina, denies the relevance of the Islanders' wishes (as opposed to interests) and, without explicit threats, refers to the Islanders' dependence on services provided by the Argentines.”*¹¹²³

Thatcher responds that it should be made clear that the wishes of the Islanders remain paramount.¹¹²⁴

*“... the British were pursuing two contradictory policies: (1) negotiate a settlement with Argentina over the Falklands; and (2) protect the rights of the Falkland Islanders as British citizens. Both were undermined by the inherent difficulties of doing things "in twos." Britain was unable to make the kind of offer to the Argentine government that would have settled the issue peacefully, because the islanders and their supporters in Britain would have seen this as betrayal.”*¹¹²⁵

In Buenos Aires, the British Embassy hosts a reception for a joint Anglo-Argentine military climbing expedition recently returned from the Andes; *“Amid the celebrations and clinking of glasses, the ambassador turned to me and said: 'See the camaraderie. Relations have never been better between our two countries.' At that moment, preparations were well advanced for the invasion. The ambassador's remark was surprising as he was involved in the attempts to diffuse the threatening crisis. It was later revealed that his sympathies lay with Argentina, to the extent that there were allegations that he betrayed the United Kingdom by withholding vital information from Lord Carrington.”*¹¹²⁶

February 16th, in London, the Governor's annual review of the Falkland Islands is considered; *“It is inevitable that the view it gives is a partial one. But, as a description of the Islanders' position, it is admirable and worth reading carefully for that reason.”*¹¹²⁷

February 17th, in Buenos Aires, morning newspapers announce that negotiations with Great Britain regarding the Falkland Islands will resume in New York on February 26.

*“In February 1982 the Argentine Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Mendez, recommended that project Alpha be postponed so as not to complicate the forthcoming negotiations in New York. On 17 February the Junta agreed. Nevertheless, there is some indication that the navy – without the knowledge of either the Junta as a whole or its own commander-in-chief – decided to proceed.”*¹¹²⁸

February 18th, Argentine newspaper *La Prensa* reports:

“The least that can be asked of military governments is that they do not dither in the face of any military eventuality when questions of sovereignty are involved. After decades of fruitless negotiations, Argentina has good cause to know that Great Britain will not give up the Malvinas either voluntarily

1123 ALW 040/325/1 B 51-100. Also PREM19/657 f113

1124 ALW 040/325/1 B 51 - 100

1125 *When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces Argentina during the Falklands War* Patrick Bratton & Wallace Thies 2011 in *Comparative Strategy* 30:1 1-27

1126 Briley 2022

1127 PREM19/613 f101. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/1AE5D53659934E5E9AB0C299BD5FF11C.pdf>

1128 Welch 1997, citing circumstantial evidence that the Navy afterwards authorised another voyage without notifying the Foreign Ministry. See Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.46

*or via any agreement that would mean losing its administrative power in the islands... the time is approaching for Buenos Aires to think in terms of force.”*¹¹²⁹

*“Mike Hickson has been sending you translations of a series of articles written by Jesus Iglesias Rouco, and calling for an invasion of the Falklands Islands by Argentina. The latest of these appeared on 18 February. David Joy and I had a chance to talk to Iglesias Rouco about these articles ... Iglesias Rouco was adamant that he had not been put up to write any of the articles, but that they represented his own opinion. He genuinely believed that the time was right for Argentina to take unilateral action to recover the Islands, that after many years of patient negotiation, Argentina could no longer expect results from negotiating, and that since the British government was not in a position to force the issue vis-à-vis the Islanders, or to defend them, it fell to the Argentine Government to take the necessary action to solve the dispute once and for all. Our own view, following this discussion with him is that, having been given a lead on the story by one of his editors, as reported by secret sources, Iglesias Rouco has got a bit of a bee in his bonnet about the subject of the Falklands. The question is, as Iglesias Rouco himself said, whether anyone in the Argentine Government will listen to him.”*¹¹³⁰

*“Speaking of “the measure of Argentine need”, the “Galician” Iglesias Rouco, at that time with the help of influential sources in the San Martín Palace, made a scan of the reasons that (lay behind) the military decision of April 2: “1) The isolation that the country suffers with regard to the political and strategic schemes of the West, caused by its erratic foreign policy of the last thirty years, its progressive internal weakening and more recently, the methods used in the so-called anti-subversive war, which have placed Argentina in a kind of international ghetto; 2) the unfavorable results of the arbitration on the Beagle, and now of the Papal mediation, which poses an imminent threat to our position in the South Atlantic; 3) the Soviet penetration in the zone, with the consequent North American concern [...]. In short: if Argentina does not immediately obtain a new foothold in the South Atlantic, it runs the risk of being excluded from everything that is cooked there”...”*¹¹³¹

February 22nd, in Buenos Aires, Lord Buxton, en-route to the Falkland Islands, has a brief conversation with Foreign Minister Costa Mendez.

*“Lord Buxton found Costa Mendez an eminently urbane and cultured person and more pertinently, quite reasonable and clearly anglophile. Buxton came away convinced that no wild actions are likely to be taken by the Argentines whilst the present government was in charge. Costa Mendez said it was essential to find some alternative to the discredited leaseback proposal which he considered had been badly handled. For the Argentines sovereignty was crucial but the rest was negotiable. ... He discounted the possibility of invasion with disparaging references to the airliner hijacking of some years ago. ... Lord Buxton ... seemed generally optimistic that some civilised solution to the problem could be found...”*¹¹³²

February 23rd, in Buenos Aires, scrap dealer Constantino Davidoff turns up at the British Embassy. He apologises for his earlier failures to comply with South Georgia's regulations and informs Embassy staff that he wishes to return to Leith on March 10th, with 30 workers; expecting to stay some six months. Davidoff is warned that the appropriate formalities must be complied with on his arrival at South Georgia.

1129 Iglesias Rouco quoted in ALW 040/325/3

1130 MacKenzie (British Embassy Buenos Aires) to Bright February 19, 1982. See - https://e75f6e9cfeb9a135aad4-518ea3b2de549204a48e1fd09592ed5a.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/820219_UKE_BA_le_to_Bright_ROUCO_MTG_FCO12_384_f97.pdf

1131 *El fracaso de la cumbre entre argentinos y británicos que decidió la guerra: “En un mes tomamos las Malvinas”* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022.

1132 UKE Buenos Aires to FCO in ALW 040/325/1 B 51 – 100.

*“Davidoff was never, of course, given any permission by this Embassy but, on the contrary, warned personally in February ...”*¹¹³³

*“Admiral Otero's office, in charge transportation and logistics, gave the go-ahead to the trip without further consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”*¹¹³⁴

*“... the time to conduct salvage operations on South Georgia was between November and March, not March and October. Yet, Davidoff's declared plan of operations called for his men to work for the next four months through the worst of South Georgia's winter when there would be nineteen hours of darkness out of every twenty-four, heavy winds and several feet of snow. This was a poor choice of timing for what purported to be a purely commercial enterprise.”*¹¹³⁵

*“Whitehall's complacency was shared by the Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Anthony Williams, who, belonging to the Neville Henderson school of diplomacy, believed that even a horrible dictatorship like General Galtieri's would not stoop to actual aggression, especially if Britain kept on good terms with it. Williams, a 'brilliant' public-school and Oxford diplomat, carried weight in the Foreign Office; Rex Hunt, the Governor of the Falkland Isles, a plain commonsensical man who shared Barker's fears, did not.”*¹¹³⁶

From Buenos Aires, Harold Briley, the BBC's Latin American Correspondent, reports:

*“Speculation that Argentina's Generals may resort to force in an attempt to invade the Falkland Islands to get their way is emphatically discounted by the Foreign Ministry. ... A Foreign Ministry spokesman told me Argentina's patience is running out and the new Galtieri government wants 'quick results' (on surrender of sovereignty). ... The Argentines have promised to respect the interests of the Islanders and guarantee their lifestyle, traditions and democracy. The Islanders are understandably sceptical, pointing out that successive Argentine regimes have been unable to guarantee democracy in their own country.”*¹¹³⁷

February 24th, in London, Edward J, Streater, Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy, speaks to Richard Luce, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; *“Luce noted that he would be in New York over the weekend for further discussions with Argentine officials on the future of the Falkland Islands. The Argentines, he said, were if anything more prickly than ever. The new regime in Buenos Aires was sounding more hawkish. It came through in a more aggressive attitude toward Chile over the Beagle Channel, and the Falklands negotiations could easily go the same route, to the disadvantage of all concerned. Luce wondered if we might quietly pass the word to the Argentines to ‘cool it’ a bit.”*¹¹³⁸

Informed, the US Embassy in Buenos Aires telegrams the US State Department.

1133 Ambassador Williams in a telegram to London dated March 20, 1982 quoted in *PREM 19/613*. The ‘warning’ was actually given by Richard Gozney, a junior member of the Embassy staff, and later described by *Endurance's* Capt. Barker as; *“so weakly worded it was no more discouraging than a few dandelions in the lawn of opportunity.”*

1134 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.46

1135 Thornton 2014. Thornton calls the Embassy reaction - *“nothing less than extraordinary”* after Davidoff's previous failure to follow regulations. Sadly, Thornton's interpretation of events is tainted by his belief that Thatcher's government was complicit in the fomenting of a conflict for its own political ends; which he was trying to prove.

1136 *The High Cost of Cuts* Correlli Barnett in *The Spectator* May 16, 1997 p.42. Henderson was Britain's Ambassador to the USA.

1137 Briley 2022

1138 *Telegram 4235 from the US Embassy, London, to the Department of State in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984 Document 10*

*"In response to Luce's February 24 request for the United States to "quietly urge restraint on the Argentines", the Embassy advised that the United States should "avoid involvement" in the dispute. "As Department recalls, the Argentine Navy has tried to draw us into the dispute on Argentina's side. In any case, the cost to us here of being perceived as leaning toward the British in this dispute, which arouses Argentine passions, could be high and the Argentines would find ways of indicating their displeasure". In a final comment, the Embassy noted: "Some of our contacts in the GOA have sought to convey a sense of urgency about the current round of negotiations" and "we have also heard references to an Argentine desire to accelerate the pace of the negotiations but it is hard for us to tell what precisely the Argentines hope to accomplish". "*¹¹³⁹

February 25th, Foreign Minister Costa Méndez issues instructions to the Argentine negotiators in New York.

*"The Argentine delegation will constantly keep in mind the fact that the recognition by Great Britain of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands is a national and permanent objective of the Republic and that therefore it is crucial for the successful development of the negotiating process that the negotiations deal essentially with (that) said issue. "*¹¹⁴⁰

*"The Argentine delegation that attended New York was made up of ambassadors Enrique Juan Ros, Carlos Ortiz de Rozas and Carlos Lucan Blanco; Minister Atilo Molteni; Secretary Domingo Cullen and the advisor of the Antarctic and Malvinas Directorate of the Foreign Ministry, Colonel (R) Luis González Balcarce. The British (delegation) was chaired by Minister of State Richard Napier Luce; the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Anthony Williams; the head of the South American Department, Robert Fearn, and Foreign Office officials Colin Bright, John Anthony Penny and Jeremy Creeswell. Kelpers Lionel G. Blake and John Edward Check (sic) were also integrated into the United Kingdom delegation. "*¹¹⁴¹

*"A bilateral meeting was scheduled in February to continue talks. It fell to Richard Luce, then Minister of State at the FCO who replaced Ridley, to represent London, with instructions to resist the deadlines set in the Argentine memorandum and maintain that any agreement on the Commission should be ad referendum. "*¹¹⁴²

In Britain's House of Commons, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher takes questions.

"Mr. Farr: Has my right hon. Friend seen the reports in today's press about the possibility of the Argentine taking military action against the Falkland Islands? Can she assure the House and the country that the Falkland Islands will receive full support and military protection from Her Majesty's Government? Furthermore, can she assure the House that she will again consider withdrawing HMS "Endurance" from station and leaving her in the area until a suitable substitute can be provided?

*The Prime Minister: As my hon. Friend knows, we have put the position to the people of the Falkland Islands and we have said that their future is wholly a matter for their decision. In the meantime, we shall do our level best to meet the decisions of the Falkland Islanders. "*¹¹⁴³

February 26th, in New York, Anglo-Argentine negotiations commence. Argentina's delegation is led by Deputy-Foreign Minister Enrique Ros. Britain's team by Minister Richard Luce. Representing the Falkland Islands people are Tim Blake and John Cheek.

1139 Telegram 1112 from the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, to the Department of State; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820105-0567

1140 Quoted in Yofre 2011

1141 Yofre 2011

1142 *La política británica hacia las Malvinas* Vicente Berasategui 2013

1143 Hansard HC [18/980-84]

*“Mr. Luce explained that he wished to make the British position clear from the outset. We had no doubts about British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies. The wishes of the Islanders themselves were paramount ... Sr. Ros recalled that Argentina had been trying to reach a solution to this dispute for over 16 years ... He stressed that the principal question for Argentines' was sovereignty. The key to their position was the need for Britain to recognise Argentine sovereignty in the area. ... Argentina had no intention of disturbing the Islanders' style of life; what they wanted was a balance between Islanders' interests and Argentine sovereignty rights. ... For the Argentines it would not be possible to accept any agreement that excluded the Argentine claim to sovereignty. ... ”*¹¹⁴⁴

*“We knew before the talks took place in February 1982 what the Argentines were going to propose. Lord Carrington agreed that I should accept their concept of a ‘negotiating commission’ which would look at every facet of the Falkland Islands problem, including sovereignty. However, I was to make it absolutely clear to them that, as far as sovereignty was concerned, there would be no change without the consent of the Islanders and of Parliament. Against that background I was given the broad brief to go into negotiations, to keep dialogue going and, to be quite blunt about it, if things were getting difficult, we would just have to buy time. ... I say, quite bluntly, that we were blocked in. Leaseback had not made any progress, and we saw no easy way out. We hoped, I hoped, that perhaps the Argentines would come forward with something positive out of the negotiating commission, which might lead us to a new way forward ... all we could do was buy time. We had run out of any innovating ideas. Of those, leaseback had been the most important.”*¹¹⁴⁵

*“At one point (February 26 at 10 a.m.), Luce said that “the wishes of the islanders take absolute priority.” An unacceptable condition for the Argentines, since only “the interests” of the islanders should be taken into account. ... The terms of the dialogues hinted at the difficult possibility of an understanding. LUCE: The wishes of the islanders are of absolute priority to us. There must be no change without their consent ... (We) have no doubts about British sovereignty. ROS: Argentina has no doubts about its sovereign rights. In the future we must reach a “common understanding”. [...] The element of recognition of our sovereignty is essential. We must bear in mind that this problem will persist until a solution is reached. In Argentina there is increasing pressure in this regard [...] And nothing should be interpreted in Buenos Aires that could lead to the inference that the dispute over sovereignty is set aside. LUCE: I don't think we're misunderstanding each other. I understand the special sensitivity but it also exists in our Parliament. Our common goal is to work towards the solution. ORTIZ DE ROZAS: I do not underestimate the sensitivity of your Parliament, but it is more acute in Argentina.”*¹¹⁴⁶

February 27th, in Argentina, the morning newspaper *Convicción* notes; “All the conditions are given: we have a determined president and an excellent foreign minister. If after winning the war on terrorism, we take back the Falklands, history will forget the economic stupidities. Argentina will be alive, aware of its vigor and ready to take a place in the world.” The article concludes that a positive outcome for Argentina in the negotiations would reinforce Argentina's position regarding the Beagle Channel Islands.

In New York, a second day of talks take place at the Headquarters of the United Nations.¹¹⁴⁷

1144 PREM19/613 f68. The full FCO record of the two days can be found here - https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/820226_FCO_cnv_UK-ARG_NY_PREM19-0613_f68.pdf

1145 Richard Luce interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.182

1146 *El fracaso de la cumbre entre argentinos y británicos que decidió la guerra: “En un mes tomamos las Malvinas”* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022

1147 These were the 3rd round of talks under the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher and, as it would turn out, the last ever face-to face Anglo-Argentine negotiations.

*“At the end of day one we were going to continue discussing ways of cooperation, and ways forward. All we had to do after that was draft a communiqué. But they had obviously conveyed to BA what they thought had been agreed, and were told to go back and start again. So we covered exactly the same ground on day two.”*¹¹⁴⁸

At the end of the meeting, the two delegations confer on a joint-statement to be released to the press.

*“Then we drafted a communiqué, saying that we would aim to progress the relationship, and that we respected each others' position on the sovereignty dispute. It was another long grass' situation. We had no inkling that they were losing patience. It was odd. To this day I don't believe that the people in New York were aware of the level of planning in BA. The idea that we were [made] aware that they were going to invade is something that people have invented.”*¹¹⁴⁹

From New York, Ambassador Ros informs his Foreign Ministry as to what he believes has been achieved.

*“It should be stated that the (Argentine) delegation has achieved the objectives set in the instructions in that the Argentine proposal have been accepted in the following aspect: Constitution of a permanent negotiating Commission whose meeting will have sufficient frequency to negotiate the dispute.”*¹¹⁵⁰

*“Ros's superiors in Buenos Aires were furious. Here the assessment was that Britain was procrastinating once again. The aim of demonstrating British intransigence before the international community was not going to be helped by cryptic reports of cordial meetings. The key fact was that Britain had not formally accepted the Argentine proposal and had given no indication of when it intended to do so.”*¹¹⁵¹

*“From the report it is clear that Juan Enrique Ros felt satisfied with the progress made in the meetings in New York, but that was not the feeling of Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Méndez.”*¹¹⁵²

In Argentina, conscripts inducted into the armed forces from the 'Class of '63', commence basic training.

February 28th, from New York, the UK's Mission sums up the agreement with regard to a 'Permanent Negotiating Commission.

*“The purpose of a UK/Argentine Permanent Negotiating Commission would be to accelerate progress towards a peaceful and comprehensive solution of the dispute between Britain and Argentina on sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. ... The work of the Commission should be conducted without prejudice to the sovereignty position of either Government.”*¹¹⁵³

*“By the end of February, the DENAC 1/82 and a handwritten fourteen-page document called “Outline Plan for Recapturing the Malvinas Islands” were ready.”*¹¹⁵⁴

March 1st, in New York, the negotiating delegations release a joint statement to the press.

“The meeting took place in a cordial and positive spirit. The two sides reaffirmed their resolve to find a solution to the sovereignty dispute and considered in detail an Argentine proposal for procedures to make better progress in this sense.”

1148 Tim Blake quoted in Bound 2007

1149 *Ibid.*

1150 Quoted in Yofre 2011. All proposals were *ad referendum* to London.

1151 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.28

1152 Yofre 2011

1153 *PREM19/613 f67*. In full here - [https://c59574e9047e61130f13-](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/98B7E22397DB47C1852DD59E4169ACC8.pdf)

[3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/98B7E22397DB47C1852DD59E4169ACC8.pdf](https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/98B7E22397DB47C1852DD59E4169ACC8.pdf)

1154 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

In Washington DC, on the same day, Britain's Minister Richard Luce has a meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders.

*“When Luce saw Enders at the State Department on 1 March, , he briefed him on the present situation on the Falklands issue following the New York talks. The issue was becoming increasingly polarised. The Argentines were impatient at what they saw as a lack of progress after sixteen years of negotiations: at the same time Islanders opposition to any transfer of sovereignty or greater involvement with Argentina had hardened. ... It would therefore be helpful if Enders during his forthcoming visit to Buenos Aires could encourage the Argentines to keep things cool on the Falklands dispute. Enders undertook to do this ... His only specific comment was that the Argentines had recently given the impression of greater optimism that the UK was now more ready to consider the interests rather than simply the wishes of the Islanders...”*¹¹⁵⁵

From Buenos Aires, in the evening, Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues a statement.

*“At the meeting held in New York on 26 and 27 February, the representatives of Argentina and Great Britain considered an Argentine proposal to establish a system of monthly meetings with a pre-established agenda, pre-arranged meeting place, and led by top-level officials. The aim of such meetings will be genuinely to speed up to the maximum the negotiations in train to achieve recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and by this means to achieve substantial results within a time which at this advanced stage of the discussions will necessarily have to be short. Argentina has negotiated with Great Britain over the solution of the sovereignty dispute over the islands with patience, loyalty and good faith for over 15 years, within the framework indicated by the relevant United Nations resolutions. The new system constitutes an effective step for the early solution of the dispute. However, should this not occur, Argentina reserves the right to terminate the working of this mechanism and to chose freely the procedure which best accords with her interests.”*¹¹⁵⁶

*“The unilateral Argentine communique was released before the GOA negotiator returned to Buenos Aires, indicating that the GOA planned to issue it regardless of the outcome of the talks, which the British entered with instructions to listen only. In any event, the Foreign Ministry has limited influence on GOA decisions regarding the Malvinas, which, like the Beagle, is managed at the Junta level. The unexpected, threatening GOA communique suggests a hardening attitude, ...”*¹¹⁵⁷

*“I would not say that that report was the beginning of an offensive, but an accentuation in the face of a failure bigger than we expected, from the meeting on the 26th and 27th. (It had) the purpose of putting pressure on the British government so that they would not give in to the pressure of the (Falklands) Committee or a group of the Islanders. ... Both General Galtieri and Admiral Anaya called me in the morning of March 1st, both rightly disappointed about the meeting of the 26th and 27th and they pointed out to me the convenience of doing something more concrete. That is why I planned that memorandum... At no time did I have in mind, when I talked about other procedures, the possibility of resorting to force.”*¹¹⁵⁸

1155 PREM19/657 f108

1156 Williams to FCO March 2, 1982 in ALW 040/325/1 B 51-100. Also PREM19/657 f107.

1157 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

1158 Judgment provided by Decree 2971/83 of the alleged infractions provided for in the Code of Justice Military indicated in the actions and report produced by the Commission for Analysis and Evaluation of the Military Political and Strategic Responsibilities of the War Conflict in the South Atlantic. Interview with Costa Mendez after the 1982 Falklands War for, apparently, the Argentine Commission of Inquiry (Rattenbach). Undated, the document can be found here - https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/ar_ea_cem_csf_05_17.pdf

*“... Costa Méndez, after consulting the Military Junta, issues a unilateral statement maintaining that a negotiation system had been considered in New York and revealed the points analyzed, despite the confidentiality of the treaty (sic) having been agreed to ... The final paragraph of the statement was more of a threat than a warning.”*¹¹⁵⁹

*“The talks appeared to go well and resulted in an agreement to set up a commission that would consider both parties' demands. The Argentines, however, decided to turn up the pressure on London rather than wait to see what the commission might accomplish.”*¹¹⁶⁰

March 2nd, Argentine newspapers report on the Foreign Ministry's statement.

*“The press release stated that Argentina had negotiated for more than fifteen years with the UK, with patience, loyalty and good faith and within the framework of the UN and had proposed a new mechanism for negotiations which is to include South Georgia as well as the Sandwich Islands. If there was no agreement, Argentina retains the right to ... resort to whatever procedure is commensurable with the interests of Argentina. This last paragraph obviously does not exclude the possibility of military occupation of the islands.”*¹¹⁶¹

*“The Falklands talks are given front-page treatment in most of today's newspapers. The text of the Joint Communique is widely reproduced, but is overshadowed by the text of a separate Argentine statement which was issued by the MFA ... an unnamed Government source, quoted by La Nacion, recalled Camilion's assertion that the present status of the Falkland Islands was "unsustainable" ... He said that various plans were already being prepared for forthcoming meeting. ... He stated that there were also parallel plans already formulated in case the envisaged meetings did not produce sufficient progress.”*¹¹⁶²

Argentina's *Buenos Aires Herald* sees the Foreign Ministry announcement as containing a “veiled threat”, and warns the UK that this time Argentina, “means business.”¹¹⁶³

*“Even the Buenos Aires Herald (never a lapdog of the military government) soberly reported a source in the government, believed to be the Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Méndez, saying that Argentina was preparing to break off diplomatic relations with Britain unless there was a successful outcome very soon.”*¹¹⁶⁴

From Buenos Aires, Britain's Defence Attaché, Stephen Love, writes to Governor Hunt regarding the Argentine's possible use of force to seize the Islands; suggesting a clandestine assault would be the most probable.¹¹⁶⁵

*“On 2 March, the military attaché in Buenos Aires, Colonel Love, envisaged the Argentine navy landing marines on the Falklands, and if the Argentines believed a negotiated settlement was no longer possible, there might be 'a straight seizure of the Islands.' ...”*¹¹⁶⁶

In New York, Britain's delegation respond that the Buenos Aires statement; “... creates a more difficult and unhelpful climate for continuing the negotiating process.”¹¹⁶⁷

1159 Yofre 2011

1160 Bratton P. & Thies W. 2011 p.4

1161 *Clarín* March 2, 1982

1162 *Williams to FCO March 2, 1982* in PREM19/657 f107

1163 *ALW 040/325/1 B 51 – 100*

1164 Bound 2007

1165 Not in the file, but the Governor responded to Love on March 11, 1982. See *FCO12/384 f216*.

1166 Briley 2022. Colonel Stephen Love.

1167 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.137

*“Alarm bells should have been ringing loudly in London. Instead, it was judged that negotiations would continue. The government's Joint Intelligence Committee concluded no major military action was likely before the start of the southern summer in October. There was little sense of urgency.”*¹¹⁶⁸

In Argentina, Brigadier-General Mario Benjamin Menéndez is informed that he will head the military government in the Falklands, once they have been seized.¹¹⁶⁹

*“On 2 March, when Galtieri offered the governorship of the Malvinas to General Mario B. Menéndez, he told Menéndez that the invading force would only remain on the islands until November-December 1982...”*¹¹⁷⁰

*“On 2 March, ... Brigadier General Mario Benjamín Menéndez was informed about the existing plans to militarily recover the islands and his intended role: Military Governor of the Malvinas.”*¹¹⁷¹

*“At the meeting, Galtieri informed him that the Military Junta was preparing (for) the occupation of the Malvinas and that the operation depended on how diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain evolved.”*¹¹⁷²

*“The Military Junta had appointed General de Brigada Mario B. Menéndez, Chief of the 3rd Operations of the Army General Staff, to be in charge as Military Governor. General Galtieri assured him that his commission would not extend beyond November or December as they did not expect any complications. Menéndez quickly requested to be assigned assistants, as there were around 1,900 people living in the archipelago: 1,420 natives, 450 British citizens, and approximately 30 foreigners (including Argentinians, Canadians, Uruguayans, Israelis, and Americans).”*¹¹⁷³

From New York, Island delegates Tim Blake and John Cheek return to the Islands but are unable to comment due to the level of confidentiality insisted upon by the Foreign Office.

*“The meetings have been shrouded in secrecy to a degree that would not exist in most other democratic countries ... we, whose way of life is up against the wall are left uninformed and wondering.”*¹¹⁷⁴

*“The councillors returned to Stanley on 2 March, exactly one month before the invasion, and reported confidentially to their colleagues on Executive and Legislative Councils (Exco and Legco). Even before their LADE plane touched down in Stanley the Argentine popular press was shrieking outrage at the 'failure' of the talks and quoting bellicose words from the military government.”*¹¹⁷⁵

March 3rd, in Argentina, *La Prensa* reports that Britain has only a limited time period in which to acknowledge Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.

“... columnist Iglesias Rouco claims to detect Argentine dissatisfaction with the New York talks and serious thought of breaking off relations with Britain in the near future. He quotes his sources as saying that Britain will have no more than three or four months to acknowledge Argentine sovereignty and agree on an early date for the "return" of the Islands to Argentina. ... There would be no flexibility in Argentina's minimum demand for restitution of sovereignty before the 150th anniversary of the colony ... Argentina would resort to other means if there were no progress. He goes on to speculate about the advantages of a direct seizure of the

1168 Briley 2022

1169 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.52

1170 *The Origins of the South Atlantic War* John Arquilla & Maria M. Rasmussen 2001

1171 Carbone 2008

1172 Yofre 2011

1173 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1174 *Penguin News*

1175 Bound 2007

Islands, which he believes would be "understood" by the Americans, to whom joint naval facilities in the Islands could be offered. He suggests that such direct action might be taken between the middle and end of this year." ¹¹⁷⁶

"We have now received a Secret report confirming that this press speculation was inspired by the Argentinian Naval High Command in an attempt to achieve an early settlement of the dispute. The report states that as there is no tangible progress towards a settlement by the end of June 1982 the Navy will push for a diplomatic offensive in international organisations, a break in relations with the UK and military action against the Islands." ¹¹⁷⁷

"No diplomat can talk about the use of force. A decision of this nature is taken without any prior notice. We are willing, very firmly, to go as far as need be if the archipelago is not returned as soon as possible." ¹¹⁷⁸

British newspapers report on the Falklands dispute and the reaction in Buenos Aires following New York.

"The Argentine Government has warned that it will "put an end" to negotiations with Britain over the disputed sovereignty of the Falkland Islands and feel free to take other action unless a quick solution is found." ¹¹⁷⁹

In London, PM Thatcher minutes; "we must make contingency plans."

"A British Embassy official who handles Falkland affairs told EmbOf on March 3 that Argentine FonMin statement took HMG by surprise and is likely to annoy HMG because of the breach of confidentiality." ¹¹⁸⁰

"On 3 March Mr Luce sent a personal message to Enrico Ros referring to the agreement that the discussions should remain confidential until Governments had been consulted. He said the communique and residual press comment had created more difficulty and an unhelpful climate for continuing the negotiation process. He added, 'I am deeply disturbed by what may be interpreted as threats...!...' " ¹¹⁸¹

".., Margaret Thatcher would say that the Argentine government "violated the procedures agreed during the meeting" through Costa Méndez's (public) statement. ... However, she said years later, "despite my trepidation, I did not expect anything resembling an invasion, thinking consistent with the most recent assessment of our intelligence." ... " ¹¹⁸²

March 4th, from London, a message is sent to the British Embassy in Washington DC.

"In the light of Luce's discussion with Enders on 1 March, Mr Luce hopes that you can brief Enders before he leaves for Argentina, on the statement issued by the Argentines on 1 March and on the terms of our reaction. You should make clear that while we have every wish to find a solution to the dispute, it is politically impossible for us to negotiate against a background of threats. The Argentine action not only contravenes the spirit of the New York talks: it makes the whole task of finding a solution much

1176 UKE Buenos Aires to FCO Mar 3, 1982 in PREM19/657 f103

1177 Lt.-Colonel Lowles to DGI Falkland Islands in FCO12/384 f170. In full here - <https://e75f6e9cfeb9a135aad4-518ea3b2de549204a48e1fd09592ed5a.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/820310 DI4A mnt SECRET RPT ANAYA FCO12 384 f170.pdf>

1178 Foreign Minister Mendez quoted in Bound 2007

1179 *The Guardian* March 3, 1982

1180 *Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 4, 1982* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981-1984*

1181 Barker 1997

1182 Yofre 2011

more difficult. We appreciate that Enders will not necessarily wish to appear to be in support of the British view of the dispute in his talks in Buenos Aires. But it would be helpful if he could reinforce with the Argentines the clear risks of pushing this issue into a confrontation. He should be aware that the Argentine press continues to assert that the Americans would turn a blind eye to a use of force by Argentina.”¹¹⁸³

From the Falkland Islands' Governor: “Partly as a result of the Argentine MFA statement, feeling of Councillors today was against acceptance of informal working paper. ... More time for consideration was needed. They asked for another meeting in a fortnight. ... In view of the Argentine breach of confidentiality, Councillors have asked they could release text of informal working paper immediately.... I assume that you would prefer not to authorise this...”¹¹⁸⁴

March 5th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams telegrams the FCO in London.

*“My interview with Enrique Ros yesterday evening turned into an exchange of commiserations. He was at pains to make it clear ... that he accepted that the false impression of menace on the MFA's statement's last paragraph was "unhappy" (sic) and that the Ministry accepted no (repeat no) responsibility for the remarks ascribed to it unattributably...”*¹¹⁸⁵

From Port Stanley, Governor Hunt updates Capt. Barker on HMS *Endurance*.

*“New York talks did not end in deadlock but a bland communique. Councillors returned with an agreed working paper for consideration by Legislative Council here and Ministers in UK for further talks in near future. Irresponsible statements from Argentine MFA and press about what was agreed at New York have now made progress more difficult and Councillors have asked for a fortnight's grace to consider Argentine proposals. My guess is that they will reject them, in which case we shall have reached deaslock: but that time is not yet.”*¹¹⁸⁶

In London, Britain's Cabinet members request that the next Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee paper include; “Annexes on both civil and military contingency plans for counter-action against Argentina.” Guy Hüntrods, a director of Lloyds Bank International, complains at the implications of rising tensions for trade with Argentina, and Britain's financial interests in that country.¹¹⁸⁷

In Buenos Aires, Costa Méndez tells Ambassador Williams that he is dissatisfied with the progress of negotiations. David Joy, a member of the Embassy staff in Buenos Aires, reports a conversation with Raul Schmidt of the Chilean Embassy.

*“The Schmidt thesis is based essentially on the Argentine Navy's need of a strategic port further south than its current and most secure port, Puerto Belgrano. The obvious option Ushuaia was not satisfactory from a security point of view because it is under constant Chilean surveillance. Therefore the Argentines are, according to Schmidt, desperate to have some other secure port further south, a goal that could be satisfied by having access to the islands south of Beagle or the Falklands. In this context, he believes the sovereignty disputes are linked.”*¹¹⁸⁸

1183 Carrington to UKE Washington March 4, 1982 in FCO12/384 f180

1184 Hunt to FCO March 4, 1982 in ALW 040/325/1 B 51 - 100

1185 Williams to FCO March 5, 1982 in PREM19/657 f99

1186 FCO46/3202 f122

1187 Livingstone 2018

1188 Quoted in *Daily Telegraph* 21.2.2013

La Prensa journalist Jesús Iglesias Rouco reports that; “practically all (Army) commanders express their belief that the firm position adopted by the government against great Britain is correct, and some add that the recovery of the islands, whether by diplomatic or military means, will strengthen the process.”¹¹⁸⁹

Unidentified military aircraft are reported to have flown over Port Stanley.

March 6th, at Stanley airport, an Argentine *LADE Hercules* transport aircraft lands unannounced; citing an in-flight emergency (fuel leak).

“Overflights by Argentine military aircraft were a frequent topic of conversation. The emergency landing of an Argentine C-130 at Stanley Airport ... had given the people the jitters. (As Port Stanley reported by telegram, the plane arrived without formal warning and it was only thanks to a local ham radio operator that anyone knew it was coming in. The control tower was not manned since it was a Sunday, and the plane could presumably have landed before anyone could have got out to the airport. As it was there was still time for the Airport Manager, Mr. Gerald Cheek, and a contingent of armed marines, to drive out to the airport before the plane landed). The incident certainly demonstrated the relative ease with which unannounced military aircraft could land at Stanley ...”¹¹⁹⁰

“Ricupero cited the recent surprise landing of an Argentine air force Hercules at Stanley and surmised that despite what Costa Mendez had told his own Ministers, this might indicate the sort of additional pressure which the Argentines might feel tempted to use.”¹¹⁹¹

“With hindsight, Dick Baker saw the flight and the landing as either a spying mission or a rehearsal for an Entebbe-style raid. It was a quiet Sunday afternoon and the pilot had radioed Stanley claiming his Hercules, supposedly on a routine mail dropping flight to an Antarctic base, was leaking fuel. He needed to land immediately. When Vice Comodoro Hector Gilobert disturbed the Baker household asking for permission, Dick did not refuse it, but decided he would drive to Stanley Airport to have a look at the aircraft. Dick watched with growing concern as a few dozen obviously senior officers disembarked. They were not the sort of men to go on supply flights, but they were the kind of invasion planners who would love to have a good look around Stanley. The Chief Secretary smelt a rat and the stench became stronger when one of the airport's technical staff told him that there was no firm evidence of a fuel leak.”¹¹⁹²

“The Deputy Governor and Dick Chief Secretary, Dick Baker, said to me that efforts to sound alarm bells in London were wasted. “A lot of us did foresee it. The tragedy was no one in London seemed to want to know or to react to the signals... Why nothing happened in response is a great mystery to me”. He suspected there was a deliberate policy to ignore the signals and weather an invasion in the hope that Britain would be rid of a troublesome colony. “We used to joke we were expendable”, said Dick Baker.”¹¹⁹³

In Mendoza, Argentina, Alejandro Orfila, current President of the Organization of American States (OAS), makes a statement to the press regarding the Falklands; “It will not be long before that corner of national territory flies the flag of the Fatherland.”¹¹⁹⁴

1189 Quoted in Yofre 2011

1190 *ALW 040/325/1 Part C 101*. Hickson minute following duty call to the Island dated 19th March 1982

1191 *PREM 19/657 Telegram No.42 of 11 March 1982*. This telegram details a conversation in Brasilia between Ambassador George Harding and the Head of the Brazilian America's Department.

1192 Bound 2007

1193 Briley 2022

1194 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.51. Orfila would later deny any pre-knowledge of the *Junta's* plans.

March 8th, in London, PM Margaret Thatcher speaks to Defence Secretary John Nott regarding preparations for an Argentine blockade, or invasion; *“The Prime Minister indicated to Mr Nott on Monday evening that she would like to know how quickly RN ships could be deployed to the Falkland Islands.”*¹¹⁹⁵

*“As talks with Argentina broke down, leading to the 1982 war, the settlers' cunning assertion of themselves as both indigenized kelper subjects with the right of self-determination and neglected white British citizens ultimately earned the UK's steadfast defence.”*¹¹⁹⁶

From London, HMS *Endurance* is instructed to remain 'on station' at the Falklands. Governor Hunt increases security at the Islands' airport. In the midst of these preparations, Lord Carrington telegrams Governor Rex Hunt asking him to discern the views of local Councillors to a resumption of negotiations with Argentina.¹¹⁹⁷

Also from London, aware that Assistant US Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders, is due to arrive in Argentina, Lord Carrington sends a message to US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig.

*“In the message, which mentioned the “very helpful” meeting between Enders and Richard Luce on March 1, Carrington stated the United Kingdom’s increasing concern about “the Argentine Government’s attitude, in particular about the threats which recur in the Argentine press (apparently with some measure of government inspiration) to use force if the negotiations do not soon reach a conclusion on Argentine terms”. “You will realize”, Carrington continued, in a passage that Haig highlighted in the margin of his copy, “that it is politically impossible for us to negotiate against such a background, so anything that Tom Enders can do while in Buenos Aires to bring the Argentines to a more reasonable and pacific frame of mind will be much appreciated by us”. At the top of his copy of Carrington’s message, Haig wrote: “Was Tom apprised?””*¹¹⁹⁸

In Buenos Aires, on arrival, Assistant US Secretary of State Thomas Enders, holds meetings with Foreign Affairs Minister Costa Méndez and Under-Secretary Ros. During these discussions, he raises the question of the Falklands negotiations.

*“Ros presented a picture of British intransigence. The GOA has long been willing to accord the Islanders every kind of special status to safeguard their way of life, he said. However, the GOA insists that the British recognize Argentine sovereignty in the Malvinas and their dependencies. When Enders observed that HMG's position does not seem to be based on economic or strategic concerns but on its belief that the wishes of the Islanders must be respected, Ros said that UN decision on the Island clearly set aside the concept of self-determination for the Islanders. Ros said with emphasis that 'the United Nations did not give the Islanders the right of veto.' Ros stated that at the recent bilateral talks with the British, the GOA had proposed the establishment of a permanent high-level commission in London and Buenos Aires to seek out a solution. The GOA is now waiting for the British answer. Ros stated that his government is under increasing pressure from various sources to solve the Malvinas problem. Now the government is trying to see if the British are really interested in resolving the issue or instead are just looking for ways to procrastinate. Argentina is willing to do its utmost to find a negotiated solution but a solution cannot be delayed indefinitely, Ros stated.”*¹¹⁹⁹

1195 Ministry of Defence memo March 12, 1982. The seemingly reluctant answer was, “20 days”. Albeit with reservations regarding support and maintenance.

1196 *Salvaging Empire: Sovereignty, Natural Resources, and Environmental Science in the South Atlantic* J.J.A. Blair 2023

1197 PREM 19/657 Telegram No.30 of 8 March 1982

1198 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984 Document 12* citing *Department of State, Central Policy File, P820044-1953*). There is no evidence that Enders was informed while he was in Buenos Aires.

1199 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820137–0228*

*“During his visit to Buenos Aires, Tom Enders raised the Falkland Islands both in private and in public. He said that there are human and strategic aspects to the dispute and that both must be satisfied. Tom urged the Argentines to continue negotiations. They were non-committal but not negative.”*¹²⁰⁰

*“We were contacted by the British government prior to my trip. They raised their fears about the unproductive character of these talks, and that they might be broken off. I raised that fear with the foreign minister of Argentina, saying that the United States did not intend to change its historic view – which was not to take a position, one way or the other, on the territorial dispute. We wanted countries with which we had friendly relations to solve that problem, but we were concerned that the talks appeared to be headed nowhere. Costa Mendez did not commit himself, although he was not negative.... He said they were ‘working on it’ and they hoped to have something.’...”*¹²⁰¹

*“... during the visit to Buenos Aires of the United States Undersecretary for Latin American Affairs, Thomas Enders, the foreign minister and Enrique Ros discussed the Malvinas issue: Mr. Enders, who, as we have seen, had been informed by Luce in Washington, stated that the United States was not worried about the Malvinas issue and that his country's position on the issue was hands off (expression he used). Although it was known that Great Britain had apparently asked Enders to discuss this issue with Argentina, he did not make any statement in Buenos Aires in relation to the British position or [the] requests.”*¹²⁰²

In Buenos Aires, at a dinner hosted by US Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman, Thomas Enders addresses the possibility of war with Costa Méndez, who assures both Shlaudeman and Enders that there will be no war.

*“Nicanor Costa Méndez was not telling the whole truth. Years later, former ambassador and former foreign minister Bonifacio del Carril recounted that between March 9 and 10, 1982 – that is, hours after the foreign minister's meetings with Enders – he had an interview with Costa Méndez in his office. He was surprised to see so many maps of the south(ern) Seas spread out. After discussing the issue that had brought him there and when he was saying goodbye, the chancellor told him: – With all the trouble I'm in, now the junk dealers are coming. "What junkyards?" asked Del Carril. "Some who go to Georgia," answered his friend the chancellor. And after a few seconds, in a low voice, he added: "in a month we will take the Malvinas." ...”*¹²⁰³

March 9th, in Argentina, the junta meet again as the final invasion plan nears completion.

*“The basic landing plan was ready by the third week in February and was presented to the junta on 9 March. The junta accepted it and forwarded it to Admiral Suárez del Cerro...”*¹²⁰⁴

“... a plan was drawn up which envisaged: the landing in the Falklands ... the establishment of an Argentine government, and the immediate withdrawal of the troops involved, with the exception of the troops indispensable for maintaining security and control over Malvinese territory. In addition, it was determined that, in order for the plan to succeed, it was necessary to meet two requirements: to act with "tactical surprise", that is to say, to disembark without prior warning and, if possible, without bloodshed; and to act under the greatest "strategic secrecy" to prevent England from having the opportunity to strengthen its reduced strength – of 40 Marines – on the islands. Once the military operation – which in the end only

1200 Haig to Carrington March 13, 1982 in Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820135–0667. In response to Lord Carrington's message of March 8, 1982. After Enders' return to the USA.

1201 Thomas O. Enders interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.165. This 'historic' view had only become policy after 1945.

Worthy of note that Enders would appear to have been ignorant of Carrington's March 8, 1982 message until his return to Washington. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984 Document 12*

1202 Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022. *Op. Cit.* Not supported by Enders' interview in Charlton 1989 (above).

1203 *Ibid.* See also Yofre 2011

1204 Middlebrook 2003

*contemplated the landing of military forces in the Falklands – had been carried out, the stage of diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain would come. They would seek to convince the British government of the ‘fait accompli,’ offering concessions ranging from compensation to the Islanders and commercial companies, to offers of economic cooperation with British companies that would like to exploit with Argentina the oil from the Southern Basin or the Krill fishery. In addition, it was intended to involve the United States in the negotiation, to convince Britain that there was no ‘reverse’ and that they should accept the new situation in the South Atlantic as it was.”*¹²⁰⁵

*“The occupation plan established a D+5. This meant that, once the mission was completed, the ships and troops returned to their destinations on the continent, leaving only around 400 troops carrying out police duties, while the diplomatic scene opened. ... It was very simple for those who imagined Operation Rosario, Margaret Thatcher would not give the order to attack an “unprofitable” target. That was what history taught.”*¹²⁰⁶

*“On March 9th, the COMIL gave intervention to the Joint Staff and ordered them to prepare the DENAC 2/82, extending the previous one without considering any UK military reaction, except for the local one. Additionally, they were tasked with preparing the corresponding documents: the Military Strategic Directive (DEMIL) and the Campaign Outline Plan. The preparation of a new Campaign Outline Plan started on the basis of the previous one, creating the Malvinas Theater of Operations (TOM, for its acronym in Spanish) under the command of General de División Osvaldo García. General de Brigada Américo Daher was appointed as Chief of the Ground Forces, Brigadier Luis Castellano as Chief of the Air Component, Contraalmirante Walter Allara as Chief of the Amphibious Force, Contraalmirante Carlos Büsser as Chief of the Landing Force, and General de Brigada Mario B. Menéndez as the military governor. In short, this would be the leadership for Operation Rosario.”*¹²⁰⁷

In London, Minister Luce meets with the Falkland Islands Committee.¹²⁰⁸

Following a conversation with the Prime Minister, Secretary for Defence John Nott requests information regarding the speed with which Royal navy ships could reach the Falkland Islands.

*“... if a frigate were to be deployed to the Falklands, RFA support would also be necessary. Passage time whether from the Caribbean or the UK would be in the order of 20 days. Maintenance of one frigate on station on a semi-permanent, deterrent basis would, in practice, require the deployment of two, in order to allow for maintenance and serviceability.”*¹²⁰⁹

March 10th, in Buenos Aires, the British Embassy receives a message from Davidoff’s lawyers to say that he is sending a party of 41 workers to South Georgia to dismantle the derelict whaling station at Leith, and that an Argentine naval support vessel, *Bahia Buen Suceso* has been chartered for the operation. Embassy staff try to contact Davidoff in order to remind him of his obligations, but are unable to locate him.¹²¹⁰

1205 Carbone 2008

1206 Yofre 2011

1207 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1208 *FCO12/384 f19*. Attended by a young Suki Cameron. In full here - https://e75f6e9cf9a135aad4-518ea3b2de549204a48e1fd09592ed5a.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/820309_1100_FCO_cnv_LUCE-FIC_FCO12_384_f196.pdf

1209 *DEF24/2264/1 f127*. In full here - https://e75f6e9cf9a135aad4-518ea3b2de549204a48e1fd09592ed5a.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/820309_Nicholls_mnt_DRAFT_LTR_FOR_MT_DEF24_2262-1_f127.pdf

1210 *FCO12/384 f246*

*“A well-placed official interviewed for this study who asked specifically not to be identified on this point expressed his conviction that Davidoff's team included marines with orders to carry out the principle elements of Project Alpha.”*¹²¹¹

*“After the diplomatic disagreements in February in New York between the delegations of Argentina and the United Kingdom, Operation Davidoff began. “The Georgia operation was prepared well in advance. I know this because the ship that transported the scrap metal dealers also carried people from the Antarctic Command, ...”*¹²¹²

March 11th, Constantino Davidoff's lawyers are warned, by the British Embassy, that there will be consequences should he not comply with South Georgia's landing restrictions.

*“Davidoff knows full well that he must report at Grytviken for clearance before proceeding to Leith He will receive full instructions there. Legally, he should also be fined or imprisoned for his last illegal entry but, in view of FCO (instructions) of 31 December, Acting-Base Commander will be advised merely to admonish him not to repeat the offence.”*¹²¹³

From the UK, the owners of the whaling station at Leith, South Georgia, *Christian Salvesen*, confirm that they are aware of Davidoff's plans, and that his contract has been extended to March 31st, 1984.

From the Rio de la Plata, *Bahia Buen Suceso* (Capt. Oswaldo Miello) sails for South Georgia.

*“The ship carried Davidoff's equipment and the forty-one civilian workers of his party; it also carried some general cargo for delivery to the Argentine port of Ushuaia... Sr Davidoff was not on board the Bahia Buen Suceso when it sailed from Buenos Aires; one of his engineers would be in charge of the dismantling crew.”*¹²¹⁴

*“The captain of the ship, when he set sail, received two sealed envelopes: One with the order to cut off radio contact (on a certain day); another in which instructions were given to direct the ship first to the Georgia Islands. The entire operation was carried out on the basis that the English would not respond. There was great improvisation, in all areas”. Colonel Luís Carlos Sullivan, director of the Antarctic Command, confided to the author on August 16, 1982. The "Alfa" naval personnel commanded by officer Alfredo Astiz, also went to participate...”*¹²¹⁵

Observed from Grytviken, Argentine military aircraft overfly South Georgia.

*“The Argentines are considering a wide range of options for 'unilateral action', according to sources in Buenos Aires, These include initiatives in the UN, a break of diplomatic relations and, in the final analysis, an invasion of the islands.”*¹²¹⁶

In London, intelligence reports indicate that Admiral Anaya is behind the more belligerent press articles.

*“The military planning was, with the Falklands in Argentine hands, to invade the disputed islands in the Beagle Channel. That was the determination of the navy...”*¹²¹⁷

1211 Welch 1997 fn.8

1212 *El día que la Flota de Mar cortó las comunicaciones y no hubo vuelta atrás en la recuperación de Malvinas* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* March 30, 2024

1213 *Hunt to UKE Buenos Aires March 12, 1982* in *FCO12/384 f249*

1214 Welch 1997

1215 *El día que la Flota de Mar cortó las comunicaciones y no hubo vuelta atrás en la recuperación de Malvinas* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* March 30, 2024

1216 *Latin American Weekly Report* March 12, 1982

1217 *Memorias Políticas* Oscar Camilion 1999

March 12th, in the UK, a Ministry of Defence *memo* notes that HMS *Endurance* is off Adelaide Island, and within three days sailing time of Port Stanley.

From Washington DC, Assistant Secretary of State for American Affairs, Thomas O. Enders, sends a message for Minister Luce; *“He had raised the Falklands both privately with the Argentine Foreign Minister and publicly during his recent visit to Buenos Aires, ... although the Argentines had been somewhat non-committal, they did not give Enders the impression that they were about to do anything drastic.”*¹²¹⁸

March 15th, HMS *Endurance* visits South Georgia.

March 16th, at Leith, South Georgia's Magistrate leaves a prominent notice at the old whaling station.¹²¹⁹

‘British Antarctic Survey... Leith Field Station... Unauthorised Entry Prohibited.’

At Port Stanley, Islands Councillors agree to allow a further round of talks with Argentina provided that there is no negotiation on a question of sovereignty.¹²²⁰

March 17th, from the UK, ships of the Royal Navy sail to Gibraltar for a NATO maritime exercise in the eastern Atlantic - *Exercise Spring Train*.¹²²¹

March 18th, from London, the US Embassy reports to Washington DC.

*“FCO South America Department Head Robin Fearn has told us that the negotiations over the Falkland Islands are in real danger of breaking down. At the recent meeting in New York, he said, the Argentine delegation was “clearly uninterested” in discussing anything other than the early transfer of sovereignty. ... HMG is anxious to keep the negotiations going, fearing that Argentina might otherwise feel impelled to attempt a military solution. The British remain convinced of the legality of their position and the issue is an emotional one in Parliament, particularly in the House of Lords. Fearn fears that talks may be broken off if the Argentines refuse to take a more flexible approach. Should negotiations break down, HMG is considering the feasibility of bringing the question before the United Nations. The British believe they would stand a good chance of winning there, given the Argentine record on human rights, the UK's recent successes in decolonization (Zimbabwe and Belize), and the contrast between British democracy and the Argentine Junta. HMG would prefer, however, to avoid such a course if at all possible.”*¹²²²

March 19th, at Stanley, HMS *Endurance* anchors in the harbour.

An Argentine Learjet overflies Stanley.

“On a second secret mission with the purpose of completing the previous one, Gamen participated directly. On 12 March, he adduced his wife was sick and, with the excuse of treating her, he traveled to Buenos Aires on a LADE scheduled flight. The mission consisted in returning him to Malvinas. On 19 March, Vicecomodoro Gamen went aboard a photo reconnaissance Learjet 35 A. It took off from Río Gallegos and, when overflying Malvinas, the aircraft commander pretended he had a landing gear failure; he performed several verification passages over the airport control tower and, therefore, completed the photographic task they had started in February. The photographers and the material used were left back in Rio Gallegos. Then, it departed again

1218 Henderson to FCO March 12, 1982 in PREM19/657 f105

1219 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.149

1220 Hunt to FCO March 17, 1982 in PREM19/657 f88

1221 An annual event, some 18 British destroyers and frigates were scheduled to take part, accompanied by support vessels.

1222 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820146-0021

towards Malvinas carrying Vicecomodoro Gamen, who got off on Stanley Port platform with the engines on. The Learjet returned to Rio Gallegos immediately.”¹²²³

At South Georgia, *Bahia Buen Suceso* (Osvaldo Niella) sails directly into Leith Harbour, bypassing Grytviken in defiance of British instructions.¹²²⁴

“While Davidoff may have been anxious to keep the British happy, the Argentine navy was less concerned to do so. Once again the boat travelled in radio silence...”¹²²⁵

“The UK Ambassador at Buenos Aires, Anthony Williams, had advised Davidoff that the ship should first arrive at Grytviken, an entrance and control port designated by the British Government. Nevertheless, following the order of the Chief of Transportes Navales, the Captain of the *Bahía Buen Suceso* went directly to Puerto Leith where technicians and workers disembarked to dismantle one of the whaling stations. It was not a capricious decision. Should British supervision be accepted, sovereignty would be implicitly acknowledged.”¹²²⁶

A British Antarctic Survey observation point is established overlooking Stromness Bay. From *Bahia Buen Suceso*, a large party of both civilian and uniformed personnel are observed to land. The Argentine flag is raised. Shots are fired in salute.¹²²⁷

“The workers at Leith raised an Argentine flag, in a ceremony without much pomp. According to military sources, this act had previously been agreed by Davidoff with the Navy.”¹²²⁸

“... I was deeply concerned at the way this happened. Nevertheless, I was informed that, quite clearly, he had this contractual arrangement, it seemed to me that the problem really lay in the fact that he was there without clearance from our Embassy in Buenos Aires. The important thing therefore was for him to get his papers in order. My concern was to smooth this one over.... The advice from our Ambassador was "Look, I think we can see a way through this one, because all we need to do is to try and legitimize his papers..." Clearly Governor Hunt was concerned about the position, and saw it from a slightly different viewpoint...”¹²²⁹

“On 19 March a party from the British Antarctic Survey arrived at Leith Harbour, where they found the *Bahia Buen Suceso* unloading and the Argentine flag flying ashore. ... There seemed to be around 100 people ashore. They were making themselves comfortable, having occupied the BAS refuge and shot some reindeer (although this was a protected species). ... The four observers then reported all this back to King Edward Point from where, with some difficulty, the information was transmitted to Rex Hunt, the Governor of the Falkland Islands.”¹²³⁰

1223 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War Chapter 1* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1224 Middlebrook (2003) gives the date of arrival as March 16, 1982. Carbone (2008) as March 20. Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 suggest March 18, 1981.

1225 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.47

1226 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1227 Meneghini (2015) suggests that the shots were fired by a party from a French yacht, hunting deer, but, in support, erroneously quotes a message of March 17. There are a few references to a 40' French yacht, *Cinq Gars Pour*, having arrived at Grytviken on, or around, March 14. Damaged in a storm, the crew of three (Serge Briez, Olivier Gouon and Michel Roger) sought assistance from the BAS and hunted deer for their food supplies. On March 22, 1982, the Base Commander indicated that the French sailors appeared to be in contact with the Argentines. See Franks Committee (UK) *Falkland Islands Review Committee Report* 1983 para.175

1228 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.67.

1229 Richard Luce interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.184

1230 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.48

“... this was the second move in "Project Alpha", the Argentine navy's plan to use Constantino Davidoff's scrap-metal venture to establish an Argentine presence on the island. Some of the men were genuine civilian scrap-metal works, but others were military personnel;... that evening the BAS reported their activities to Stanley.”¹²³¹

“Hoisting the flag was an insignificant action carried out by civil workers, who refused to abide by the formalities because they were following orders.”¹²³²

In London, Argentina's Ambassador is summoned and told that the incident is regarded as serious. He is also told that if the *Bahia Buen Suceso* does not leave forthwith, the UK will take whatever action it deems necessary.

March 20th, on South Georgia, two British Antarctic Survey (BAS) staff deliver a message from Governor Hunt to the Captain of the *Bahia Buen Suceso*.

“You have landed illegally at Leith without obtaining clearance. You and your party must go back on board the *Bahia Buen Suceso* immediately and report to the base commander Grytviken for further instructions. You must remove the Argentine flag from Leith. You must not interfere with the British Antarctic Survey depot at Leith. You must not alter or deface the notices at Leith. No military personnel are allowed to land on South Georgia. No firearms are to be taken ashore.”

Argentina's flag is lowered 15 minutes later.

“The British Antarctic Survey claim was submitted to the captain of the *Bahía Buen Suceso* vessel, assuming the workers depended on him. The latter answered his vessel was only complying with a charter agreement and, without further procedures, he set sail from Leith. The workers remained on the island.”¹²³³

HMS *Endurance* is ordered to sail immediately for South Georgia; “You have discretion, in consultation with Captain Barker, to embark whatever detachment of Marine Garrison seems necessary in the circumstances.”¹²³⁴

From Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams telegrams London.¹²³⁵

“I suggest that great restraint be used at least until it is clear whether this is a deliberate challenge authorised at high level, or just a piece of low level bravura combined with Davidoff's well-known fecklessness.”

“Davidoff blames the war on the British. "Why should they have sent a warship, the *Endurance*, to take our men away?" he asks. "That was ridiculous. What if I went to North America and raised an Argentine flag? They would just take it down and say I was nuts".”¹²³⁶

“The prompt dispatch of *Endurance* did not accord with the Argentine strategy. Buenos Aires was at this stage unprepared both militarily and diplomatically for a sudden escalation in the Falklands dispute. Yet Argentine citizens were ashore on territory which Argentina claimed as her own. The British were demanding the formal acknowledgement of sovereignty through the obtaining of permits, on pain of removal by force. This would

1231 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.652

1232 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1233 *Ibid.*

1234 PREM19/657.f86. *Endurance's* own Royal Marines plus part of Naval Party (NP) 8901 (Falklands garrison); amounting to a total of 22. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/B663549D1F364EB69FF8FB7E786E6F30.pdf>

1235 PREM 19/613.

1236 *Bizarre Salvaging Incident was Fuse in Falklands War* Margot Hornblower in *The Washington Post* May 14, 1982

constitute a conspicuous loss of face for Buenos Aires. ... The South Georgia incident had come at least six months too soon ... Endurance ... should have been safely back in Britain before any invasion." ¹²³⁷

"Because of delays in receiving routine messages about the Falklands, it (GCHQ) misconstrued the first signal received on the (crisis), on 20 March, from the only Royal Navy vessel in the South Atlantic. HMS Endurance, with a small but unique Sigint (Signals Intelligence) capability,..." ¹²³⁸

"In the case of Malvinas, the crisis began on March 20. ... On March 20, 1982, a crisis originated from a strong British reaction – in my opinion disproportionate – as a result of the scrapping of an old factory located on the island of San Pedro de las Georgias del Sur, located 1,500 kilometers southeast of the Falklands. In charge of this was a private Argentine commercial company, belonging to the citizen Constantino Davidoff, who had carried out the corresponding legal procedures before the British authorities in Buenos Aires. As events have unfolded, I have always appreciated that the intention of the United Kingdom (UK) was clearly to escalate the crisis, which did not surprise the Argentine government." ¹²³⁹

In Argentina, at Puerto Belgrano, the invasion plans are reviewed in the light of events.

"On March 20, after Davidoff-related events at the Georgia Islands, the Military Committee ordered the reconvening of the Working Commission to outline an alternative plan since the Navy ships initially planned were assigned to Antarctic tasks." ¹²⁴⁰

March 21st, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry informs Ambassador Williams that the *Bahia Buen Suceso* is not in South Georgia officially; that it has no military personnel on board and that the ship will leave.

"Blanco telephoned at midnight with official Argentine response which, without pronouncing actual apology, expressed hope that significance of the affair will not be exaggerated. The party and ship would be leaving South Georgia today, they were in no way official, had no serving service personnel or military arms. I asked if they would call at Grytviken and what about the Argentine flag, defaced notices etc? Blanco was not sure about the first and said he had No repeat No knowledge of the other matters. The BAS observers must have been mistaken about the shooting, perhaps they were not accurate over the flag etc either." ¹²⁴¹

Ambassador Williams makes it clear; "... that if the party left without regularising their conduct at Gryviken they would have made an illegal landing and be liable to arrest.." ¹²⁴²

From Stanley, Captain Adolfo Gaffoglio, a LADE representative, informs Buenos Aires of the departure of HMS *Endurance*. He also reports that his office has been broken into and the Argentine flag covered over with a Union Jack. "Tit for tat you buggers," is written on the desk in toothpaste.

"On March 22 (sic), learning of the Argentine activity, the Falkland "Kelpers" reportedly attacked the offices of Argentina's state airline in Port Stanley. They lowered the Argentine flag over the building and hoisted the Union Jack, vowing "an eye for an eye", according to local press reports. ... Asked about the Falklanders' attack on the LADE office, the FonMin spokesman said the situation could become "grave". LADE is Lineas Aereas del Estado, a small Argentine Air Force feeder airline which is the Falklands' main connection to the

1237 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.70

1238 John Ferris 2020 citing Memorandum, 'Falkland Islands: The Nicholl Report' May 13, 1982 D/2304/14 pt.IV

1239 Lessons from the Malvinas Martin Balza in Perfil July 29, 2023.

1240 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1241 Williams to FCO March 21, 1982 in PREM19/657 f86

1242 Ibid.

mainland. Its offices in Port Stanley reportedly had its locks forced by irate British Islanders, who then took down the Argentine flag on the building and hung a British flag on a tree in front of it. There were no other reports of damages.”¹²⁴³

“The Governor reported that on the night of 20/21 March the LADE office had been entered, apparently by someone using a key. A Union Flag had been placed over the Argentine flag there and "tit for tat, you buggers" written in toothpaste on a desk. In a later incident, during the night of 22/23 March, "UK OK" was written on two external windows of the LADE office.”¹²⁴⁴

“There was frustration in Stanley and relations with the few Argentines living there became fraught. The LADE air service was continuing, but on the night of Saturday 20th a few local youths, fuelled with bravado and beer from the dance, broke into Vice Comodoro Gilbert's office ... It was relatively harmless stuff, but Vice Comodoro Gamin, who had just replaced Hector Gilbert, was worried. The LADE Fokkers never scheduled overnight stops at Stanley, but on this occasion one of the aircraft had developed a fault and needed to remain on the tarmac.”¹²⁴⁵

“... at Stanley, activists broke into LADE's offices and damaged the premises. Answering Governor Hunt's call, foreign reporters arrived to cover the events.”¹²⁴⁶

Argentina's representative insists that the airport must be guarded by the local Marines.

“We had been on a shorter state of alert for a couple of weeks. For a few days before the invasion we had a section [about seven men] in the airport terminal building every night. A few guys kept watch while the rest of us slept and were ready to move at very short notice.”¹²⁴⁷

“(Comodoro Gamin)... insisted that Gary Noott's Marines guard it around the clock. This was not too much bother to Noott, as, unknown to Gamin, the Marines had been staking out the airport.”¹²⁴⁸

“..., because of the protests sparked off by Davidoff's disembarkation on Georgia Islands, LADE offices were attacked. The life of the Gamen family, as well as that of the Argentine residents, got complicated. From that moment on, they would be watched.”¹²⁴⁹

At Leith, the *Bahia Buen Suceso* sails away early evening; but some personnel are seen to remain.¹²⁵⁰

“Contrary to some accounts, she did not take any of the scrap-metal workers with her; they were all left at Leith. The ship set course for Ushuaia, her captain and crew unaware of the intense diplomatic activity caused by the visit.”¹²⁵¹

1243 Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 23, 1982 in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984 Document 15*

1244 Franks Committee (UK) *Falkland Islands Review Committee Report* 1983

1245 Bound 2007

1246 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1247 Acting-Sergeant Geordie Gill quoted in Bound 2007

1248 Bound 2007

1249 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War Chapter 1* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1250 Franks Committee (UK) *Falkland Islands Review Committee Report* 1983 para.178

1251 Middlebrook 2003

March 22nd, from Grytviken, BAS staff report to Stanley, which passes the information on to London.

*“Base Commander has confirmed presence of at least six Argentines still ashore at Leith... In addition to launch ... they had also seen a landing craft ... they also observed a vehicle with a mechanical arm on the jetty...”*¹²⁵²

From Stanley, Lord Buxton, on an unofficial visit, telegrams the FCO in London.

*“It has been naïve to regard Davidoff as a casual scrap dealer and it is abundantly clear that every move has been carefully researched, planned and timed throughout... If our reaction is placatory and is not firm and final this time I predict that more unopposed illegal landings will follow ... British reactions are being tested.”*¹²⁵³

En-route to South Georgia, HMS *Endurance* receives orders from London to remove any trespassers. However, Captain Barker's instructions clearly state that he is not to use force and, if resisted, should withdraw and seek fresh instructions.

*“Ministers have agreed that HMS Endurance should continue to South Georgia in order to remove the remaining Argentines. The continued Argentine presence at Leith, ... leaves us no option but to take this action. ... It is hoped that the political consequences, with careful handling on both sides, can continue to be minimised. But it should be quite clear that this situation has not been of our seeking. It has been Davidoff's irresponsible action and the apparent inability of the Argentine Government to take the necessary remedial action which has brought it about.”*¹²⁵⁴

From Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams also telegrams the FCO, urging; *“... no forceful action be taken which would irritate public opinion in Argentina.”*¹²⁵⁵

*“The Argentines ... appreciate the gravity of the hoisting of the Argentine flag, but say that they have just received reports that there has been a parallel insult to the Argentine flag at the LADE office in Stanley.”*¹²⁵⁶

From *Endurance*, Capt. Barker reports that overheard radio traffic indicates collusion between Davidoff and the Argentine Navy; *“The naval headquarters in Buenos Aires had congratulated the Bahia Buen Suceso on a successful operation and directed her to return to Buenos Aires as soon as possible.”*¹²⁵⁷

March 23rd, in the UK, morning newspapers report the Argentine landings at South Georgia. *The Financial Times* focusses on the raising of the Argentine flag, while *The Guardian* refers to the event as “comic opera”. John Biggs-Davidson MP is reported as calling the landing an “act of aggression” and demanding an explanation.

*“The foreign ministries of both countries sought to smooth over the incident and agreed that Bahia Buen Suceso would quietly leave South Georgia as indeed it did on 22 March. The British, however, assumed that Davidoff's party would be aboard and reported publicly that evening that Argentina had agreed to withdraw the workers. When it became clear that Argentine personnel had remained behind, the British press played the event as an 'invasion' of South Georgia.”*¹²⁵⁸

1252 ALW 040/325/12 Part A 1 – 100 Telegram No. 45 of 22 March Rex Hunt to FCO. In fact there were 39 still onshore.

1253 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.154

1254 Quoted in Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.71

1255 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

1256 PREM 19/657 Telegram No. 82 of 22 March 1982

1257 Franks Report 1983 para.175

1258 Welch 1997

In Argentina, the news of the flag-raising at South Georgia makes the headlines; as reported by US Ambassador Shlaudeman to Washington DC.

*“All Buenos Aires morning dailies March 23 bannered the weekend flag-raising incident involving Argentine seamen in the South Georgia Islands on March 19, denounced yesterday in London. British Ambassador Anthony Williams was summoned this morning to the Foreign Ministry for a discussion of the issue, which now appears complicated by the retaliation by British Falkland Islanders. On March 22, learning of the Argentine activity, the Falkland "Kelpers" reportedly attacked the offices of Argentina's state airline in Port Stanley. They lowered the Argentine flag over the building and hoisted the Union Jack, vowing "an eye for an eye", according to local press reports. ... Asked about the Falklanders' attack on the LADE office, the FonMin spokesman said the situation could become "grave". LADE is Lineas Aereas del Estado, a small Argentine Air Force feeder airline which is the Falklands' main connection to the mainland. Its offices in Port Stanley reportedly had its locks forced by irate British Islanders, who then took down the Argentine flag on the building and hung a British flag on a tree in front of it. There were no other reports of damages.”*¹²⁵⁹

In Britain's House of Commons, Minister Luce makes a statement:

*“We were informed on 20 March by the commander of the British Antarctic survey base at Grytviken on South Georgia that a party of Argentines had landed at Leith harbour nearby. The base commander informed the Argentine party that its presence was illegal as it had not obtained his prior authority for the landing. We immediately took the matter up with the Argentine authorities in Buenos Aires and the Argentine embassy in London and, following our approach, the ship and most of the personnel left on 21 March. However, the base commander has reported that a small number of men and some equipment remain. We are therefore making arrangements to ensure their early departure. ... for a short period the Argentine flag was planted. It has now been removed. We are making arrangements to ensure that those who remain at Leith harbour will not do so for very much longer.”*¹²⁶⁰

Ex-Prime Minister James Callaghan MP, asks the Minister:

“Does the hon. Gentleman recall that he was warned that as soon as the news of the withdrawal of HMS "Endurance" became known to the Argentinians this type of escapade would be likely? Is it not a gross dereliction of duty on the part of the Government to persist in this course? Will they please give an undertaking forthwith that they will ensure that HMS "Endurance" is not withdrawn?” ...

*“Luce: HMS "Endurance" is in the area. It is not for me to answer questions specifically for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence on the deployment of forces. I must say as strongly as I conceivably can that it is our duty as a British Government to support and defend the islanders to the best of our ability.”*¹²⁶¹

*“Mr. Luce's brief statement led to some tough questioning from both sides of the House. Denis Healey wanted confirmed that an Argentine flag had been raised, and sought more information about the state of discussions with the Argentine Government. He wanted to know whether the landing had occurred with the support or knowledge of that Government. Mr. Luce reported that the Argentines had denied this, but he pointed out that the vessel was a naval transport, albeit on hire for civilian purposes.”*¹²⁶²

1259 *Foreign Relations of the United States 1981-89 (Volume XIII) Conflict in the South Atlantic (2015) p31*

1260 *HC Deb 23 March 1982 vol 20 cc798-801*

1261 See - <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1982/mar/23/south-georgia-incident>

1262 *Patterson to Thatcher March 23, 1982 in Thatcher MSS (Churchill Archive Centre): THCR 1/20/3/2 f21*

In Buenos Aires, the Junta meet at the Libertad building.

*“The military leaders and the chancellor had been planning the war for at least three months before and that day, in the heat of the news, the planning for the Malvinas military alternative continued. They discussed what was happening with the workers hired by Davidoff in Port Leith (South Georgia) and it was decided to “protect the Argentine personnel; intercept the Endurance and detach the ARA Bahia Paraiso ... to Port Leith”. Then it was resolved by Minute No.2 'M'/82 that “the name of the military alternative would be Azul” (... although it would later become Operation Rosario).”*¹²⁶³

*“On March 23, General García, in charge of the Working Commission, submitted the rough draft of the alternative plan to the Military Committee, which was immediately approved. It would be a joint operation consisting of an amphibious landing launched from a single transportation vessel, the ARA Cabo San Antonio. The closest date set for the landing force departure was 28 March. In just five days, the alternative plan was completed, maintaining the high-ranking leaders from the Joint Staff plan. The ground, naval, and air forces were assembled, and the necessary co-ordinations were carried out. The operation was initially called Azul and later designated Operation Rosario. There were no plans for or precautions against any enemy reaction other than a local one.”*¹²⁶⁴

From London, Foreign Secretary Carrington telegrams the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires with a message for the Argentine Foreign Minister.

*“We recognise the risk that this problem could escalate dangerously ...Please now speak to Costa Mendez making clear that you are doing so on my personal instructions. You should say ... it is essential that the remaining Argentine personnel in South Georgia should be removed without delay. If the Argentine Government are able to arrange for the Bahia Buen Suceso to return immediately to Leith and to collect the remaining men and their equipment for return to Argentina, I would be prepared to authorise this and would see no need for HMS Endurance to be involved. If this cannot be not done, we have no choice but to remove them ourselves.”*¹²⁶⁵

HMS Endurance is ordered to 'hold' off Grytviken.

*“In view of continued diplomatic activity at ministerial level aimed at allowing Argentine authorities an opportunity to remove party and equipment by Argentine vessel, HMS Endurance should proceed to Grytviken and await further instructions. Pending these instructions, HMS Endurance should not, repeat not, enter nor conduct any Naval operations in the vicinity of Leith harbour.”*¹²⁶⁶

In Buenos Aires, on hearing from Ambassador Williams, Costa Méndez expresses surprise that the British are proceeding so rapidly to such very grave action, without exhausting the diplomatic options. He gives a warning that, if the action to remove the party on South Georgia is not postponed, those like himself, who are trying to deal with the dispute in a moderate way, will lose control of events. Costa Méndez threatens that harsh action will precipitate a harsh response, and that perhaps the men should be removed by an Argentine vessel in order to take some heat out of the situation.¹²⁶⁷

1263 Yofre 2011

1264 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1265 *FCO Telegram 68 to UKE Buenos Aires* in PREM19/657 f81

1266 Quoted in Barker 1997

1267 Franks Report 1983 para. 182

"The English ambassador requested on behalf of his government the immediate withdrawal of the Argentines in the Georgias (who had raised the Argentine flag) and was told that "he should not forget that this is a disputed area that Argentina considers as hers"." ¹²⁶⁸

Williams, after conveying Méndez's reaction to the FCO, adds that he considers the events at South Georgia as *"trivial and low-level misbehaviour."*

"Lord Carrington (later) told me he was misled by Ambassador Anthony Williams." ¹²⁶⁹

At Stanley, the scheduled LADE flight arrives with, among others, 16 employees of the Gas de Estado (State Gas) company. All fit young men of military age, local suspicions are aroused. Also disembarking is an Argentine photographer, Rafael Wollman, employed by an Argentine weekly magazine, *Gente*. ¹²⁷⁰

From Buenos Aires, Argentina's Navy Command orders the ice-breaker *Bahia Paraiso* to take its marines as quickly as possible to Leith to protect the Argentine workers there.

"The Junta, determined to avoid humiliation, ordered a second ship in the vicinity, the ice patrol vessel Bahia Paraiso, to land a party of marines at Leith to protect Davidoff's men." ¹²⁷¹

"In view of this, the Superior Command of the Armed Forces decided that another vessel – the ARA Bahía Paraiso – which at that time "coincidentally" was on the Orkney Islands completing a phase of Antarctic planning, would immediately be highlighted to the Georgias to disembark the "Alpha Group", a curious name given that the operation of the same name had been abandoned. This group of "elite troops" of the Navy, with Lt. Alfredo Astiz at the head, had the objective of taking positions in the whaling facilities and protecting the Argentine workers from any future action by British forces. Apparently, given the seriousness of the situation, the Junta considered activating the plan that had been prepared at the beginning of the year..." ¹²⁷²

"... the National government considered the use of British Marines as a clear provocation and that the United Kingdom would probably send naval units to dissuade a military escalation. The transport ARA Bahía Paraiso, which was at the Orcadas Islands, was released from the Antarctic Campaign and sent to protect Davidoff's workers, together with the Grupo Alfa, before the Endurance arrived. Argentina found herself at a crossroads. On the one hand, if Argentina let the workers be removed by force without opposition, she would be accepting British sovereignty over the islands, according to the doctrine of Estoppel⁴⁴. On the other hand, if she accepted Governor Rex Hunt's proposal arbitrarily requiring that passports be stamped at Grytviken, it implied waiving the rights ipso iure." ¹²⁷³

Vice-Admiral Juan Lombardo is; *"... directed by the junta to accelerate planning so that an invasion force could launch within 48-72 hours of notification."* ¹²⁷⁴

*"I immediately ordered an increase in my staff, and we worked all through that night and very hard in the next two days. We gave an answer to the junta on the 25th; I think that Admiral Lombardo went to Buenos Aires and told them that the decision was that it would be possible to land on the Malvinas on the 1st of April."*¹²⁷⁵

1268 Yofre 2011

1269 Briley 2022. Harold Briley was the BBC's Latin America Correspondent.

1270 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.658

1271 Welch 1997

1272 Carbone 2008

1273 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1274 *The 1982 Falklands-Malvinas Case Study* Douglas N. Hime 2010

1275 Rear-Admiral Büsser quoted in Middlebrook 2003

March 24th, at South Georgia, *Endurance* arrives off Grytviken. Capt. Barker liaises with the BAS commander at King Edward Point.

In London, intelligence reports suggest that the forced removal of the workforce at South Georgia will be used by the junta as a pretext for military action. Either at South Georgia, or against the Falkland Islands. Lord Carrington writes to the Prime Minister; “... *the situation on the dispute has developed to a point where we now face the prospect of an early confrontation with Argentina.*”¹²⁷⁶

Lord Carrington also minutes the Secretary for Defence, John Nott; “*There is one action we could take which would be an immediate demonstration of our support for the Islands: that is to maintain HMS Endurance on station in Falklands waters for the time being.*”¹²⁷⁷

A House of Commons *motion* signed by 91 Members of Parliament calls for a tough line to be taken with Argentina.

From Buenos Aires, the US Embassy transmits a further telegram to Washington DC.

“... *we doubt that an attempt at a "military solution" will be made any time soon. Foreign Minister Costa Méndez and others in the GOA are looking for ways to enlist U.S. support for the Argentine cause. This issue is likely to complicate Argentine-U.S. relations...*”¹²⁷⁸

From the UK's Embassy, Britain's Defence attaché sends a message to the MOD.

“*If the Argentines fail to remove the work party from Leith Harbour and HMS Endurance were tasked to do the job, there would be the sternest of reactions (Argentine nationals taken on board British warships in Argentine waters, etc). One upshot might well be an encounter with an ARA warship. ... There is a hawk faction in the FFAA whom we can see pressing the leadership thus to take advantage of the heightened blood pressure of recent days when a military measure might attract less censure and be more easily justified abroad. We must therefore be aware that if HMS Endurance is committed we would be facing not only the obvious risk of the operation meeting resistance but also an increase in the threat to Port Stanley...*”¹²⁷⁹

At South Georgia, just before midnight, *Bahia Paraiso* arrives in Leith Harbour, some 25 kilometres north-west of Grytviken.¹²⁸⁰



1276 Carrington to Thatcher March 24, 1982 in *ALW 040/325/1 Part C 101* See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/F0AA09D6769241E8959663DE854FA669.pdf>

1277 Carrington to Nott March 24, 1982 in *PREM19/657 f78*

1278 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820157-0409. Signed off by Ambassador Shlauderman.

1279 *ALW 040/325/9*

1280 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.660

March 25th, at Leith, around dawn, *Teniente de navio* Alfredo Astiz¹²⁸¹ and ten Marines disembark from *Bahia Paraiso*, accompanied by a few sailors who start to unload supplies and military hardware; including three landing craft and a helicopter. Watched by the BAS observation team; shortly after joined by Capt. Barker.

*“Tony Ellerbeck flew me to the top of one of the mountains and we landed at 3000 feet on a narrow section of flat ground with excellent binocular vision over Leith Bay... all we could do was to sit and watch. We noted the continuing disembarkation of stores from the Bahia Paraiso and it was clear to us that the operation had been long pre-planned.”*¹²⁸²

*“The ARA Bahía Paraiso left Grupo Alfa at Leith, a crew of ten Marine officers, in order to protect the workers, together with enough elements and supplies for a long stay.”*¹²⁸³

Argentina’s naval planning committee informs the junta that their forces can be ready to sail on the 28th.¹²⁸⁴

In Buenos Aires, Costa Méndez speaks to Britain's Ambassador to suggest that the impasse can be broken if it is agreed that the workers at Leith now comply with the landing formalities – by going to Grytviken and having their 'white cards' stamped. Then returning to work on the whaling stations.

Informed of this proposal, Lord Carrington's responds that; *“only passports will do.”*

*“A series of progressive demands culminated in the imposition that the Argentine workers of the Davidoff company – who were on land that we consider under a sovereignty dispute – should seal their passports at Grytviken, as if they were entering a foreign territory...”*¹²⁸⁵

*“... this was the last straw. Permitting Endurance to evict Davidoff's party or acquiescing in the British demand that they present their passports would be tantamount to acknowledging British sovereignty over South Georgia and, by extension (so they believed) over all of the disputed territories, including the Malvinas proper. In Anaya's view: "This was aggression on the part of Britain against the territory of Argentina.”...”*¹²⁸⁶

*“Britain's escalation of the dispute – especially its demand about passports – came as a complete surprise ... There was unanimous agreement that we could not permit it.”*¹²⁸⁷

*“Now the British assert that the 1971 treaty does not extend to South Georgia, although it had always been understood that the dependencies of the Falklands were included. (I can confirm that this was also Ambassador Williams's understanding until yesterday). ... it would appear from here that the Endurance is the key to the problem of the moment. If the ship moves in to take off the workmen, there will surely be trouble. If it stays where it is, the impasse and the tensions accompanying it will continue.”*¹²⁸⁸

From London, the US Embassy also telegrams the State Department;.

“Deputy Under-Secretary John Giffard called in Charge March 25 to inform him that Carrington is sending a message to the Secretary requesting that the U.S. use its influence with Argentina in the current impasse over the Argentines encamped on South Georgia Island. Argentina has conveyed its displeasure over the

1281 Astiz had a reputation for violence; implicated in the 1977 kidnapping of 12 human rights activists, including two French nuns; none of who were ever seen again. cf. 1982

1282 Barker 1997

1283 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1284 From an interview with Rear-Admiral Carlos Busser in Charlton 1989 p.115

1285 President Galtieri in *La Nueva Provincia* November 28, 1985

1286 Welch 1997

1287 Interview with Larni Dozo quoted in Welch 2005

1288 *Shlaudeman to State Department March 26, 1982* in *Dept. of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820162–0574.*

*dispatching of the British ice patrol vessel Endurance to South Georgia. HMG also has had reports that the Argentine Navy may be planning to intercept the Endurance if it removes Argentine party and provoke a naval confrontation, possibly with a view to bringing the entire Falklands dispute to a head. Should that happen, the British would have to respond, and a situation will have arisen that neither Foreign Ministry wants. HMG consequently plans to hold off taking any action, but considers it essential that the intruders be removed. The Endurance is presently waiting about ten miles away from the Argentine party.”*¹²⁸⁹

At South Georgia, during the evening, *Bahia Paraiso* departs Leith, taking up a position just off the island.

March 26th, from South Georgia, a situation report is radioed to Port Stanley for the Governor.

*“Argentine party are still ashore at Leith. Although only two people were actually sighted this morning, smoke was emerging from several buildings and 2 boats were still alongside jetty. 65 blue drums had been stacked at inshore end of jetty. A large quantity of stores and equipment was visible, even dead reindeer. Consider shore party were working late into evening yesterday disembarking stores from Bahia Paraiso and are now established for a long stay at Leith. It is clear that this operation had been preplanned for some time as Bahia Paraiso came from Antarctic...”*¹²⁹⁰

In London, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) sends a note on the defence implications of Argentine action against the Falkland Islands, to the Prime Minister. They note; *“our scope for effective military action in response to whatever the Argentinians may do is extremely limited, and that almost anything we could do would be too late and/or extremely expensive.”*¹²⁹¹

*“ ... Argentine military options were identified as: a. Harassment or arrest of British shipping. b. Military occupation on one or more of the uninhabited islands. c. Arrest of the British Antarctic Survey Team on South Georgia. d. Small scale military operation against the Islands. e. Full scale military invasion of the Islands. ... Argentina, with the most efficient armed forces in South America, has the military capability any of the options listed...”*¹²⁹²

The presence of HMS *Endurance* in the South Atlantic is also a consideration at the MOD.¹²⁹³

*“You asked whether as a temporary solution HMS Endurance could remain on station in the Falklands area beyond her planned departure date. It would be possible to defer HMS Endurance's departure from the area by up to two months.”*¹²⁹⁴

At Montevideo, 43 Royal Marines under the command of Major John Norman, fly in to meet the RRS *John Biscoe* for the journey to Falkland Islands; where they are to relieve the garrison (NP-8901).¹²⁹⁵

1289 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820159–0368

1290 Barker 1997

1291 PREM19/657 f46 See - <https://e8e62e492b4a1a43cd16-77325458036aa340f9e5dfc158bde804.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/820326 MOD mnt DEF IMPLICS PREM19-0657 f46.pdf>

1292 *Ibid.*

1293 DEFE13/1606 f114. See - <https://ca4d1f7bf6abad87ffa2-0f3bfca8c23275e637922db40b741d00.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/820326 Nicholls mnt for Wiggin ENDURANCE DECN SOON DEFE13 1606 f114.pdf>

1294 *Wiggin to Carrington March 26, 1982* in PREM19/657 f42

1295 *John Biscoe* was a civilian vessel owned by the British Antarctic Survey. With *Endurance* busy elsewhere, the BAS had given permission for the ship to transport the marines to Stanley. This was a standard rotation and not connected to the rising tensions on South Georgia; although the MOD was already considered maintaining the two squads at Stanley while the crisis persisted. Bad timing from Argentina's perspective.

From Stanley, Governor Hunt telegrams London regarding the scrap metal workers' white cards.

*"... I am more than ever convinced that this whole exercise was carefully planned ... Proper documentation does not (repeat not) mean stamping of white cards. I am instructing the base commander to ask for passports and, if produced, to stamp them in the normal way with an entry permit..."*¹²⁹⁶

*"The issue of the South Georgias precipitated the events. When the 40 or 41 Argentines landed there, and, departing from (the) agreement of coexistence of 1971, the British demanded the signing of the cards at Grytviken... or else they were going to remove them with the 'Endurance' or other ships. That affected the dignity and honor of the Nation. And that forced us to make the decision that was taken on March 26."*¹²⁹⁷

In Buenos Aires, at 7.15pm at the Liberator Building, Junta members meet to consider the evolving situation at South Georgia. The meeting is informed that a British submarine has been observed leaving Gibraltar.

*"... that is what (Admiral) Anaya describes as a 'war-starter.' That announcement turned out to be false. But based on that announcement he decided to execute a contingency plan... He decided to advance it because, if he did not, he would never be able to do it."*¹²⁹⁸

*"We interpreted the sailing of an SSN from Gibraltar on 26th March as coming south and that the Brits would keep one on station indefinitely thereafter, so ... we had about twelve days in which to fix it."*¹²⁹⁹

*"Costa Mendez's view was that, from 1956, Britain's behaviour was always to deal, but not on the basis of force. Rhodesia was the most recent example. There Britain had abandoned 600,000 British subjects. The sum of perceptions led to the conclusion that Britain would not respond with force. ... How could we doubt his judgement?"*¹³⁰⁰

At 11pm, Argentina's Military Junta decides to occupy the Falkland Islands.¹³⁰¹

"March 26, the Military Committee met at 7.15pm in the Libertador building ... the decision to occupy the islands was made ... (with the objective of affirming and defending the Argentine position in (South) Georgia, preventing Great Britain from militarising the islands and establishing a naval and air defence system for them, preventing the British position in the area since this would have a negative impact on the rights, strategy, positions and objectives of Argentina in the South Atlantic and Antarctica. It will also activate the negotiation and improve the Argentine negotiating position.

*The occupation of the islands is not intended to initiate a military escalation or end the negotiations or replace them ... on the contrary, an attempt will be made to achieve the beginning of a serious and substantive negotiation ... it is emphasized that the operation should be bloodless and that it should provide for the maintenance of a small garrison in the Malvinas once the recovery was achieved..."*¹³⁰²

1296 PREM 19/613

1297 Galtieri quoted in the *Rattenbach Report*. Translation by Fabian Turcato.

1298 US Admiral Harry Train in Charlton 1989 p.116. Train interviewed Admiral Anaya immediately after the 1982 conflict. Contrary to some contemporary views in the UK, the proposed withdrawal of *Endurance* had not weighed on Argentine planning. She was lightly armed and no match for the Argentine navy. A submarine, however, would be an entirely different matter.

1299 Admiral Jorge Anaya in an interview with Hugh Scully quoted in *The Falklands War* Andrew Dorman, Michael Kandiah & Gillian Staerck (eds) 2005 p.20. In Charlton (1989 p.187) it is suggested that news of the submarine's departure was published in the *Daily Express*. This particular submarine, however, was actually headed north. No decision to despatch a submarine to the Falklands was made before March 29, 1982.

1300 Interview with Admiral Jorge Anaya, quoted in Welch 2005 p.87

1301 *Cadena 105* February 28, 2021

1302 *Minute No.4 'M'/82* quoted in Yofre 2011.

*“On the evening of 26 March, the Junta decided to occupy the Malvinas as soon as the necessary military preparations could be completed ... The Junta believed that with Endurance in the vicinity of South Georgia, Argentina had a narrow window of opportunity in which to act without interference from the Royal Navy. The 500 men assigned to Operation Rosario were to capture and disarm the forty-two-man garrison of Royal Marines at Port Stanley and evict the British Governor. They had strict orders not to shed British blood. Once they had secured Port Stanley, they were to withdraw, and Argentina would place the islands under temporary international administration while Britain and Argentina finalized an agreement recognising formal Argentine sovereignty over the islands and safeguarding the 'interests' of the Islanders. ... The Junta seems clearly to have underestimated the danger and misgauged world reaction.”*¹³⁰³

*“I was told on 26 March the invasion would take place... We thought that occupying the Islands would press Britain to negotiate or press the international organisations to intervene and try to obtain a peaceful end of the conflict.”*¹³⁰⁴

*“On 26 March, the Military Committee decided to take the Malvinas Islands, which took the Joint Staff by surprise, who had not yet finished the DEMIL or the Campaign Plan. Therefore, the islands recapture would be carried out using the alternative plan proposed by the Working Commission.”*¹³⁰⁵

Researcher's Comment: Quite when the Argentine Military Junta made their final decision to invade the Falkland Islands is much debated, even today. This, was it.

Argentine destroyer ARA *Bouchard* and a corvette, *Granville*, sail from the Mar de Plata.¹³⁰⁶

From the UK, a message is relayed to the Falkland Islands Governor instructing that the roulement of NP8901 should not take place. Both squads to be retained until further notice.¹³⁰⁷

March 27th, Argentina's morning newspapers announce a statement from the Foreign Ministry: *“... a firm decision has been taken to give the men on South Georgia all necessary diplomatic protection... nor is this protection diplomatic only, since there is a navy ship called Bahia Paraiso in the area to provide any necessary protection.”* It is also reported that the *Bahia Buen Suceso*, *Granville* and *Drummond*, will be sent to South Georgia to protect the scrap-metal workers there.¹³⁰⁸ Argentina's press report *“intense activity”* at Puerto Belgrano.

Relaying this information to the Ministry of Defence in London, Britain's Defence Attaché in Buenos Aires, Stephen Love, adds; *“Detailed press comment conflicts with some known facts but confirmation secret sources of others obtainable.”*¹³⁰⁹

*“After Major-General Garcia and Marine Rear-Admiral Carlos Busser had approved of the landing plan ..., the invasion force weighed anchor and Task Force 40 assembled in the Bahia Blanca de la Plata estuary...”*¹³¹⁰

1303 Welch 1997

1304 Costa Méndez quoted in Briley 2022. The wording erroneously implies that the Foreign Minister was not present at the meeting. Not the case.

1305 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1306 Reported by Britain's Defence Attaché, Colonel Stephen Love, from the Embassy in Buenos Aires. He also reported information provided by the Chilean Consul that none of Argentina's four submarines were now in the Mar de Plata.

1307 *FCO46/3202 f32*

1308 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.667

1309 Colonel Love believed that his warnings were not being taken seriously by the MOD; while the MOD believed that Love's sources were solely local newspapers and that the information was either old, or inaccurate.

1310 *Argentine Perspectives on the Falklands War: The Recovery and Loss of Las Malvinas* Nick Van der Bijl 2023. Task Force 40 was the amphibious group landing force.

From Buenos Aires, the US Embassy reports;

*“The crisis atmosphere heightened sharply overnight Mar 26–27 as the armed Argentine Navy transport "Bahia Paraiso" carrying a unit of marines, reportedly turned up at Leith Harbor. Its mission there, where it is said to be in sight of the British icebreaker "Endurance", is to protect the Argentine work party landed on San Pedro Island Mar 18 that triggered the present UK-GOA face-off. Unconfirmed press accounts attributed to Argentine naval sources also reported the dispatch of two missile corvettes, "Drummond" and "Granville", to the South Georgias in support of the ArgNav transport. The arrival at Leith of "Bahia Paraiso" was announced last night by FonMin Costa Mendez, who called the situation in the disputed archipelago "serious" and "grave". He spoke to the press after an emergency meeting of the three service commanders of the ruling Junta, making clear that the GOA is not presently disposed to back off. "The Republic is ready to provide the workers (at Leith) all diplomatic and security protection that may be necessary", he said. The GOA, he added, has adopted a posture to insure that "measures are not taken against them (una medida que no corresponde) and that they are permitted to continue their work". Costa Mendez added that a British proposal for overcoming the crisis is under study.”*¹³¹¹

After being denied a direct interview with Costa Méndez, and backtracking on his previously held views, Britain's Ambassador Williams reports his fears that the Foreign Minister has been less than honest with him and that Argentina had been “playing us along”.

*“I cannot, however, discount the possibility that any action on our part to disrupt the Argentine working party at Leith will be taken as a trigger for armed action by the Argentines.”*¹³¹²

*“... an R. W. Apple despatch to the New York Times in early April stated that the (US) embassy, on 26, 27, or 28 March, had warned the (UK) Foreign Office of an Argentine invasion plan. Embassy officers later complained, "They chose to ignore it entirely. It was a complete error of judgment on London's part." ... If Apple's information is accurate, this episode would stand as another familiar example of unwillingness of a government preoccupied with higher priority problems to hear and accept warning.”*¹³¹³

*“Anthony Williams and Whitehall making "Tut! Tut!" noises is not impressing the Argentines. Rex Hunt and a few others taking a good firm stand. C-in-C (Fleet) is sailing some ships in support. In my view some Buccaneers are required.”*¹³¹⁴

*“Williams was met by deputy foreign minister Enrique Ros, who simply stated that the junta had given the foreign ministry new instructions. Later that day Costa Méndez called his five top officials to his office, told them to look at the crucifix on the wall, demanded an oath of silence, and revealed that Argentina was about to enter a war.”*¹³¹⁵

In London, PM Thatcher considers again the prospect of taking the question of the Falklands to the ICJ.

*“... if we win or if we lose, at least we know where we are.”*¹³¹⁶

1311 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820163–0916

1312 Williams quoted in Franks 1983 para.207. PREM 19/613 Telegram Nos.110 & 113 of 27 March 1982

1313 CIA Doc RDP85T00153R000200020037-8. Approved for release July 12, 2007

1314 From Capt. Barker's *Endurance* diary in Barker 1997

1315 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.667 citing Cardoso *et al.* 1987 pp76-77

1316 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.164

*"In March 1982, in the light of the growing Argentine pressure, the Buenos Aires Embassy suggested that it might be worth offering to submit the Falklands to the (ICJ) 'as a last resort if things really turn nasty.' If the offer was refused, which was quite likely given the Argentine attitude, then Britain would have gained moral support; if accepted then the whole matter would be put on ice for a considerable period... In March the FCO saw insufficient merit in adopting this strategy, ..."*¹³¹⁷

En-route from Curaçao to Britain, RFA *Appleleaf* is ordered to make for Gibraltar; take on general stores and then sail south in support of HMS *Endurance*.¹³¹⁸

March 28th, in Buenos Aires, Foreign Minister Costa Méndez sends a message to President Galtieri, requesting a delay to the occupation of the Falkland Islands. The letter from Costa Méndez is accompanied by a memorandum, which notes; *"1) if it is deemed necessary to stop the military operation, this decision can still be made; 2) the US position is unclear. There is no guarantee that it will support Argentina; 3) with the block of Non-Aligned countries, although we start from an unfavorable situation, we can rebuild it in a short time and achieve their solidarity by virtue of our anti-imperialist struggle."*¹³¹⁹ Galtieri, says no.

*"The Malvinas Special Group had not completed the necessary measures to accompany military action in the diplomatic field ... to such an extent that on Sunday, the 28th March (Costa Méndez) asked for a postponement. After thirty years of silence, a diplomat related: "He sent me to Campo de Mayo with a personal letter to Galtieri in which (Costa Méndez) requested a few days postponement of the invasion. They made me go to (Galtieri's) office, I handed in the letter and he read it in front of me. After finishing reading, the president (said): "Tell the chancellor absolutely not", and as if this were not enough, he returned the letter to me after writing "absolutely not"."*¹³²⁰

In Argentina, all leave for military personnel and diplomatic staff is cancelled. Argentina's Embassies around the world are told to await new instructions.

*"There were no major setbacks, and the troops started loading in the ships at Puerto Belgrano at 8.00am on Sunday 28 March. Secrecy had been well maintained. ... The Argentine newspapers announced that a joint anti-submarine exercise was to be carried out with the Uruguayan Navy."*¹³²¹

Comodore Carlos Bloomer-Reeve flies into Buenos Aires from Germany; *"Comodoro Carlos F. Bloomer Reeve had been the Argentine representative before the Special Advisory Commission and head of LADE on the Malvinas Islands between 1974 and 1976. Additionally, in his capacity of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chief of Staff, he had participated in formal and informal rounds of talks between 1979 and March 1981. In 1982, he was performing functions as Air Attaché to the Argentine Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany. He was possibly the cabinet member who best understood the Malvinas Islands' reality. In the morning of 27 March, in Bonn, Bloomer Reeve received the order to immediately travel to Buenos Aires so as to witness the execution of the contract with Dornier Company for the design of the IA-63 Pampa aircraft. At 0900 in the morning of the 28th, he arrived at Ezeiza Airport, where the Airport Chief was waiting for him to tell him to contact Brigadier General Basilio Lami Dozo. The latter then referred him to Brigadier Mayor Sigfrido M. Plessl."*¹³²²

1317 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1318 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.667

1319 *El día que la Flota de Mar cortó las comunicaciones y no hubo vuelta atrás en la recuperación de Malvinas* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* March 30, 2024

1320 Yofre 2011 citing a conversation of August 5, 1982 with Ambassador Gustavo Figueroa.

1321 Middlebrook 2003

1322 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

At the UK Embassy, Ambassador Williams receives a statement from the Argentine Foreign Ministry.

*“The activities of the group of workers disembarked at Leith are of a private and peaceful character based on the undisputed fact that they were known in advance by Her Britannic Majesty's Government and in any case on the fact that they are being carried out on territory subject to the special regime agreed in 1971 between the Argentine and Great Britain. It is moreover within Your Excellency's knowledge that these territories are considered by the Argentine Republic as her own and that the sovereignty dispute about them had been recognised by the United Nations in its relevant Resolutions. Your Excellency's Government has accepted the existence of the sovereignty dispute. However the British Government has reacted in terms which constitute a virtual ultimatum backed by the threat of military action in the form of the despatch of the naval warship Endurance and a requirement for the peremptorily immediate evacuation of the Argentine workers from the Island. ... In light of this attitude my Government can only adopt those measures which prudence and its rights demand, in this context the Argentine workers in South Georgia must remain there since they have been given the necessary documentation to do so. ... the present situation is the direct result of the persistent lack of recognition by the United Kingdom of the titles to sovereignty which my country has over the Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.”*¹³²³

Williams reports to London and Port Stanley that Costa Méndez insists that South Georgia was included in the white card scheme arrangements.¹³²⁴ On receiving a copy of the Argentine message, Hunt telegrams London.

“The 1971 Communications Agreement does not apply to the Dependencies ... (and) ... does not absolve the holder of the requirement to present himself to an immigration officer at a recognised port of entry ... I am appalled at the arrogance of the message which confirms my previous fears that the Argentine Government are using Davidoff as a front to assert with a physical presence their sovereignty claim over South Georgia.”

Argentina's fleet sails from Puerto Belgrano; including an aircraft carrier, *Veinticinco de Mayo*, four destroyers, *Comodoro Py*, *Hipólito*, *Bouchard*, *Piedra Buena* and *Segui*, accompanied by a tanker, *Punta Medanos*.

*“In the islands we are going to meet a population that we must treat deferentially... They are inhabitants of Argentine territory and, therefore, they have to be treated the same as those who live in Argentina. You will have to strictly respect personal property and integrity; you are not going to intrude into any private residence unless it is necessary for combat reasons. You are going to respect women, children, elders and men. Be tough to the enemy but courteous, respectful and kind to the population of our territory which we have to protect. If anyone engages in rape, robbery, or looting, I will immediately apply the maximum penalty.”*¹³²⁵

*“Those of us who knew where we were going were very proud. We felt very lucky that we had been chosen and extraordinarily fortunate to have the opportunity to regain the Malvinas... April was a lovely month that year.”*¹³²⁶

1323 PREM 19/657 f37 Telegram No.116 of 28 March 1982. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/06FD88C7FE25420794AF07A6B6FA4AA6.pdf>

1324 See June 6, 1972, (ratification) above. Link to agreement, here - <https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/1971-anglo-argentine-joint-statement-on-communications.pdf>

1325 Rear-Admiral Büsser's address to his officers, quoted in *74 days under the Argentine flag: The experiences of occupation during the Falklands/Malvinas War* A. L. Corbacho 2018

1326 Rear-Admiral Büsser quoted in Middlebrook 2003

An invasion squadron, led by a destroyer, *Santisima Trinidad*, includes a tank landing ship, *Cabo San Antonio*, the icebreaker *Almirante Irizar* and a submarine, *Sante Fe*. The submarine is carrying members of Argentina's elite frogmen, the Buzos Tactico, whose orders are to reconnoitre the beaches for the invasion forces.¹³²⁷ Further east, closing on South Georgia, is the corvette *Guérrico*, and a naval auxiliary, *Bahia Paraiso*. Argentine frigates *Drummond* and *Granville* position themselves between South Georgia and the Falklands.

“... there was no need for such a vast force; the Argentinians were using a sledgehammer to crack a nut... it is hard to escape the conclusion that the main purpose was "prestige and display";...”¹³²⁸

In the USA, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issues a report:

“On or shortly before 28 March 1982, the Argentine Army and Navy prepared a joint assessment for President Leopoldo ((Galtieri)) on the current dispute with the United Kingdom over the South Georgia Islands in the South Atlantic. The assessment included the following points: A. Argentine public opinion strongly approves of the Argentine Government taking a strong stand against UK "threats" to Argentina. B. The UK Embassy in Buenos Aires was aware of plans to place Argentine workers on the Island and has therefore urged London to keep this in mind and be moderate in its response. C. The UK appears unwilling to take any action to remove the workers. D. Successful handling of this incident could help to fortify the Galtieri government and give it an image of being strong, decisive, and highly nationalistic. This will deflect leftist charges against the government.

The "crisis" is already serving to deflect public attention from economic problems and from the planned labor demonstration in Buenos Aires on 30 March. E. If Argentina gives the appearance of having "lost" in this confrontation with the UK, it will serve to strengthen enormously Chile's position in the dispute with Argentina over the Beagle Channel. (Source comment: On 28 March, working-level officers within the Argentine Naval Intelligence Service, who are not necessarily privy to actual operational planning, discounted the possibility of Argentine intervention should the British choose to forcibly remove the Argentine workers from the Island; these naval intelligence officers believed that the Argentine Navy is not ready or able to support any type of armed conflict in the South Georgias area because of existing limitations on equipment. These naval intelligence officers expected that, if the British should remove the workers, the Argentine Government would certainly speak strongly but would try to cast itself as a peacemaker by avoiding a direct conflict with the UK.)”¹³²⁹

In London, a note titled *The Defence Implications of Argentine Action Against the Falkland Islands* is prepared by Britain's Ministry of Defence.

“The recent JIC assessment argued that the Argentine Government ... if they concluded there was no hope of a peaceful transfer of sovereignty, military action could not be ruled out. Argentine military options were identified as: a. Harassment or arrest of British shipping. b. military occupation of one or more of the uninhabited islands. c. Arrest of the British Antarctic Survey Team on South Georgia. d. Small scale military operation against the Islands. e. Full scale military invasion of the Islands.

1327 A set of coded, detailed, instructions, dated 1530hrs March 28, 1982, were intercepted (by who is not clear) and sent to be decoded by GCHQ in England. The message referred to a '*reconnaissance of the beach*' and a reference to the '*San Felipe lighthouse*'. San Felipe being Argentina's name for Cape Pembroke; good indicators of the submarine's intentions. However, GCHQ did not start work on the message until the following day and the final decoded message was not available until the 30th /31st. See below.

1328 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.670

1329 *Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, POL-15(h) Country Political 82—Latin America.*

This note considers the defence implications of seeking to deter or counter these options by military means. ... Possible responses to Argentine action ...

c. Full scale military invasion of the Islands. In order to deter a full-scale invasion, a large balanced force would be required, comprising for example, Invincible or Hermes with an LPD and LSLs, 4 destroyers/frigates, plus an SSN, supply ships in attendance and additional manpower; up to brigade strength, to reinforce the garrison. Such a deployment would be very expensive and would engage a significant portion of our naval resources. Moreover, its despatch could well precipitate the very action it was intended to deter. If then faced with Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands on arrival, there could be no certainty that such a force could retake the Dependency. Argentine national pride would demand a maximal response. Their geographical advantage and the relative sophistication of their armed forces would put our own task group to a serious disadvantage, relying as it would on extended lines of communication.

Conclusions. Military measures to deter or counter Argentine military action against the Falkland Islands would require the despatch to the area of additional forces, primarily naval, and on a substantial scale. Any such deployment would be costly and pose considerable logistic difficulties. To deter or repel even a small scale invasion would require a significant commitment of naval resources, at the expense of commitments elsewhere, for a period of uncertain duration. To deal with a full scale invasion would present significantly greater problems requiring naval and and forces with organic air support on a very substantial scale; the logistic problems of such an operation would also be formidable.”

Lord Carrington sends a telegram to Washington DC, for the attention of US Secretary Alexander Haig.¹³³⁰

“Your Charge d’Affaires in London will have reported to you the serious situation which has developed between ourselves and the Argentine Government following the illegal landing at Leith Harbour on the British island of South Georgia last week of a party of Argentines. The Argentines have a long-standing claim to the Falkland Islands and their dependencies and, despite all our efforts to resolve the dispute by peaceful negotiation, the Argentines have recently been making it clear that they are prepared to use other means to achieve their aim of a full transfer of sovereignty. The whole question of the Falklands is a very sensitive one for us, our public opinion and our Parliament. As soon as we discovered the presence of the party, we sought to persuade the Argentine Government through diplomatic channels to remove them. But they have refused to do this. Instead they appear to have consolidated the party’s position by landing further equipment and have issued a statement that the men on South Georgia will be given all necessary protection. I have moreover, just received an uncompromising and negative message from the Argentine Foreign Minister about the problem. It offers no constructive suggestions and seems likely only to aggravate the problem. The Royal Navy Ice Patrol Ship, HMS Endurance, is anchored nearby in Grytveken Harbour. A number of Argentine Navy vessels are heading for the area and we cannot exclude the possibility that, if we attempt to remove the men ourselves, they may retaliate.

It is our firm wish to resolve this problem peacefully. To that end, we have done everything we can to persuade the Argentines to find a way out: we are prepared to examine every avenue with them. But the continued presence of these men is an infringement of British sovereignty and you will understand that we cannot acquiesce in that. I appreciate that this dispute will seem to others a bilateral matter from the British and Argentine Governments. But despite all my Government’s efforts to find an acceptable

1330 Delivered personally by the UK Ambassador, Henderson.

solution, we have now reached a stage where the situation will soon become very difficult. I do not, however, believe that it is in anyone's interests to allow this incident to be the cause of what may become armed conflict in the South Atlantic, and I wish to explore every possible avenue which might help us to avoid this. I should accordingly be grateful if you would consider taking the matter up with the Argentines, stressing the need to defuse the situation and find a solution we can all accept. If the Argentines maintain that they will not remove the men themselves and that they will resist any attempt by us to do so, the use of a third country ship might be a compromise they could accept. The problem could also be resolved by the Argentines agreeing that their men should seek the necessary permission from the British authorities at Grytveken in order to regularise their presence. I should be very grateful for any help you can give us on this. If we do not find a solution soon, I fear the gravest consequences."¹³³¹

*"To his astonishment, he received a message from Haig's deputy, Walter Stoessel, pointing out that both Britain and Argentina were 'good friends' of the USA and counselling caution. America's Ambassador ... would nevertheless see what he could do. ... Carrington hit the roof."*¹³³²

Furious with the equivocal response, Lord Carrington summons the US *charge d'affairs*, Edward Streater.

*"(The UK had) supported American policy in Sinai, had supported it in El Salvador; that this support had not been particularly willing, not wholly consistent with our own better judgement, but we had given it; and now we expected a better response than this not very friendly message, equating our case and position with that of Argentina."*¹³³³

March 29th, from London, Margaret Thatcher and Lord Carrington fly to Europe for a meeting.

*"By the time their plane landed at Brussels, they had agreed that three nuclear submarines should be sent south immediately. John Nott at the MoD was telephoned from the airport and instructed accordingly. Considering the abuse heaped on British ministers and their cabinet staffs in the prelude to the Falklands invasion, it is worth pointing out that a submarine force was ordered to sea within two and a half days of the junta's probable decision to proceed with an early invasion."*¹³³⁴

*"Following a decade-old reflex regarding the Falklands, and fashionable ideas about rationality and 'escalation ladders' during crises, Britain reacted cautiously in order to avoid provocation and to buy time. Whitehall thought that crisis loomed, but it was months away – likely after a slow and rational process of escalation ... Whitehall disassociated the flashpoint of South Georgia Island from the Falkland Islands. It over-estimated the rationality of the Argentine junta and the pace of the unfolding crisis. Thatcher later said "It seemed utterly ridiculous to contemplate an invasion of the Falklands then"."*¹³³⁵

HMS *Spartan*, a nuclear powered submarine, is directed to embark stores and weapons at Gibraltar.

A support vessel, RFA *Fort Austin*, is ordered to sail from Gibraltar to resupply HMS *Endurance*. First Sea Lord Sir Henry Leach and his senior staff meet at the Ministry of Defence; after which Defence Secretary John Nott advises the Prime Minister that it will take a week to ready a "viable" naval force, then three more weeks to get

1331 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820054–0571*

1332 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.82

1333 Quoted in Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

1334 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.76

1335 John Ferris 2020 citing *Falkland islands Review Committee, Note of an oral evidence session October 25, 1982 CAB 292/47*

them to the Islands; although a group of seven destroyers and frigates, on *Exercise Spring Train* in the eastern-Atlantic, could be off the Falklands within two weeks.

In Buenos Aires, newspapers refer to the cancellation of all military leave, and report that five Argentine warships are heading towards South Georgia. Ambassador Williams writes to the Foreign Office in London.

“I am receiving gestures of sympathy ... but I fear that in general, the Argentine Government will not only gain in popularity by playing the jingoist drum, but be accepted as doing the right thing in taking even the most extreme measures.”

At Stanley, RRS *John Biscoe* anchors with 43 Royal Marines from Montevideo, reinforcing those marines of NP 8901 that have not sailed with HMS *Endurance*.¹³³⁶

In Argentina, Comodoro Carlos Bloomer Reeve speaks to Brigadier Plessl.

*“(Bloomer Reeve) was of British descent, bilingual in Spanish and English, and had been serving as Argentine air attaché in Germany.... With another bilingual officer, Capitan Barry Hussey, he was given two days to plan a civilian administration for the islands.”*¹³³⁷

*“Bloomer attended the briefing called by Menéndez. The General explained to the appointees that the islands would be considered a province, that he would be assuming the position of governor, and they would form the cabinet with direct responsibility over the civilian population. ... In subsequent meetings and on the basis of these data, it was decided to organize the government on the existing structure, which the islanders were familiar with. The existing communication networks could be used, and public officials, without many alternatives for employment, would appreciate the opportunity to keep their jobs. Patriotism and the fear of being labelled as collaborators could be overcome with the excuse that they were serving their fellow citizens. ... Law and order would initially be maintained by military police personnel. The governor would lead the administration, assisted by a chief secretary who would oversee the superintendencies of the basic government agencies. The treasury would report directly to the governor, except for certain duties of the chief secretary. In addition, there would be two elective councils: one with legislative functions and the other with executive functions. Both would be chaired by the governor and assisted by the chief secretary and the treasurer.”*¹³³⁸

Out in the North Atlantic, Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Sir John Fieldhouse, observing *Exercise Spring Train* from HMS *Glamorgan*, is notified of events. Fieldhouse summons the flag officer in charge of the exercise, Rear Admiral Woodward, to a conference before flying by helicopter to Gibraltar, and then on to London. All British vessels involved in *Exercise Spring Train* are ordered to report their readiness for war.

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman reports to the State Department in Washington DC; *“British Ambassador Williams called on me this morning... Williams is now persuaded that the Argentine military have stage-managed this entire incident as a means of pressing the British for accelerated negotiations on the Falklands/Malvinas without revealing their full intentions to the Foreign Ministry. One particular piece of evidence in this regard is the fact that the Bahia Paraiso has been unloading equipment at Leith Harbor. Costa*

1336 Originally intended as replacements, Norma's team merged with that of Gary Noot; some of which had deployed to South Georgia with HMS *Endurance*. The result was a force of 69 Royal Marines in Stanley, together with a few officers and men left behind by *Endurance*. Rather more than Argentina had been expecting, although this news appears to have reached Argentina before April 1, 1982. Argentina had eyes in Stanley.

1337 Middlebrook 2003

1338 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

*Méndez told Williams initially that the ship had been sent there suddenly to watch over the working party and perhaps to evacuate them.”*¹³³⁹

In the South Atlantic, Argentina's invasion fleet encounters bad weather.

*“The intention was to sail down the coast of Argentina until well past the Falklands and then approach the islands from the south, but a fierce storm which blew up on... Monday the 29th – lasted for forty-eight hours and spoiled that plan.”*¹³⁴⁰

*“29 March was a day of rough seas and poor weather. The galleys, particularly on the transports, struggled to provide enough food. Garcia was unable to meet with his commanders and in spite of the risk of interception, he issued orders by radio. The Almirante Irizar reported that the 601 Combat Aviation Company Puma helicopter on board, tasked to land a 25th Regiment platoon... had been damaged beyond repair in the rough seas.”*¹³⁴¹

In England, the coded message to *Sante Fe*, intercepted the day before, arrives at GCHQ.¹³⁴²

*“Few people handled intelligence on the Falkland Islands, which slowed its processing and impact ... DIS, charged with basis analysis, had no specialist on the Falklands and only two officers tasked to handle Latin America, meaning one person at a time. ... Thatcher probably saw only the most important of reports – as did the two ministers most involved with intelligence (Nott and Carrington).”*¹³⁴³

In Washington DC, Argentine Ambassador Takacs and British Ambassador Henderson are summoned to the State Department.

*“Ambassador Takacs said that he had no instructions on the issue but would convey the Deputy Secretary’s comments to Buenos Aires immediately. Takacs asked if he could tell his Foreign Minister that the same message was being conveyed to the British. The Deputy Secretary replied that he would be telling the exact same thing to Ambassador Henderson and reiterated that we would like to be helpful if both sides believe we can be. Ambassador Henderson said that the workmen were on the Island illegally, having gone there ostensibly under the scrap removal contract. They had no immigration permission for the Island, not even a white card which is valid for entry into the Falkland Islands proper. The line the Argentines are taking does not suggest they are prepared to do anything. The British do not want them to stay there but they are prepared to make an important concession: if the Argentine ship, the Bahia Paraiso, would take the work party around to Grytviken Harbour, they could give them permission to stay. Henderson did not see how the USG could condone the illegal occupation of the Island and did not see why it would be taking sides to ask if the GOA was willing to accept this reasonable compromise. Henderson did not seem to be aware that the GOA had vetoed this possibility.”*¹³⁴⁴

March 30th, in Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlauderman speaks to the Argentine Foreign Minister; making an offer to mediate between the UK and Argentina regarding the situation on South Georgia.

1339 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820165–0179

1340 Middlebrook 2003

1341 Van der Bijl 2023

1342 Intercepting and decoding Argentine signals was not a quick process, taking up to a day during the early stages of the intelligence operation. Even when GCHQ managed to improve on that, it could still take 14 hours.

1343 Ferris 2020

1344 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820166–0400

Meanwhile, the Military Junta commence the first of two meetings at the Libertad building; *“The first meeting ... resolved that General Garcia would be the commander of the Malvinas Theater of Operations until approximately D+5, after this the South Atlantic Theater would be created ... appointing Vice-Admiral Lombardo as commander.”*¹³⁴⁵ Possible reactions by the British Government, are considered.

“Finally, on 30 March 1982, the Military Committee approved the DEMIL 1/82 drafted by the Joint Staff to plan the use of the force and urge the United Kingdom to negotiate the Malvinas Islands sovereignty. The Directive maintained the Chilean case precautions and established that, in the event of an armed reaction after recapturing the islands, a defensive strategic military stance should be adopted, and that, depending on the circumstances, British maritime traffic should be interdicted to deter the dispatch of troops and/or the theater of operations established on the Malvinas Islands should be supported. The estimation that the United Kingdom would not respond with a military operation was of particular influence on the development of the conflict.

Appendix 1) through "Annex 6" of the DEMIL 1/82 specified the enemy's capabilities and subsequently determined the following adoption probabilities:

1. Capability No. 2: "Not responding with a military operation, but attempting to recapture the islands submitting claims before international organizations, the Vatican, and various forms of pressure".

2. Capability No. 4: "Wearing down our own forces through the actions of 1 or 2 nuclear submarines and command operations on installations and personnel".

3. Capability No. 1: "Deploying an Infantry Brigade (+) with the ability to subsequently provide logistical support, antiaircraft, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare detection and interception capabilities. Arrival as from D plus 30".

4. Capability No. 5: "Engaging in general harassment actions throughout the island and the mainland territories by disrupting maritime traffic, blockades, etc., with or without a declaration of war".

5. Capability No. 3: "Attempting the recapture of the islands through the use of a coordinated Task Force and the simultaneous attack by Chile in the Southern Theater of Operations (TOS) and the Área Naval Estratégica Austral (Southern Strategic Naval Area, ANEA)".

*The assessment carried out by the Joint Staff, and approved by the Military Committee, indicates that Britain was not expected to commit to a significant military effort, estimating that the British would deem it a minor and distant conflict.”*¹³⁴⁶

Unaware of what is happening, a large demonstration in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires demands a return to democracy. Similar protests take place in other Argentine cities; *“On the 30th, a protest was held that concentrated thousands of demonstrators in all the major cities of the country. And the government prepared to receive them: Plaza de Mayo was surrounded by patrol boats, fire trucks, police on horseback, assault cars and even helicopters. The restriction on access to the square provoked clashes between demonstrators and security forces, as happened in Pueyrredón Bridge – where a large column of workers was intercepted and repressed – courts and the port of Buenos Aires. Similar situations occurred in cities of the interior where there were acts: Mendoza, Rosario, Tucumán, Córdoba and Mar del Plata. The day of protest left more than a thousand detainees (including many union representatives), wounded and one dead in Mendoza.”*¹³⁴⁷

1345 Yofre 2011 citing *Act. No.5 'M'/82*

1346 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023 citing *DEMIL 1/82*, Annex 6. *DEH-FAA Archives*.

1347 Carbone 2008

*“In 1982 inflation was running at 150%; 400,000 children in northern Argentina were suffering chronic malnutrition, and the peso had been devalued by 500% in less than a year – a new 100-million-peso banknote was introduced which was worth only just over £50. ... Three days later, the same square was filled with crowds cheering the same dictatorship.”*¹³⁴⁸

In Britain’s Parliament, Richard Luce makes a statement regarding the situation in South Georgia.

*“The situation which has thus arisen, while not of our seeking, is potentially dangerous. We have no doubts about British sovereignty over this Falkland Islands dependency as over the Falklands themselves. We remain of the view that the unauthorised presence of Argentine citizens in British territory is not acceptable. We have no wish to stand in the way of a normal commercial salvage contract, but the position of those carrying it out must be properly authorised. Further escalation of this dispute is in no one’s interest. In those circumstances, it is clearly right to pursue a diplomatic solution of the problem. This we are doing. I hope that the Argentine Government will take the same view. Meanwhile, the question of security in the Falklands area is being reviewed, although the House will understand that I prefer to say nothing in public about our precautionary measures. I can, however, inform the House that HMS “Endurance” will remain on station as long as is necessary.”*¹³⁴⁹

From the opposition benches, ex-PM James Callaghan reveals his 1977 deployment to the South Atlantic.

*“... is the Minister aware that there have been other recent occasions when the Argentinians, when beset by internal troubles, have tried the same type of tactical diversion? Is the Minister aware that on a very recent occasion, of which I have full knowledge, Britain assembled ships which had been stationed in the Caribbean, Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean, and stood then about 400 miles off the Falklands in support of HMS “Endurance”, and that **when this fact became known**, without fuss and publicity, a diplomatic solution followed? ...”*¹³⁵⁰

*“Concluding, Denis Healey said that the Government clearly took the Argentinian moves as deliberate provocation. Taking a cue from Mr. Callaghan, he argued that the Government, unlike its predecessor, had failed to assemble a suitable naval force to assist in sorting matters out. It was simply one more in a terrible series of errors on defence policy.”*¹³⁵¹

After an *in-camera* meeting of the Conservative back-bench committee, at which Luce refuses to confirm anything, a leak suggests that a submarine force has been ordered south. This information is immediately broadcast by the *International Television News (ITN)* service.

*“The information was flashed to Buenos Aires where it confirmed rumours already current ... Britain’s Parliament, ... had turned a covert deterrent to invasion into a public invitation to one.”*¹³⁵²

Britain’s Defence Operations Executive (DOE) receives intelligence of an Argentine task force lying 800 miles north of the Falklands; consisting of an aircraft carrier, 4 destroyers and an amphibious landing craft. Also more information regarding the situation at South Georgia.

1348 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.674

1349 *HC Deb 30 March 1982 vol.21 cc163-70*. See - <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1982/mar/30/south-georgia-falkland-islands>

1350 My emphasis. There is no evidence that Argentina ever became aware of this deployment. When pressed, in the days that followed, Callaghan refused to say how Argentina’s government had become aware of his sending a squadron to the South Atlantic. Eventually, Callaghan refused to take any further questions on the matter. *cf.* 1977

1351 *Pattison minute to Thatcher March 30, 1982* in PREM19/657 f26

1352 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

*“Intelligence Briefing: The Argentinian party at Leith Harbour, South Georgia, was now estimated at 16 men. The British Antarctic Survey (BAS) Team at Grytviken numbered 22, and HMS Edurance, with 21 Royal marines on board was currently lying off Grytviken. The Argentine ship Bahia Paraiso was patrolling off the coast with two helicopters. 2 landing craft and an unknown number of marines embarked. ... Two type A69 Argentinian Corvettes were in the Falklands/South Georgia area, and believed to be tasked with intercepting Endurance should she attempt to remove the Argentinian shore party...”*¹³⁵³

A joint MOD/FCO note considering options for reinforcing the Falklands is sent to PM Thatcher.¹³⁵⁴

From London, Britain’s Foreign Office telegrams Argentina’s Foreign Ministry in Buenos Aires.

*“The potentially dangerous position which has now developed has in no way been of our seeking. ... A confrontation, which could have far-reaching consequences and which would seriously prejudice our attempts to resolve the whole Falklands issue through peaceful negotiation, is in neither of our interests.”*¹³⁵⁵

From Argentina, Britain’s defence *attaché* contacts GCHQ to warn that a small invasion off East Falkland Island was possible, and requests any indicators that GCHQ may have been aware of.¹³⁵⁶

From Faslane naval base in Scotland, a nuclear powered submarine, HMS *Splendid*, deploys south. Another, HMS *Conqueror*, is readied.

In Stanley, the scheduled LADE flight lands and Vice-Comodoro Héctor Gilobert steps off the aircraft.

*“On Thursday, 30 March 1982, Vicecomodoro Héctor Gilobert arrived in Stanley aboard a Fokker F-28, in what would be the last scheduled service of Líneas Aéreas del Estado (LADE) to the Islands. The aircraft was guarded by armed Marines under the pretext of preventing hostile attitudes. However, it was clear that they wanted to prevent the possible descent of Argentine commandos hidden inside. The F-28’s arrival, after the riots at the airline commercial offices following Davidoff’s incident in South Georgia, immediately aroused the authorities’ suspicions as they already knew that a Task Force had set sail for the South Atlantic. Gilobert explained he had come to assess the situation after the attack against LADE’s premises and wished to clear the air. As he entered the town, everything looked as usual. Local residents did not seem to suspect the reasons for his visit and exchanged polite greetings. ... **Sophisticated communications equipment**, which had been transported on that same flight, was installed at Vicecomodoro Gamen’s house (LADE House) to send coded messages. The installation was done in front of local residents, as it had been impossible to conceal the bulky packages being transported and the technicians working with the antennas, although some of the work was carried out overnight. ... news and the events in Stanley were coded and rebroadcast to the landing forces command via LADE’s stations in Buenos Aires and Comodoro Rivadavia.”*¹³⁵⁷

1353 ALW 040/325/9. The DOE acted as the executive agency for the Chiefs of Staff. Franks 1983 para.224. For the minutes of the DOE meeting on March 30, 1982, see - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/7659D57170334501A6C2C3CF39BFA5A8.pdf>

1354 PREM19/657 f27. See - <https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/E1AAA0D12A6D47D59B5F371F8EB2A422.pdf>

1355 PREM 19/657 f24. Telegram No.77 of 30 March

1356 Ferris 2020 citing GCHQ incoming telegram no.36 March 30, 1982. cf. *The Threads that Link the Falklands to Iraq* Simon Jenkins London Spectator March 30, 2007

1357 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023. My emphasis.

Also arriving on the flight are four British journalists trying to get to South Georgia. ¹³⁵⁸

In Cheltenham, England, GCHQ finally decode the message to Argentina's submarine, *Santa Fé*. The submarine is being ordered to take reconnaissance forces to Mullet Creek, near Stanley. ¹³⁵⁹

"At some time on 30 March, GCHQ distributed an Argentine order that the Type 209 diesel-electric submarine Sante Fe sail with remarkable caution, launch a "reconnaissance of the beach and/or disembarkation (word garbled)" and then move twenty miles east of the San Felipe (or Pembroke) Lighthouse, just off Port Stanley. ... This remarkable message might not have arrived until late evening on 30 March, but it would have been on a DIS desk at 0900, 31 March, alongside another one: the Argentine aircraft carrier, Veinticinco de Mayo, would receive special meteorological reports." On this basis, an alert DIS (Defence Intelligence Staff) officer might have called the alarm several hours faster than actually occurred,.." ¹³⁶⁰

At the Libertad building in Buenos Aires, the second meeting of the day commences; *"... The Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vice Admiral Leopoldo Alfredo Suárez del Cerro "reported on the weather forecast for the landing, reporting that the commander of the Malvinas Theater of Operations (had) decided to begin operations on April 2 at 0000 hours" (as) a storm prevented the operation being carried out on April 1. It was also resolved that "for reasons of international policy, it was appropriate for the Military Governor (General Mario Benjamin Menéndez) to have jurisdiction over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands."* ¹³⁶¹

March 31st, in the UK, following the ITN news report of the 30th, Britain's morning newspapers carry stories of Royal Navy submarines sailing for the South Atlantic; *"The Argentine chargé d'affairs in London, Alfredo Molteni, had a call from the local manager of Aerolíneas Argentinas, who told him that flights between Argentina and London had been "suspended". Molteni ... phoned the London manager of the Argentine national bank to warn him there might be financial restrictions if there were an "incident" in the Falklands."* ¹³⁶²

Published in *The Daily Telegraph* newspaper, a Gallup poll of voter intentions places the Conservative Party on 35%, the SDP on 33% and the Labour Party on 30% - with the Conservatives having an overall lead of 2%. ¹³⁶³

From Buenos Aires, Britain's defence *attaché*, reports to the MOD that all the Argentine fleet has sailed.

"On March 31 At 12:57, the fleet cut communications with the continent, modified the navigation course, headed to Port Stanley and changed the code name: from Operation Azul it became Operation Rosario." ¹³⁶⁴

During the afternoon in Britain, the information from GCHQ finally achieves a reaction; *"... when GCHQ began a drum-roll of alarming messages, collectively showing that Argentine warships would concentrate around Port Stanley on 2 April. ... At 1436, GCHQ distributed a message showing that an Argentine auxiliary vessel was to take "a position south of the Falkland Islands" and, at 1738, that 2 Marine Infantry Brigade would soon land somewhere."* ¹³⁶⁵

1358 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.675. Simon Winchester (*Sunday Times*), Ken Clarke (*Daily Telegraph*), David Graves (*The Sun*) and William Langley (*Daily Mail*). Gilbert had been tasked by the junta with organising a civilian administration. See above. The LADE flight left the next day. Pascoe notes that it was the last LADE flight, which had commenced operations in 1971.

1359 See March 28, 1982 above.

1360 Ferris 2020 citing 3/AA/73089-82 March 30, 1982 D/2304/14 pt.1

1361 Yofre 2011 citing *Act No.6 'M'/82*

1362 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.676 citing Cardoso *et al* 1987 p.88

1363 *UK Polling Report*. See June 9, 1983. Urban myth has it that Thatcher started a war because the Tories were behind in the polls.

1364 Yofre 2011

1365 Ferris 2020

At around 6pm in London, the GCHQ intercepts are handed to Defence Secretary John Nott, who seeks an urgent meeting with the Prime Minister at the House of Commons. They meet in the Prime Minister's office, together with Humphrey Atkins and Richard Luce of the Foreign Office.

*“John gave the MOD's view that the Falklands could not be retaken once they were seized. This was terrible, and totally unacceptable. I could not believe it: these were our people, our islands. I said instantly: “if they are invaded, we have got to get them back.”...”*¹³⁶⁶

*“As Thatcher recalled: “That night no one could tell me whether we could retake the Falklands – no one. We did not know – we did not know”. Nott and the DIS believed that Argentina had achieved a *fait accompli* to which Britain could not even respond.”*¹³⁶⁷

Uninvited, and unannounced, Admiral Sir Henry Leach arrives at the Palace of Westminster with copies of the latest intelligence reports. Asking to speak to John Nott, the Admiral is allowed into the meeting where he, in opposition to much of the advice already given, tells Margaret Thatcher that Britain could, and should, send a task force if any of the Islands are invaded.

“Because if we do not, or if we pussyfoot in our actions and do not achieve complete success, in another few months we shall be living in a different country whose word counts for little.”

*“... the main thrust of this was that I left ... with full authority to assemble, but not yet sail, a task force.”*¹³⁶⁸

*“Leach's advice was that whatever was done must not be half-hearted, for that was likely to result in a shambles. ... He argued for sending every element of the fleet of any possible value. ... Leach's conviction that a fleet able to look after itself if subjected to air and sea attack by Argentine forces would be ready to sail early the next week made a deep impression on the politicians present.”*¹³⁶⁹

*“... the hour produced the man. Admiral Sir Henry Leach, the First Sea Lord, joined us in my room in the Commons, where colleagues and advisers gloomily combined to tell me why every option was unthinkably risky. I asked the Admiral: “If this invasion happens, precisely what can we do?” I won't forget his answer. Quite calmly and confidently, he replied: “I can put together a task force of destroyers, frigates, landing craft and support vessels, to be led by the aircraft carriers *Hermes* and *Invincible*. It can be ready in 48 hours. All I need is your authorisation. I gave it.”*¹³⁷⁰

*“... once the crisis came she was second to none in her single-minded devotion to the righting of a wrong and the defence of democracy and British interests. It is hard to believe that the Falklands would be British now if any other politician of that day had been in No. 10 Downing Street...”*¹³⁷¹

In Stanley, Governor Hunt, informed of the probability of an invasion, reviews his options. At his immediate disposal are the remaining marines of NP 8901 and their newly-arrived replacements; a total of 69. Also 11 Royal Navy personnel onshore from HMS *Endurance*; and one ex-Royal Marine, who had promptly re-enlisted on hearing rumours of an attack. Of the civilian Defence Force, 21 men report for duty.¹³⁷²

1366 Thatcher 1993

1367 Ferris 2020

1368 Sir Henry Leach in *The Falklands War* A. Dorman, M. Kandiah & G. Staerck (eds) 2005 p.28

1369 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.181

1370 The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher in *The Falklands War: Then and Now* Gordon Ramsey (ed) 2008

1371 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.678

1372 Defence Force members were: Ally Biggs, Les Biggs, Fraser Wallace, Marvin Clark, Teddie Summers, Len McGill, Gavin Short, Brian Summers, Rag McAskill, Neil Ford, Robert King, Martyn Smith, Owen Summers, Phil Summers, Keith Summers, Les Harris, Derek & Tony Pettersson, Pat Peck, ‘Tubby’ Smith, Vernon Steen, Gerald Cheek, Kenneth

*“Major Gary R H Noot, the outgoing commanding officer, and his replacement, Major Mike J Norman, were halfway through the administrative handover when the first hints of the impending invasion were received. The handover meant that the defending force was about twice what might otherwise have been expected...”*¹³⁷³

*“On Wednesday afternoon, 31 March, the mood changed. The Marines' secure link with Britain was through their Commander in Chief, Rex Hunt, at Government House. He had received a message which was as confusing as it was disturbing. American intelligence had picked up a radio signal indicating that some action around the Falklands was imminent and they had passed it to London.”*¹³⁷⁴

From London, Lord Carrington sends a message to Minister Costa Mendez offering to despatch a high-level British official to discuss the situation of Argentina's scrap-metal workers on South Georgia.¹³⁷⁵

In Washington DC, Britain's Ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson calls on Secretary Alexander Haig.

“British Ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson, under instructions from London, called on the Secretary evening of March 31 to inform him that HMG believed it had solid evidence that the Argentine Government was moving a large Naval task force toward the Falkland Islands.

The information, which the British believe the US also has, indicates that the task force is due to reach Port Stanley at 0006 hours April 2 and will join a submarine which has orders to observe a beach as a possible landing site. The Ambassador stated that Argentine aircraft overflew the Falklands March 30.

More serious, according to the British, is other intelligence which they believe shows that the Argentine Junta is contemplating military action on April 2 no matter what kind of assurances they are giving us. Henderson reported that the UK is still trying to diffuse the situation and that Lord Carrington had offered to send a high level figure to Buenos Aires to try and deal with the problem of the workers at Leith Harbor.

*The British believe however, that the GOA is not interested in negotiating over the status of the workers, but only on the question of sovereignty over the Islands. HMG is convinced that the Argentines will only hold off if the US immediately immediately raises the issue with the Argentine President. ...”*¹³⁷⁶

Disturbed to discover that US agencies, including the CIA, have no information, Haig immediately alerts the White House. Secretary Haig telegrams Ambassador Shlauderman in Buenos Aires.

“In telegram 85684 to Buenos Aires, March 31, the Department instructed Shlauderman to deliver a message from Haig to Costa Mendez expressing the former's "hope that both governments will be able to move forward towards a satisfactory resolution" of the "longstanding issues" between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Haig continued: "Because the issues are not new, it would appear that arrangements and understandings have been agreed upon in the past for how to deal with problems such as that now posed at Leith Harbur. I urge your government do everything possible to adhere to such arrangements, and to avoid any actions that would make solution even more difficult. I have made the same requests to the British. I am convinced that it is

McKay, Dougie Hansen, Stewart Wallace, Jeremy Smith, Duane Andrade, Charles Coutts, Robert Rozee, Irwan Summers, Robert Stewart and Anthony ‘Taff’ Davies. Information provided by Taff Davies.

1373 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1374 Bound 2007

1375 Referred to in *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom April 1, 1982, 0429z in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984.* See below.

1376 *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom April 1, 1982, 0429z in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

*in the interest of both governments to resolve the current impasse as quickly as possible. If our good offices can be of assistance, please let me know".*¹³⁷⁷

In New York, Argentina's new Permanent Representative to the UN, Eduardo Roca, tells the President of the Security Council (SC) that his country is considering putting the issue of South Georgia before the Security Council.¹³⁷⁸

*"It is appropriate for me to emphasise in the clearest possible terms that the means employed by the British Government and their unilateral acts have created a situation of serious tension whose continuation could jeopardise the maintenance of international peace and security."*¹³⁷⁹

In Moscow, Argentina's Embassy requests that the Russian Government use its veto should a Security Council vote go against Argentina.¹³⁸⁰ China receives a similar request in the event of an unsupportive Security Council resolution.

From South Georgia, HMS *Endurance* is ordered back to Port Stanley.¹³⁸¹ Before sailing, Capt. Barker transfers a platoon of Royal Marines onto South Georgia to maintain a presence, and protect the unarmed BAS civilians. At 7pm local time, HMS *Endurance* slips away from South Georgia.¹³⁸²

At Stanley, what little news there is, is circulated to the population by radio.

*"Around 1900, on March 31st, Stanley's radio broadcast spread the news on the Islands that the Argentine fleet had been set back twenty-four hours due to a sea storm. This cleared things up. Not only were the British aware of the ongoing situation, but they could also accurately locate naval surface units."*¹³⁸³

From Washington DC, Secretary Haig cables the US Embassy in London.

*"I am instructing our Ambassador in Buenos Aires to convey my concern to the Argentine Foreign Minister and to urge that his government take no steps which would aggravate the present crisis. Furthermore, I am urging the Argentine Government to abide by existing arrangements and understandings concerning regularizing the status of foreign residents on South Georgia Island. We will, of course, have a greater chance of influencing Argentine behavior if we appear to them not to favor one side or the other. We will continue quietly to try and move the Argentines away from taking further steps which would make a peaceful resolution more difficult to achieve."*¹³⁸⁴

From London, Prime Minister Thatcher sends a message for the US President, Ronald Reagan.

"Dear Ron, You will know about the disturbing intelligence reports both from your sources and from ours that the Argentine Navy could be preparing to invade the Falkland Islands within the next 48 hours. There are less than 2,000 inhabitants there. We maintain only a small garrison of about 75

1377 Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 31, 1982 2208z in Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982).

1378 *The Falklands crisis in the United Nations, 31 March-14 June 1982* Anthony Parsons in *International Affairs* vol.59 Issue 2 (Spring) 1983 p.169

1379 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2

1380 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.91. It is not clear how much information regarding Argentine intentions was attached to the requests.

1381 This order appears to have come directly from the MOD in London where Leach was stamping his new authority.

1382 Barker 1997. See also Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.680 for details as to the means by which *Endurance* avoided detection by the *Bahia Paraiso*.

1383 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023. Unconfirmed.

1384 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982

Marines at Port Stanley—the capital of the Falklands—and the only Royal Navy vessel which we have in the area at the moment is an ice patrol ship. An Argentine assault would undoubtedly result in loss of life. We could not acquiesce in any Argentine occupation: The Falkland Islanders have always made it clear they wish and intend to remain British. Will you talk urgently with the Argentine President and ask him to give you an immediate assurance that he will not authorise any landing, let alone any hostilities. You can tell him that we will not escalate the dispute or start fighting. Meanwhile, we are pursuing urgent diplomatic initiatives with the Argentine to reach a settlement and I would ask for your support in this effort too. Warm personal regards,

Margaret” ¹³⁸⁵

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman telegrams Washington DC.

“Foreign Minister Costa Méndez called me in late this afternoon ... The Minister said he had conveyed my demarche of yesterday to the governing Junta. ... he gave me the following response from the three commanders: the GOA is prepared to accept the proffered good offices of the USG, but only on the basis that HMG first recognize the sovereignty of Argentina over the Malvinas and agree to deliver those Islands and their dependencies to Argentina within a reasonable period of time. The good offices of the USG would then be employed to help arrange such details as the future status of the Islanders under Argentine rule and the establishment of a permanent British fuelling station to support operations in the Antarctic. ... he reiterated that there would be no confrontation unless the British tried to take the working party off South Georgia. I said we would regard any confrontation as most serious. ... Costa Méndez closed the meeting by delivering himself of some harsh observations on the British, asserting that the GOA had had enough, that HMG had tried to dupe and string along Argentina for years and that the GOA was prepared “to break relations” without any qualms.” ¹³⁸⁶

Shlaudeman adds a comment; *“The Junta's response is, of course, absurd. It sounds like Galtieri playing Patton. In any event, the GOA is clearly bent on pressing to the utmost the advantage it thinks it has. ... If the press reports of British Navy ship movement towards the South Atlantic are true, the Argentines may simmer down a bit. Our impression from contacts in the Argentine navy is that no armed action is expected in that quarter for the time being at least.”*

The US Ambassador also notes that Haig's message for Costa Mendez had arrived while his current cable was being drafted, adding; *“I would prefer not to deliver any high-level message until after the CNO has had a chance to talk to the navy here and to give us his insights.”* ¹³⁸⁷

In Washington DC, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) circulates an intelligence cable.

“On the evening of 31 March 1982, Argentine President Leopoldo (Galtieri) and the other two members of the ruling military Junta were determined that Argentina will take military action, if necessary, to resolve the current conflict with the United Kingdom over conflicting claims of sovereignty over the South Georgia Islands (sic) in the South Atlantic. In meetings late on 31 March, Galtieri and the other two members of the Junta were in firm agreement that Argentina will not back down on this matter. ...Late on 31 March, Costa Mendez told members of the Junta that the current impasse with the UK is a military problem, not a diplomatic problem; Galtieri forcibly echoed this statement.” ¹³⁸⁸

1385 *Ibid.*

1386 *Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 31, 1982 2208z in Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982).*

1387 *Ibid.* CNO = Chief of Naval Operations

1388 *Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontain files, Falkland Islands [04/01.1982-04/02/1982], Secret.*

*“Argentina evidently plans an invasion as early as tomorrow of the disputed Falkland Islands, if its increasingly tough diplomatic posture does not yield results. ... Argentina's Foreign Minister has stated that it will require British recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and South Georgia groups and expeditious transfer of them to Buenos Aires. He said, however, that there would be no confrontation unless the British try to remove the Argentine nationals from South Georgia.”*¹³⁸⁹

April 1st, in the early hours, US Secretary of State Haig telegrams the US Embassy in London.

*“British Ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson, under instructions from London, called on the Secretary evening of March 31 to inform him that HMG believed it had solid evidence that the Argentine Government was moving a large Naval task force toward the Falkland Islands. The information, which the British believe the US also has, indicates that the task force is due to reach Port Stanley at 0006 hours April 2 and will join a submarine which has orders to observe a beach as a possible landing site. The Ambassador stated that Argentine aircraft overflew the Falklands March 30. More serious, according to the British, is other intelligence which they believe shows that the Argentine Junta is contemplating military action on April 2 no matter what kind of assurances they are giving us. Henderson reported that the UK is still trying to defuse the situation and that Lord Carrington had offered to send a high level figure to Buenos Aires to try and deal with the problem of the workers at Leith Harbor. The British believe, however, that the GOA is not interested in negotiating over the status of the workers, but only on the question of sovereignty over the Islands. HMG is convinced that the Argentines will only hold off if the US immediately raises the issue with the Argentine President. Henderson said that the situation is serious and that Mrs. Thatcher is very worried. The Secretary answered that he had been concerned that Carrington thought we had not been supportive enough at the outset of the dispute. The USG had not wanted to take sides as long as the dispute appeared to be only over workers status. Now that there is plainly a military dimension, we will urgently contact the Argentine Government at the highest level. The Secretary said he recognized that the British have done much for us and in turn Carrington should be told that we will do what we can to assist in this matter.”*¹³⁹⁰

Secretary Haig also cables the US Embassy in Argentina.

*“Request you contact Galtieri immediately. Tell him we have disturbing reports. Tell him that we don't want to overreact, but would like very much to be reassured. Tell him that from the US point of view we believe that we are embarked on one of the most fruitful periods in the history of our relationship, in which we can become not only the partners in the struggle against Communism in the Hemisphere, but together we can again achieve that standing in international life which we both can rightfully claim. Tell him that should any military action occur, for whatever reason, it is a simple fact that overriding internal and external pressure would be brought to bear on us to abandon the new and promising relationship we are building.”*¹³⁹¹

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman cables Washington DC to report; “... That Williams had received from Costa Mendez a verbal answer that morning regarding the proposed visit of a high-level British official to discuss the workers at Leith Harbor. Costa Mendez said the Government of Argentina was "not

1389 *National Intelligence Daily*. A regular briefing prepared by the CIA

1390 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982*.

1391 *Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State in Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982)*.

interested" and that "from the Argentine point of view the Leith Harbor affair is closed". Conveying this reply to Shlaudeman, Williams added that Costa Mendez did indicate that "the GOA would be prepared for immediate discussions on the sovereignty issue".¹³⁹²

At the United Nations building in New York, during the morning, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar asks both Roca and Parsons, to meet him.

"The Secretary-General summoned my Argentine colleague and myself successively and spoke to us in similar terms. He said that he was distressed at reports of rising tension between the two countries and urged that we should settle our differences through diplomatic channels. He made clear that he will publicise his appeal...."

The Secretary-General told me that Roca (Argentina) was completely taken aback by being summoned. He told Perez de Cuellar that he was on the point of presenting a note to the President of the Security Council. He showed Perez de Cuellar the text which amounted to a rehearsal of the Argentine position over the years, laying the blame on us.

I told Perez de Cuellar that I was glad that he had sent for me. I added in confidence and without any supporting detail that we were seriously worried that the Argentines might be contemplating using the South Georgia incident as a pretext for military action. I therefore believed that his initiative, particularly since it would be made public, could have a useful deterrent effect.

*Perez de Cuellar said that, if the Argentines were contemplating military action, this would be partly to divert attention from their internal difficulties and from the mess they had got themselves into with Chile over the Beagle Channel."*¹³⁹³

At midday, the UN Secretary-General issues a press release regarding his meeting with the Permanent Representatives of both Argentina and the UK; repeating his call for a diplomatic solution.

In Stanley, Vicecomodoro Gamen receives information; "Around 1400, on April 1st, Reinaldo Reid, an Anglo-Argentine man who had been living for a long time in Malvinas' capital, informed Gamen that the runway was blocked with vehicles to prevent landings. Only a small portion was available for the Britten Norman Islander, the aircraft owned by Governor Hunt, which was patrolling the area around the adjacent sea."¹³⁹⁴



1392 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982)

1393 UKMiss New York telegram 352 to FCO April 1, 1982 in FCO12/384 f352

1394 The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023. Unconfirmed.

In New York, early afternoon local time, Britain's Sir Anthony Parsons requests that the President of the Security Council convenes a meeting; to call upon the Argentine Government to refrain from the use of force.

*“By letter’ dated 1 April 1982 addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of the United Kingdom requested an immediate meeting of the Council as his Government had good reason to believe that the armed forces of the Argentine Republic were about to attempt to invade the Falkland Island.”*¹³⁹⁵

*“... we had never been to the Security Council before with this dispute. It had only touched the Fourth Committee; it had scarcely been to the plenary of the General Assembly and it hit everyone by surprise. The day before the invasion I got word to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council which I did. I rang up colleagues in turn personally, saying would you be down at the Council in an hour's time, the invasion of the Falklands is pending. My American colleague (Jeanne Kirkpatrick), who was very mixed up with Latin American policy, said that I had gone mad and that she would block the vote.. I said that if you are going to block me from having a meeting you will have to do it in public and I shall insist on a public meeting so ...? My Russian colleague said: it is April 1st and I know this is an April Fool's joke, the kind of thing you do the whole time, but you don't know your own rules; it is after mid-day. I had quite a problem persuading him that this was serious ...”*¹³⁹⁶

On being informed that a meeting of the Security Council is being requested, Argentina's Permanent Representative, Roca, responds that; *“It was ironic and inadmissible for the Council to be convened by the United Kingdom on that day to consolidate the spoils of colonial plundering. Argentina rejected being accused when in fact what should be judged, if justice was to be served and peace preserved, was the conduct of the accuser.”* Roca, submits a note to the President of the Security Council.

“The tense situation which is a cause of serious concern to my Government has been created by the following facts: the (fraudulent) claim of the British Government not to recognise the 1971 declaration for the Islands of South Georgia and not to recognise the documents created for them, and the British threat to use force by means of sending naval warships (to the area). ...

The conduct of the British Government has provoked the incident I have described, combined with a military presence which is unjustified and against the basic principles of international peace and security, constitute the culmination of a systematic policy of the United Kingdom aimed at maintaining a position of total rejection of the sovereignty of my country over the Falklands, South Georgia and South Sandwich. ...

*It is appropriate for me to emphasise in the clearest terms that the means employed by the British Government and their unilateral acts have created a situation of serious tension whose continuation could jeopardise the maintenance of international peace and security.”*¹³⁹⁷

UN Security Council President Kamanda wa Kamanda calls for restraint; announcing a meeting for that evening.

1395 See - <https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/security-council-discussion-1-to-3-april-1982.pdf>

1396 Sir Anthony Parsons interviewed by Jane Barter March 22, 1996

1397 *UKMiss New York telegram 354 to FCO (1530Z) April 1, 1982.* See - https://e75f6e9cf6b9a135aad4-518ea3b2de549204a48e1fd09592ed5a.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/820401_1530_UKMIS_tel_ARG_NOTE_TO_UNSCR_PRES_FCO12_384_f310.pdf

*“Kirkpatrick,.. was less than pleased, having told Roca that such a move was unlikely... Parsons was suspicious of Kirkpatrick's 'close and sympathetic relationship with Roca.' He suspected that she had given the Argentine Ambassador to understand that, if Argentina could support the US over Nicaragua, she would return the compliment over the Falklands.”*¹³⁹⁸

From London, information regarding the approaching invasion fleet is relayed to Governor Hunt.¹³⁹⁹

*“We have apparently reliable evidence than an Argentine task force will gather off Cape Pembroke early tomorrow morning 2 April. You will wish to make your dispositions accordingly.”*¹⁴⁰⁰

*“Faced with that Hunt arranged for his staff to sleep at houses in the town rather than near Government House, then he put all available staff to work shredding or burning secret papers,...Then he summoned the two Marine Majors, Gary Noott and Mike Norman, to Government House ...”*¹⁴⁰¹

Major Noot, officer commanding NP8901, briefs his marines before deploying them in small groups to sites around the town.

In Argentina, at 5pm, crews from the 1st Air Brigade are summoned to a meeting.

*“On April 1 at 1700, the crews, who were unaware of the purpose of the meeting, were summoned with overnight gear to the Officers’ Mess Assembly Hall. Comodoro Martínez began by saying: "Gentlemen, you will have the opportunity to achieve what you have dreamed of your entire lives –to recapture the beloved Malvinas Islands". The audience was deeply surprised, and then an intense and overwhelming joy followed. He then explained the reason for the meeting, the Aries 82 operation order, the airborne assault, and the details of the task to be carried out by the military air transport. Squadron commanders provided specific aspects, and the meeting concluded with a review and update of sea survival techniques.”*¹⁴⁰²

From Stanley, a coded message is transmitted to Argentina; *“... at 1810, Vicecomodoro Gilbert informed the command of the runway status, using code words such as "obstacles" and "comfortably accommodated”.*¹⁴⁰³

Out in the South Atlantic, at 6.30pm local time, Major-General Garcia signals the commanders of the Argentine Amphibious Task Force of the behaviour expected during and after the invasion.

*“No. 1. The mission must be complied with (sic) on our own territory, so it must be bloodless as permitted by the situation, so as to gain support among the population and (gain) worldwide approval. ... No. 5. The success of the operation... will be obtained if we can tilt the opinion of the population and the world in our favour, an outcome that will depend on each of the members of this Task Force. A wrong move, cunningly exploited by the propaganda, may bring about a serious problem at international level for the Nation whose greatness we are trying these days to enhance, both territorial and spiritually.”*¹⁴⁰⁴

1398 Freedman 2005 vol.2. The Presidency of the Security Council revolves monthly among its members. The USA had held the position during March, 1982 with Jeane Kirkpatrick, an Argentine sympathiser, taking the chair. On April 1, the position moved to the Republic of Zaire with Gerard Kamanda wa Kamanda taking the presidency. A stroke of luck considering Kirkpatrick's subsequent behaviour.

1399 By telegram, which arrived in Stanley at 3.30pm local time.

1400 FCO 7/4490 f113 The Governor is alleged to have responded; *"They might have added goodbye and the best of British!"* cf. *The Guardian* November 12, 2012

1401 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.684

1402 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1403 *Ibid.*

1404 Quoted in Van der Bijl 2023

At Stanley, 8.15pm local time, Governor Hunt goes on Falklands local radio to warn the Islanders.

“I have an important announcement to make about the state of affairs between the British and Argentine Governments over the Falkland Islands dispute. We have now sought an immediate emergency meeting of the Security Council on the grounds that there could be a situation which threatens international peace and security. I don't yet know whether it has been possible to arrange a meeting today, but our spokesman has been asked to make the following specific points. The Secretary General has today summoned the British and Argentine Permanent representatives to express his deep concern over the situation in the South Atlantic and has urged restraint on both sides. It is right that the Security Council should endorse and back up his approach.

We, for our part, have continued to make every possible effort to resolve the current problems by diplomatic means. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires yesterday delivered a further message to the Argentine government urging a negotiated settlement to current problems, and offering to send a senior emissary to Buenos Aires. The Argentine Foreign Minister had today responded to this approach in negative terms. He had declined to discuss further the problems occasioned by the illegal presence of Argentine nationals on South Georgia, and he had specifically stated that he no longer wished to use diplomatic channels to discuss the situation in South Georgia. In addition to the Foreign Minister's unwillingness to pursue diplomatic exchanges, there is mounting evidence that the Argentine armed forces are preparing to invade the Falkland Islands. In these circumstances it is essential that the Security Council urge that there should be no resort to armed force and that diplomatic negotiations should be resumed.

*In these circumstances, I think it is necessary to take certain precautionary measures here in Stanley. I have alerted the Royal Marines and I now ask for all serving members or active members of the Falkland Islands Defence Force to report to the Drill Hall as soon as possible. They will be on guard tonight at key points in the town. Schools will be closed tomorrow. The radio station will stay open until further notice. If the Security Council's urging to keep the peace is not heeded by the Argentine Government, I expect to have to declare a state of emergency, perhaps before dawn tomorrow. I shall come on the air again as soon as I have anything to report. But in the meantime I would urge you all to remain calm, and to keep off the streets. In particular, do not go along the Airport Road. Stay indoors, and please do not add to the troubles of the security services by making demonstrations or damaging Argentine property. This would play into their hands and simply provide them with the excuse they need to invade us.”*¹⁴⁰⁵

*“We were all dumb, ... We couldn't believe it. In the dining room, there were four English journalists, eight state gas operators, a British visitor by the name of Carisley, (and) the owners of the hotel... After the speech the silence continued ... We all watched, silent, but I felt that the eyes were fixed more on me because they knew I spoke English. Then they asked me what I thought. I told them I didn't believe that news. We got up, left the food almost intact (Lamb, as every night, every day) and along with the four English journalists we walked to (the) telex office to try to speak, each (man), to his country. They passed the news to their newspapers. I couldn't talk to Buenos Aires. Nothing could be heard across the line. Cut.”*¹⁴⁰⁶

1405 Bound 2007. Also *The First Casualty* R. Phillips 2017 pp.115-116

1406 Rafael Woolman, Argentine photo-journalist, who had arrived in Stanley a few days before on a LADE flight. Quoted in *La Gesta de Malvinas y sus protagonistas, conocidos y no tanto* in *El Diario del Fin del Mundo* January 4, 2008 citing *Malvinas. El desembarco de una primicia* Rafael Woolman in *La Nueva Provincia de Bahía Blanca* April 2, 2007

*“Rafael Wollmann, a photojournalist for ILA (Imagen Latinoamericana) agency, along with British correspondents Simon Winchester (of The Sunday Times) and Ian Mather with his photographer Tony Prime of The Observer were the only reporters on the islands when the occupation occurred. Wollmann arrived earlier (March 23) in order to make a report for the Gamma agency on the islands, while the British came to report on the South Georgia incident.”*¹⁴⁰⁷

*“Before 1900, following British tradition, Gilbert and Gamen were having dinner at Borland’s house. The atmosphere was rather tense, with an air of strange courtesy. From the next room, as though coming from far away, orders and information being broadcast on the radio could be heard. Both Argentine men tried to understand the messages spoken in distorted English, maybe a mixture of cockney accent or London slang and Gaelic. Dinner finished at 2100, and the Argentines left for Gamen’s residence. Once there, they found the house guarded by four armed FIDF militiamen. Both men assessed the situation: the guards prevented them from moving, the runway was blocked, and troops were deployed and ready. Since they were convinced that the air assault would not be executed, they did not go to the airport. Meanwhile, policemen and defense forces searched the houses of Argentine residents. All adult men were sent to the Town Hall under armed guards. ... On April 1 at 2200, Gilbert and Gamen began their radio communications attempts with the Task Force 40, at the scheduled times. They repeated the procedure every two hours, until the early morning of April 2,...”*¹⁴⁰⁸

From Buenos Aires, a signal to Argentina's invasion force informs General Garcia and Rear-Admiral Allara that the Islanders, and the garrison, are aware of their approach. Without the advantage of surprise, the invasion plans are quickly revised. Afraid that the target beach will now be defended, another landing site is selected. A squad whose objective was to be Goose Green is reassigned to reinforce those attacking Stanley. The new plan calls for Government House to be seized by the sixteen members of the Amphibious Commando Group, under the command of Lieut-Commander Pedro Giachino.

*“... making a total of 940 Argentine troops who would be attacking eighty-one British marines and sailors.”*¹⁴⁰⁹

In the Falklands, Civilian Defence Force (FIDF) members make their way to the Drill Hall.

*“... corps spirit is a strong thing, and Anthony Davies, known as Taff, was the only experienced soldier among them. Taff had been a Marine and met his wife Jackie when serving with Naval Party 8901 in the late 1970s. He left the Corps in 1979 and settled in Stanley. That night he felt he had to do something to help and became the FIDF's newest member. Taff recalled that, in spite of the lack of experience and the understandable nerves, the men were calm.”*¹⁴¹⁰

*“... the Marines took most of the FIDF General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs) and magazines for SLR rifles, leaving the FIDF with SLRs in the racks but no magazines to put in them, so quite number of the 32 FIDE volunteers who reported for duty were armed with Second World War .303 rifles. ... Once each man had been issued with a weapon (of whatever vintage) and 100 rounds of ammunition, the FIDF dispersed to their allotted posts around the town.”*¹⁴¹¹

1407 *The relationship between the military and Argentine correspondents authorized to report from the islands during the Falklands War* Eva Lavín & Jorge Gallardo-Camacho 2017

1408 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1409 Middlebrook 2013

1410 Bound 2007

1411 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.695. With two detachments of marines in the Islands, the NP8901 stores did not contain enough weapons.

From Stanley, Governor Hunt reports to London.

“(1) Royal marines disposition will be made near expected landing beach and will do what they can to contain landing and to defend airport.

(2) FIDF will round up Argentines in Stanley before dawn tomorrow and bring them to Government House for safe-keeping. They will then deploy at probable helicopter landing sites.

*(3) Marines will fall back to outskirts of Stanley but will not fight in Stanley. Survival party will take off to the hills as Argentine forces reach Stanley. I shall remain at Government House. ...”*¹⁴¹²

HMS *Endurance* is ordered to return to South Georgia.

*“I made for the south-east corner of the island. This was because we had a report that two corvettes, two destroyers, a submarine and a tanker were heading for South Georgia; the assumption was they would make their approach from the north.”*¹⁴¹³

At South Georgia, Argentine corvette, *ARA Guerrico*, with two helicopters and 40 marines, joins the *Bahia Paraiso*.

In Washington DC, Secretary Haig summons Argentina's Ambassador Takacs to see him.

*“The Secretary called in Argentine Ambassador Takacs at 7:45 p.m., April 1. They met for 15 minutes, The Secretary told Takacs that the President and he are deeply concerned about the situation in the South Atlantic. Our assessment suggests that the use of force is contemplated on the Falkland Islands and in South Georgia as well. We know that the UK will take a counter action if this happens. The situation would become a tragedy. Nothing would be more self defeating for Argentina's interest in good relations with the United States. The Secretary described our present relations as those of unprecedented cordiality after many years of languishing. GOA use of force would reverse our cooperation in Central America and the hemisphere. The reaction of the American people will be overwhelming, we will have to side with the British, and US-Argentine relations will be back to the worst days. The Secretary said he had been in touch with Lord Carrington and received the clear impression the British will react. He said he had urged the President to call Galtieri. He was shocked to learn that the Argentine President would not take the call. ...”*¹⁴¹⁴

Secretary Haig then sends a message to Lord Carrington indicating that the USA will do all it can to help and that their Ambassador in Buenos Aires is seeking an urgent meeting with President Galtieri; who is resisting an invitation to speak with President Reagan.

*“In his memoirs, Haig wrote that Reagan had attempted to telephone Galtieri at 6:30 p.m., but had been informed by Galtieri's aide that he was "unavailable" to take Reagan's call.”*¹⁴¹⁵

In Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman finally speaks to President Galtieri.

1412 FCO 7/4490 f124 Telegram No. 64 of 1 April 1982

1413 Barker 1997

1414 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and the United Kingdom: Washington, April 2, 1982 0304z Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). See - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d39>

1415 Footnote 2 in Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and the United Kingdom: Washington, April 2, 1982 0304z Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). General Galtieri “resisted” for 4 hours.

“... I emphasised to him, as I had to the Foreign Minister, that any armed confrontation would do serious damage to the excellent relations we have been developing between our two countries. I asked for the assurances on the use of force as set forth in para five of the refiel. Galtieri did not address that question... but when later I pressed it said bluntly that he was not going to tell us whether or not he intended to use force.... With respect to US/Argentine relations, the President insisted that Argentina has the support on this issue of the great majority of nations and that the failure of the U.S. to understand its position would do us damage in the Southern Cone and elsewhere. He referred several times to Argentine support for our position in Central America—support which I acknowledged—and seemed to suggest there should be a quid-pro-quo in this case.

The talking paper, which the President handed to me at the end of the meeting, reviews the Argentine complaints about HMG's lack of response to the Argentine proposals of January and February. It describes the current situation as "intolerable and impossible to maintain" in terms of "our national honor." The paper contains the following sentence: "We have not considered for a moment that at a time when the freedom of the American people is seen to be seriously threatened your government (USG) would be inclined to defend a colonial system represented by fewer than 2,000 persons thousands of kilometers from the metropol. We believe firmly that such situations belong to the history of past centuries and that it is not rationally possible to ask us to be the last example of a colonial aggression." ... The last point in the paper responds in a way to our request for assurances. The Foreign Minister commented that this point was the key. It states: "We can offer all the tranquillity and security required if public and express recognition of our sovereignty is made real, along with the stipulation, also public, that in a period not to exceed the end of the year 1982 the consequences of said recognition will be made concrete."

*I told the President that we were not talking about US support or lack of support for the British position, that we were not taking sides, and that we were only speaking of the possibility of military action, a possibility which concerns us greatly. I said that such action could bring unforeseen and very grave consequences. The President said that Argentina was prepared to face such consequences.”*¹⁴¹⁶

Informing Washington DC, Shlaudeman comments; *“Galtieri was emotional and, I believe, quite nervous. I'm still not certain that he means to take action tomorrow. It would be in his nature to run a bluff to the very end. On the other hand, his ego shows signs of serious inflation and I'm afraid that he is capable of doing something stupid.”*¹⁴¹⁷

In Washington DC, Britain's Ambassador, Henderson, receives a message from the US State Department; *“... that their Ambassador has informed them from Buenos Aires of his meeting with the Argentine President. The latter would not say what the Argentines were going to do. The Americans have deduced from this that the Argentinians are therefore planning to go through with their military operation. The Argentine President muttered some mumbo-jumbo, to use the State Department's phrase, about the need for the British to talk about surrendering sovereignty...”*

Closing on the Falklands, Argentina's invasion forces begin to deploy.

¹⁴¹⁶ Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State, Buenos Aires, April 1, 1982 2345z: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982)

¹⁴¹⁷ Ibid. Also Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982)

*“At 9.30pm on 1 April, ... the Type 42 destroyer Santisima Trinidad anchored one mile south of the Falklands coast. Twenty-one inflatable rubber boats were lowered into the sea, and the marines of the Amphibious Commando Company transferred to the small craft.”*¹⁴¹⁸

At the same time, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's President Galtieri finally agrees to take a telephone call from US President Reagan –

Reagan: *“I have reliable news that Argentina is about to adopt force in the Falkland Islands. As you will understand, I am very worried about the repercussions such an action would have. I want to express to you Mr. President, the concern of United States in this matter and the need to find an alternative to the use of force.”*

Galtieri: *“... I want to remind you that my country has always maintained a favorable attitude towards negotiations in this dispute with Great Britain. This is demonstrated by seventeen years of fruitless discussion under the auspices of the United Nations. We have conducted these negotiations with a nation which, more than a century and a half ago, used force to usurp a territory which by right belongs to Argentina. Our negotiating position remains the same – but the patience of the Argentine people has a limit. Great Britain has threatened Argentine citizens legitimately going about their business in South Georgia, and my government has an obligation to protect them. Besides, the United Kingdom persists in ignoring Argentine claims in order to put an end to the negotiations and has not responded – in spite of our insistence – to the last proposal that we formulated in order to speed up the process. I want to repeat to you, Mr. President, that our negotiating stance has not changed...”*

Reagan: *“I understand, Mr. President, but I consider it essential to continue the discussions and seek an alternative to force. ... Believe me, ... I have good reason to assure you that Great Britain would respond with force to any Argentine military action.”*

Galtieri: *“Argentina has always been in favor of a peaceful solution to this dispute. It will only be possible to find the alternative you seek, Mr. President, if there is recognition on the part of the United Kingdom of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. And that recognition would have to be explicit and public.”*¹⁴¹⁹

Reagan offers mediation via Vice-President Bush and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, but Galtieri rejects the offer.

“... Galtieri: There are all those resolutions of the General Assembly, such as 1514, 2065 and others which repeatedly call on the parties to seek a negotiated settlement to this sovereignty dispute.”

Reagan: *“Mr. President, I believe that it is my obligation to bring to your notice that Great Britain is ready to respond militarily to an Argentine landing. This has been made known to me by the United Kingdom. Furthermore, Mrs. Thatcher, a friend of mine, is a very determined woman and she would have no other alternative than to make a military response. The conflict will be tragic and have grave consequences for the Hemisphere. ...*

*I want to make clear, therefore, that the relationship between your country and mine will suffer greatly. American and world-wide opinion will take a negative attitude to an Argentine use of force.”*¹⁴²⁰

1418 Middlebrook 2003

1419 Quoted in full in Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 pp.83-86

1420 *Ibid.*

From London, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, responds to Governor Hunt's earlier telegram, urging caution in the treatment of Argentines present in the Islands.

*“... This must be for your judgement, but you will wish to bear in mind that although the evidence of Argentine intentions to attack the Islands tomorrow is highly suggestive, it is not yet entirely conclusive. The action we are taking in the Security Council and US representations in Buenos Aires could yet deter them. To arrest the few Argentines in Port Stanley before it is entirely clear that a landing is about to take place could simply provide the Argentines with the excuse they need. On present information we would not anticipate that a landing itself would take place until later in the morning. It would however seem a sensible precaution for the FIDF to keep a close watch on any Argentine citizens. We leave it to your discretion on when to inform the civilian population but it would seem right to do so with adequate warning...”*¹⁴²¹

From Washington DC, President Reagan telephones PM Thatcher with regard to his conversation with Galtieri.

*“... I conveyed to him my personal concern about the possibility of an Argentine invasion. I told him that initiating military operations against the Falkland islands would seriously compromise relations between the United States and Argentina and I urged him to refrain from offensive action. I offered our good offices and my readiness to send a personal representative to assist in resolving the issues between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The General heard my message, but gave me no commitment that he would comply with it. Indeed, he spoke in terms of ultimatums and left me with the clear impression that he has embarked on a course of armed conflict. We will continue to cooperate with your Government in the effort to resolve this dispute. Both in attempting to avert hostilities and to stop them if they should break out. While we have a policy of neutrality on the sovereignty issue, we will not be neutral on the issue of Argentine use of military force.”*¹⁴²²

*“The over-riding complication is the President's closeness to Mrs. Thatcher. The President called Galtieri and Galtieri told him to mess out.”*¹⁴²³

In New York, the United Nations Security Council meets in public session.¹⁴²⁴

*“We decided in the Mission that if we were going to get a Resolution – we didn't think the odds were good but we must do it quickly, avoid all the negotiations over blue drafts and black drafts and I don't know what other drafts, we must slap down something we could live with – we must demand that Argentina withdraw and we must get a vote on it within 24 hours because if we allowed it to drag out it would be fatal. So we did exactly that;..”*¹⁴²⁵

Britain's Permanent Representative, Anthony Parsons, addresses the Security Council.

“As members of the Council will be aware, there have been differences for many years between my Government and the Government of the Republic of Argentina concerning the Falkland Islands. My Government has asked for this emergency meeting of the Council because it now has reason to believe that the Government of Argentina is planning to attempt to invade these Islands. ...

1421 Carrington to Hunt ALQ/050/5

1422 PREM 19/657 Telegram from White House to Cabinet Office, London

1423 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary International Security Affairs (Noel C. Koch) to the Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense April 2, 1982. Washington National Record Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0003

1424 See - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/security-council-discussion-1-to-3-april-1982.pdf>

1425 Ambassador Parsons quoted in *British Diplomatic Oral History Project (Interviewing Sir Anthony Parsons)* J. Barder 1996

For several years, the affairs of the Falklands have been discussed by the General Assembly. The Falklands are one of those territories about which the United Kingdom reports to the United Nations under Article 73(E) of the Charter. At the most recent session of the General Assembly, a decision was adopted to the effect that the Committee of 24 should keep the situation in the territory under review.

The Assembly has not adopted a Resolution on the subject for several years but has contented itself with taking note of developments. My Government and the Government of Argentina have held a series of meetings to discuss the situation in the Falkland Islands. In these meetings, elected representatives of the local population have regularly taken part. Reports have been submitted to the General Assembly about these meetings, most recently in Notes dated 1 April 1981 (document A.36/156).

In this Note, it is stated that: "Both delegations agreed that this question should be examined in further negotiations at an early date." Such discussion did in fact continue, most recently in New York at the end of February. Representatives of the two Governments confirmed on that occasion their wish to continue their discussions within the negotiating framework referred to in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. But regrettably the Argentine Government appears to have decided, following those discussions, that it did not wish to continue on this course. The Joint Communique which had been agreed at these talks in New York was not published in Buenos Aires. Recently, relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina deteriorated as a result of an incident in South Georgia, one of the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands,...

On 31 March the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires proposed to the Argentine Foreign Minister that a senior official should visit Buenos Aires to discuss a diplomatic solution, adding that the diffusing of this incident would help prepare the way for a resumption of a dialogue on the broader sovereignty issue. Earlier today, the Argentine Foreign Minister gave the reply of his Government to the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires. His reply was negative. He declined to discuss further the problems occasioned by the illegal presence of Argentine nationals on South Georgia. He specifically stated that he no longer wished to use diplomatic channels to discuss the situation in South Georgia.

Mr President, ... the purpose of my Government in calling this meeting of the Security Council is to consider the threat not to South Georgia but to the Falkland Islands,.. We have evidence that the Argentine Navy is about to launch an invasion, possible as early as tomorrow morning. ...

Mr President, my Government views the present situation with the utmost seriousness. We call on the Security Council to take immediate action in order to prevent an invasion. We ask this Council to exercise its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security. We ask this Council to call upon the Government of Argentina to refrain from the threat or use of force against the Falkland Islands and to exercise restraint. I can assure the Council that my Government has conducted the recent negotiations in perfect good faith and that the British Government stands ready to continue these negotiations in the future.

What is unacceptable is an attempt to change the situation by force. ..."¹⁴²⁶

1426 UKMIS to FCO April 2, 1983. Telegram 363. See <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/parsons-to-security-council-emergency-meeting-april-1-1982.pdf>

Argentina's Ambassador Roca responds.

*“The representative of Argentina stated that his country had once again been the object of aggression perpetrated by the Government of the United Kingdom by the dispatch of vessels to its national waters in order to exercise force against workers who, with the full knowledge of the United Kingdom authorities, had been engaged in peaceful commercial activities on San Pedro Island, in the South Georgia group of islands, a dependency of the Malvinas Islands. That aggression constituted one more episode in the violence that had been perpetrated by Great Britain on 3 January 1833, when it had taken possession of the Malvinas Islands, seizing the Argentine authorities residing there and expelling almost all of the inhabitants. ... The speaker said that his narration showed undeniably that for nearly 150 years the Argentine Republic had been and continued to be the object of continuous acts of aggression perpetrated by the United Kingdom. It was nothing other than the maintenance of a colonial situation which had originated in an act of force, which was then followed by illegal occupation, usurpation, without the metropolitan Power having demonstrated any desire to put an end to it, despite the repeated appeals of the General Assembly. There was a serious and imminent threat by the United Kingdom to utilize force against Argentina’s islands, waters and mainland, leaving Argentina no other course than immediately to adopt the necessary measures to ensure its legitimate defence ... It was ironic and inadmissible for the Council to be convened by the United Kingdom on that day to consolidate the spoils of colonial plundering. Argentina rejected being accused when in fact what should be judged, if justice was to be served and peace preserved, was the conduct of the accuser.”*¹⁴²⁷

After consulting with the Security Council, Council President Kamanda wa Kamanda makes a statement.

“The Security Council has heard statements from the representatives of the United Kingdom and Argentina about the tension which has recently arisen between the two Governments. The Security Council has taken note of the statement issued by the Secretary-General, which reads as follows: “The Secretary-General, who has already seen the representatives of the United Kingdom and Argentina earlier today, renews his appeal for maximum restraint on both sides. He will, of course, return IO Headquarters at any time, if the situation demands it.”

The Security Council, mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, expresses its concern about the tension in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).

*The Council accordingly calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to exercise the utmost restraint at this time and, in particular, to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region and continue the search for a diplomatic solution. The Security Council will remain seized of the question”*¹⁴²⁸

*“After a brief exchange between myself and Ambassador Roca, who appeared to be taken by surprise by this development, the (SC) President read out the statement. I immediately took the floor to assure the Council that my government would be guided by the Presidential appeal and challenged Ambassador Roca to respond similarly. He remained silent.”*¹⁴²⁹

“Clearly, the members of the Junta miscalculated. ... They saw Britain's unexpected vehement response to the South Georgia incident as the first act of aggression in the conflict. From their perspective, it was Argentina,

1427 UN record. Link above.

1428 *Ibid.*

1429 Parsons 1983 p.170

not Britain, which had to choose between appeasement and demonstrating resolve. As Galtieri puts it, "Everything has to be put in the larger context of Britain pushing Argentina up against the wall". They also incorrectly gauged the extent to which the international community would sympathize with Argentina. They expected that world leaders would accept or even applaud a bloodless use of military force in the pursuit of a just end, especially since Argentina was sending troops into what many countries – including virtually all of Latin America – considered to be Argentine territory. Moreover, they believed, Argentina was carrying out the operation in pursuit of decolonization, a principle endorsed by the United Nations.... they believed that either China (because of Hong Kong) or the Soviet Union (because of its geopolitical rivalry with the United States and Britain) would veto any resolution unfavourable to Argentina. They also believed that the United States would restrain Britain and encourage Thatcher to negotiate a final diplomatic settlement because of Argentina's support for American policy in central America. ... the Junta relied specifically and heavily on the advice of Costa Mendez, an experienced diplomat who, of all senior Argentine officials, should have been able to anticipate the Western perspective and the Western response. ... Thus when Argentine commandos stormed ashore on East Falkland in the early hours of April 2, decision-makers in Buenos Aires did not consider this the first use of force to solve the sovereignty dispute, and they anticipated no further military conflict. Accordingly, there were no plans for defending the islands against a possible British response. As the Argentine military governor of the islands, General Mario Benjamin Menendez, recalls: "There was nothing in the plans about what would happen after five days. The last entry was "D+5: Menendez becomes governor.".." ¹⁴³⁰

From London, Governor Hunt is sent permission to destroy Stanley airstrip; "... if you can do so, to prevent it being used after invasion to resupply an invasion force." ¹⁴³¹

"The 1st Air Transport Group would participate with four Hercules C-130H aircraft for transporting special forces, troops, and equipment; five Fokker F-28 aircraft for transporting personnel; one IA-50 G-II aircraft for liaison tasks; and one Fokker F-27 aircraft for search and rescue." ¹⁴³²

A little before midnight, twelve men of Argentina's *Buzo Tactico* paddle away from the submarine *Santa Fe*. Their task is to check the beaches for obstacles and defences, and lay out beacons for the assault force. ¹⁴³³

Cape Pembroke lighthouse is turned off. Two hydrographers left behind by HMS *Endurance*, board the FIG vessel *Forrest* and sail out to try to give the Governor an early warning of approaching vessels using *Forrest*'s radar.

The die was cast. Argentina's military government had abandoned negotiation and chosen trial by combat. An old-fashioned notion where there could only be one winner, and that winner would, traditionally, be seen to have right on their side.

Paper 12 considers the following 74 days in some depth, but with particular emphasis on the diplomatic and political battles that framed the main fight.



Bibliography <https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/bibliography.pdf>

1430 Welch 1997

1431 *FCO 7/4490 f104 Telegram No. 50 of 2 April 1982*. A hand written note suggests that this was not received by Hunt.

1432 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023

1433 Argentina's equivalent of US Navy Seals.